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and their establishment in other parts of the world as a derivative and mostly defec-
tive process. This book challenges such Eurocentric visions by retracing the evo-
lution of modern institutions of collective decision-making in Eurasia. Breaching 
the divide between different area studies, the book provides nine case studies cov-
ering the area between the eastern edge of Asia and Eastern Europe, including the 
former Russian, Ottoman, Qing, and Japanese Empires as well as their succes-
sor states. In particular, it explores the appeals to concepts of parliamentarism, 
deliberative decision-making, and constitutionalism; historical practices related 
to parliamentarism; and political mythologies across Eurasia. It focuses on the 
historical and “reestablished” institutions of decision-making, which consciously 
hark back to indigenous traditions and adapt them to the changing circumstances 
in imperial and postimperial contexts. Thereby, the book explains how represent-
ative institutions were needed for the establishment of modernized empires or 
postimperial states but at the same time offered a connection to the past.
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Parliaments are often seen as institutions peculiar to the Euro-American world. 
In contrast, their establishment elsewhere is frequently thought of as a derivative 
and mostly defective process. Such simplistic tales of unilateral and imperfect 
transfers of knowledge have led to a suboptimal understanding of non-Western 
experiences, as well as of their contribution to the shaping of the global political 
landscape of the modern world. The present volume challenges Eurocentric visions 
by retracing the evolution of modern institutions of collective decision-making 
in Eurasia, more specifically in the Russian/Soviet, Qing/Chinese, Japanese, and 
Ottoman/Turkish cases. It argues that, over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
intellectuals and political actors across Eurasia used indigenous as well as foreign 
elements to shape their versions of parliamentary institutions for their own politi-
cal purposes. It was through the creative agency of these often understudied actors 
that representative institutions have acquired a wide range of meanings through-
out Eurasia and become a near-ubiquitous element of modern statehood.
This volume approaches two main questions: what made concepts like par-
liamentarism, deliberative decision-making, and constitutionalism so appealing 
throughout the world, and how were these ideas reflected in historical practices 
related to parliamentarism? Even in Europe, constitutions – and the representa-
tive organs instituted by these – served a multitude of sometimes seemingly con-
tradictory purposes, including those of liberalism, nationalism, militarism, and 
imperialism.1 But it is the broader Eurasian context which demonstrates that 
parliamentarization was not the result of a clear-cut teleological development 
from autocracy to participative democracy but rather of a variety of alternative 
approaches to political modernization which unfolded between and within indi-
vidual polities.
As Eurasian parliaments often wielded rather limited powers, approaches 
departing from a normative Euro-American ideal have understood them as 
façade institutions. Such an assessment was already common at the time of 
the imperial transformations of Russia and the Qing, for example, when Max 
Weber termed the 1906 Russian Duma an exercise in “sham constitutional-
ism” (Scheinkonstitutionalismus),2 and Chinese revolutionaries lambasted the 
Qing court for attempting the same as Russia had done.3 Later, the notions of 
“sham constitutionalism” and “nominal constitutionalism”4 became even more 
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prominent in the case of the socialist “rubber-stamp” parliaments, even though 
this label had been challenged already during the Cold War.5
Although legislatures and parliamentary democracy attract much scholarly 
attention, the refusal to look beyond the sham aspect and the accompanying persis-
tent focus on the Western European and North American experiences in detriment 
of the Eurasian context have made it difficult to theoretically grasp these parlia-
mentary formations. As institutions such as the State Duma (Gosudarstvennaia 
duma) and the Political Consultative Council (Zizhengyuan) were abolished when 
the Russian and Qing Empires perished, and as other parliamentary institutions 
have not developed into liberal democratic parliaments, they tend to be dismissed 
as constitutional experiments doomed to fail.6 For example, the standard interpre-
tation in Chinese scholarship for the demise of the Qing Empire is that the reforms 
of the 1900s went against the “spirit of constitutionalism” and the “tide of the 
times,” for their purpose was to maintain the imperial rule rather than to protect 
the rights of the citizens.7
In studies concerned with the transnational history of parliamentarism, 
Eurasian contexts are still frequently overlooked or treated as secondary, in par-
ticular as to their historical dimension. Even recent comparative studies in the 
conceptual and intellectual history of parliamentarism tend to remain focused 
on the European experience, treating it as a merely “European concept.”8 
Nonetheless, there has been a discernible shift in various disciplines toward 
more nuanced analyses of the roles of parliaments in the Eurasian context. Legal 
scholarship has expanded our knowledge about global constitutionalism, dem-
onstrating that contemporary constitutions fulfill important roles in authoritarian 
regimes and that the respective governments spend significant time and effort in 
crafting them.9 Political science has begun to move its focus from parties to the 
role of parliaments within the various contemporary political systems of Asia.10 
Finally, in the historical scholarship, studies on individual imperial constitutions 
and parliaments have begun to offer more nuanced analyses of the institutions on 
their own terms.11 Some studies have also probed into the transnational entan-
glements underlying the emergence of the tools of government shared by most 
contemporary states.12
It is on this historiography on Eurasian contexts that this volume builds, add-
ing a transnational and transcultural outlook that encompasses the most signifi-
cant (post)imperial polities of Eurasia. There, more than being mere instruments 
of “sham” and “nominal constitutionalism,” parliamentary institutions acquired 
and fulfilled functions and meanings which were not necessarily predominant in 
Western parliaments. In a time of emerging nationalisms across the world, they 
provided for at least a degree of popular representation and functioned as avenues 
of political mobilization in the nationalizing or newly emerging nation-states. 
They were designed not only to bring up political talents from across the people 
but also to manage imperial and postimperial diversities. Due to the multiplicity 
and versatility of their functions, parliamentary institutions were useful during 
imperial transformations just as they continued to be useful in the socialist con-
texts of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.
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Contrary to the idea of parliamentarism being a belated transplant from 
European sources, one of the elements which made modern parliamentary institu-
tions attractive was that they offered strong connections to the own past to those 
who adopted them. Although political modernization and the establishment of 
modern deliberative assemblies in Eurasia took place in contact with Western 
Europe and the United States, it also made frequent references to indigenous 
political mythologies, consciously adapting the vernacular traditions to the chang-
ing circumstances in imperial and postimperial contexts. Even if new institutions 
were not necessarily traditional in themselves, they were conceived of as hav-
ing been reestablished from old times or were at least justified with local intel-
lectual traditions. Where it has been acknowledged at all, this phenomenon has 
been belittled as a negligible device “used by elites to construct a democratic 
legacy where in fact there was none.”13 However, it should be taken seriously, as 
it reveals the substantial non-European contributions to the formation of the mod-
ern world. While one can trace the origins of the modern concepts of democracy, 
constitution, and parliament to Atlantic intellectuals, these only became universal 
in a process of a global “circulation of forms,”14 in which their application was 
synthesized with vernacular political ideas. The search for representative institu-
tions was informed by the respective local contexts, and the heterogeneous impe-
rial practices contributed to the development of vernacular political mythologies 
and vocabularies. These have become constitutive for the current global toolkit of 
political instruments.
The empires15 analyzed in this volume shared some characteristics which 
engendered different developments than those experienced in Western Europe. In 
the second half of the nineteenth century, Japan as well as the Ottoman and the 
Qing Empires had to cope with encroachment by the Western imperialist powers 
but managed to maintain their independence and escape full-scale colonization. 
After undergoing a thorough program of nation-building, Japan was the first of 
them to revert this situation and be accepted as a first-rate international power, 
thus playing a pivotal role as a global example of a non-Western path to moder-
nity. In a similar manner, the perpetual exclusion of the Russian Empire from the 
West16 and its military defeat in the Crimean War (1853–1856) raised the issue 
of modernization. Unlike Japan, the Qing, Ottoman, and Russian Empires shared 
similar imperial legacies. Despite introducing some political novelties, such as 
a constitution and a parliament in the Ottoman case or modern self-government 
and judiciary in the Russian case, they had resisted pressures to undertake more 
thorough political reforms throughout the nineteenth century, and ended up facing 
their own deep structural crises.
The existential problems faced by these empires meant that their newly formed 
parliamentary institutions were predominantly aimed at strengthening the state or 
reorganizing it from the perspective of the political elites. The justifications of con-
stitutional and parliamentary reforms often were explicitly etatist, with the state 
presented as the greater good. The modernization of legislative procedures was one 
of, and perhaps the most important of, a series of reforms pertaining to the transfor-
mation of empires by the instruments of power which were adopted from the model 
4 Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira 
of the nation-state but applied creatively to produce vernacular projects of imperial 
modernization. Among many others, these included the restructuring of the military 
and police forces, the introduction of mass education, the establishment of financial 
and banking systems, the building of crucial infrastructure, and the introduction 
of modern statistics. If the parliaments established in the wake of such reforms 
were often not democratic, this was due to the concrete political needs they were 
designed to satisfy rather than to an innate inclination toward Oriental despotism.
At the same time, the observation of a tendency toward bureaucratic parlia-
mentarism is not absolute. A closer look at the various parliamentary experiences 
of Eurasia also reveals how parliamentary institutions reflected shifting power 
relations behind the reforms. Several examples discussed in this volume evince 
the diversity and variability of Eurasian approaches to parliamentarism, such as 
the development of Japan’s contemporary parliament out of oligarchic concerns 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, the shifting status of the Ottoman 
and Turkish parliaments, and the unplanned, though not unexpected, role of the 
Qing Political Consultative Council as a catalyst for the republican revolution of 
1911–1912. Generally, the parliamentary reforms in the Ottoman, Russian, and 
Qing contexts involved the issue of representing and managing diverse interest 
groups, defined in ethnic, religious, regional, and other terms. Whereas empires 
traditionally bound together these groups by patrimonial arrangements, parlia-
mentary representation offered the chance to foster national cohesion in the era 
of constitutional inclusionary nation-states or modernized empire-states.17 In this 
sense, these Eurasian parliamentary formations could at times offer even more 
representation than the parliaments of the European colonial empires, as they 
granted political representation to dependent territories.
To address these issues, the volume sets out to trace the relevant transnational 
interactions among imperial and postimperial intellectuals, their engagement in 
global discussions, and the parliamentary practices through which parliaments 
have come into being outside the Atlantic context. It offers nine case studies cov-
ering the extreme East of Eurasia and the Eastern part of the European subcon-
tinent, including the former Russian, Qing, Ottoman, and Japanese Empires, as 
well as their successor states. Chapter 1, co-written by Ivan Sablin, Egas Moniz 
Bandeira, Jargal Badagarov, Martin Dorn, and Irina Sodnomova, traces how 
vernacular concepts and mythologies of parliamentarism were created as local 
refractions of a global process. This chapter compares the formation of new par-
liamentary institutions in the two largest land empires of Eurasia – Russia and the 
Qing – and their postimperial transformations until the 1920s. The authors chart 
the genealogies of the Russian State Duma and the Qing Political Consultative 
Council, positioning them in the vernacular conceptual contexts and the wider 
discussions about imperial and postimperial modernizations. Although the main 
point of reference during the attempted imperial modernizations was the Western 
parliament as a generalized idea, the State Duma and the Zizhengyuan were often 
explicitly distinguished from it. Thereby, the chapter shows that both organs were 
conceived of as etatist rather than popular institutions reacting to internal pres-
sures and external crises.
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Both the Russian and Qing governments’ decision to institute the respec-
tive deliberative organs were accelerated by the emergence of Japan as a new 
and vigorous international player, which managed to militarily defeat the Qing 
in 1894–1895 and Russia in 1904–1905. Japan had undergone a stunning politi-
cal transformation in the second half of the nineteenth century, which was coro-
nated by the establishment of a constitutional government and the convening of 
the Imperial Diet in 1890. In Chapter 2, Yuri Kono challenges the view that 
at the roots of Japanese parliamentarism lay transplants from Western Europe 
made in the wake of the so-called Meiji Restoration. Instead, his study takes us 
back to the last years of the Tokugawa government (bakumatsu), showing that the 
bakumatsu intellectuals grasped parliamentarism in terms of existing debates on 
the Confucian notions of hōken (commonly translated as “feudal” government) 
and gunken (government by division into districts and provinces). At the same 
time, contemporary intellectuals who were studying “Western learning” compre-
hended the new idea in the context of Montesquieu’s theory of the division of 
powers and its practice in the American continent. Thereby, Kono reconstructs the 
1860s as a pivotal momement which remained influential after the abolition of the 
domain system and the establishment of prefectures by the Meiji government in 
1871 and contributed to the formation of the peculiar features of Japan’s present-
day representative democracy.
Bruce Grover’s Chapter 3 continues Yuri Kono’s contribution into the 1880s 
and 1890s by offering a case study of the parliamentary ideas of Torio Koyata, 
a conservative Meiji-time military commander and politician. Grover explains 
that Torio aggressively promoted a constitutional parliamentarianism suited for 
Japanese culture to oppose both the rise of liberalism and the despotism of the 
ruling oligarchy. Just as bakumatsu intellectuals had stressed the importance of 
“public opinion” in governance, Torio attributed it to the ancient philosopher 
Mencius and approached liberal terms such as “liberty,” “equality,” and “natural 
law” from similar Confucian and Buddhist angles. This parliamentarian construct 
was designed to offset the rise of individualism, value-pluralism, and economic 
liberalism and protect a system of ethical cultivation under a benevolent Emperor. 
Furthermore, it had certain egalitarian consequences for perceptions of the peo-
ple’s role in politics. This discourse not only facilitated Torio’s participation in 
the public sphere but also impacted a later generation of nationalists. The example 
of Torio’s philosophy, which drew from modern reinterpretations of strains of 
thought that had been long discussed on the Japanese archipelago, again shows 
how global and local elements were adapted to construct a specifically Japanese 
understanding of parliamentarism.
In other cases, parliamentary institutions not only were derived from and justi-
fied with familiar political philosophy but also expressly sought to revive ancient 
institutions of collective decision-making in the guise of modern parliamentarism. 
In Chapter 4, Ivan Sablin and Kuzma Kukushkin explore the historiographies 
of the early modern Russian assemblies, which were later termed zemskii sobor 
(“assembly of the land”), as well as the autocratic and democratic mythologies 
connected to the concept. Whereas the current growing historiographic consensus 
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does not see the zemskii sobor as a coherent institution, nineteenth–early twen-
tieth century history writing integrated a mythologized zemskii sobor into the 
argumentations of both the opponents and the proponents of parliamentarism in 
Russia. Sablin’s and Kukushkin’s contribution reveals how constitutions and par-
liaments were often the result of governmental appropriation of such concepts for 
conservative goals. Although the autocratic approach to the zemskii sobor was 
idealistic, it became more practical at the summit of its popularity during the 
Revolution of 1905–1906/1907, when it was discussed by the government as a 
way to avoid bigger concessions. At the same time, regionalist approaches to 
Russia’s past and future became formative for the democratic mythology of the 
zemskii sobor, which persisted well into the Russian Civil War of 1918–1922.
If the foregoing examples referred to parliaments as elected representations, 
Chapter 5, by Egas Moniz Bandeira, unearths the significance of another type 
of collective decision-making institution: privy councils or councils of state as 
advisory bodies to the head of state. Whereas the Sūmitsuin – the Japanese refrac-
tion of the phenomenon – has been thought of as a historical anomaly next to the 
extinct or ceremonial privy councils of Central Europe, Moniz Bandeira shows 
that it was not. Using the cases of Japan, the Qing Empire, and the Republic of 
China, his chapter reconstructs how the idea of the head of state as a fourth – 
“neutral” or “moderating” – power within the state merged with the notion of 
the privy council as the formalized organ of said power, akin to the ministers of 
state as instruments of the executive branch and the parliament as the instrument 
of the legislative branch of government. Hence, far from being a moribund relic 
of the pre-constitutional past, such councils were a productive global element of 
constitutional architecture, which was variously adapted according to local needs 
and conditions. According to the circumstances, they provided a connection to the 
past, but also intervened substantially in the correlation of powers at the highest 
levels of state architecture. Eventually, they did not fall into disuse because of 
being useless, but because they became too closely associated with authoritarian 
politics and presidential strongmanship.
Oleksandr Polianichev’s Chapter 6 moves to an examination of how mytho-
logical underpinnings informed the implementation of parliamentary concepts in 
practice. In the aftermath of the Revolution of 1905, Cossack conservatives in the 
northwest of the Caucasus Viceroyalty of the Russian Empire, namely, the land of 
the Kuban Cossack Host, devised a rada (“council” or “assembly”) as a platform 
to assert their loyalty to the throne in Saint Petersburg. However, soon after its 
establishment, the institution turned into a representative assembly with parlia-
mentary ambitions. Celebrating local cultural distinctiveness, the rada fashioned 
itself as a “restored” ancient political practice of the Zaporozhian Cossack Host. 
Hence, the chapter is an example that parliamentary institutions often developed 
a life of their own not necessarily intended by their founders.
In Chapter 7, Ellinor Morack continues the analysis of imperial and post-
imperial parliamentary practices on the example of the lower chamber of par-
liament (Meclis-i Mebusan) in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. In her study 
comprising the two Ottoman constitutional periods (1876–1878 and 1908–1920) 
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and the first three years of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (1920–1923) 
up to the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, Morack identifies two diverg-
ing yet parallel trends which persisted throughout this time: a drive toward the 
strengthening of parliament vis-à-vis other constitutional institutions was offset 
by the prevailing of an authoritarian spirit in the guise of parliamentarism. Morack 
shows that an increase in parliamentary powers was usually followed by serious 
conflicts with the executive, which would then drastically curb the chamber’s 
de facto competences. While initially violations of the parliamentary rules of 
procedure were mostly committed by other institutions, such as the Sultan and 
the Sultanic government, the deputies’ faithfulness with the internal regulations 
decreased massively during the period of the postimperial transformation in the 
late 1910s and early 1920s. Hence, it was not only the executive which obstructed 
the parliament but sometimes the members of parliament themselves.
Whenever the competences of a parliament were curtailed, the accusation of 
sham parliamentarism lay near. After a period of an explicitly anti-parliamentary 
regime in the Soviet Union, which nevertheless included representative bodies, 
the Constitution of 1936 reintroduced a universally elected assembly vested with 
supreme authority, the Supreme Soviet. The elections were however never con-
tested, and the Communist-led bloc always won them. All decisions were made in 
the Communist Party and then unanimously ratified by the Soviet “parliament.”18 
The Supreme Soviet was not a unique institution and can be compared to the 
assemblies in the one-party regimes of Turkey and China.19 As a consensus forum, 
it was also quite similar to the assemblies in the one-party regimes of Italy and 
Germany. Furthermore, in many one-party regimes, the ruling parties had their 
own quasi-parliamentary assemblies, substituting thereby state institutions.20
But what then was the function of such assemblies? One would be tempted to 
see them as little more than theatrical façades, but Olga Velikanova’s analysis 
of the 1936 Soviet Constitution in Chapter 8 finds a much denser set of func-
tions fulfilled by the Supreme Soviet than is usually assumed. Based on extensive 
archival research, she shows that the crafters of the 1936 Constitution did not see 
it as a mere sham but that they were genuinely attached to Vladimir Il’ich Lenin’s 
vision of a future socialist state and a subsequent full-fledged democracy, includ-
ing his critique of bourgeois parliamentarism and his dreams about future forms 
of representative institutions. Placing the 1936 Constitution in a larger historical 
context, Velikanova demonstrates that the Soviet government introduced the new 
Constitution to achieve international, ideological, and political goals. What made 
the Supreme Soviet functionally a sham was the result of Iosif Vissarionovich 
Stalin’s self-deception about the successful socialist transformation of the econ-
omy and society by the mid-1930s and of the clash of such a utopian thinking with 
the Soviet reality of recurrent crises.
The last contribution (Chapter 9) by Henrike Rudolph illuminates an institu-
tion which continues to exist until the present day: the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The first session of the body, convened in 
September 1949, shortly before the formal proclamation of the People’s Republic 
of China, became a central element in its foundation myth. Basing herself on 
8 Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira 
previously neglected Chinese primary sources, Rudolph examines the meticulous 
staging of the conference preparation and demonstrates that the Communist Party 
used the conference to vie for public support from China’s minor political groups. 
It was a crucial means of uniting left-leaning intellectuals under Mao Zedong’s 
slogan of “New Democracy” while isolating potential opposition forces. At the 
same time, as the conference served as an element of continuity with the popular 
notions of the Republican past, it was – and is – subordinated to Marxist notions 
of the leadership of the proletariat, projecting an image of a government empow-
ered by consensual decision-making and popular support.
Although the existence of a representative element at the center of the political 
structure is almost universally accepted, the cases, studied in this volume, show 
that there were alternative approaches to parliamentary modernity. The parlia-
mentary institutions in one-party regimes, especially in the Soviet Union and the 
Chinese People’s Republic, emulated some elements of an imperial parliament, 
such as symbolic interest group representation (for instance, ethnic, professional, 
and gender), and integrated the diverse nationalities and social strata within one 
state, building thereby inclusionary national communities. Such institutions also 
performed as the linkage between the party authorities and the populace, fos-
tered political and ideological education and socialization, and contributed to elite 
recruitment, all of which resembled the etatist agenda of the imperial policymak-
ers.21 One-party regimes have survived and continue to evolve, at times featur-
ing direct connections to the concepts, mythologies, and practices studied in this 
volume.22 The experience of imperial and postimperial Eurasia is also crucial for 
understanding the now global phenomenon of authoritarian constitutionalism as 
not a mere deviant of its liberal counterpart, but as a phenomenon which devel-
oped in parallel to and in interaction with it, in which assemblies have a number 
of different functions beyond that of a façade, and which again postponed the end 
of history.23
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In the early twentieth century, the Russian and Qing Empires, together with 
other Eurasian polities, became part of the global constitutional transforma-
tions,1 which included the introduction of new institutions – the State Duma 
(Gosudarstvennaia duma, 1905/1906) in the former and the Political Consultative 
Council (Zizhengyuan 資政院, 1907/1910) in the latter. Some hundred years later, 
the State Duma in Russia and the Legislative Yuan (Lifayuan 立法院) in Taiwan 
were generally accepted as vernacular variations of the globalized institution of an 
elected legislature,2 that is, a parliament. At the time when the two imperial par-
liamentary bodies were introduced, their names pointed to the etatist rather than 
popular connotations of the new institutions. Furthermore, the State Duma and 
the Zizhengyuan were often explicitly distinguished from the Western parliament, 
even though the latter as a generalized notion was undoubtedly the main point of 
reference during the attempted imperial modernizations. Seeking to expand the 
current debate on the conceptual history of parliamentarism by including non-
European histories,3 this chapter charts the genealogies of the two terms – duma 
and yuan – and positions them in the discussions of parliamentarism during the 
modernizations of the Russian and Qing Empires and during the postimperial 
settlements.
The parliamentary concepts and institutions in the Eurasian empires had a dif-
ferent history from that of their Western counterparts. The attention given to for-
eign experiences with parliamentarism during the imperial modernizations and 
the explicit aim of strengthening the imperial states, which were perceived as 
lagging behind their Western or previously modernized counterparts, may be seen 
as key aspects. In the case of the Russian and Qing Empires, the successful expe-
rience of inter alia political modernization of Japan was especially important. In 
both cases, the elite understandings of parliamentarism were state-centered. Even 
though they did not necessarily prevail, like in the case of the State Duma, the 
imperial elites sought to create not an institution of dissensus, that is, a parlia-
ment in the Western sense of the word,4 but a new institution for receiving local 
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information and managing the populace, along a bureaucratic rationalizing logic. 
In the Russian Empire, the Tsarist administration feared a constituent State Duma, 
rushing with the adoption of the Fundamental Laws before the assembly’s con-
vocation. In the Qing Empire, the Zizhengyuan, itself a provisional precursor of 
a parliament, was also supposed to operate on the basis of the previously adopted 
legislation.
Another key difference between most Eurasian empires (for instance, Russian, 
Qing, and Ottoman) and Western states, which often had empires of their own, 
was the representation of dependent groups or territories in the parliamentary 
bodies of the former. In the practical implementation of parliamentary ideas 
in the Russian and Qing Empires in the early twentieth century, the non-Rus-
sian and non-Chinese constituencies were included in the State Duma and the 
Zizhengyuan. The very creation of these institutions, which were interpreted as 
imperial (pre)parliaments, undermines the idea of a unidirectional transition from 
empires to nation-states. Furthermore, some sub-imperial parliamentary institu-
tions, such as the Kuban Cossack Rada (see Oleksandr Polianichev’s Chapter 6 in 
this volume) or the planned Siberian Regional Duma, were explicitly connected 
to the projects of imperial modernization and reconfiguration, rather than its dis-
integration. Not just the imperial elites but also many oppositional intellectuals, 
coming from diverse backgrounds, often foregrounded the benefits of parliamen-
tarism for the state rather than the people, which may be seen as a manifestation 
of their state-centered imperial nationalism. Indeed, the two concepts, duma and 
yuan, also had ethno-nationalist meanings. Russian conservatives, for instance, 
attempted to reinterpret the duma as a Russian national parliament, while Sun 
Yat-sen conceptualized the Legislative Yuan as a specifically Chinese political 
institution.
The two concepts must be understood in their respective dynamics. The two 
major schools in the history of concepts – the German Begriffsgeschichte (con-
ceptual history) and the Cambridge School of intellectual history – have helped to 
distinguish between temporal and relational aspects of these dynamics. Whereas 
Reinhart Koselleck, representing the former, focused on the temporal implica-
tions and changes in meanings, Quentin Skinner of the latter stressed that contex-
tualized texts should be understood as political actions in the authors’ pursuit of 
specific objectives rather than mere reflections.5 The idea of the imperial situation, 
which can be defined as the “unstable balance in a composite society” with “con-
ditional, fluid, and situational” social boundaries and, hence, social categories, 
have helped grasp the Russian and Qing contexts as themselves being dynamic.6 
The chapter studies duma and yuan in the context of the concrete imperial 
situations and the respective conceptual histories and political mythologies, that 
is, myths and their interpretations connected to these terms. The main sources 
for the study are the writings of Russian and Chinese politicians and intellec-
tuals. Although the trajectories of the two terms were different, the conceptual 
language initially developed through the reception of Western institutions in both 
cases. In both cases, however, this reception was critical, and the ultimate use of 
vernacular (rather than directly borrowed) terms demonstrates that the adoption 
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of a seemingly global form of organizing authority7 entailed its significant trans-
formations along the logic of the Russian and Qing bureaucratic approaches to 
governance.
Concepts in the Russian imperial context
The terminology that was later used for parliamentary institutions developed on 
the territory of the future Russian Empire through reflection on both domestic 
and foreign institutions. The experience of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy proved 
especially important, but that of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania established an 
early reference point of a Western parliamentary history for the Muscovite and 
Russian elites and intellectuals.
The term duma (“council”), together with veche (“gathering” or “council”) 
and sobor (“gathering” or “assembly”), was used in early East Slavic texts dat-
ing to the twelfth century. Duma initially denoted the process of the princes of 
Rus’ taking advice from the senior members of their retinues.8 In the first half of 
the sixteenth century, the Boyar Duma (boiarskaia duma, “the council of lords”) 
developed into a key institution in Muscovy. During the infancy of Ivan IV, the 
Boyar Duma was in fact the main governing body.9 Veches, community assem-
blies, had survived until the early modern period only in Novgorod and Pskov, 
but there too they disappeared with (or soon after) the annexation of the two poli-
ties to Muscovy in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, respectively.10 
The term sobor was mainly used for ecclesiastical assemblies. Although in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there were several nonexclusively ecclesias-
tical sobors, it was only duma which functioned as a coherent institution at the 
time. Furthermore, later authors (inaccurately) used the term duma when speaking 
about the larger assemblies, which were called sobor or sovet (“council”) in the 
historical sources (see Chapter 4 by Ivan Sablin and Kuzma Kukushkin in this 
volume).
During the Oprichnina, the period of political violence in the second half of 
the sixteenth century, there were Boyar Dumas in both zemshchina (“the land”) 
and oprichnina (“the external part”) – the two parts into which Ivan IV nominally 
divided the Tsardom of Russia. Furthermore, the Tsar himself formally remained 
in charge only of oprichnina, which made the Zemskaia duma (“the Council of the 
Land”) the nominal head of zemshchina. Although its members also suffered from 
persecutions of the Oprichnina, the Zemskaia duma participated in foreign-policy 
decision-making as a consultative body. In oprichnina the duma became more 
socially diverse with the rise of the duma gentry (dumnye dvoriane), a bureau-
cratic social group, which developed in the chancellery (prikaz) system and coun-
terbalanced the boyars.11 All this made the duma strongly associated with the 
bureaucratic centralization of Muscovy.
The Grand Duchy of Muscovy, however, was not the only major state forma-
tion in the European part of the future Russian Empire. The Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania, which, according to some sources, included Rus’ and Samogitia into 
its official name, also left a prominent conceptual legacy.12 In the Grand Duchy of 
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Lithuania (by the sixteenth century) and in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth 
(1569–1795), the supreme authority belonged to the sejm (“gathering” or “assem-
bly”). In the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the General Sejm (Sejm walny) 
included the Senate (Senat) of nobility and the Ambassadorial Chamber (Izba 
poselska) of regional representatives as its two chambers, as well as the King. 
This made it a vernacular version of the “King in Parliament.” By 1573 the nobil-
ity had institutionalized the notion of an elected monarch, with the decision being 
made at an electoral sejm.13 Muscovy borrowed the concepts of sejm and rada 
(“council”), the council of lords which since the late fifteenth century limited 
the ruler’s authority, from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.14 Andrei Mikhailovich 
Kurbskii, a former courtier of Ivan IV and at the time his fierce opponent, used the 
term rada to describe the advisory council during the early years of Ivan IV’s rule 
in his book A Story of the Grand Duke of Muscovy, which he wrote in the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania.15
The Tatar polities on much of the territory of the future Russian Empire in 
the early modern period and the legacies of the Mongol Empire did not seem to 
influence the concepts pertaining to assemblies.16 Tatar institutions in Muscovite 
texts were described with Russian terms. The diplomatic documents of the 1550s, 
related to the relations with the Nogai Horde, for instance, mentioned a duma 
under the latter’s ruler. Similarly, according to a 1568 intelligence document, the 
Crimean Khan had a duma of his own.17
The Russian elites were aware of the contemporary early modern assemblies 
in Europe. The manuscripts, which were read to the Tsars and the boyars in the 
seventeenth century and were collectively known as the “News Columns” (Vesti-
Kuranty), frequently mentioned them. In 1620, Vesti-Kuranty described the 
Portuguese Cortes, the assembly of the estates, as a sejm (rendered in Russian as 
soim and seim). The word sejm was also used for an assembly in Hungary in 1622 
and for the assemblies in Lubeck and Mecklenburg in 1627. The same 1620 Vesti-
Kuranty, however, discussed another assembly in Hungary as zemskoe sobranie 
(“assembly of the land”), which meant that terminology was not standardized. 
Other manuscripts used vernacular and loan terms in different combinations. 
A 1626 letter rendered the Dutch States General as staty but called the English 
Parliament zemskaia soim (“the sejm of the land”). During the detailed discus-
sion of the conflict between the English King Charles I and the Parliament, the 
1627–1628 Vesti-Kuranty called the Parliament sejm; when translating the speech 
of George Villiers, the First Duke of Buckingham, it used both sobor and sejm 
and called the members of Parliament dumnye (“those of the duma”).18 The use of 
multiple terms when speaking about the Parliament may imply its understanding 
as a foreign institution (sejm), which had no equivalent in Russia, but at the same 
time it may point to its interpretation as a “bureaucratic” body comparable to that 
of the duma.
The world parliament (parlament) was first used in Vesti-Kuranty (in the trans-
lated correspondence of English merchants discussing the English Civil War) in 
1646 to describe the English Parliament.19 Historically, the use of the word parlia-
ment in Russian coincided with the direct relations between the Tsar’s envoy and 
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the Parliament in 1645–1646.20 The term parliament became continuously used 
for the English Parliament but was also mentioned in relation to an institution in 
France in 1649, probably the Estates General rather than a court (for which the 
word parlement had been used in France).21
The early modern centralization of the Russian administration did not eliminate 
the particularistic approaches to governance in the Tsardom’s peripheries. The 
Mongolic term khural (“assembly”), which was used in the Mongol Empire, for 
instance, returned into the Russian political language with the Buryat and Kalmyk 
Buddhists who used it for their religious ceremonies. The expansion to the Black 
Sea region contributed to the continued use of the word rada. The Zaporozhian 
Cossacks, who originally organized according to egalitarian principles, used the 
word rada, together with kolo (“circle”), for the assemblies which elected their 
leader (hetman) and made other decisions.22 The Sich Council (Sichova Rada) 
became the supreme governing body in the Zaporozhian Sich between the Russian, 
Polish–Lithuanian, and Ottoman imperial polities.23 In 1654, the Pereyaslav Rada, 
which convened on the initiative of Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, pledged the 
Cossacks’ allegiance to the Russian Tsar, but the Zaporozhian Sich remained an 
autonomous polity until the second half of the eighteenth century.24 
In the empire’s center, Peter I replaced the duma with a new advisory body, the 
Senate (Senat), in 1711. Duma, however, returned to Russian political discourse 
later the same century as part of Catherine II’s efforts to further centralize the 
state. In the process of bureaucratic standardization, Catherine II abolished some 
of the autonomous polities, such as the Kalmyk Khanate and the Zaporozhian 
Sich, in the 1770s, establishing a unified system of provinces. The 1785 Charter 
to the Towns introduced standardized urban self-government bodies, the munici-
pal dumas, which were elected by the triennial assemblies of prosperous urban 
dwellers.25
The debates on political modernization became especially prominent in the 
Russian Empire after the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783) and the 
French Revolution (1789–1799). Alexander I approved the first modern consti-
tution on the territory of the Russian Empire, in the newly annexed Kingdom of 
Poland, in 1815. The Polish Constitution established an elected legislature, the 
bicameral State Sejm, although the Russian Tsar (as the Polish King) remained 
the supreme authority.26
The proposals to establish a parliament in the empire as a whole used the 
terms duma and sejm. The bureaucrat Mikhail Mikhailovich Speranskii suggested 
establishing the legislative State Duma and further dumas at different levels of 
self-government in 1809.27 The intentions of Speranskii’s project had long been 
debated. Some viewed it as an attempt to limit autocracy, while others considered 
his State Duma a bureaucratic institution, tasked with rationalizing the autocratic 
government.28 In 1820, Nikolai Nikolaevich Novosil’tsev, the Russian official in 
charge of the Kingdom of Poland at the time, used sejm and duma interchangeably 
for the parliament which he proposed.29 
Although Speranskii’s and Novosil’tsev’s projects were rejected, the Sejm of 
the Kingdom of Poland (abolished in 1832) and the Diet of the Grand Duchy of 
18 Sablin et al. 
Finland (Finland was annexed in 1809) can be seen as proto-parliamentary institu-
tions of the Russian Empire. Furthermore, Speranskii used the term duma in his 
reform of indigenous self-government in Siberia in 1822, establishing the Steppe 
Duma as a council of clan elites for the Buryat-Mongols and other groups.30 A 
system of local self-government, which was reminiscent of that proposed by 
Speranskii, was introduced by Alexander II in 1864, but the new assemblies were 
called zemskoe (zemstvo, “local” or “rural”) sobranie (“assembly”) instead of 
duma. Soon after that, in 1870, however, municipal dumas were turned from 
executive councils into larger assemblies, which appealed to Speranskii’s project 
conceptually.31
Premodern and early modern terms informed the debates among intellectuals 
in the nineteenth century. In his The History of the Russian State (1818–1829), 
Nikolai Mikhailovich Karamzin, who was the main authority on Russian history 
in the first half of the nineteenth century, stressed that the Boyar Duma was an 
advisory body under the Tsar and became important in the centralization, and 
hence improvement, of the Russian state.32 The much more liberal historian 
Vasilii Osipovich Kliuchevskii, active in the late Russian Empire, supported such 
an interpretation of the Boyar Duma. He stressed that in the seventeenth century 
giving advice to the Tsar was not the political right of its members but their loyal 
duty.33 
Karamzin used the term zemskaia duma not for the Boyar Duma in zemshchina 
but for the multiple larger early modern assemblies, which were called sobor and 
sovet in the historical sources. Thanks to Karamzin’s use of the term, duma was 
the name for a parliament, which a number of oppositional intellectuals proposed 
or demanded over the nineteenth century. Very few, however, claimed that par-
liamentary institutions existed in Russia prior to 1905. Most of those who did saw 
veche and sobor (or zemskii sobor) but not duma as comparable to European par-
liaments, although some continued to use the term zemskaia duma when speak-
ing about sobors. Whereas liberals and socialists viewed the nonequivalence of 
Russian institutions to Western parliaments as a sign of Russia lagging behind 
Europe, Slavophiles and conservative intellectuals argued that duma and sobor 
were not and should not be equivalents of Western parliaments, foregrounding 
the supposed consensus between the Tsar and his subjects at such assemblies in 
the past and, possibly, in the future. Those who favored the establishment of a 
popular assembly, even when dismissing its equivalence to a parliament, fore-
grounded the need to improve the state machinery and, in the case of Slavophiles 
and conservatives, to establish direct communication between the Tsar and the 
people. More radical intellectuals insisted on the need for a constituent assembly 
(uchreditel’noe sobranie), sometimes calling such an institution zemskii sobor 
(see Chapter 4 by Sablin and Kukushkin in this volume).
Discussing parliamentarism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Russian intellectuals often used the term narodnoe predstavitel’stvo (“popular 
representation”) when talking about the parliament in an abstract sense. Boris 
Nikolaevich Chicherin, who arguably authored the first theoretical work on parlia-
mentarism in Russian, summarized the liberal understanding of parliamentarism 
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as a consequence of the demand for freedom, which swept the peoples of Western 
Europe after the French Revolution, implying a natural yet repeatedly challenged 
progress.34 In the early twentieth century, the term parlament was also used exten-
sively in the debates both on representative government in general and on its 
concrete forms in the Russian Empire.35 
Concepts in the Qing imperial context
Although in East Asia the use of parliamentary terminology was even more driven 
by contact and observation of foreign practices, the concepts which pertained 
to parliamentarism were also vernacularized and positioned within the histori-
cal and mythologized context of the empire. Increased contacts with European 
countries as well as the United States in the nineteenth century necessitated the 
creation of a vocabulary to describe concepts and institutions specific to those 
places.36 Chinese-language books describing the countries of the world, including 
their respective political institutions, began to mushroom from the 1830s. The 
most well-known of these works, Wei Yuan’s 魏源 Illustrated Treatise on the 
Countries of the Seas (Haiguo tuzhi 海國圖志), first published in 1843 in the 
wake of the First Opium War (1839–1842) between the Qing and British Empires, 
compiled excerpts from a large number of other works and was seminal for the 
formation of the mental world map of Chinese intellectuals in the middle of the 
nineteenth century.
The encyclopedia showed two possible strategies of coping with the chal-
lenge of explaining parliamentary institutions to a Chinese readership. On the one 
hand, it quoted extensively from the US American missionary Elijah Coleman 
Bridgman’s 1838 Sketch of the United States of America (Meilige Heshengguo 
zhilüe 美理哥合省國志略), which translated the US American House of 
Representatives as “Elected Department for Deliberation” (xuanyichu 選議處),37 
and the Senate as “Chamber for Deliberation of Matters” (yishige 議事閣). On the 
other hand, the Haiguo tuzhi is also well-known for its treatment of the English 
Parliament under the phonetic transcription Baliman 巴厘滿.38 As a matter of 
fact, the encyclopedia employed a whole set of transcriptions for the parliamen-
tary institutions of the United Kingdom, United States, and France: Ganwen 
Haosi 甘文好司 (“House of Commons”); Lü Haosi 律好司 (“House of Lords”); 
Gun‘elishi 袞額裏士 (“Congress”); Libolixian Haosi 裏勃裏先好司 (“House 
of Representatives”); Xiye 西業 (“Senate”); Zhanma’afu 占馬阿富 (“Chambre” 
[des députés]).39
Whether mid-nineteenth-century East Asian intellectuals used newly coined 
words or phonetically transcribed the English- and French-language terms, their 
renditions mostly appealed to preexisting East Asian notions of governance, as 
these institutions got rendered as bureaucratic institutions. In the case of transcrip-
tions, the Haiguo tuzhi and others specified the meaning of the unheard-of term by 
adding the general Chinese word for an administrative office. The “Parliament,” 
thus was actually a “Parliamentary office” (Baliman yamen 巴厘滿衙門),40 and 
the Congress was the “Congress office” (Gun’elishi yamen 袞額裏士衙門).41 The 
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Haiguo tuzhi also offered the clearest example of this understanding of parlia-
ments as bureaucratic organs in its description of the French parliament: “For 
administrative matters, [France] established one Chambre office with 430 offi-
cials staffed by every district, just like in the example of the English House of 
Commons.” 42
In the more frequent case of new coinages such as “chamber for deliberation 
of matters,” Chinese – as well as Japanese43 – writers mostly attached suffixes 
which referred to types of buildings and, by extension, to bureaucratic offices in 
the Chinese and Japanese government systems. The by far prevailing suffix, yuan 
院, originally denoted a courtyard, and later became “a common final element in 
agency names, impossible to render consistently in English: Office, Bureau, Court, 
Academy, Institute, etc.”44 From the late nineteenth century, it not only came to be 
employed as the general term to denote parliaments (yiyuan/Jap. giin 議院 – “court 
of deliberation”) and as a suffix in the name of various parliamentary institutions 
such as the late Qing “Political Consultative Council” (Zizhengyuan 資政院) and 
the legislative branch (“Legislative Yuan”) of the Republic of China (Lifayuan 
立法院). Actually, it came to be the suffix for all branches of government of 
the Republic of China. Although using certain signifiers in a translation does not 
necessarily pre-define how the understanding of a term evolves later, Kuei Hung-
chen 桂宏誠 rightly points out that the understanding of parliamentarism as seen 
in the first texts about foreign parliaments set the basis for a bureaucratic under-
standing of parliaments which prevailed throughout the Qing Empire.45
Yet, there is also another, less bureaucratic and more national-stately46 notion 
which gained general currency: that of an assembly (hui 會). Throughout Imperial 
China, a deliberative assembly (huiyi 會議) of court officials used to be convened 
in order to deliberate about policies and make recommendations to the Emperor, 
and the term hui 會 was also used as equivalent for the Mongol khural.47 In its 
modern parliamentary sense, it reappeared in 1837 and 1838 in Karl Friedrich 
August Gützlaff’s Eastern Western Monthly Magazine (Dong-xi-yang kao meiyue 
tongji zhuan 東西洋考每月統紀傳), which referred to the English Parliament 
as the “public assembly for the administration of the state” (guozheng gonghui 
國政公會), the “public assembly of the state” (guojia gonghui 國家公會 and 
guogonghui 國公會), or simply the “state assembly” (guohui 國會).48 This last 
form stuck. In the literature it was used, for instance, in the seminal 1864 Chinese 
translation of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law.49 Later, it became 
the name of the Japanese Imperial Diet (jap. pronunciation kokkai), the National 
Assembly of the Republic of China, and eventually the National Assembly of the 
Republic of Korea (kor. kukhoe).
Whereas works such as the Haiguo tuzhi or Karl Gützlaff’s magazine merely 
described foreign parliaments and other foreign political concepts, sooner or later 
East Asian intellectuals were bound to discuss them in light of their own politi-
cal realities. In Japan, intellectuals were vigorously debating possible reforms to 
the Tokugawa-led bakumatsu government even before the “Meiji Restoration” 
of 1868 (see Yuri Kono’s Chapter 2 in this volume). In China, it took less than a 
decade until, in the mid-1870s, the first intellectuals began to discuss not only the 
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adoption of European technology, but also the adaptation of Western statecraft as 
a means to counter the country’s political and economic decline and to strengthen 
it against external threats. 
Indeed, parliamentarism was the first such concept to be seriously discussed 
for the Qing Empire, nearly two decades earlier than the closely related “consti-
tutionalism.”50 From the beginning, this happened with reference to Japan. For 
example, an editorial of the Shanghai newspaper Shenbao 申報 published on June 
17, 1874, can be taken as indicative of the public debates on parliamentarism that 
would be held in the last decades of the Qing. According to the paper, parliaments 
facilitated the communication between “high” (shang 上) and “low” (xia 下). 
Yet, they needed well-informed representatives who could “be above the peo-
ple” (ju min shang 居民上), something which was lacking in the Qing Empire. If 
the development of parliamentary institutions in Europe and America had been 
gradual, the paper implied, it needed to be even more so in the Qing Empire.51
The newspaper-led debate of the 1870s was gradually taken up by men-of-let-
ters.52 The tropes set in the Shenbao in the 1870s continued to pervade in discourse, 
but given such events as the Sino–French War of 1884–1885, an increasing num-
ber of intellectuals began to downplay the aspect of gradualism and instead main-
tained that the Qing Empire needed a parliamentary institution not in some distant 
future after gradual preparation, but here and now. As the proposal for such an 
institution had to be justified in light of the ruling ideology, they argued that, from 
ancient times, it had been a Confucian ideal that officials be well-informed about 
the concerns of the populace. Zhang Zimu 張自牧, for example, argued in 1884 
that parliaments were a source of the political strength of a nation and that the 
“West preserved the idea from [Chinese] antiquity” whereby the concerns of the 
people were brought to the attention of the officialdom.53 
One of the contributors to the Shenbao, Zheng Guanying, began to publish 
his book Easy Words (Yiyan 易言) in 1871, wherein he painted the international 
scene of the time as a re-edition of the ancient Chinese Warring States period 
(475–221 BC). In the subsequent editions of the book as well as in the successor 
book Words of Warning in Prosperous Times (Shengshi weiyan 盛世危言), first 
published in 1894, Zheng developed his position that the Qing Empire should 
adopt modern instruments of statehood in order to survive in a Warring States 
like cut-throat competition, with parliamentarism being one of the main elements 
in strengthening the Qing Empire’s competitiveness. Zheng devoted a section of 
his book to the bicameral parliamentary system found in the “Western countries,” 
which, he argued, ensured concord between government and the people, as well 
as the quality of political measures. 54
For long-standing political traditions to be radically changed in a short period 
of time, references to foreign examples alone did not suffice to make arguments 
in favor of – or against – reforms. Rather, until the fall of the empire, the notion 
of parliamentarism was also analyzed in view of one’s own tradition. This was 
even more important in a culture which valued its own classics and ancestors 
as much as China. Scholarship has pointed out that the recourse to the vener-
able classics was used to legitimize modern phenomena from railroads to political 
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institutions.55 But this was not the only use: as was pointed out at the time, the con-
nection between the classics and modern phenomena was also made to protect the 
classics at a time when their authority stood under heavy attack.56 Furthermore, it 
should also not be forgotten that the classics were also used in conservative argu-
ments against new institutions.57
Zheng Guanying had no unified approach to possible ancient Chinese equiva-
lents of parliamentarism. In his chapter on parliaments, he raised the question 
whether parliamentarians would not be the same as the Court Gentlemen of 
Consultations (yilang 議郞), who had existed in the Han state (206 BC–AD 220), 
or the same as the censors and remonstrators of later periods, but denied the ques-
tion and argued that the parliament was a different institution which would avoid 
China’s traditional vices.58 Yet, in the revised 1895 edition of his book, Zheng 
added a chapter in which he made a reference to a Han-time practice of “local 
selection,” of which the actual historical meaning is obscure. Zheng placed strong 
emphasis on the point that it was imperative to revive this institution, framing his 
chapter with references to it at the beginning and at the end.59 At any rate, Zheng’s 
views about possible Chinese parliamentary precedents did not affect his opinion 
about why the introduction of a parliament was imperative and which he had laid 
down in his parliamentary chapter. It is representative of a large portion of late 
Qing arguments in favor of a parliament:
Hence, if we want to implement public international law, nothing is more 
important than strengthening the country’s clout; if we want to strengthen 
the country’s clout, nothing is more important than conquering the people’s 
hearts; if we want to conquer the people’s hearts, nothing is more important 
than letting the concerns of the lower [part of society] flow; if we want to let 
the concerns of the lower [part of society] flow, nothing is more important 
than establishing a parliament.60
Imperial modernizations
Like elsewhere in the nineteenth and twentieth century, parliamentarism and con-
stitutionalism were frequently discussed in Eurasia in the context of political mod-
ernization. The Japanese and the Ottoman Empires (see Ellinor Morack’s Chapter 
7 in this volume) introduced constitutions and parliaments in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. Although in the latter constitutionalism was suspended, 
the success of political modernization of Japan, which supposedly led to its mili-
tary prowess and turned it into a colonial power, affected the Qing and Russian 
Empires directly – in the Sino–Japanese (1894–1895) and the Russo–Japanese 
(1904–1905) Wars – and contributed to the discussions of political reforms in the 
Qing Empire and a revolution in the Russian Empire.
Until the end of the nineteenth century, the debates on parliamentarism in the 
Qing Empire stayed within intellectual circles. Although memorials referring to 
the establishment were presented to the throne, the government did not take up 
the topic, and it was not even included in the abortive Hundred Days’ Reform 
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promulgated in the summer of 1898. The negative evaluation is shown by the 
diary of Li Jiaju 李家駒, an official who was accompanying the Qing minister 
to Tokyo in order to study the Japanese education system, and who later would 
become one of the main figures of the constitutional reforms. In 1899, however, 
the balance of the Meiji reforms contained in his diary still emphasized the con-
vening of a parliament as one of its main drawbacks, as opposed to the moderniza-
tion of the military and the revitalization of the education system.61
In Russia, the so-called zemstvo constitutionalists and other liberal groups of 
nobility and intellectuals reinvigorated the discussions of introducing a parliament 
in the 1890s. After the demise of the conservative Alexander III, his son, Nicholas 
II, was asked to convene a parliament in 1895. Nicholas II, however, rejected the 
idea, pledging to defend autocracy. As noted by an oppositional politician several 
years later, that very same year the fatal decision of expanding to East Asia was 
made as if to counterbalance the dreams of liberalizing the empire.62 
Ten years later, however, in the wake of the disastrous war with Japan and 
the Revolution of 1905–1907, Nicholas II conceded. Although Nicholas II was 
inclined to support an irregular consultative zemskii sobor, the governmental 
commission, which was created on the initiative of Minister of Internal Affairs 
Aleksandr Grigor’evich Bulygin in 1905, suggested a permanent assembly. 
Sergei Efimovich Kryzhanovskii of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was the main 
advocate of introducing the Duma.63 Its name, the State Duma, was taken up from 
Speranskii’s project, which was referenced directly during the official discussions 
of the new institution at the closed Peterhof Conference chaired by the Tsar. Some 
participants of the conference once again deemed the gathering of local informa-
tion and the communication between the Tsar and his subjects the main objec-
tive of the Duma. The historian Kliuchevskii, one of the few liberal voices at the 
Peterhof Conference, located the Duma in the history of popular representation 
in Russia, which he traced to the zemskii sobors, and stressed the need to base 
legislation on the will of the majority of the people, hence attempting to define the 
Duma as a parliament. Although most of the ruling elite did not see the Duma as a 
parliament and rejected the very idea of limiting autocracy, Nicholas II’s attempt 
to “de-modernize” the proposed institution by calling it a Gosudareva (“of the 
autocrat”) rather than Gosudarstvennaia (“of the state”) duma was shut down at 
the Peterhof Conference.64
Although initially it was designed as a consultative body, the establishment 
of the legislative State Duma (on October 17, 1905, in the so-called October 
Manifesto) and the adoption of the new Fundamental State Laws of the Russian 
Empire (on April 23, 1906) seemed to make Russia a constitutional state. In 1907, 
Vladimir Matveevich Gessen and Boris Emmanuilovich Nol’de, two prominent 
liberal legal scholars, listed Russia, together with Persia and Montenegro, as a 
new constitutional state in their comprehensive collection of contemporary con-
stitutions. Articulating a popular progressive view, they claimed that the failures 
of the Russo–Japanese War unmasked the inefficiency of bureaucratic autocracy, 
spreading the critical attitudes to the ancien régime beyond intellectual circles and 
transforming them into a broad liberation movement across the whole country.65
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Indeed, before and especially during the Revolution of 1905–1907, the ineffi-
ciency of the Russian state played a key role in the broader debates on democracy, 
which contrasted the public and the bureaucracy. The liberal program included 
not only parliamentarization but also decentralization of the empire, with the 
introduction of zemstvo and municipal self-government on the basis of universal 
suffrage. As argued by Gessen, since bureaucracy lacked information on particu-
lar affairs, it could not govern them effectively and needed to be substituted by 
local and professional self-organization.66 The same logic applied to the parlia-
ment. Articulating a widespread opinion, the Tomsk liberal newspaper Sibirskaia 
zhizn’ celebrated the October Manifesto as the liberation of the people from “the 
tutelage of bureaucracy.” According to the newspaper, the Russian Empire had 
become a constitutional state and “joined the family of modern civilized states 
as an equal,” and in such a state the population had supreme authority. At the 
same time, Sibirskaia zhizn’ voiced a popular liberal argument in favor of gradual 
political change.67 
Few contemporary observers, however, viewed the Duma (1906–1917) as a 
parliament equal to its Western counterparts. It occupied a subordinate position 
to the State Council, which was reformed from a bureaucratic advisory council 
into a partly appointed upper chamber (for a similar conservative take on parlia-
mentarism, see Bruce Grover’s Chapter 3 in this volume), and did not control the 
cabinet, which contributed to the term “sham constitutionalism” being applied to 
the new Russian regime.68 The non-universal, indirect, and unequal elections were 
further limited with the dissolution of the Second Duma on June 3, 1907. Nol’de 
nevertheless stressed that the Russian Empire could be called a constitutional state 
and deemed the State Duma the first normally functioning parliament in Russia, 
implying the country’s connection to Western constitutional modernity.69 
Liberal intellectuals made gradualist arguments about the situation. Sergei 
Andreevich Kotliarevskii, a historian, legal scholar, and one of the founding mem-
bers of the liberal Constitutional Democratic (KD) Party, favored “democratic 
parliamentarism,” but the notion of political evolution and Russia’s inferiority 
compared to the West helped him justify the existence of the “Prussian regime” 
of a non-answerable cabinet as a transitional stage. Despite his skepticism of the 
Duma’s “parliamentarism,” he urged Russia’s progressives to set parliamentarism 
(rather than radical republicanism) as their ultimate goal.70 In practical terms this 
translated into the KD program of constitutional monarchy featuring a potent uni-
versally elected “popular representation.”71 
Even after the Duma was made legislative, conservative opponents of parlia-
mentarism remained vocal. Vasilii Vasil’evich Rozanov, a conservative philoso-
pher, refused to admit that a “constitution” and a “parliament” were introduced 
in Russia, maintaining that the Duma was a product of Russian history, produced 
by the Russian soul, enthusiasm, patience, and work, and not a “foreign nov-
elty.” Although Rozanov acknowledged that the Russian people also moved to 
liberation like elsewhere, this movement was parallel to those of the others. For 
Rozanov, however, it did not have the same direction. For him, the Duma did 
not mimic Western institutions and was not a place for representing difference. 
 Duma, yuan, and beyond 25
Rozanov called for the unity of Russia’s political groups there, which would miti-
gate the splits in the Russian society.72
Although it did not become a potent parliament, the State Duma proved to be a 
key site of imperial nation-making, both in the sense of imagining the larger inclu-
sionary political community of the empire and the smaller communities (based on 
ethnicity, religion, region, social estate, and class) in the composite space of the 
empire.73 As argued by Alexander Semyonov, the State Duma was a microcosm 
of empire not because it ostensibly represented the national or ethno-confessional 
distinctions but because the parliament itself was based on uneven or multidi-
mensional heterogeneity. The elections, albeit restrictive and representative of 
just a fraction of the overall population, were based on several principles, which 
alternately referenced territorial, social estate, ethno-national, and confessional 
markers or combinations of them. This owed to the differentiating and individuat-
ing approach of the government to imperial space. In the Duma itself it resulted 
in the articulation of multiple and overlapping categories, with some having been 
politicized before and with others being operationalized only in the imperial par-
liament. There were multiple caucuses (with overlapping memberships) based on 
ethnicity (for instance, Poles), religion (Muslims), social estate (Cossacks), and 
region (Siberians) in addition to the party factions. There was also a caucus of 
Autonomists which united nationalist and regionalist advocates of decentraliza-
tion.74 A popular print of the First Duma accentuated the diversity of the deputies 
by placing Muslim and peasant deputies at the foreground of the composition (see 
Figure 1.1).
Despite their criticism of the Duma, liberal and moderate socialist and nation-
alist thinkers generally supported parliamentarism. The KDs included parlia-
mentarism, as the answerability of the cabinet to the parliament’s majority, into 
their program in 1905. The other two largest oppositional parties – the Party of 
Socialists Revolutionaries (SR) and the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party 
(SD) – supported the slogan of democratic republic. The SRs also included 
the slogan of revolutionary dictatorship of proletariat, if it became necessary, 
into their draft program in 1905 but ultimately dropped it in favor of demo-
cratic republic ruled by the people through their elected representatives and 
referendum.75
Left and right radicals, by contrast, questioned the very necessity of a parlia-
ment. The former rejected parliaments as part of class exploitation and oppressive 
state machinery and called for direct rule of the toilers to represent an alterna-
tive democratic modernity. The prominent anarchist writer Petr Alekseevich 
Kropotkin rejected the idea of dividing the struggle into two steps – a political 
coup and economic reforms ostensibly to be implemented by a Russian parlia-
ment. For him, the struggle against autocracy and capital was to be simultane-
ous, and any parliament was a deal between the parties of the past and those 
of the future and hence would never introduce revolutionary measures. Arguing 
that Russia was unique and opposing parliamentary gradualism, Kropotkin main-
tained that the Russian people had a historic chance to take the power into their 
own hands and surpass the stages which the West went through.76
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For the far right, the threat to the “greatness” of the state was intertwined with the 
supposed threats to the ethnic Russians. Rozanov’s aspiration for unity in the State 
Duma was shattered by the oppositional majorities of the first two Dumas, which 
triggered their dissolution. Anticipating the convocation of the Third Duma, based 
on the limited electoral law, Rozanov expected the new Duma to finally become 
one of the “state” and not one of the “society,” rejecting thereby the liberal notion 
of societal self-organization. Rozanov expressed hope that the Duma would be a 
“national Russian” representation and personally attacked the SD deputies from the 
Caucasus. What progressives and non-Russian nationalists saw as the non-Russians 
finally gaining a voice through the Duma, for Rozanov was a clear indication that 
the Russian state and the ethnic Russians (who in practice made up some 44.3 per-
cent of the imperial population in terms of language but legally also included the 
17.8 percent speaking Ukrainian and 4.7 percent speaking Belarusian, becoming 
thereby a majority)77 could become marginalized, as he claimed that the “grey-
haired old Rus’,” embodied by the people of “serious positions and professions,” 
had to listen to the “nonsense” of the deputies from the Caucasus.78 Some right 
radicals even saw the roots of Russian parliamentarism in a Jewish conspiracy.79
Figure 1.1  Zasedanie pervoi Gosudarstvennoi dumy [The session of the First State Duma]. 
Moscow: Lit. T-va I. D. Sytina, [1906]. The text at the top reads “State Duma. 
(Tauride Palace).” The text at the top right corner reads “Chairman of the State 
Duma S. A. Muromtsev.” 
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Whereas the defeat against Japan in 1895 did not seem to boost government 
interest in parliamentarism in the Qing Empire, subsequent events did. The Boxer 
War of 1900–1901 and the Russo–Japanese War led the Qing government to 
agree to political reforms. The aforementioned Li Jiaju thoroughly changed his 
opinion on this matter, coming to act first as the Qing constitutional commissioner 
to Japan in 1908, and eventually as one of the Imperially appointed drafters of 
the final constitution in 1911. However, subscribing to a gradualist policy, the 
government maintained that a full bicameral parliament (yiyuan) could only be 
convened after a thorough reform of the state, as delegates were not expected to 
legislate from scratch, but instead to deliberate policy matters on the basis of an 
already existent body of laws.80 The gradualist approach was not only the one 
recommended by a large part of foreign observers, but it was also reinforced by 
the Qing government’s perception of Russia, where the speedy adoption of a con-
stitution and the convening of the First Duma in 1906 did not do much to mitigate 
the crisis through which the country was going.81
Following this principle, the government promised in 1906 to study the adop-
tion of constitutional government and foresaw the creation of a proto-parliamen-
tary body, the Political Consultative Council (Zizhengyuan 資政院), as a place to 
“broadly collect public speech” (bocai qunyan 博采羣言).82 In the following years, 
the government followed through, setting up the Zizhengyuan as well as delib-
erative assemblies at lower administrative levels, called “offices for consultation 
and deliberation” (ziyiju 諮議局) at provincial level and “deliberative assemblies” 
(yishihui 議事會) at lower levels. As the official documents issued by the govern-
ment at the time made clear, the lower provincial assemblies should be a basis for 
the Political Consultative Council, serving as a talent pool for it (wei Zizhengyuan 
chucai zhi jie 爲資政院儲材之階) and as gathering points of public opinion (caiqu 
yulun zhi suo 採取輿論之所).83 These local assemblies were not to be treated as 
national parliaments, but were confined to a consultative role.84 They were, how-
ever, parliamentary “forerunners” (xiansheng 先聲)85 which should be transformed 
into provincial legislative organs after the convening of the National Assembly.86 
For the government, such parliamentary assemblies were thus mainly meant 
as consultative bodies that should bring the concerns of the people to the govern-
ment. Equally, it was hoped that they would foster national cohesion by bringing 
those governing and those governed closer together. This was true even for vast 
parts of the empire which were deemed unfit to participate in the new system, 
that is, the large non-Han regions of Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. The new 
parliamentary system presupposed “the existence of a pool of educated Han gen-
try outside the bureaucracy – a milieu conspicuously lacking” there.87 Hence, no 
provincial assemblies were established in Mongolia and Tibet, and the one for 
Xinjiang never assembled. Yet, by giving elites of these regions, particularly from 
Mongolia, special group representation by Imperial appointment to the Political 
Consultative Council, the Qing tried to parliamentarize their traditional method of 
creating loyalty by conferring aristocratic privileges.88
The government’s slow approach to parliamentarism met with increasing 
impatience on the part of a public which, to a large extent, although by far not 
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exclusively, had come to see constitutionalism as a panacea for the Qing Empire’s 
ills, and called for a much faster pace of reforms. A large number of people 
signed petitions calling for the “speedy convening of a parliament” (su kai guo-
hui 速開國會), including Li Jiaju himself. But even the mere “right to express 
proposals” (jianyan zhi quan 建言之權)89 had a tremendous impact on late Qing 
politics. As the provincial assemblies were allowed to memorialize to the Political 
Consultative Council, they had a communication channel to the Emperor and were 
less dependent on the governor.90 When the provincial assemblies were convened 
in 1909 and the Political Consultative Council in 1910, the local elites represented 
in them made extensive use of their “right to speak.” Using the assemblies as 
platforms, they severely pressured the court, which became one of the immediate 
causes of its demise in 1911/1912.91
Postimperial settlements
The logic and contradictions of imperial parliamentarism persisted during the post-
imperial settlements. On the one hand, there were attempts to constitute inclusion-
ary Russian and Chinese postimperial civic nations, which would include not only 
the titular groups but also other groups of the former empire. Both the projected 
Russian federative republic and the Chinese Republic of “Five Races under One 
Union” were to have inclusionary parliaments. At the same time, the discussions 
of parliamentarism also continued as part of particularistic, exclusionary national 
projects, and the use of vernacular terminology very much reflected that.
The events at the turn of 1911 to 1912 – that is the Xinhai Revolution and the 
replacement of the Qing Empire by the Republic of China – meant an at least 
nominal transition from monarchical to popular sovereignty. Prima vista, the 
founding constitutional texts of the Republic of China seem to reveal this momen-
tous shift of focus. While Article 1 of the Imperial Outline of a Constitution, 
adapted from the Japanese Constitution of 1889, had declared that the Empire was 
to be governed by the Emperor in “one dynastic line for ages eternal.”92 Article 2 
of the Republic’s first Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March 11, 1912, 
declared that “the sovereignty of the Republic of China is vested in the entirety 
of the nation.”93
The establishment of the republic was accompanied by a rough exercise in a 
more democratic form of government. In theory, the political structure laid down 
in the Provisional Constitution as well as in the Law on the Organization of the 
National Assembly of August 10, 1912, conferred a paramount importance to the 
bicameral National Assembly (Guomin yihui 國民議會, short Guohui 國會): next 
to its attribution of passing legislation, it was also entrusted with drafting a perma-
nent constitution for the Republic, and furthermore it elected the President of the 
Republic and the Prime Minister as the head of the Cabinet.94 
The election to the National Assembly at the turn of 1912–1913 was not only 
the first one to be ever held in China at a national level, but also drew from a mas-
sively enlargened basis of voters of more than 40 million people.95 Whereas suf-
frage for the 1909 provincial elections had stood at 0.39 percent of the population,96 
 Duma, yuan, and beyond 29
it had increased to more than 10 percent of China’s population of roughly 400 
million inhabitants in 1912. Next to letting much broader sections of society par-
ticipate in the political process, it also continued and deepened the shy attempts of 
the Qing Empire at parliamentarization of the imperial situation. While the Qing 
had merely integrated the vast non-Han regions of the Empire into the upcoming 
parliamentary system via upper-house indication, the Republic insisted on having 
these regions represented in the lower house as well.
However, at the same time, these elements of democratization and increased 
participation of the masses in politics, as well as of greater national integration, 
also had clear limits both in the political realities and in the intellectual debates 
of the time. As to the integration of the non-Han regions into the new National 
Assembly, the 1912–1913 elections faced numerous difficulties and delays in 
Xinjiang97 and could not be carried out in Tibet and Outer Mongolia, which had 
separated themselves from the Republic of China. Tibetan and Outer Mongolian 
seats were filled from loyal Mongol and Tibetan communities in Beijing. Combined 
with the fact that the sparse population of these regions required overproportional 
delegate quotas, this led to the perception that the Republic was actually granting 
ethnic, not territorial, representation to Tibetans and Mongols, and to correspond-
ing frictions with the officially sanctioned ideology of ethnic equality.98
The parliamentarization of the Chinese post-empire was celebrated by Russian 
socialists as a marker of global progress, even though they viewed parliamenta-
rism not as a goal but merely as a means of achieving socialism. Commenting on 
the Xinhai Revolution and the developments in the Republic of China in 1912, 
Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, celebrated the awakening of the “four hundred million 
backward Asians” to political life and stressed the importance of the convocation 
of the Chinese parliament – “the first parliament in a former despotic country.”99 
Returning to the issue in 1913, Lenin called the Chinese parliament “the first par-
liament of a great Asian country” and praised Sun Yat-sen’s 孫逸仙 Guomindang 
for bringing the broad masses of Chinese peasants into politics, which he described 
as “a great factor of progress of Asia and progress of humanity.”100
In the chaotic struggles of the early Republic, the elected National Assembly 
did not last for long. By November 1913, President Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 effectively 
replaced the National Assembly with two other assemblies – a “Political Assembly” 
(Zhengzhi huiyi 政治會議, see Figure 1.2) and a “Constituent Assembly” (Yuefa 
huiyi 約法會議, see Figure 1.3). In 1914, Yuan officially disbanded the National 
Assembly and had another provisional constitution approved.101 This Constitution, 
which provided for an extraordinarily strong position of the President, foresaw 
the establishment of a bicameral national assembly – styled “Legislative Yuan” 
(Lifayuan 立法院) – and of a presidential Privy Council (Canzhengyuan 參政院; 
see Egas Moniz Bandeira’s Chapter 5 in this volume). Proposed by the Japanese 
constitutional advisor Ariga Nagao 有賀長雄 as the equivalent to the Japanese 
Privy Council (Sūmitsuin 樞密院), only the latter institution convened at the time. 
Consisting of 50–70 delegates personally selected by Yuan, it was immediately 
decried as an instrument of Yuan’s monarchic ambitions and megalomany. While 
these accusations are not false, they do not depict the whole story, for Yuan’s 
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constitutional design conformed to the recommendations given to him by advisors 
such as Ariga Nagao and Frank Johnson Goodnow. Hence, these institutions also 
reflected a current of contemporary constitutional scholarship which accorded a 
powerful position to the head of the executive, regardless of whether he be an 
emperor or a president.102
Yuan’s Canzhengyuan was disbanded after his death in 1916, while the origi-
nal National Assembly convened again. A new National Assembly, elected in 
1918,103 functioned comparatively smoothly for two years before it was disbanded 
again. By that time, the Beijing government had already lost control over much 
of the country and China was experiencing the beginning of a decade full of civil 
war and warlordism.104 The Beijing government’s parliament, while strong in 
theory, was subject to maneuverings by political strongmen. The old National 
Assembly was convened again, but its widespread corruption contributed to the 
disillusionment with parliamentarism and constitutional politics as such.105 When 
the Guomindang troops conquered Beijing in June 1928, effectively ending the 
Warlord Era, “China’s experiment with parliamentary politics was over.”106 
The parliamentarization of the Russian postimperial space followed a some-
what similar trajectory of initial success and quick demise. It was the Duma which 
Figure 1.2  Zhengzhi huiyi quanti sheying [Group photo of the Political Assembly]. 
Dongfang zazhi 東方雜誌 11, no. 2 (Minguo 3 [1914]).
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formed the Provisional Government during the Revolution of 1917, while a uni-
versally elected omnipotent parliament – the All-Russian Constituent Assembly 
– was supposed to resolve the Russian imperial crisis, which inter alia manifested 
in the disastrous First World War (1914–1918). At the same time, parallel to the 
institutions of the Provisional Government and the new zemstvo and municipal 
authorities, which were reformed on the basis of universal suffrage, the soviets 
(“councils”) reemerged (after their brief appearance in the Revolution of 1905–
1907) as the bodies of class self-government. Although this situation was fre-
quently interpreted as “dual power,” some socialists and liberals in fact viewed 
the soviets as “legislative chambers of deputies” and the Petrograd Soviet as “a 
surrogate people’s duma,” which replaced the State Council in a two-house par-
liament of new Russia.107
The ideas of gradualism and what can be called “parliamentary tutelage,” 
however, were still articulated by some Russian liberals. In his pre-revolutionary 
work, which was published and discussed in 1917, Gessen rejected the notion of 
popular sovereignty. For him, the people were the source of legislative author-
ity in a representative republic but were not seen as capable of exercising it due 
to the lack of a deliberate unity of wills. Legislative authority was exercised by 
the parliament on behalf of the people and in its interests, but the election of 
deputies was not a delegation of legislative competence, since the people did not 
Figure 1.3  Yuefa huiyi quanti sheying [Group photo of the Constituent Assembly]. 
Dongfang zazhi 東方雜誌 11, no. 2 (Minguo 3 [1914]).
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have it in the first place. A citizen was a voter and not a lawmaker who adopted 
legislation through his or her representatives. According to Gessen, the parlia-
ment received its competence from the constitution and not from the people, but 
elections were still needed for the will of the parliament to correspond to popular 
interests. Gessen concluded that popular representation implied the incapacity of 
the people. In his view, a parliament was not and could not be a cliché of the 
popular masses; it organized and created the general will, turning the anarchy of 
circulating opinions into one.108 
Moderate socialists did not share such a view on popular representation, with 
Mark Veniaminovich Vishniak, a legal scholar and a member of the SR Party, 
insisting that according to the idea of democracy (narodopravstvo), as initially 
formulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, only the people were the source of public 
opinion, that is, of the will directed at the common good. A parliament, according 
to Vishniak, was only a secondary institution articulating but not creating popular 
will,109 which very much corresponded to Georg Jellinek’s interpretation of the 
people as the primary body and the parliament as the secondary body.110
Liberals and moderate socialists hence agreed that Russia needed a parliament, 
which could be uni- or bicameral. A possible second chamber, as discussed by a 
committee under the Provisional Government, could reflect decentralization and 
include the representatives of autonomous territories and local self-government 
bodies, as well as the representatives of the most important “organized social 
and cultural forces of the country,” such as representatives of trade and industry, 
cooperatives, trade unions, and academic institutions.111 
The establishment of a Bolshevik–Left SR government, supposedly legiti-
mized by the soviets, on October 25–26, 1917, however, reflected the growing 
popularity of leftist anti-parliamentarism. The new government allowed the con-
vocation of the Constituent Assembly on January 5, 1918, but since the two radi-
cal parties did not have a majority there and did not find the assembly’s support, 
they disbanded it the very next day. With the expulsion of the Left SRs from 
the Soviet government, the Bolsheviks established a one-party autocracy. Indeed, 
they introduced a sham federation but opted for a complete and explicit oppo-
sition to parliamentarism in favor of an exclusionary class government.112 The 
Soviet non-parliamentary system, however, was formally abandoned in 1936 with 
the adoption of the new Soviet Constitution, which introduced a Soviet “parlia-
ment” – the Supreme Soviet (Verkhovnyi sovet) of two chambers113 (see Olga 
Velikanova’s Chapter 8 in this volume). 
China experienced a similar departure from Western-style parliamentarism, 
yet following a different logic. In spite of the optimistic attempts at amplifying 
suffrage in 1912, the same republicans who had attacked the Qing for installing 
sham constitutionalism and for not adopting a constitution soon enough came to 
subscribe to similar positions, that is, that a full constitution could not be adopted 
at once, but only after a sufficiently long preparatory phase. Sun Yat-sen, who had 
been the first President of the Republic in 1912 and led the so-called Constitutional 
Protection Movement against the Beijing-based Beiyang 北洋 government from 
1917, came to conceptualize such a gradualist thinking in his 1924 “Outline of 
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National Construction” (Jianguo dagang 建國大綱). Therein, he foresaw devel-
opment in three stages, from a military government (junzheng 軍政) to a govern-
ment of “tutelage for the people” (xunzheng 訓政) to, eventually, “constitutional 
government” (xianzheng 憲政).114 A popularly elected Legislative Yuan was only 
foreseen for the last phase, and thus still away from a fractured China that was still 
considered to be in the first phase of military government. Effectively, thus, the 
parliament became the coronation rather than the main agent of the nation-build-
ing process of the Chinese Republic, not unlike it had been for the Qing Empire.
According to official ideology, the unification of most of China under the 
Guomindang in 1928 marked the transition from military government to the era 
of “tutelage,” which was to be exerted by the Guomindang. The subsequent revi-
sion of the Organic Law of the National Government of October 4, 1928, adopted 
Sun’s five-branch system of government and introduced the Legislative Yuan 
together with four other yuans. The new legislative body was only one element in 
the legislative process, since the adoption of a law required the joint countersig-
nature of the presidents of all five yuans. The next revision of the Organic Law 
(November 24, 1930) elevated its status a bit by requiring only the President of 
the National Government to countersign law bills.115 However, the members of 
the Legislative Yuan continued to be unelected, being appointed instead by the 
National Government. In 1931, the Guomindang convoked a constituent assem-
bly – called People’s Convention (Guomin huiyi 國民會議). Most of its delegates 
represented the territorial subdivisions of the Republic as well as overseas com-
munities, but were elected by a number of legally registered organizations at the 
local level, giving the Guomindang the power to directly or indirectly control 
the Convention.116 The Provisional Constitution of the Political Tutelage Period, 
adopted by the People’s Convention in May 1931, consolidated the system laid 
out in the organic laws and the place of the Legislative Yuan in it. Hence, in the era 
of Guomindang-controlled “tutelage,” the party dominated both the establishment 
as well as the functioning of these institutions, and the Legislative Yuan remained 
a bureaucratic body.117 The result was a one-party regime similar to that in Soviet 
Russia and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the 1931 Provisional Constitution can 
be seen as an early constitutional formalization of a one-party regime. 
After the end of the Second World War, the Republic of China officially tran-
sitioned from “tutelage” to “constitutional” government, promulgating a new con-
stitution in 1947 and convening the first popularly elected Legislative Yuan in 
1948. Yet, China was amid a civil war which eventually forced the Guomindang-
led government to flee to Taiwan. While the victorious Communist Party estab-
lished its own one-party regime, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference – China’s main parliamentary institution from 1949 to 1954 – sought 
to integrate other political currents and to create some continuity to the Republic 
(see Henrike Rudolph’s Chapter 9 in this volume).
The postimperial settlements witnessed a number of further vernacular parlia-
mentary developments, which followed the particularistic national projects after 
the two empires. The newly established sovereign Polish and Lithuanian repub-
lics, for instance, called their parliaments sejm. Many polities, however, did not 
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succeed in retaining their autonomous or independent status. Here the examples 
of Ukrainian and Mongolian parliamentary formations were especially illustra-
tive of the use of the concepts which had been relevant for larger imperial spaces 
before in political nation-building.
Diverse Ukrainian nationalists were among several postimperial groups 
which used the concept of rada. As a national institution, it emerged in the con-
text of the Habsburg Empire during the Revolution of 1848–1849, when the 
Supreme Ruthenian Council (Holovna Rus’ka Rada) was formed.118 Mikhailo 
Hrushevs’kyi, a prominent Ukrainian historian and politician, contributed to the 
integration of the Cossack past, and hence its institutions, into a coherent narrative 
of democratic Ukraine.119 During the crisis of the Habsburg and Russian Empires, 
radas were being formed in both. On March 4, 1917, the Ukrainian Central Rada 
(Ukraїns’ka Tsentral’na Rada) was formed in Kyiv as the governing body of 
the anticipated Ukrainian autonomy in postimperial Russia. Although the body 
consisted of nominees rather than popularly elected deputies, it was occasionally 
called a parliament – and after its constitutionalization, the Ukrainian polity was 
supposed to have a universally elected one.120 The Ukrainian Central Rada, chaired 
by Hrushevs’kii, proclaimed the formation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic 
in November 1917, following the Bolshevik–Left SR coup in Petrograd and in 
anticipation if the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. When the latter was dis-
banded, the Ukrainian Central Rada declared Ukraine’s independence in January 
1918. The Ukrainian National Rada (Ukraїns’ka Natsіonal’na Rada) became the 
supreme legislative body of the self-proclaimed independent Western Ukrainian 
People’s Republic on the former Habsburg territory in October 1918.121 Radas as 
governing bodies were also formed by Kuban Cossack, Belarusian, and regional 
Ukrainian groups (for instance, in the Russian Far East).122
Mongolic-speaking politicians and intellectuals of the Russian and Qing 
Empires participated in constitutionalizing Outer Mongolia. There, the term 
khural was used for the new institutions. Following the declaration of independ-
ence in 1911, which in 1915 was internationally recognized as mere autonomy 
within the Republic of China, the Bogd Khan ordered the establishment of a 
bicameral consultative assembly – the State Khural (Ulus-un khural). The Bogd 
Khan’s decree on the establishment of the State Khural referred to the experience 
of the “powerful, rich, and cultured” states of the world, which had general assem-
blies of representatives, and stressed the need for deliberation and consideration 
of different opinions when resolving challenging and important issues.123 The fact 
that both chambers of the State Khural were appointed, while all decisions were 
to be approved by the Bogd Khan, led Pavel Dudin to conclude that the regime 
remained an absolute theocratic monarchy.124
The Buryat intellectual Tsyben Zhamtsarano participated in the debates on 
parliamentarism in Outer Mongolia. In his Ulus-un erke (“Power of the State”), 
Zhamtsarano presented a comparative study of political systems. He paid spe-
cial attention to parliaments, their structures, and elections, as well as the rela-
tions between central and local authorities in most states, dominions (such as 
Australia and New Zealand), and parts of states (such as Finland or the states of 
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the German Empire) with constitutions, probably using an available collection in 
Russian. Zhamtsarano used the word khural for parliaments. He interpreted their 
emergence from a progressive standpoint, explaining that the authorities had to 
adapt to changing times and gather representatives to establish khurals “to dis-
cuss problems, benefits, interests, income and expenditure, and many other mat-
ters” of the respective countries, as well as “to make laws to foster and rule the 
people.” He continued, “Thus established, state khurals proved to be beneficial 
in many respects, therefore making the state more powerful. [People] definitely 
understood that and nowadays most of sixty big and small countries have state 
khurals.”125 
Whereas the Ukrainian radas and the first Mongolian State Khural ceased to 
exist as institutions in the 1910s, the concepts were integrated into the Soviet 
imperial formation, which extensively used non-Russian nationalisms. Even 
though the Ukrainian Central Rada was the enemy of the Soviet government in 
Ukraine, the translation of soviet into Ukrainian as rada practically appropri-
ated the term for the Bolsheviks. Indeed, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic 
(Ukrains’ka Sotsiialistychna Radians’ka Respublika), which was formed in 
1919 as a nominally independent state, became one of the USSR’s constituent 
republics in December 1922. In 1921, the Mongolian People’s Government, 
which proclaimed Mongolia’s independence with Soviet support, established the 
Provisional State Khural as a consultative body.126 Furthermore, the assembly 
which constituted the Mongolian People’s Republic after Bogd Khan’s demise 
in 1924 was called the First Great Khural. It adopted the first Constitution of 
Mongolia, establishing the Great Khural as a constitutional parliamentary body.127 
Both the radas and the khurals in the Soviet empire, however, were nominal bod-
ies, fully subordinate to the Ukrainian and Mongolian ruling parties, themselves 
accountable to the Bolshevik Party.
Conclusion
Duma and yuan emerged as signifiers of Russian and Qing/Chinese legislatures in 
a contested conceptual landscape, with multiple alternative terms being used by 
the proponents and opponents of parliamentarism. They did not, however, une-
quivocally point to the establishment of parliaments in the two contexts. Although 
the Western system was largely perceived as universal, there was a critical recep-
tion of Western models rather than their simple “import,” and suggestions that the 
Eurasian empires were not yet ready for such popular participation as in Western 
Europe and America were frequent in the discussions among Eurasian intellec-
tuals. Some intellectuals, and especially the imperial elites, foregrounded the 
state-centeredness of the new institutions which were supposed to rationalize and 
facilitate governance of the populace rather than shift the source of sovereignty to 
it, which often had bureaucratic connotations.
In both cases, parliamentarism did not seem to help preserve the Russian and 
Qing Empires. Furthermore, after their collapse, pluralistic parliaments were estab-
lished only for brief moments, giving way to nominal representative institutions 
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under dominant political parties – the Bolsheviks and the Guomindang, respec-
tively. It was the parties which were supposed to be at the core of political and 
other modernization. Even though the one-party regimes were formalized, the 
new elites still viewed parliaments, albeit nominal, as important markers of a 
modern state.
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Introduction: Heisei democracy and the 1955 System
The political structure of contemporary Japan is that of a representative democ-
racy. But what kind of representative democracy is it? It is different from the pres-
idential system of the United States. That is to say, a strict separation of powers is 
not really enshrined in the Constitution of Japan, which determines the superior-
ity of the House of Representatives (Shūgiin 衆議院). Although the Constitution 
provides for the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review as a court of last resort, 
the Court is known to nearly always respect the positions of the government when 
“highly political questions” are involved.1 Furthermore, Japan’s political sys-
tem is also different from a “consensus” democracy, although this point is a bit 
more controversial. Contemporary Japan differs from the type of representative 
democracy as is often to be seen in European countries, with an electoral system 
centered around proportional representation and in which important political deci-
sions tend to be taken in consensus between the major political parties.2
But what is contemporary Japan’s democracy then? Certainly, the central 
position of the National Diet within the political system reminds of the status of 
the English parliament, of which, since the eighteenth century, it has been com-
mented that it “can do everything except for turning men into women and women 
into men.”3 Contemporary Japan comes close to a majoritarian democracy or the 
model which is called the “Westminster Model.” The electoral system is in princi-
ple that of single-member districts. The political party which detains the majority 
in the parliament elects the prime minister, and the prime minister concomitantly 
serves as the head of the executive organs. In this system, in which legislative 
organs and executive organs are “merged,” the powers of the Japanese prime min-
ister tend to be rather strong.4
Certainly, some caveats are necessary. First, there is a divergence between 
model and reality. The Westminster Model assumes that at every election, the 
composition of the parliament largely changes, and that government is frequently 
handed over. However, in contemporary Japan, since 1955, political power 
has only been handed over twice, and the one-party hegemony of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (Jiyū Minshutō 自由民主党) continues. Lacking the formation 
of a strong opposition party, the system of two large parties originally expected by 
2
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the Westminster Model has not been realized. Is the Westminster Model appropri-
ate as a form for representative democracy? Questions such as why strong opposi-
tion parties do not arise in Japan even though the Westminster Model is used are 
very interesting topics, but are not discussed in this chapter.
As a second caveat, another element is to be considered which has been spared 
out of the considerations above: the existence of a monarch. In Japan, there is a 
hereditary monarch who is different from the prime minister. In the case that the 
monarch has different political preferences from the prime minister, the powers 
of the prime minister could be seen to be restricted. However, as in the United 
Kingdom, there is the principle that the monarch “reigns but does not rule.” His 
(or her) powers are limited to a ceremonial role, and, as a matter of principle, he 
(or she) does not possess substantial deciding powers. Being a part of governance 
without practical effects, the monarch fully plays the “dignified part.” This point 
becomes more important in practice in the Senate (Sangiin 参議院) and in local 
government. Although, as has been described, the Constitution accords a position 
of superiority to the House of Representatives, there are accordingly high obsta-
cles for draft bills to pass the Senate. In the sense that managing the government 
becomes rather difficult when the Senate and the House of Representatives are 
occupied by different factions, the Japanese Senate (the second house) is an impor-
tant exception when considering the “Westminsterization” of Japan. Furthermore, 
local government is also an important exception. Japan does not apply a federal 
system. However, the Constitution promulgated in 1946 professes the ideal of 
“local autonomy” and confers upon local governments extensive discretionary 
powers. If the local governments are resolutely determined not to comply with the 
decisions of the central government, the measures that the central government can 
take are rather limited.
Third, there have been historical changes. The transformation of the Japanese 
political system into the Westminster Model was a rather recent phenomenon. 
Certainly, there is scope for interpreting provisions of the 1946 Constitution such 
as those determining the superiority of the House of Representatives (First House) 
as fundamentally foreseeing a parliamentary system. However, before the Liberal 
Democratic Party was temporarily sent into the opposition in 1993, circumstances 
were different in Japan even though the text of the Constitution as such did not 
change at all. In conclusion, it was the epoch-making reform of the electoral sys-
tem and consolidation of the legal system concerning the Cabinet in 1993 which 
advanced the Westminsterization of Japanese politics.5 The parliamentarism after 
1993, which conforms to the Westminster Model, has taken on the era name 
“Heisei Democracy,”6 whereas parliamentarism before that is sometimes called 
the “1955 System.”
For this chapter, this third point is important, i.e., the question of the “1955 
System” being another type of parliamentarism in Japan alongside the Westminster 
Model. In 1955, the Liberal Party (Jiyūtō 自由党) and the Democratic Party 
(Minshutō 民主党) – two conservative parties –merged, and the Socialist Party 
accomplished its unification. The Communist Party relinquished armed revolu-
tion and adopted the policy to act as a parliamentary party. Later, the situation 
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that conservative parties continuously secured the majority of the House of 
Representatives (First House), but on the other hand could never win the two-
thirds majority of the seats necessary for constitutional amendments, in fact 
persisted until 1993. The system whereby constitutional amendments by the con-
servative wing – for which two-thirds of the seats are necessary – and a takeover 
of government control by the left wing – requiring a simple majority of the seats – 
were concomitantly precluded is sometimes called “One-and-a-half major party 
system” (ichi to ni-bun-no-ichi daiseitōsei 一と二分の一大政党制).7
While the conservative parties did not hide their nostalgia for the pre-1945 
system by publicly professing policies such as amending the Constitution and re-
militarization, the left-wing parties did not hide their sympathy for the “Eastern 
Bloc” by showing enmity toward capitalism. The differences in the ideological 
standpoints of the two sides were all too clear, and in fact, on the surface, the two 
camps seemed to be fiercely opposed. However, that could also be said to have 
been nothing more than a “quarrel.” What took place against the background of 
such a superficial relationship of hostility was in reality a politics of consensus 
(dakyō 妥協). In this sense, this “1955 System” was not so dissimilar to the con-
sociational democracies of Europe. The electoral system of multimember districts 
(in one district, several candidates were elected) promoted the diversification 
of parties. Furthermore, this generated parties within parties, called “factions“ 
(habatsu 派閥), within the strongest party, the Liberal Democratic Party. In other 
words, the Liberal Democratic Party was a coalition government of multiple fac-
tions. The prime ministers’ powers were comparatively weak, and their terms of 
office were not very long. Politics was fundamentally a coordination between such 
factions, and the parliament, in its turn, was a place for coordination with opposi-
tion parties (yatō 野党). The structure of the parliament, which had short sessions 
and needed to digest complicated agendas, made the veto rights held by such 
opposition parties more important than the actual number of seats. Contrary to 
the superficial ideological differences, in practice, politics was made with strong 
consideration for the opposition parties. “The winner takes it all” did not work.
What is also interesting is that such a structure of the separation of powers in 
the political system was represented and understood as a political system charac-
terized by a US-style “separation of the three powers,” even though in practice 
it was not. In Japan, there is no president, and the executive branch is not really 
independent from the legislative branch. Moreover, the judgments of the judicial 
branch basically do not depart from those of the government. This notwithstanding, 
in standard Japanese textbooks of compulsory education, explanations as “Japan 
adopts the separation of three powers” are frequently to be seen.8 The confusion of 
terminology here is an interesting example of how the people who live in a certain 
political system name its division of powers, but, as this chapter will show, this 
“misuse” itself reflects the reception history of parliamentarism in Japan.
This chapter tentatively names the understanding of parliamentarism with a 
division of powers as represented by the “1955 System” as the “Montesquieu 
Model.” Further, it will tentatively name the understanding of integrated and 
combined “Westminsterian” parliamentarism as represented by the “Heisei 
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democracy” as the “Bagehot Model,” showing that a tense relationship between 
the two models was visible in the beginnings of the reception of parliamentarism 
in modern Japan. Of course, it is ineluctable that the discussion, after undergo-
ing several abstractions, will be rough-hewn, but I think that this is an effective 
method in order not to consider the need for parliamentarism in modern Japan as 
merely a story of “success” and “limitations.”
Prior to this, I would like to first give a rough overview of the political system 
in the Japanese archipelago before it took over a “parliament.” In reality, this is 
because the political structure created at that time prescribed the pattern of how 
parliamentarism was taken over in modern Japan.
Historical premises
Contacts with Western countries were an important trigger for the introduction of 
a political structure centered on a parliament in the Japanese archipelago. Since 
the formal demand for trade relations made by the President of the United States 
in 1853, Western people came to visit these islands in unprecedented frequency. 
Japan had been much praised for its natural abundance, but although the customs 
different from the West stimulated a fascination for the exotic, it was neither the 
“Eldorado” nor the “unexplored land” that they had sometimes imagined.9
The population was 30–35 million. This was incomparably small in relation to, 
e.g., the population of the neighboring dynastic states of the Chinese mainland, 
yet it was not inferior in scale to the so-called Western countries of the time. 
The population of the United States, which were demanding the “opening up” of 
Japan, did not even match that of these isles.10
The awareness of “Japan”
Furthermore, these more than 30 million inhabitants were devising their unifi-
cation as a single political community. Of course, certainly, the property over 
the Ryūkyūs and Yezo, as well as over the small islands of Tsushima and the 
Ogasawara Archipelago, remained ambiguous. However, if the property over 
such islands had become a problem, from that time there would have been 
no dispute about who would become the eventual negotiating party. In other 
words, a central government existed. What’s more, it was also clear from the 
handling of the people who were unwittingly drifting across the “national bor-
der” that this government aimed at a rather strict control of entry into and 
exit from the country, compared to other regions at the same time. And it was 
not only the politicians. There is ample evidence that common people, too, 
broadly shared a collective awareness of a “Japan” (Nihon 日本; Nihonkoku 
日本国) which went beyond the scope of their own direct observations.11 On 
an immediate plan, this was a reaction to the early globalism imported from 
Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth century (a self-awareness as a country free 
of Christianity), and on a more long-term plan, it was nurtured in the midst of 
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the relationships with the very large polities that had been established on the 
Chinese mainland and in the Indian subcontinent (the fact that the objects of 
comparison had long been very large polities on the continent engendered an 
awareness on these islands of being a “small country” [shōkoku 小国] with a 
population size that could not match them). Then, the second encounter with 
the countries of the West also must have brought about an intensification in the 
consciousness of “Japan” as a unit.
Gunken and hōken
Of course, as is well known, we can ascertain that an intermediate group called 
“household” (ie イエ) was extremely present, which turned one’s specific work 
abilities into one’s trade or business and was closer to a company or a legal person 
than to a group of blood relationships. It is certainly true that most people’s scope 
of consciousness in their daily lives did not exceed that of such “boxes” which each 
one belonged to, and rarely extended to a unity called “Japan.”12 In particular, the 
corporation to which a hereditary ruling class professing to be “warriors” (bushi 
武士) belonged (called “domain” [han 藩]), had, so to speak, a separate existence 
as local governments independent from the central government. It also happened 
that the relationship which should exist between central government and local 
governments was debated in Confucian terms, which conformed to the standard 
upbringing of the intellectuals of the time. The so-called dispute between hōken 
封建 and gunken 郡県 was that between a decentralized system in which heredi-
tary lords governed the regions (hōken), and a centralized one in which bureau-
crats sent by the Emperor governed the regions (gunken).13 As a matter of fact, 
for the most part of the well-nigh 300 years that the Tokugawa government ruled 
Japan, there are no traces of the intellectual debates having exerted an influence on 
actual governance. The central government recognized the autonomy of the local 
governments, and the local governments tacitly recognized the separate authority 
of the central government. In this regard, the impotence of the intellectuals might 
be evidence that the fundamental structure of such a political system was not the 
object of the debates, but a premise for them. However, contact with Western 
countries changed this situation. Several powerful local governments became 
aware of the benefits of autonomy, and, contrary to the intentions of the central 
government, aimed at dealing with Western countries on their own, sometimes 
being even prepared to go to war. Intellectual debates about hōken and gunken, 
which had theretofore been empty armchair discussions, became extremely real 
disputes in that time.14 Under the premise of “Japan” as a unity, it was unclear at 
that point of time whether it would become a federal or a centralized state.
Kantō and Kinri
Furthermore, it was a question of whether this central government was really 
a central government. In the process of building contacts with the Western 
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countries, the situation arose wherein it was doubtful whether the self-pro-
claimed central government of the “Great Leader” (Taikun 大君) could decide 
matters without looking up to instructions from the Emperor resident in the “for-
bidden inner premises” (Kinri 禁裏; used metonymously for the Emperor him-
self) of his palace in Kyoto. In fact, this was a new situation on this archipelago. 
The government of the Taikun with its capital at Edo (present-day Tokyo) had 
established its power in 1600 after a large-scale military victory. Located in the 
Eastern Japanese Kantō 関東 region, it initially did not consider the Imperial 
palace in Kyoto in political decisions at all, its ceremonial authority notwith-
standing. Although the Kyoto Kinri had once been the actual sovereign of the 
archipelago, it had long ago – beginning from ca. 1300 – been stripped of most 
of its authority from the so-called warrior (bushi 武士) caste. The descendants 
of the previous dynasty were accorded a merely nominal continuation of their 
existence, and they and their entire entourage remained confined to this role for 
a long time.
A change in this situation was brought about by Confucian scholars from 
China who discussed political theories. Although they exerted virtually no 
practical influence in the debates about hōken and gunken, they left important 
traces in this question. That is to say, Confucian doctrine, which teaches to 
“follow the right ruler,” raised the complicated question of “but then, who is 
the right ruler?” Of course, for most bushi, this was the lord of the domain 
to which they belonged themselves, or the Taikun resident in Edo. Yet, the 
Kinri in Kyoto with his supposedly nominal and ceremonial role was, to the 
extent that he was present as an abstraction, a convenient projection screen 
for the image of an “ideal monarch.” Here, room for using the Kinri as a sym-
bol for gathering the hidden dissatisfactions with the government arose. The 
ceremonial power held by the Kinri was dangerous, and it was alluring. From 
the eighteenth century to the turn of the nineteenth century, against the back-
ground of this rise in authority, the government of the Taikun was concerned 
with the clout of the Kinri as well as with the Confucian theory that stood 
behind his rise in authority. They tried to legitimize their own rule according 
to the legal reasoning that “this archipelago’s original sovereign has been the 
Kinri all along, but the effective right to govern inherent to this sovereignty 
is being entrusted to the bushi.”15 However, the attempt of trying to secure 
the authority of the central government as the effective part of governance by 
attaching the position as the dignified part of governance to the Kinri eventu-
ally had the opposite effect. As soon as the authority of the central government 
became perceptible in the process of establishing contacts with the Western 
countries, political activists came to appear all over the archipelago who, using 
their condition as subjects of the Kinri, subordinated themselves neither to the 
various local governments nor to the central government. The machinations 
of these anti-system activists eventually attained their objective, becoming 
successful in overthrowing the central government, but the new government 
established after it continued to struggle with the positioning of the symbolic 
element within the political system.
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Gōgi and kōgi
As is already clear, the political system of this polity had been one of extreme 
authoritarianism. Even in high estimations, the ruling class of the bushi amounted 
to no more than one-tenth of the population. As the local governments of the 
“domains” (han 藩) did not exceed 300, their lords amounted to no more than 
0.00001 percent of the population. Moreover, the Shōgun 将軍, who held author-
ity and ruled isolatedly over them, was, of course, a single person. This ruling élite 
was essentially all male, and their positions were hereditary.
They hardly cared about whether their governance was based on “popular 
will” (min’i 民意).16 On the contrary, one could not even positively say that they 
pretended to be governing “for the people.” Therefore, there was little need for 
intellectuals within the system to rhetorically reinforce the legitimation of the 
government. In this respect, the situation differed from the dynasties in the Asian 
mainland and in the Korean peninsula, which, while being equally authoritarian 
systems, employed Confucian political theory in institutions and educations, and 
which, while linking it to the recruitment system of talents via Imperial exami-
nations, were fully structured around the concept of “benevolent government” 
(jinsei 仁政).17 In the Japanese archipelago, where such a way for intellectuals 
to become an élite within the system by passing public ability tests such as the 
Imperial examinations did not exist, the standing army, without modifications, 
was the bureaucracy. They were essentially a hereditary military regime, and their 
rule was, in short, a military government.
On the other hand, these specificities of this political system, characterized 
by official ideology and the nonexistence of Imperial examinations, were also 
advantageous for the introduction of a political architecture centered around a 
parliament. This was because the Japanese archipelago avoided the demise of 
the hereditary élite and the concentration of powers around the Emperor brought 
about in China and Korea by the Confucian notion of “benevolent government” 
and the Imperial examination system. A division of powers as has been described 
above persisted, which ensured the need for “consultations” (gōgi 合議) in the 
decision-making process. As a matter of fact, the decision-making of the central 
government took place in a powerful bureaucratic consultative body called the 
“Council of Elders” (Rōjū 老中). Concerning the critical questions of the contacts 
with the countries of the West, it has been said that the central government’s will 
to decide them in “consultations” with the various local governments and the 
Kinri was, on the one hand, the first step to the collapse of this system, but that, 
even more so, it expressed the original character of this system.18
Furthermore, Confucianism not being an official ideology, it brought about an 
active intellectual life. Although they could not combine money and fame, a host 
of intellectual schools appeared in the various regions and engendered a com-
mon intellectual and artistic circle in which they referred to and criticized each 
other. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, following the institutionali-
zation of Confucianism, the bushi began to study Confucianism as part of their 
standard education, became acquainted with its vocabulary, and also accumulated 
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experience in debating through language. From these circumstances, in the last 
stage of this system, the opinion that decision-making should proceed from “pub-
lic deliberation and opinion” (kōgi yoron 公議世論) was supposed to be shared 
even by actors holding differing interests.
The Montesquieu moment
It was not the “Meiji” revolutionary government trying to seize the Kinri’s pow-
ers which first seriously investigated the introduction of a parliamentary system, 
but rather the Edo “ancien régime.” In a situation in which the new and old forces 
were competing with each other and a temporary cease-fire in the form of a “res-
toration of royal government” (ōsei fukko 王政復古) was reached, the aim was to 
control the momentum of the new powers by proposing a new political system. 
It was Nishi Amane 西周 (1829–1897), who had studied in the Netherlands with 
Simon Vissering (1818–1888), who shouldered a concrete draft for an institu-
tional system.19 As has been described, the Edo government, being a hereditary 
military government, did not necessarily value intellectuals highly. However, on 
account of the acute political crisis at the end of this government, the Edo govern-
ment began to slowly recognize the importance of intellectuals and knowledge. 
Nishi Amane is a good example thereof.
When looking at the details of the new system proposed by Nishi in his Draft of 
Discussion Topics (Gidai sōan 議題草案), let us first contemplate the understand-
ing of the current situation which is at the basis of Nishi’s proposal for the intro-
duction of a parliamentary system. First, he can no longer ignore the importance 
of “public deliberation” (kōgi 公議). Some kind of “parliamentary idea” (kaigi no 
shui 会議の趣意) had to be incorporated into the political structure:
What is called “public deliberation” (kōgi 公議) is universally praised by the 
population. Because, indeed, it is unavoidable to deal with public opinion, I 
wish for the notion of a parliament to be established, summarizing as much 
as possible the above discussion.20
Second, as a gunken system was temporarily impossible, he foresaw the continu-
ation of hōken (i.e., in this case, a federal system or a confederation) for the time 
being:
But concerning the meaning of the above-mentioned “restoration of royal 
government,” in the present hōken government, our lords, pertaining to the 
same lineages of vassals, have been residing in half of the territory and 
holding the power in the Empire for more than a thousand years, and have 
been attached to families which can cause “the heavenly revenue to come 
to a perpetual end.” Even a three-year-old child would know that not once 
in a million times would it be possible to wish for the sudden revival of the 
gunken system and the reestablishment of the “personal fields” and “salary 
fields.”21
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Based on these two premises, Nishi proposed to introduce a parliamentary sys-
tem based on a “differentiation of three powers” (sanken no betsu 三権之別). 
Concretely, in his scheme, the Tokugawa Shōgun’s government, being the “gov-
ernment of the Generalissimo” (Kubōsama seifu 公方様政府), should continue 
to hold the executive branch, while an assembly called “Office for Deliberating 
Politics” (Gisei-in 議政院), composed of representatives of every domain, should 
be established and be put in charge of the legislative branch. In other words, its 
main idea was premised on a federal system and foresaw a division of powers 
between the federal assembly as executive branch and the national government as 
executive branch. This was, as Nishi Amane expressed it in his Brief explanation of 
the administrative systems of the West (Taisei kansei ryakusetsu 泰西官制略説), 
a reception of the Western “administrative system” (kansei 官制) “discovered” 
(hatsumei 発明) by the “great French scholar Montesquieu” (Bukkoku no daiju 
Montesukiu 仏国之大儒モンテスキウ), and more precisely an attempt to copy 
the federal political system of the United States.22
Of course, there were also large differences to the US model. First, the 
Tokugawa Shōgun was clearly different from the President of the United States. 
At the same time, as the Tokugawa was the “head of state” representing the “gov-
ernment of the generalissimo,” he was also a landlord controlling a vast stretch of 
land on his own right. Within his territory, he could autonomously exert his rule. 
Furthermore, it was not clear from the text of the draft whether his territory should 
become a member of the federal assembly or not. This aspect also resembled the 
relationship between the monarch and the parliament in a European sense, and 
was the reason why Nishi Amane did not say “American model,” but carefully 
used the expression “the West” (Taisei 泰西).
Second, the structure of the Lower House was different. The assembly was 
divided into two chambers, i.e., an Upper and a Lower House, with the Upper 
House being composed by the lord (daimyō 大名) of every domain. In princi-
ple, one domain was represented by one person, and the right to speak of every 
domain was equal, without regard to their size. This basically is the same idea as 
that of the Upper House (Senate) of the United States. However, the problem was 
the Lower House. Concerning the structure of the Lower House, in the annex to 
his Draft of discussion topics (Besshi gidai sōan 別紙議題草案), Nishi writes the 
following:
In the Western system, representatives are deployed according to the size 
of the population. Although this exists as an example, such is impossible in 
our current hōken system. And while such will hardly be possible as long as 
both the rural and urban common people are still illiterate, at that time it will 
behove us to abolish the representation of one person per domain!23
The structure of the Lower House was the same “one person per domain” (ichi-
han ichi-mei 一藩一名) as the Upper House. This is not to say that Nishi did not 
see value in the Lower House. To the opposite, considering Tsuda Mamichi’s 
津田真道 (1829–1903) argument, which will be dealt with later, it seems that 
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Nishi hardly looked forward to an Upper House filled up with daimyōs. It must 
have been an honest suggestion when he wrote in his Draft of Discussion Topics: 
“Because the parliament is unable to decide through the Upper House alone, I 
think that one should treat the Lower House likewise.”24 Nishi also acknowledges 
that, in case one would bestow real decision rights to the Lower House, the “num-
ber of representatives or the weight of their voice” should actually change accord-
ing to “the province’s size.” This notwithstanding, because of the “current hōken 
government,” he deemed that this was impossible in practice. Similarly, Tsuda 
Mamichi, who had also studied in the Netherlands with Vissering, indeed fore-
saw an Upper and a Lower House in his General Institutions of Japan (Nihokoku 
sōseido 日本国総制度), the reform plan which he proposed at about the same 
time as Nishi. Yet, concerning the Lower House, it contrasted with Nishi’s 
scheme in that it clearly stipulated a proportional representation of the population: 
“For every 100,000 citizens, one person should be elected.”25 Here, along with 
Tsuda’s fidelity to his standard model, the “Western system” (yōsei 洋制), one 
can discern an element of his tendency toward centralization of power. As will be 
discussed later, Tsuda’s outlook was eventually correct. However, the one who 
thought “realistically” at the moment was probably Nishi. Tsuda assumed Japan’s 
contemporary political system not to be a hōken one, but to have “the shape of 
what the Westerners call ‘federation’” (yōjin no iwayuru gappō no sugata 洋人
之所謂合邦之姿).26 Tsuda understood this term, “federation” (gappō 合邦), as a 
federal state presupposing unification, while Nishi can be said to have understood 
hōken as a “confederation which does not presuppose unification.”
As a third point, connected to this, there was an absence of debates about 
the judicial branch. Nishi’s Draft of Discussion Topics emphasized the “sepa-
ration of the three powers,” but the discussion of the judicial branch in it 
was limited to the sentence “the judicial power can for the time being not be 
set up as within the authority of the laws in force in all countries” (shuhō no 
ken wa imashibaraku no tokoro, kakkoku gyōhō no kennai ni kane sōrō koto 
守法之権は今暫之所、各国行法の権内に兼候事). Yet, its implications were 
clear: The establishment of a supreme judicature on the model of the United States 
with jurisdiction for the whole federation was out of consideration, and it was 
planned to leave it at the jurisdiction of the justice within the various “domains” 
(han 藩) and “provinces” (kuni 国). In this aspect, too, it is possible to say that the 
new political system of Japan envisaged by Nishi was a more strongly decentral-
ized confederation than the federal system of the United States.
Whether one assumed a hōken system or a federation (gappō 合邦), attempts 
to subsume the decentralized shape of Japan’s contemporary political system 
under the extremely peculiar models of Montesquieu and “division of powers” 
were indeed not restricted to Nishi Amane and Tsuda Mamichi. Rather than the 
Tokugawa government, with which Nishi and Tsuda cooperated, it was Fukuoka 
Takachika 福岡孝弟 (1835–1919) who cooperated with the creation of the new 
institutional structure at the side of the new Meiji government and who wrote 
about the Constitutional Document (Seitaisho 政体書), which he had drafted him-
self: “The administrative system laid out in the Constitutional Document takes 
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as its basis a separation of three powers akin to the United States of America.”27 
The Montesquieuan Model was widely accepted by both the Tokugawa and Meiji 
sides. The temporal range of this acception was also long. Even after the abolition 
of the domains and the establishment of the prefectures had been concluded, and 
the Meiji state had clearly begun to walk on the path of centralization of powers, 
the influence of the Montesquieu Model was tenacious. When Maurice Block 
(1816–1901) asked Kido Takayoshi 木戸孝允 (1833–1877), who had gone to 
Paris as a member of the Iwakura mission (1871–1873): “Why do all the Japanese 
with whom I have been in touch hold fast to the theory of separation of powers? 
Methinks this is strange,” he was stunned:
If we had been careless about the three branches of politics being a standpoint 
of US American democracy, while we thought that it is a common notion in 
the (whole) West, we would have missed the national essence of Imperial 
restoration right at the beginning.28
In the autumn of the fifth year of Meiji (1872), Nishimura Shigeki 西村茂樹 
(1828–1902) explained the “principle of the three powers” (sanken no ri 
三権之理) in the preface to his Brief history of all countries (Bankoku shiryaku 
万国史略) by noting: “There are three powers in a state: the legislative, the exec-
utive, and the judiciary. When the three powers are balanced, then the state will be 
stable and prosperous.” With the words “The English law is the most perfect one, 
but the American system even surpasses it,” he valued the system of the United 
States highly. Nishimura’s preface was continued to be included in both the print 
edition of 1875 and in the second edition of 1879.
The Bagehot moment
As has been seen, the presence of Montesquieu’s model of division of power 
(actually, the US federal model via The Federalist) was strong from the late Edo 
period (bakumatsu) to the mid-second decade of the Meiji era (the early 1880s). 
One of the reasons for this was that the structure of the contemporary Japanese 
archipelago as a hōken state (called “federation” by Tsuda) was deemed to con-
form to Montesquieu’s theory, which it had inherited. However, this situation 
was already unstable by the late Edo period. For example, as Katō Hiroyuki’s 
加藤弘之 (1836–1916) Grass in the vicinity (Tonarigusa 隣草) already perceived 
correctly, there were in fact two options in the circumstances of the late Edo times: 
(1) either that of establishing a federative parliament in order to safeguard integra-
tion while maintaining the hōken system, or (2) that of constructing a centralized 
gunken system by destroying the decentralized hōken system. Of these two, as has 
been seen in the previous sections, Nishi and Tsuda groped for the first one, but 
what was thereafter carried out in political practice was in fact the second option, 
i.e., the way of “gunkenization.” Of course, what was groped for from 1862 up 
to 1868 was the “Taikun monarchy” (Taikun no monaruki 大君之モナルキ; 
Fukuzawa Yukichi 福澤諭吉, 1835–1901)29 centered around the Tokugawa, and 
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then, after 1868, the gunken system centered around the Emperor. But the cru-
cial point is that the 1868 “restoration of royal government” did not immediately 
mean a gunken structure. The following discussion points brought forward by 
Mori Arinori 森有礼 (1847–1889) in 1869 at the newly convened assembly were 
characteristic of this (this assembly itself was a federal system which assembled 
representatives of all domains):
 1. At present, the form of our state resembles one divided into half hōken and 
half gunken. Hence, what will the national affairs really be like in the future?
 2. If one should reform this, conforming to one of them, should one adapt to a 
hōken system or else to a gunken system? What are, after all, their respective 
advantages and disadvantages?
 3. If one were to fully conform to hōken, what measures should one take such 
that it conforms to human nature and the tendencies of the time?
 4. If one were to fully conform to gunken, what measures should one take such 
that it conforms to human nature and the tendencies of the time?
(Four articles on questions concerning matters of the national polity 
[Okokutai no gi ni tsuki mondai shijō 御国体之儀に付問題四条])30
Mori’s understanding that Japan was “at present” (i.e., in the year of 1869, after 
the restoration of a royal government) a mixed constitution “divided half-half” 
into hōken and gunken was extremely precise. Exactly because of this, the “aboli-
tion of the domains and establishment of prefectures” (haihan-chiken 廃藩置県 – 
actually the materialization of gunken), which happened only two years thereafter, 
was a sudden event for which the name of revolution or coup d’état would be 
appropriate, rather than a foreseeable event within the expected course of things.
Considering the above context, the importance of the “Memorial on the 
Adoption of Popular Elections and a Parliament” (Minsen giin setsuritsu ken-
pakusho 民選議院設立建白書), submitted in 1874, also becomes clear. This 
“Memorial” has been often highly evaluated for its function as the spark that caused 
the “Freedom and People’s Rights Movement” (Jiyū minken undō 自由民権運動), 
which has been deemed to have been a “bourgeois democratic revolutionary move-
ment.”31 What has been emphasized is the picture of a “popular” (minshū 民衆) 
resistance against the power-holding élites, and the “Memorial on the Adoption of 
Popular Elections and a Parliament” fits into such a picture. However, as has been 
pointed out since that time, most of the signatories of the memorial were figures 
who had been active within the government right up to that date, and in reality it 
was a fight for power within the élites, a “discord among friends” (nakamaware 
仲間割れ). Furthermore, as has been shown in this chapter, the idea of estab-
lishing a parliament by itself was not new at all. If there was any novelty in the 
“Memorial on the Adoption of Popular Elections and a Parliament,” it was simply 
that it was the first full-dress plan to open a parliament after the gunken revolution. 
It was the first time that the groping for a “gunken parliament” began in full scale.
What is interesting is that the groping for such a “gunken parliament” could not 
immediately find an appropriate term for it. Even after the realization of gunken, 
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many commentators who supported the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement 
continued to devise the parliament according to a Montesquieuan (Federalistian) 
three-power model, notwithstanding that its premise, the hōken system or the 
mixed hōken and gunken system, had already disappeared. An evidence for this is 
the fact that new editions of Nishimura Shigeki’s Brief history of all countries – 
with its preface advocating high esteem for the “separation of three powers” – 
continued to appear after the abolition of the domain system, when the Freedom 
and People’s Rights Movement was in full bloom. One of the reasons why this 
was possible is the vagueness of the contemporary terminology for “separation 
of powers.” It was the common understanding at that time that a parliamentary 
system was the materialization of the “separation of powers” (bunken 分権). 
However, for example, in the case of the “separation of powers” between the 
monarch and the parliament, it was not self-evident whether that would be a verti-
cal division of powers or a horizontal division of powers. In other words, it was 
frequently (and possibly intentionally) kept in the vague between what actors this 
“separation” (division) of powers would be worked out: whether it would be a 
vertical “separation of powers” between élites and the common people (called, 
e.g., “separation between above and below” – jōka bunken 上下分権), or whether 
it would be a horizontal “separation of powers” between each domain and the 
government institutions (called, e.g., “regional separation of powers” – chihō 
bunken 地方分権).
Fukuzawa Yukichi’s epoch-making significance in the history of how a par-
liamentary system was adopted in Meiji times is in fact related to this aspect: 
(1) Fukuzawa tried to correctly understand the conceptual confusion in the word 
“separation of powers” and to redefine this term as a horizontal division of powers, 
i.e., to give it the specialized meaning of “regional separation of powers” (chihō 
bunken 地方分権); (2) based on this, he envisioned and proposed a Bagehotian 
Westminster Model in which two major parties would carry out a “civilized com-
petition” for political form in the form of a gunken parliament.32
Fukuzawa redefined “separation of powers” in his 1877 work On separa-
tion of powers (Bunken-ron 分権論). Here, invoking Alexis de Tocqueville 
(1805–1859), Fukuzawa distinguished between “government” (seiken 政権) and 
“administration” (chiken 治権), assigning the former to the central governments 
and the latter to the regional governments. The idea he defended hereby was that 
of a horizontal division of powers between the central and the local governments. 
He aimed at preventing an excessive implementation of gunken, i.e., the Meiji 
government’s tendency to excessively centralize powers. However, concomi-
tantly, a point that also needed attention was the denial of the hōken system. As 
has been shown above, ten years before On the separation of powers was written, 
an even more federalized division of powers had been institutionally guaranteed 
in the form of hōken. Of course, Fukuzawa did not really hope for the realization 
of such a decentralizing separation of powers in the form of a federal state. His 
plan staunchly presupposed the gunken system in place after the abolition of the 
domains. His real aim was not to adapt the horizontal division of powers between 
the central and the local governments in the form of a federal system within a 
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hōken polity but precisely to subsume it under a framework of local autonomy 
appropriate for a gunken system.
In this way, after he had revised the definition of “separation of powers” 
(bunken 分権) as a question of local autonomy in a gunken polity, what Fukuzawa 
presented in his works On the National Diet (Kokkai-ron 国会論, 1879) and 
Transformation of the People’s Spirit (Minjō isshin 民情一新, 1879) was a 
Westminster-like system with a parliament and a cabinet. Concerning the “gov-
ernment” (seiken 政権) as delimited from “administration” (jiken 治権) in On 
the separation of powers (1877), Fukuzawa did not regard it as a fight between 
“above” (élites) and “below” (the common people) but imagined it as a horizontal 
competition between the two political forces of “conservatism” (hoshu 保守) and 
“reformism” (kaishin 改進). “Competition” (kyōsō 競争) was a keyword much 
beloved by Fukuzawa at that time, implying a fair competition by two partners on 
the same level:33 “That is, contemporary society is a single big stage for competi-
tion.”34 As Fukuzawa said, the English method to materialize this fair competition 
was superior to the US one:
The parliamentary theorists of this generation lock government officials out 
of parliaments, taking them out from elections for members of parliament. 
Thus, the government is made up of officials, the National Diet is made up of 
the people, and the confrontation of government and diet is like a device to 
set the boundaries which delimit a government for the court and the people. 
Our side also once believed that a National Diet had to be opened based on 
this consideration. … Nonetheless, as we examined the question of how a 
National Diet should be opened back then, our side had a moment of great 
enlightenment. Now, as we are about to open a National Diet in our country, 
and since we wish to draw our models from the various countries of the West, 
methinks that it will be most convenient to copy the English law in what 
regards the matter of parliamentary elections. A comparison between the par-
liaments of England and the USA yields that, even if they are akin to each 
other in set-up and strength, the United States prohibit officials from being 
elected as members of parliament, while England is different to this: There, 
hardly any dignified government officials do not become members of parlia-
ment. According to this law, English officials become administrative officials 
when they are in government, and they become parliamentary officials when 
they are in parliament. Because it is as if they combine in themselves the two 
powers of administration and deliberation (i.e., the executive and the legisla-
tive powers – note of the author), the English government frequently under-
takes to cajole the majority of the members of parliament, always achieving 
a satisfactory result.35
What is here called “officials” (kanri 官吏) is not the same as the so-called 
bureaucrats (kanryō 官僚) present in later times, after a specialized bureau-
cratic system had been established. The gist of Fukuzawa’s discussion can be 
summarized into two points. First, there was an overlap between the image 
 Montesquieu vs. Bagehot 67
of the parliamentary system nurtured by those who at that time supported the 
Freedom and People’s Rights Movement (the “parliamentary theorists of this 
generation”) – a model of vertical political struggle between the government as 
the court and the parliament as the people – with the US model of the separa-
tion of powers, which makes a sharp distinction between the executive and the 
legislative branches. Second, in contrast to the above confrontational model, 
he seeks from “English law,” i.e., from the Westminster system, a model of 
competitive democracy which combines “the two powers of administration and 
deliberation.”
Federalism and unicameralism
In other words, it is certainly possible to evaluate the intellectual activities led 
by Fukuzawa in the early 1880s as an attempt to analyze according to new terms 
the question of how to balance the concentration and separation of powers within 
the political system, which had theretofore approached with the terms hōken and 
gunken. The separation of powers theretofore attached to the word hōken was 
reframed as a regional autonomy (more stable than the federal system), and the 
centralization of powers manifested in the word gunken was reconceptualized as 
a parliamentary cabinet system providing for the combination of “the two powers 
of administration and deliberation.”
However, the problem was of course not really solved with this. For example, 
the hōken problem continued to linger thereafter. The fact the Fukuzawa himself 
was actually not sure about whether federalism and regional autonomy can be 
clearly distinguished from each other is already reflected in his On the abolition 
of domains (Haiken-ron 廃県論, 1872). Fukuzawa, who had warned of an exces-
sive implementation of gunken and advocated a revival of the hōken element in 
his On the separation of powers, here, so to speak, praises the thoroughness of 
the implementation of gunken. Such a theoretical “swaying” is of difficult expla-
nation without taking Fukuzawa’s vigilance against the Freedom and People’s 
Rights Movement into consideration. For example, Ueki Emori’s 植木枝盛 
(1857–1892) private Draft of a Constitution for the Oriental State of Japan (Tōyō 
Dainihonkoku kokken an 東洋大日本国国憲按), which was the theoretical 
underpinning of the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement, clearly stipulated a 
federal system along with a centralized unicameral parliamentary structure. This 
shows that, at the camp of the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement, attempts 
to analyze the hōken problem not as “regional autonomy” but as “federalism” 
were not rare at all.36
Furthermore, Fukuzawa’s theory did not get adopted by the political authori-
ties. The “discord among friends” within the government known as the Meiji 
14 Coup of 1881 (continuing the one of 1874) – in concrete, the dismissal of 
Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈重信 (1838–1922) and the formation of the Constitutional 
Reform Party (Rikken kaishintō 立憲改進黨) – signified the preliminary collapse 
of Fukuzawa’s ideas. Instead of refusing to accept the Westminster Model accord-
ing to Ōkuma and Fukuzawa, the government promised to convene a parliament 
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after ten years. Yet, it was left completely blank as to what kind of parliament this 
would be.
Thereafter, what kind of twists did the parliament convened in 1890 take? As 
there is already plentiful research on this question, the author does not have any 
new insight to add to it. However, broadly speaking, the form of the parliament in 
these more than 100 years can be positioned in between what in this chapter has 
been preliminarily called the Montesquieu Model and the Bagehot Model. Paper 
width does not allow to prove this in this chapter. What this chapter has done is to 
clarify the moment when these two models appeared.
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Japanese history] Kindai Nihon kenkyū 近代日本研究 22 (2005): 1–19.
34 Fukuzawa, Kokkai-ron, 5:85.
35 Ibid., 5:85–86.
36 At that time, within the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement, there was a conflict 
in strategy about whether one should dissolve hōken in the form of a federal system or 
whether one should deal with it in the form of regional representation in an upper house 
of a bicameral parliament.
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I was born into a lowly family and I endured severe poverty. Thus, as a small child 
this hit me with a visceral feeling and I was painfully saddened by the misery of 
poverty and low-rank status. As I think about it now from the vantage point of our 
current era, it is like the feudal regime was a separate world. That “autonomy” 
(celebrated by the liberal reformers) is in reality having the Emperor above us and 
becoming one subject of the Emperor below him. That “liberty” is a monarchy that 
has no bias towards class status and a legal system entirely devoted to the creation 
of a land for our own happiness. The meaning of this is hard to understand for 
those who have not lived through feudal despotism.2
Torio Koyata, in 
Discussion of Current Affairs
Introduction
Writing during the intense ferment of public debate over the most suitable consti-
tutional system for the Japanese polity, arch-conservative member of the Genrō-in 
(Senate) Lieutenant-General Torio Koyata was emblematic of the breadth and 
complexity of visions seeking to fundamentally reshape the concepts and opera-
tion of liberal parliamentarianism and adapt them to the needs of Meiji Japan. The 
former ranking military commander who had helped usher in the modern state 
was among the most Emperor-centric politicians of the period. He was a trench-
ant critic of republicanism denouncing the foreign ideal of popular sovereignty as 
a menace to Japan’s religious-ethical traditions of unity and mutual cooperation. 
Yet, Torio was no less an indefatigable advocate of a Japanese-style constitu-
tion and a popularly elected national assembly earning praise from a range of 
voices as a defender of “People’s Rights.” In 1890, the popular daily newspaper 
Yomiuri described Torio as being “nicknamed ‘the People’s Rights activist within 
the government,’ and for many years has been a thorn in the side of the authori-
ties.”3 Contemporary books written on the “People’s Rights Movement” did in 
fact include Torio as a central figure in the movement, and the official party his-
tory of the Liberal Party edited by its central member Itagaki Taisuke, among 
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the most prominent advocates of the establishment of constitutional government, 
stated that “among the members of the Genrō-in, Torio Koyata, … and others, 
listened to what the representatives of the party opposition said and often had a 
tendency to support the popular will.”4
At first glance Torio appears to be a paradox. He was at once among the most 
obstinate anti-liberal and anti-Christian political activists of rank during the mid-
Meiji period, routinely stating that Western “civilization and enlightenment will 
destroy the customs of our Imperial land.” Nevertheless, he was also deeply 
critical of the liberal parties’ view that suffrage should be limited to the proper-
tied elite and appears to have had an expansive view of the role of the people as 
one central pillar of the nation in tandem with the Emperor.5 In the late 1870s, 
Torio, along with other colleagues historians have deemed the “National Essence 
Preservation Movement,” grew increasingly disillusioned with the rapid moderni-
zation reforms implemented by the ruling oligarchy committed to renegotiating 
the unequal treaties with the Western powers and to stabilizing the state. This 
faction of the culturally conservative opposition perceived the rapid succession of 
reforms for national development as opening the floodgate of indiscriminate and 
arbitrary Westernization at the expense not only of historical Japanese culture but 
also of the welfare and development of the Japanese people. In 1881, Torio and 
fellow military generals who resigned from the military in protest of the oligarch’s 
despotic approach to governance petitioned the Emperor to demand a constitu-
tion which would establish an independent legislature. Outside of the state, Torio 
campaigned tirelessly through his political and religious organizations on the one 
hand to stem the tide of Western liberalism and Christianity, and on the other to 
restrain the despotism of the oligarchy through idealizing a unique constitutional 
separation of powers with a legislature which could channel the thoughts and 
needs of the people to the Emperor to ensure benevolent rule.6 Despite his rigid 
dedication to defending the integrity of Eastern thought, Torio showed resource-
fulness and adaptability in integrating the strengths of diverse trends in seeking to 
harness the newly prevalent concept of “public opinion,” —kōgi yoron 公議輿論, 
or kōron 公論 – to legitimize greater demands for the representation of the will of 
the public to check the arbitrary power of the oligarchy.
Torio’s openness to a more expansive role for the citizen-subjects in politics 
has led some sharp observers, such as Barbara Teters and Janine Sawada, to rec-
ognize that despite Torio’s hostility to liberalism, his support for the popular will 
(min’i 民意) contained elements which appear surprisingly “progressive.”7 Most 
historians, however, who have touched on Torio Koyata and his organizations 
have branded him a “reactionary.” One important example of this is Motoyama 
Yukihiko, who presumes that conservatives such as Torio and his Society of the 
Great Way were shackled to local feudal loyalties and sought the return of their 
former privileges as members of the samurai elite.8 Nevertheless, as Manabe 
Masayuki has pointed out, there is a conflict between the historical perception of 
Torio as an anti-Western, Emperor-centric xenophobe whose social thought was 
nothing more than a holdover from feudal Nativism; and the complexity of his 
political thought and action which demands more careful attention.9 The apparent 
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contradiction is reinforced by his own statements in the Privy Council, where in 
the same session Torio insisted that the decision of the actively involved Emperor 
should take precedence over the majority decision of the representatives if neces-
sary for the nation; yet, also lambasted the possibility that the proposed national 
assembly could not initiate legislation, revealing his fervent belief that the rep-
resentatives of the people should have considerable control over the framing of 
national policy.10
In Torio’s ideal polity, in the intimate relationship between the Emperor and 
the people, the Emperor was the sole bearer of national sovereignty standing 
above the people as a reflection of divinity and bestowing welfare unto the peo-
ple. Yet, equally vital for Torio’s conception of benevolent government, in his 
view the primary purpose of Eastern political philosophy, was the active role of 
the people both in parliamentarian politics and the moral self-cultivation neces-
sary for ethical interaction in social relations. This self-initiated moral cultiva-
tion was the foundation of the ethical state for which the parliamentarian system 
was designed to facilitate and mutually reinforce. The opposition activism in the 
1880s of this Buddhist–Confucian nationalist against the despotic modernizing 
reforms of the Meiji oligarchy, articulated through a culturally modified parlia-
mentarian ideology, helps clarify the understudied conservative involvement in 
the public sphere during this formative time of public furor over the nature of 
the Japanese political structure. The example of Torio and his ilk associated with 
the “National Essence Movement” clarifies that Emperor-centric political views 
envisioning an intimate involvement of the Emperor in political decisions could 
also serve as an abstract principle to critique the state and even the Emperor him-
self while simultaneously embracing a more inclusive, and even central, role for 
the people in national affairs through the ideal of benevolent rule cognizant of the 
popular will. The ideal of the intertwined nature of Imperial rule and popular will 
can be seen in Torio’s direct criticism of the Emperor in a written statement to 
him in November 1880. In the document, Torio criticized the failure to establish 
a constitution and a national assembly, financial wastefulness, and the lack of 
moral governance. Torio also boldly stated that the Emperor held responsibility 
for trustfully employing the services of the officials of the Satsuma-Chōshū clique 
who formed the despotic ruling oligarchy. He further reminded the Emperor that 
the ruler and the people have the same interests and thus the Emperor should base 
governance on the popular will.11
Torio’s parliamentarian thought was the product of an evolution from an initial 
support of a despotism devoted to military preparation against Western imperialism 
to a fervent belief in restraints on state power codified in a constitution compatible 
with Japanese culture. After being disillusioned by the authoritarian pragmatism of 
the oligarchy which he could not join in power, and which threatened his deeply 
held religious and ethical ideals, Torio began to demand a legislature independent 
of the cabinet. This legislature would channel the sentiments of the people to the 
Emperor through a popularly elected assembly to adhere to the ethical principles 
essential to ensuring benevolent rule. Torio’s critical stance toward his former close 
colleagues in the government based on principle was made possible by wielding 
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the legitimacy of the concepts of the Emperor and the people as the base of the 
state against the monopolization of power by the oligarchy. The use of the people 
as one base of legitimacy had important political implications and was intertwined 
with what could be thought of as an element of egalitarian tendencies rooted in a 
communalist view of ethics. Communal ethics articulated by Confucianism and 
Buddhism served as both the guide for self-realization within moral community 
and for national strength through solidarity. Torio’s participation in the diverse 
public debate over the nature of the Japanese Constitution to promote his conserva-
tive vision of the integration of both the Emperor as benevolent and active sover-
eign and the people as active agents in a moral system, was facilitated by his use of 
two themes: the concept of “public opinion,” and Torio’s adoption and reformula-
tion of liberal terminology, notably his conception of naturalism or “natural law.”
“Public opinion” was representative of a broader set of assumptions about the 
need for active citizens in the maintenance of the state. Furthermore, for Torio, 
natural law was based on the universal truth of “Eastern philosophy” or “Eastern 
religion,” which prescribed the social relations most conducive to the realization 
of the thriving of a fixed human nature. In both cases, Torio reworked liberal con-
cepts to privilege Confucianism and Buddhism as the basis of “civilization and 
enlightenment.” Under the unequal treaties forced upon Japan by the imperialist 
powers in which Japan was regarded as not fully civilized, there was a debate 
among Japanese nationalists concerning the adaptability of Western norms and 
the optimal degree of emulation necessary to enlighten the people and develop 
the nation. In his campaign to prove the relevance of “traditional” intellectual 
and political systems as civilization, Torio appears to have sought to strategically 
appropriate the discourse of liberalism, while overtly acknowledging some of its 
strengths, to show the sophistication of “Eastern thought” and its compatibility 
with a strong and independent state that could hold its own against the Western 
powers.
Consequently, Torio’s political campaigns and the influence on the public 
sphere he commanded help bring to light the full range of challenges confronting 
the oligarchy which impacted the choices they made concerning the framing of 
the Meiji Constitution. Torio’s career also sheds light on the civil society actors 
who ultimately worked to validate the Emperor system in prewar Japan as in the 
interest of the people and as a critical platform for evaluating the performance of 
the state. Finally, Torio and his movement also may provide insights into deep-
seated aspirations for alternative cultural systems and social ideals to liberalism 
which can potentially undergird a critical mass of public support for developmen-
talist, illiberal regimes whose social capital is founded on the pretense of provid-
ing for social needs divergent from the culturally, historically developed attitudes 
to state power in the European and North American experience.
From militarism to “public opinion”-based parliamentarianism
The first records of Torio’s early thought appear in 1873 when Torio was still an 
active military commander and primarily focused on the immediately pressing 
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concerns of military preparation for national defense. In an 1873 letter to Field 
Marshall Saigō Takamori, the head of the military at the time, Torio describes his 
urgent belief that the Japanese Empire should mobilize to become a garrison state 
with two-thirds of tax revenue devoted to national defense against what he felt to 
be an inevitable Western incursion.12 Crucially, however, by 1875, Torio’s views 
had significantly changed in response to what Torio saw as the shocking political 
self-interest of the ruling oligarchy13 as well as the unpredictable popularity of 
Western ideals of governance and the discourse on “civilization and enlighten-
ment.” The challenge of Western liberalism galvanized Torio to co-opt its termi-
nology to protect and promote his view of Japanese traditional political ideals. In 
his 1875 On Karma and National Power, written the year he was appointed to 
the deliberative body the Genrō-in, Torio divided “People’s Rights theory” into 
high and low streams. The high theory of people’s rights, argued Torio, would 
recognize the value of people’s rights and eliminate the root cause of the people’s 
“enslavement,” a phrase he and his protégés used frequently to denounce despotic 
governance and religion. Valuing the people’s rights would serve as the basis 
of the spirit of national independence. The state would pass laws respecting the 
rights of the people, while the people each individually would thus be encouraged 
to exert their strengths through the wielding of their rights. The low theory of 
people’s rights, represented by the emerging movement to emulate foreign mod-
els of governance, sought rapid change and reform and was grounded in nothing 
more than dissatisfaction with the government. In this writing, Torio also begins 
to develop his answer to natural law, writing that human rights (jinken 人権) are 
granted by heaven and are not arbitrary creations of men. It was the role of the 
monarch to defend these natural human rights.14 Further hints of his evolving view 
of the people can be gleaned from an 1880 memorial to the Emperor co-signed 
with Tani Tateki and other “National Essence” generals. Following a government 
corruption scandal concerning the sale of property, which was seen as the neces-
sary outcome of overcentralized control, there was a groundswell of public anger 
prompting a spate of memorials to the Emperor and government. In his memo-
rial, Torio revealingly relies on the sentiments of the “people” as justification to 
express his own opposition:
Since the government has lost its essential principles to an extent unprec-
edented in recent times at home or abroad, the three great powers, legisla-
tive, and judicial authority, are all united in the cabinet. We have the name 
of Imperial rule but not the reality. This has given suspicions among all the 
people.15
Torio had begun to more thoroughly codify his worldview in his 1878 political 
tract Kingly Law. This piece showed a more developed argument for the rights 
of the people and of social law as grounded in a human nature which could not 
be altered by the arbitrary power of state officials. The tract became influential 
and informed his general political activity throughout much of the 1880s. Torio’s 
Kingly Law claims that any ruler deserving the name govern according to the 
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sentiments of the people, thus advocating for the establishment of constitutional 
government through the founding of a legislative assembly. Torio maintained that 
“the mind of the people is the great law of the state” and that its members should 
have the great right to carry out politics in the realm. Torio argued: “The people 
have the great of right of choosing wise men to become legislators. Their task is 
to serve the interests of the realm and provide justice.”16 Torio’s argument that the 
state should be grounded in representative government draws on Mencius, stating: 
“Heaven sees according to what the people see and hears according to what the 
people hear. The Kingly Way comes into being when the ruler sees according to 
what the people see and hears what the people hear.”17 Remarkably, Torio justi-
fies the need for a legislature by stating that a ruler may not necessarily have the 
ability to adhere to the will of the people and ensure their happiness and stability.18 
As a result, the establishment of a legislative assembly chosen by the people could 
serve as a system to help ensure the implementation of these ideals. Through a 
parliament, contended Torio, the people would assist in carrying out the natural 
order which served as the premise of communal morality.
In the late 1880s and 1890s, Torio still conceded that his natural inclination 
was toward a benevolent despotism in which just rule was guaranteed by monar-
chy and not thwarted by self-interested politicians. Yet, Torio’s disillusionment 
with the dictatorial oligarchy led him to acknowledge that “despotic authoritarian-
ism can be effective in solving problems, yet if power is used for self-interest and 
is wielded through coercion it is called tyranny.”19 What was needed was, in part, 
to “take the strong point of the West, the elected legislature.”20 Torio would ulti-
mately come to the conclusion that this required a new attitude to the role of the 
people. Torio approvingly wrote after the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution:
Where once Japan was divided into castes, each with different occupations 
and the warrior class was tasked with leadership, now after the restoration of 
the monarchy, this monopoly is gone and replaced with a new constitutional 
state. All citizen-subjects are now tasked with the affairs of the state.21
A clear expression of the culminating political worldview which drove Torio’s 
political activism in the 1880s in the anticipation of the promulgation of the 
constitution can be seen in a memorial demanding the empowerment of the 
Genrō-in as an independent legislature which he wrote in 1887 as a member. 
The Genrō-in had been established by an Imperial Edict in 1875 announcing the 
intent to gradually transition toward a constitutional system and was to a signifi-
cant degree a response to the rise of the parliamentary movement. The Senate 
was tasked with drafting a constitution with a second edict giving instructions 
to “determine the cardinal laws of Japan” through “widely consulting the laws 
of foreign lands.”22 Its first draft in 1876 was highly elitist and called for the 
gradual introduction of representative government. Further drafts in 1878 and 
1880, however, incrementally accepted broader representation with a “council 
of representatives.”23 Nevertheless, the Senate’s recommendations were not 
accepted by the oligarchy.
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In his memorial, Torio denounces the relegation of the Senate, or Genrō-in, 
to a powerless bureaucracy. He argues that “the creation of laws is in fact the 
central basis of the state” and must be carried out by an independent legislature. 
However, the cabinet dominated by the oligarchy had despotically monopolized 
this power and had ignored the will of the people. Such unjust despotism was 
opposed even by Eastern ideals of governance based on monarchy. Legislation 
carried out by the state must follow two essential principles: the mind of the peo-
ple, which is ordained by heaven, and the laws of heaven, thus restricting the 
powers of the state. “From ancient times,” wrote Torio,
the leader of a new initiative would reflect on the heavenly ordained mind of 
the people, and determine laws through the laws of the ancient holy sages as 
his constitutional principles. Descendants would maintain the ancestral laws, 
and the realm would be governed by obediently conforming to the heavenly 
ordained mind of the people.24
The limits of power applied even to the Emperor, who must obediently follow 
his ancestral laws, and as a result, the people gratefully and respectfully accept 
his rule.
However, following the Restoration, it was no longer possible to maintain 
the old system as it was. Now was the time to determine the nature of legislative 
power and place the Empire on a firm basis, establishing a constitution through 
broadly consulting domestic and foreign political knowledge. To settle the issue 
of legislative power was to the settle the existential crisis of the Japanese state.25 
It was deeply regrettable that the Genrō-in, which should be endowed with leg-
islative powers, was entirely powerless. All of the power was relinquished to the 
cabinet ministers.26 The oligarchy was dangerously governing without relying on 
the ancestral law of the Imperial Household, not reflecting on the popular will 
(min’i jinshin 民意人心) or even adopting Western regulations.27 Here it should 
be emphasized that for Torio, not only were the ancestral law of the Imperial 
House and the popular will mutually reinforcing, but his ideal of governance 
was also potentially compatible with Western political thought if suited for his 
agenda of checking the power of the oligarchy. Torio continued his critique by 
arguing that cabinet ministers were acting on short-term interest according to 
what was convenient for themselves, which may prove inconvenient for later 
cabinets. Yet, the arbitrary nature of relying on their own ideologies and opinions 
did not allow for decision-making through public opinion. The main problem 
with the government was that both the powers of administration and legislation 
were held by the cabinet. These powers should be separated, and officials of 
state tasked with implementing legislations should have a nonbiased, nonpar-
tisan stance. The cabinet should only follow the law of the Emperor. Crucially, 
Torio declares that “[i]t is truly the great virtue of the Emperor that he freely, 
willingly abstains from being a despot and vows to decide (his policies) through 
public opinion.”28 The cabinet ministers, however, toyed with the Emperor and 
silenced his logical arguments.29
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Building on an argument he began making as his disillusionment with the gov-
ernment grew, Torio drew on what Winston Davis refers to as the “latent pop-
ulism” in the thought of Mencius to argue that a just ruler reflects the thoughts 
and needs of the people in his governance.30 Torio emphasized “public opinion” 
as one core tenet of the state to critique the Cabinet’s abuse of power and justify 
the expanded role of the Genrō-in as the government’s primary creator of laws 
and representative of the people. Mencius’ ideal was equated with the legitimiz-
ing quality of this newly prominent concept of “public opinion” and, in turn, the 
channeling of “public opinion” is equated with ideal of the benevolent “Kingly 
Way” to be facilitated through an independent legislature. According to Torio, the 
role of the Cabinet – the cabinet system having been established in 1885 to cement 
the oligarchy’s centralized control – was simply to implement the policy of the 
legislature in consultation with the Emperor.31
Despite being a religious and political conservative seen as standing at the 
extreme end of the political spectrum, Torio’s critique of the puppet status of 
the Genrō-in (Senate) and greater need to integrate public opinion to address the 
popular will struck a chord with several of the Genrō-in’s prominent members 
during this juncture in history. Among them, the memorial won signatures of 
support from two prominent “enlightenment” figures in the Genrō-in who had 
been members of the Meiroku-sha, Tsuda Mamichi, and Katō Hiroyuki, as well 
as cultural conservatives who would become members of Torio’s future political 
party, the Conservative Impartial Party.32 These discursive strategies promoting 
a degree of inclusion for the people were no doubt partly adopted in the pursuit 
of their own advancement out of resentment at exclusion from the inner sanctum 
power. However, at the very least, the adoption of “public opinion” reveals the 
conceptual adaptations and innovations that allowed effective communication in 
public ideological debates with political actors of different backgrounds. It further 
shows that a critique of the oligarchy conceived through a culturally domesti-
cated form of parliamentary thought could underpin a broad, if fleeting, consensus 
among often conflicting ideological factions.
“Public opinion” and the impact of the public sphere
Kyu Hyun Kim, in his study of the Japanese parliamentarian movement, has clarified 
the prevalence of the term “public opinion” and its central significance in the public 
discourse on Meiji-era parliamentarianism. Kim argues that the rise of “public opin-
ion” formed in tandem with a vibrant public sphere. The Japanese term, kōgi yoron 
or kōron, had long-standing historical significance for legitimizing the state and was 
initially used by domain lords to prove that they would work for the public good 
rather their own private interests. However, from the crisis sparked by the shock of 
Commodore Perry’s gunboat diplomacy in 1853 to the restoration of monarchical 
government in 1868, Kim explains, the term became frequently used by intellectu-
als and had evolved to mean public opinion in the modern sense. Channeling public 
opinion was seen as important among advocates of the reform of the shogunate 
system and for preventing extreme centralization under the Emperor.33
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Yet, Kim’s argument concerning the emergence of a public sphere has rekin-
dled a contentious debate about the nature of the constitutional order in Meiji 
Japan. Kim’s analysis of the broad range of views on the ideal function of parlia-
mentarian government within both the state and the civilian movement demanding 
the expansion of political participation through the opening of a national assembly 
led Kim to conclude that state power was not absolute and that civil society was 
powerful enough impact state policy. Parallel to Carol Gluck’s pathbreaking argu-
ment that the Imperial system and its political myths in the late Meiji period was 
not purely a one-sided imposition, but rather a co-creation actively embraced by 
imperial subjects to protect their own interests even against the state, Kim draws 
on the work of Elizabeth Berry to assert that the public sphere marshaled a degree 
of disciplining power on state efforts to monopolize control. Even outside a demo-
cratic framework, Berry argues, the public sphere can act through various means 
to hold power accountable and force it to live up to the rhetorical ideals which 
justify its control.34 As a result, Kim contends that the Meiji constitutional system 
was in part a product of a negotiation between the state and civil society.35
Other historians have challenged Kim’s attempt at revisionism, arguing that the 
“People’s Rights Movement” seeking to introduce constitutional reforms imploded 
as the result of internal class divisions and a repressive state which was ultimately 
successful in imposing a largely Prussian constitutional regime.36 Objectively 
evaluating an enduring, positive impact from the public sphere on state power will 
continue to elicit debate in ways likely tinged by the political assumptions and ide-
als of the historians themselves. What can be said in the case of the conservative 
opposition active in the public sphere is that although their success in impacting 
the constitutional structure paled in comparison to their great hopes, “National 
Essence” leaders such as Torio had an indelible effect on the formation of a mod-
ern ethnic nationalism among a younger generation of nationalist activists who 
directly impacted policy in the interwar period. The example of army general and 
Prime Minister Hayashi Senjūrō, an ardent disciple of the Society of the Great Way 
founded by Torio, will be briefly discussed in the conclusion.
Nevertheless, Kim has undeniably shown that there were few political actors 
who outright rejected parliamentarianism. There was a clear spectrum, however, 
of differing assumptions about the abilities of the people and the role of the state, 
etc., which were often either a misunderstanding of liberal ideas or deliberate 
reformulations. Kim acknowledges that this spectrum of parliamentary thought 
ranged from “reactionary” to “radical.” Yet, undergirding and informing nearly 
all of the strands of parliamentarian discourse was a central emphasis on the con-
cept of public opinion, or public discussion. In the case of conservatives, how-
ever, there remains a clear tendency to assume that “Emperor-centric views” were 
typically mutually exclusive with governance informed by public opinion. The 
diversity of “Emperor-centric” positions has been partly obscured by a tendency 
in the secondary literature to equate what is perceived as a largely monolithic 
conservatism and Confucianism with an opposition to the participation of the 
people in politics. Even in Kim’s work, which does recognize the complexity 
of conservatism, Torio is briefly mentioned in the same stroke as Confucianist 
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Motoda Eifu and even Inoue Kowashi, central advocate of a Prussian constitution, 
without explanation of their vast differences.37 The example of Torio, among the most 
enthusiastically Emperor-centric and doggedly Confucian politicians of the period 
together with other like-minded conservative opposition activists such as Tani Tateki, 
however, defies these assumptions and shows the breadth and diversity of ideological 
stances embracing the importance of integrating public opinion into Imperial rule as 
the method of forming public policy as well as the base of the legitimacy of the state. 
In fact, Torio’s embrace of the people as one central pillar of the nation allowed him 
to transcend, not entirely, it must be stressed, but to an important degree, the elitism 
associated with many Confucian thinkers (in Japanese guminkan 愚民観, a view that 
the people are foolish and unequipped to meaningfully participate in national affairs). 
This allowed Torio to make the charge of elitism to the oligarchy calling for more 
equal treatment of the people. Torio argued that “a government worthy of the name 
should not provide (spoils) to the rich, selfishly use the poor (for their own purposes), 
should not be partisan to the wise, nor look down on the foolish.”38
In contrast, the oligarchs Itō Hirobumi and Inoue Kowashi set about creating 
a Prussian constitution with notable assistance from German scholars who advo-
cated a social monarchy with the constitution ostensibly enshrining an Emperor 
with extensive power in response to the emergence of a vigorous parliamentar-
ian movement. Yet, to consolidate state institutions, the oligarchy enacted state-
centric policies, including the formation of the cabinet system in 1885 maligned 
by many opposition voices of many ideological backgrounds, including Torio’s. 
Kim explains that the state ideology ultimately engineered by the oligarchy was
expressed in the confirmation of the nation of the “national body” (kokutai 
国体) headed by the Emperor as the central tenet of the Japanese nation. The 
notions of popular sovereignty as well as “public opinion” as the source of 
political legitimacy was decisively refuted. Never would the legitimacy of 
the imperial government be challenged by mere “voices of the people.”39
Thus, Torio’s views based on public opinion can be easily distinguished from a 
purely statist view of the Imperial system.
Parliamentarianism as facilitating the natural order 
of the unity of the ethical state and society
Torio’s parliamentarianism, however, was not merely the product of the discourse 
on public opinion. There is a second undercurrent discernable in the language of 
the memorial on the Genrō-in, and Torio’s thought in general, which clarifies how 
he was able to balance an emphasis on state policy reflecting public opinion and 
yet also his explicit rejection of popular sovereignty in favor for sovereignty held 
exclusively by the Emperor. This was the concept of naturalism, of natural law. 
Torio sought to turn the tables on liberal thought by redefining liberal terms, and 
especially the concept of natural law used initially to justify the limitation of state 
intervention into society and potentially opening the way to value-pluralism and 
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republicanism challenging the cherished place of the Emperor. Torio, in his politi-
cal writings of the 1880s and 1890s, defines natural law as the universal truth of 
Confucian social relations and the karmic cause and effect of Buddhist law.40 The 
embrace of the discourse on law hinted at in his memorial on the Genrō-in also 
likely facilitated the communication of his ideas with the aforementioned enlight-
enment thinkers Tsuda, a noted legal scholar, and Katō, whose social Darwinist 
thought had not yet matured at this stage and whose earlier political view had 
been grounded in a conception of natural law, albeit one very different from the 
conception espoused by Torio.
For Torio, a popularly elected assembly was a mechanism for the nation to 
conform to the natural law of the universe, which would lead to stability and hap-
piness for the people of the realm. Public opinion served not merely to legitimate 
the power of the state but primarily as a necessary guide for the function of this 
benevolent government. Torio argued for an assembly which could integrate both 
of these ideals of public opinion and Confucian–Buddhist natural law. And the 
two ideals became axial principles providing a standard for critiquing the state 
as refined in his 1878 political treatise Kingly Law. Adopting a reformulated dis-
course on “natural law” was another way in which the conservative Torio was 
able to participate in the public sphere and interact and communicate with fun-
damentally differing viewpoints in the debate over the nature of a constitutional 
system appropriate for Japan. Torio used a culturally domesticated “natural law” 
based on “Eastern philosophy” to show a system of ethical laws must be suited 
to human thriving as determined by human nature and its natural passions. This 
was a hard truth which could not be arbitrarily manipulated by the oligarchy or 
the liberal parties.41
Like other advocates of the “National Essence Preservation Movement,” such 
as Torio’s associate, general Tani Tateki, Torio was angered by the oligarchy’s 
drive for nation-building and military strength at the expense of the general wel-
fare of the people. Governance guided by natural law should conform to the ethi-
cal natural order. Yet, “civilization and enlightenment” suppressed the natural 
sentiments of human nature. Westernization was unnatural and may go against 
the needs of the people and their stability, which must be the first priority of the 
state. Torio used the metaphor of a river that must be allowed to flow naturally. If 
dammed improperly, the river can overflow in unpredictable and destructive direc-
tions, suggesting that rapid national development may be counterproductive.42
A similar concern also comes out strongly in his views of education. Torio 
denounced the modernizing education policy of the oligarchy geared toward rapid 
national development. This approach, he cautioned, sacrificed the self-realization 
of a person’s true human nature. Education cannot impose the desires of the edu-
cators onto children. Torio argues that the people are not mere tools of the state 
and denounces the “for the state, we should do anything” attitude of many reform-
ers, stating, “people are not puppets to be manipulated from above.” Education 
must conform to human nature and its natural sentiments and passions. To force 
an unnatural development would do irreparable harm to the people of the nation. 
Natural law reflected the natural order and served as the foundation of ethics and 
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the standard of judging governance.43 As a result, the presentation of the funda-
mental principles of the constitutional state based on his understanding of natural 
laws also allowed Torio to justify his ideal communal ethics as the natural order 
to which all citizen-subjects must conform.
Torio’s development of his concept of natural law (tennen shizen no hō 
天然自然の法) occurred during the prominence of liberal concepts of society 
during the Meiji period and can be seen as a response to liberal influenced legal 
thought as introduced and popularized by Tsuda Mamichi and Nishi Amane, 
members of the Meiroku-sha “enlightenment” society mentioned above. Tsuda 
and Nishi had been sent by the Tokugawa shogunal government to study under 
Simon Vissering at Leiden from 1863 to 1865. Central to the education received 
from Vissering was his concept of natural law, which Nishi described as being 
“rooted in man’s nature, that is why it is called natural law.”44 However, under 
Vissering’s influence these two legal thinkers came to promote a division between 
subjective morals, and governance and law. Kiri Paramore explains that Tsuda 
and Nishi came to argue that:
natural law … was different to human nature, in that while human nature was 
a moral state that related one’s own conduct, natural law related to one’s rela-
tions with others, and was therefore concerned with what was just or unjust. 
Morals and law were therefore divided, and the ultimate status of natural law 
was described by Vissering as allowing freedom to the extent that the free-
dom of another is not hindered. Assisting people in poverty or sickness, or 
saving others in danger, was “a matter of morals, not of natural law.”45
Nishi saw the liberal ideals of Vissering as consistent with early, pure Confucianism 
and that later schools of neo-Confucianism had erroneously sought to fuse sub-
jective morals and law. Nishi wrote that it was the post-Zhu Xi neo-Confucians 
who sought to equate morality and governance, “making true one’s intention and 
rectifying the mind as wanting to equalize all under heaven,” a description which 
suited the neo-Confucian and Zen naturalism of Torio.46
By grounding his political worldview on the laws of Confucian relations, 
the cultivation of a human nature which intrinsically understood morality and 
Buddhist karmic law of cause and effect, Torio sought to legitimize a holistic con-
ception of social law as unified with morality, uniting governance and a universal 
morality determined by human nature. This concern for presenting Eastern tradi-
tion as describing rational laws which explained society and were legitimately 
consistent with the natural world was part of broader effort in the late 1880s to 
prove that Confucianism and Buddhism were integral elements of “Eastern phi-
losophy” that could hold its own against Western social and natural philosophy, 
and were in fact its superiors.47 Torio’s Kingly Law, in which he equates natural 
law with Confucianism and Buddhism, was a treatise which sought to offset the 
strength of liberal thought by redefining natural law not as limited government 
and individualistic value-pluralism, but rather as communal ethics buttressed by 
religious metaphysics which governed both the universe and the ideal social state. 
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Natural law was a reflection of laws of morality most suited to human nature. For 
Torio, the base of morality was the law of human interactions. Morality was the 
reciprocation of the two virtues of empathy and the knowledge of right and wrong.48 
People are already equipped with the tools to engage in moral behavior, and these 
tools are found in seijō 性情, which is human nature and its range of human emo-
tions. A disciplined human nature can effectively harness the emotions and if the 
seijō of the people is correct, then the fundamental principles of morality can be 
achieved. The work of true “civilization and enlightenment” was the complete 
advancement of this empathy and knowledge implemented through education.49
In his writings throughout the 1880s from Kingly Way onward, Torio sought 
to redefine the terms of liberalism such as freedom, autonomy, and equality to 
align with these Confucian and Buddhist concepts. In his Buddhist formulation, 
liberty and autonomy were the agency to pursue moral cultivation and the respon-
sibility of reaping the consequences of one’s actions in the context of the laws of 
the universe which were most conducive to ethics and morality.50 The law was 
realized through action, and each individual receives the effects of these actions. 
According to Torio, autonomy was used to realize the law, and freedom to follow 
the way. The people had the right to exert themselves to fulfill their own nature 
and not harm others. Their obligations were to maintain their own responsibility.51 
As opposed to the liberal concepts introduced by proponents of Western “civili-
zation and enlightenment,” Torio rejected the concept of fundamental subjective 
differences between individuals and with it the need for the liberty explore these 
subjective differences in thought and values. True freedom was the ability to dis-
cover pre-set universal laws true for everyone and which guided the goals of life 
and the direction of self-cultivation.
Egalitarian communalism and the agency of moral autonomy
Kingly Law became widely read and admired by such influential opinion makers 
as the publicist Kuga Katsunan, who admired a progressive quality in Torio’s 
argument. Kuga wrote:
(Torio) Sensei already had as his fundamental belief the equality heaven 
and earth, there being, from the beginning, no difference between high and 
low, self and others, and in this respect, his views almost resembled those 
expressed by Rousseau in Le discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité parmi les 
hommes in which he regarded equality as the original state (…)
This school believed constitutional government was right and proper; it 
recognized the well-understood truth of the liberal system, and did not cling at 
all to the customs of the past. Therefore, even though its members call them-
selves conservative, I must say that the truth is that they are instead radically 
progressive. However, in urging the truth of liberty and independence, they 
bitterly attack Europeanization and call themselves the Conservative School. 
Since they usually expound Confucianism and Buddhism and do not talk care-
lessly about the academic theories of the West, people misunderstand them 
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and believe they resemble the name they bear, the “Conservative School”. 
This is indeed a case in which name and fact do not agree. An indiscrimi-
nating school borrows some of the beliefs of old Western scholars, patches 
them together and constructs an antiquated political theory, and calls itself 
the Liberal or the Reform School. Such people should be greatly ashamed 
when they face this Conservative School.52
Yet, despite Kuga’s astonishing characterization of the highly conservative views 
of Torio as parallel to Rousseau, Kingly Law was in fact a concerted effort to 
stem the tide of liberalism. By reorienting the perceived strengths of liberal con-
cepts, namely, equality, freedom, and autonomy, and grounding them on a base of 
Buddhist and Confucian thought, Torio sought to conceptualize a parliamentarian 
system regulated by a concept of natural law compatible with his ideal of com-
munalist commitment to ethics. Whereas Kuga was especially enthusiastic about 
Torio’s embrace of “equality,” Torio uses the word in the Buddhist sense that all 
things in the universe are intertwined, and that equality is in fact also a reflection 
of differentiation. Torio’s argument that equality must come through differen-
tiation was designed to protect differentiated roles within society and through it, 
the five Confucian relations. Torio emphasized that the social order and meaning 
depended on validating normative human relations undergirding the Confucian 
ideal of “rectifying names.” Torio states that human society must have “a moral-
ity for people as people,” in other words, that must be built around the communal 
cooperative bonds most conducive to the flourishing of a fixed human nature. 
Most of all, the purpose of this argument appears to protect the transcendent status 
of the Emperor against republican ideas being introduced into Japan.
As Manabe Masayuki has pointed out, it appears that Kuga misunderstood that 
Torio was clearly seeking to counteract liberal individualism and the perceived 
shirking of moral obligations inherent in liberal freedom. Yet, there was some-
thing akin to a seductively liberating and egalitarian quality within the confines 
of a nationalist ideology which sought to harness the commitment of the people 
through devotion to the Emperor and nation all determined by the natural law of 
morality. This egalitarian element further clarifies his metaphysical natural law 
and the allure of his worldview. An understanding of this element can be gleaned 
from the opposition of his concept of liberty versus his use of “slavery” applied to 
both Christian creationism and repressive political systems. Stemming from his 
interpretation of Zen Buddhism and neo-Confucianism, which stressed that the 
world was a reflection of mind and its karmic effects, the cornerstone of Torio’s 
worldview was self-powered moral cultivation. One article in the periodical of 
the Society of the Great Way states that “if we Japanese master the Way, correct 
our mind, accumulate virtue and work for the benefit of the world, we (Japanese 
citizen-subjects) can become even a god (kami 神), even a Buddha, even a wise 
ruling-class gentleman.”53
There was a striking emphasis in both his writings on Buddhism and poli-
tics on individual will and the importance of self-driven striving for morality and 
knowledge which would serve as the base of moral order. Yet, there would appear 
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to be a tension between the subjectivity or agency in the autonomy of exerting 
individual will on the one hand and the absoluteness of the law of the universe on 
the other, which is a truth that “cannot be changed by the hands of men,” and is 
true regardless of whether the people recognize it or not. I suggest that the mean-
ing and purpose of self-powered striving for self-cultivation was made secure by 
law believed to be universal truth. Law based on Confucianism and Buddhism 
also served to manage the unity of the thought of the people not through coercion 
but through willing commitment, enticing all members of the nation to be striving 
toward the same goals and driven by the same values. Torio idealized unity of 
thought, in which the whole nation would come to a consensus on politics, which 
would transcend the partisan divisions he saw weakening the nation. The goal of 
politics, he argued, cannot be achieved if the minds of people are divided. Torio 
wrote that “if each individual will is divided into different interpretations we can-
not come to a non-partisan view. The peoples’ thought will be torn apart and will 
not be mended.” Each individual, family, village, and region had its own subjec-
tive interests, but individuals must abandon their understandings of self-interest as 
delusions of the mind and work for the interest of the public.54
Bob Wakabayashi has argued that Confucian thought during the Meiji period 
was designed to protect the status quo and entrench hierarchy.55 In reality, paral-
lel to “enlightenment” figures within the Meiroku-sha, Torio’s cultural national-
ist political worldview was constructed in part as opposition to the oppressive 
despotism and arbitrary class-based hierarchy of the Tokugawa regime, and his 
campaign against the Meiji oligarchy was highly colored by this critique. In fact, 
as suggested above, a trenchant attack on unjust government was the central thrust 
in his articulation of political ideals, for despotism leads to misery and economic 
inequality, and ultimately to national weakness. Underpinning his political ideals 
was a clearly defined set of communal ethics which was not strictly top-down and 
instrumentalist. It was this communalist view which propelled his opposition to 
liberal individualism, value-pluralism, and economic thought he associated with 
selfish greed and exploitation. Along these lines, Torio characteristically stated:
Determining superior and inferior, and competition, is not the truth of nature. 
If trying to maintain human morality and the equality of happiness, the (lib-
eral) theory of the strong defeating the weak is absolutely not the way to fol-
low the truth of the universe.56
Further evidence of Torio’s more inclusive role for the people comes from his 
vision for the people outside of the state. Torio makes clear that the parliamentar-
ian system in which the needs of the people are recognized by the state itself is 
not complete. The constitutional state must operate within a broader moral sys-
tem in which the people play an essential role, thus valuing the ethical agency 
of the people. As Torio states: “A country’s civilization, its rightful path... even 
if it can be said that it is potentially facilitated by the wisdom of politicians, is 
entirely based on the nature of a nation, which emerges from the manners and 
customs of the people.”57 These customs and manners guided the people in their 
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self-cultivation and their ethical interactions with their peers. Torio believed that 
each individual must reflect on one’s own actions and determine what is mutually 
beneficial for self and others.58 Self-reflection to gauge the impact on others was 
possible because “all heart-minds are the same” and this equality of self and oth-
ers (jita byōdō 自他平等) allows the empathy essential for self-reflection.59
Moral action was further facilitated by the fact that all people are naturally equipped 
with an innate understanding of morality, but devices, such as religiously informed man-
ners, are needed to act on this innate awareness. Torio believed that “the separation of 
religion and politics was the result of Western public discussion.” But ethics must be 
rooted in social customs, and in Japan, religious ethics and politics were united. Social 
behavior was guided by Shinto, Confucianism, and Buddhism.60 The contest over the 
nature of the Japanese Constitution was for Torio a question of what values should orient 
the hearts and minds of the people and form the social manners necessary for civiliza-
tion, the cornerstone of which was morality. Torio explains:
In the West, having the God of Heaven as an object of worship provides the 
social manners which allow the people to seek to improve the world and is 
the source of equality, and is the reason behind the popular demand for liber-
alism and egalitarianism.61
However, in Japanese civilization, manners emerged from loyalty and filial piety 
to the Emperor, the laws of the Imperial Household being equated and intertwined 
with the laws of Confucianism and Buddhism.
In sum, Torio’s conception of a moral constitutional order required both a 
national assembly channeling public opinion and the moral agency of the people 
for just governance to conform to the ethical natural order. The central thrust of 
Torio’s ideal of ethical natural order, which conformity to natural law was to 
bring about, was defined by the striving to support the public good over private 
self-interest. To not live in accordance with this public ideal would bring suffering 
upon self and society. This prioritization of the public over private and consequent 
belief in the necessity of the active participation of all members of the nation in 
the maintenance of benevolent rule led to important political implications.
The egalitarianism of ethnic nationalism
Torio’s totalistic worldview integrating morality and governance demanded 
inclusion of the entirety of the nation for the realization of ethical ideals and 
for national strength. Despite Torio’s statements that Western “civilization and 
enlightenment” is the path to human extinction and that Western “theories of 
freedom and equality would destroy the good customs of our land,” by which 
he largely meant that they would lead to republicanism and challenge the status 
of the Emperor,62 Torio was opposed to the class system in which the warrior 
class monopolized privileges to the detriment of meritocracy, noting that “even 
highly talented people cannot help save the world if they are suppressed by class 
hierarchy.”63 Now that feudalism had been eliminated and Japan must construct 
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a strong, independent state, the solution to preventing both the injustice of self-
serving Western liberalism and the despotism of arbitrary authoritarian develop-
mentalism was an ethical system informed by the traditional Eastern principles of 
benevolent governance. From ancient times, Eastern thought was solely carried 
out for the happiness of the people and it was not morally acceptable for the strong 
to take advantage of the weak and foolish.64
Benevolent government could only come about through a public spirit and not 
through self-interested competition. Western “civilization and enlightenment,” 
however, was fundamentally driven by self-interest, and by satisfying worldly 
desires. This led Torio to claim that “Western civilization and enlightenment is 
driven by greed and is nothing more than a great struggle where the strong and 
intelligent win supremacy” over the weak.65 Republican America proudly claims 
to be the world’s most free and politically equal country. Yet, economic equal-
ity is not possible in this kind of system. A new hierarchy emerges based on the 
accumulation of property and not through moral striving. This leads to the misery 
of the poor. For Torio, this reflected a morally bankrupt society and may also lead 
to political extremism such as republicanism.66 Writing in the context of not only 
a burdensome tax regime for developmental goals but also the unequal treaties 
which forbid import tariffs ultimately causing negative trade imbalances, Torio 
argued that those who see Western history in a positive light, and who worship 
the West, do not see that their policies were causing harm for generations and 
that most of the population in Japan was suffering. Torio laments that no matter 
how much the people work, their production is not enough to earn a living. Torio 
voices similar denunciations of imperialism, which he explains as the result of 
selfish immorality leading the West to lose the Way.67
Torio’s tirade against the Meiji government’s perceived exclusion of the peo-
ple extended to education. Torio argues that education is not just for the elite. 
True civilization fully recognizes the central importance of everyday skills, and 
the contributions to society of a range of different people and the need for their 
cultivation. Civilization must be for the whole of the nation. With seething indig-
nation, Torio fumes that “this idea that the ‘high-collar’ upper class, who have 
assets above the average and have a little education and knowledge, are the only 
ones with ‘civilization,’ is not true civilization.” If this was the case,
then imagine if a new train line was created. Are the well-to-do passengers 
in the train the only ones with civilization? But that means that those who 
toil underground to mine the coal (and who make the train run) have no 
civilization.
In this recklessly hasty developmentalism, for “those good people doing menial 
labor and suffering under increased taxation, there is no ‘civilization.’”68 Torio 
continues by exclaiming that despite the hostility of the elites toward the lowly 
jinrikisha drivers, he had always found them to be morally upright and scrupulous 
about money, unlike many upper-class people who manipulated the nuances and 
gaps in law for their own profit. In referencing cart pullers, Torio was possibly 
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making a veiled criticism of the elitism of the penultimate Meiji liberal thinker and 
central Meiroku-sha member Fukuzawa Yukichi, who had stated the unwashed 
masses, “the peasants and cart pullers,” were not yet equipped to participate in 
politics. For Torio, the privileging of industrial and financial power for national 
development over the moral customs of the people, which in his eyes brought 
true happiness and stability, meant that the true definition of civilization had been 
turned “upside-down.”69
Torio’s views can also be interpreted as being tinged with a level of pater-
nalism stating that if the people’s thought and action are not enlightened, they 
can fall back into an acceptance of despotism. Yet, crucially, he does evince the 
recognition that the ruling class was not possible without the lower classes. Torio 
states that it is inevitable that the wealthy and respectable dominate human soci-
ety, and the poor will be forced to submit. Yet, drawing on his belief in Confucian 
benevolence, those with power must take responsibility accordingly, and through 
their own self-initiative seize the duty of the exemplary gentlemen. The wealthy, 
cautions Torio,
are not capable of earning their wealth by themselves. The status of wealth 
and respect must inevitably come from benefitting from the poor. Therefore, 
they must also (work) for the interests of the masses, and love the mass of 
commoners. They should lovingly use them and bring about their happiness 
and virtue. The wealthy should lovingly cultivate the poor, and the respect-
able should lovingly protect them.70
Torio goes on to explain that deciding the Emperor as the leader of the nation 
prevents competition and fighting over who is superior and inferior, prevent-
ing the exploitation seen in the liberalism of the West.71 Nevertheless, Torio’s 
spirited defense of the underrepresented and exploited, which commanded the 
respect of many who saw him as champion of People’s Rights, was not only moti-
vated by ethics. Torio’s need for inclusion of the populace was also driven by the 
pragmatic concerns of strengthening national security. In his writing on tax law, 
Torio makes this explicit. Torio argued that tax policy favoring landlords would 
enrich the property owners and bring calamity to poor farmers. In the crucible 
of Western imperialism and intense competition among nations, Japan must not 
engage in destructive competition within the country. Japanese policy concerning 
land, which he argued was the property of the state, and taxation must be for the 
“total” of the nation to ensure ethics and strength, a mentality that has resonances 
with the interwar period.72
Party politics and the role of the public-
minded exemplary gentleman
The question is then what was the nature of the relationship between the state, 
which was ideally informed by public opinion while conforming to the ethical 
natural order, and society, which operated on individual moral striving; and how 
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they were seen to be joined into a functional whole. As the opening of the Diet 
approached in the late 1880s, Torio began to delineate more specific ideas about 
party politics. He imagined that the parliamentarian system would create a fluid 
interaction between the benevolent state and the active populace. Whereas Kingly 
Law had laid out the ethical philosophy underpinning Torio’s argument for a con-
stitutional system, Discussions of Current Affairs emphasized that the ethical state 
required assistance from exemplary moral gentlemen to assist the Emperor in 
carrying out the affairs of the state.73 More concrete details concerning the role of 
exemplary gentlemen in party politics were detailed in a publication for Torio’s 
political party, the Conservative Impartial Party founded in 1888. Torio’s presen-
tation of the fusing of the mind of the people and the Emperor remains the central 
priority:
In regard to our Imperial Diet, the gathering of the people’s representatives, 
it is entirely (a process in which) the monarch takes the mind of the people as 
his own mind, and this is born from the great mind of the Imperial ancestry. 
The monarch cultivates the great morality of the Imperial ancestry and clari-
fies it for the current era.74
The Party’s journal, New Thesis on Conservatism, began publishing along with 
the establishment of the party in 1888 during a period when Torio had become 
a member of the Privy Council. An 1889 editorial, “On Political Parties,” begins 
with an invocation of the central Confucian ideals of filial piety, of good and 
beauty and meritocratic employment of men of talent in the state. Yet, as com-
pelling as these truths are, they are not enough to save the nation from its weak-
ness.75 Thus again, for Torio’s party, the establishment of an elected legislative 
assembly was seen by Torio and his followers as essential for the empowerment 
of the nation and its deliverance from debilitating internal divisions and existen-
tial external threats. Nevertheless, the pursuit of morality and the active partici-
pation of the people was required for the system to function. In the post-feudal 
era, claims the editorial, the Emperor saw that the country had deteriorated into 
chaos and decided that Japan must have constitutional government. A constitu-
tional government requires political parties, and inevitably there will be competi-
tion and disagreement about ideas. However, the purpose of the parties should be 
to determine the interests of the nation and to preserve its ancient foundation by 
showing the right path.76 As in many of Torio’s writings, parliamentarian reforms 
in the modern era were clarified in contradistinction to the concept of despotism, 
in which the ruler chooses who is worthy of serving the state. In contrast, in a 
constitutional polity, representatives and policy are chosen by the majority of the 
people.77 Those seeking office may be exemplary gentlemen (kunshi, defined as 
those who put public good over private interest) whose ideas conform to morality, 
or may be small men driven by self-interest. Given the inherent difficulty for the 
average citizen to distinguish between the exemplary gentlemen and the oppor-
tunists, the parties’ fundamental task is to define their philosophy and publicize 
them. Both the exemplary gentlemen and the small men must come forward with 
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their platforms, and the people decide.78 This facilitates the process in which the 
people distinguish between the well-intentioned statesmen and the small men, 
thus orienting the people.79 It is assumed that the political process will expose 
the fraudulent opportunists telling the people what they want to hear, bringing to 
the fore true patriots seeking to implement ethical principles naturally shared by 
everyone once properly clarified.
The ultimate goal, according to Torio, is to orient and unify the thought of the 
people. Under the Constitution of the country, the way of the nation is determined 
by the majority of the people, and it is their choice which determines its prosper-
ity or decline and fall. But he cautions that this does not mean that the people will 
choose the way of stability and prosperity. It is imperative that upright men of 
loyalty, imagined by Torio to be outside the state, give their all to analyzing and 
critiquing the platforms of the various parties to help identify which political par-
ties are the parties of the exemplary gentlemen and which would bring catastrophe 
to the country. For Torio and his conservatives, the Great Way, the natural order of 
morality, was a reality whether the people chose it or not. Yet, it is important that 
the people come to understand the Way through persuasion and the work of right-
eous patriots. New Thesis on Conservativism states that even if a system is funda-
mentally sound and the ruler strong, the ideals of politics cannot be achieved if the 
minds of the people are divided.80 The importance of the people choosing their rep-
resentatives is central, and yet the ideal outcome is to achieve willing consensus.
However, as New Thesis on Conservatism makes abundantly clear, this does 
not mean that the people are sovereign. The Emperor has granted the people 
the right to participate in his legislation and are to assist in the creation of laws 
within the limits of their power though the people’s representatives. Torio’s party 
flatly rejected the concept of party cabinets, which would mean depriving the 
Emperor of all power. The realm of the people’s rights was the legislature, and 
the realm of the ruler’s rights (the prerogative of the Emperor) was the cabinet.81 
This conception further sought to ideologically restrict the ability of the Diet to 
stray from Torio and his party’s idealized views by arguing that those members 
of the legislative assembly elected by a majority of the people should uphold 
the fundamental principles of the polity, which are fixed by culture and cannot 
be arbitrarily changed.82 Thus, it can be gleaned from the party platform, and 
his career as a whole, that Torio’s vision of benevolent government simultane-
ously sought to empower the people to embrace an active role in the nation and 
ideologically enforce boundaries of acceptable thought and values to protect his 
own ideals for communal ethics and nationalism. Following the promulgation 
of the Constitution, Torio gave his thoughts on the details of the document in a 
writing titled Omi no Tomogaki (The Limits of the Emperor’s Servants). Barbara 
Teters and Janine Sawada have noted that Torio continued to vigorously seek 
revisions to draft constitutions sent to the newly formed Privy Council, of which 
he was a member, despite winning only a few concessions such as the right of the 
Diet to initiate legislation.83 This suggests the degree in which Torio was deeply 
frustrated with the nature of the emerging constitution being crafted by the rul-
ing oligarchy. However, in Omi no Tomogaki, Torio seems enthusiastic that the 
Constitution, often thought to be a Prussian façade, provided actual rights and 
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should be regarded as the “scripture” of the nation. Torio approvingly notes that 
the Constitution provided an independent legislature the proof of which was the 
opening of elections. Torio also suggests that the Diet would have real power 
over the budget. Torio argues that the nation, and the liberal parties, should be 
satisfied with the rights codified in the Meiji Constitution and not demand more 
rights.84 This apparent approval of the Meiji Constitution would perhaps expose 
the limits of Torio’s ideas as an opposition worldview. Yet, Torio’s view of the 
Diet’s power with the budget presaged an argument later made by historian Banno 
Junji, who has shown that the power to reject a budget from the cabinet during 
a time when the government required ever more funding for its developmental 
goals, especially during the Sino-Japanese war, granted a level of negotiating lev-
erage. Banno has shown that the popular parties, who advocated tax reduction, 
could exploit such opportunities to check the ruling clique, if only in consequence 
to force a stalemate until some in the oligarchy later relinquished opposition to 
reduction in the tax burden.85 Furthermore, the continuity of Torio’s opposition 
stance is revealed most clearly in his later writing criticizing proposals to reevalu-
ate land values which Torio saw as a bid by landlords to evade their proper share 
of taxation. After denouncing the proposals for seeking to enrich landed elites, 
Torio fumed that “it could be said that the House of Representatives is the land-
lord’s Diet,” which preaches public opinion and claims the mantel of people’s 
rights as people’s parties, yet merely represents the will and interests of a small 
number of landlords.86 Torio further lamented that in “the circumstances of today, 
it can rather be said that the right to vote is not a human right, but a right of land, 
a right of property ownership.”87 This bitter disillusionment with the reality of 
self-serving politics set the tone for a younger generation of nationalist activ-
ists eager to rectify the betrayal of the Restoration and achieve true justice and 
self-realization through the intimate relationship between devoted subjects and 
benevolent Emperor.
Conclusion
The Chōshū military commander and conservative politician Torio Koyata 
aggressively promoted a constitutional parliamentarianism which fundamentally 
rejected liberal Westernization. Torio sought to develop an alternative form of 
parliamentarianism based on social values informed by Buddhism and neo-Con-
fucianism. Torio’s participation in the national discussion to win support for his 
political views was facilitated by the use of two themes in his argument for a 
Japanese-style representative government: the reflection of “public opinion” in 
governance, which he equated with his interpretation of Mencian thought, namely, 
benevolent monarchy reflecting the popular will; and the reinterpretation of lib-
eral terms such as liberty, autonomy, equality, and natural law to have Confucian 
and Buddhist meanings. This parliamentarian construct was designed to offset the 
rise of individualism, value-pluralism, and economic liberalism, and protect a sys-
tem of ethical cultivation under a benevolent Emperor which he saw as the source 
of personal self-realization. Torio also perceived this system as the source for the 
national ideological solidarity necessary for independence and military strength 
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during a period when Japan was still vulnerable to Imperialist encroachment. This 
discourse further had, to a significant degree, egalitarian consequences for per-
ceptions of the people’s inclusion in politics and impacted a later generation of 
nationalist ideologues who would come to power in the 1930s.
Torio’s efforts to pressure the state and persuade fellow citizens to share his 
ideals for the Japanese political structure and the nature of “people’s rights” not 
only shows the important conservative participation in the parliamentarian move-
ment during the lead up to the promulgation of the Constitution, but also how 
“public opinion,” a discourse which had pre-Restoration roots and suggests a 
broadening base of inclusion in politics, was understood as an essential element of 
benevolent Imperial rule. Some historians have argued that this trend represented 
a public sphere, a place where state power was scrutinized and disciplined by a 
civil society powerful enough to exert agency through vigorous protest if the state 
deviated from a tacit social contract. As a result, the Meiji constitutional structure 
must be recognized as a negotiated product between state and society and not 
merely a one-sided imposition. I suggest for further research that one way of iden-
tifying the actual impact of the public sphere represented by the parliamentarian 
movement on the state would be to broaden the temporal scope of analysis beyond 
the impact on the Meiji Constitution itself to the interwar period, when national-
ists influenced by the “National Essence” ideologues of the 1880s and 1890s who 
had participated in the parliamentarian movement began to challenge the Meiji 
consensus on government with parallel critiques in the 1930s. The process of mid-
Meiji cultural conservatives agitating through writings, speeches, the formation of 
parties, and petitions forged a new ethnic nationalism which conditioned popular 
attitudes idealizing a benevolent state and a populace whose ideological commit-
ment sustained the state. These ideals influenced a younger generation who later 
emerged as important officials and thinkers and may help explain the political cli-
mate of the interwar period. One direct example of this influence is Army General 
Hayashi Senjūrō, who participated in the Manchurian Incident in 1931, served as 
Minster of the Army in 1934–1935, and briefly became prime minister in 1937. In 
his youth in the 1890s, Hayashi had, in fact, been an ardent disciple and member 
of the Society of the Great Way founded by Torio Koyata along with other reli-
gious nationalists such as Kawai Kiyomaru. During his tenure as Prime Minister, 
Hayashi sought to promote the Fundamentals of Our National Polity as national 
ideology orthodoxy and saw his cabinet as a way of implementing the ideals of the 
Society of the Great Way.88 In 1938, Hayashi resuscitated the Society of the Great 
Way for the purpose of war mobilization on the home front and reprinted many 
of its Meiji-era writings on political ideals.89 Hayashi’s own writings also reveal 
familiar criticisms of the distortions of Japanese culture through the incursions of 
Western political liberalism and economic thought.90
In understanding the enthusiastic embrace of the paradigm of an active public 
sphere outside of popular sovereignty, it is helpful to consider why the ideals of 
the religio-political organizations led by Torio as well as other “National Essence” 
ideologues could have inspired a critical mass of Japanese nationalists as private cit-
izen-subjects before they entered the state. Torio did not argue for a return to feudal 
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hierarchies. In contrast, his was a call for human liberation under benevolent gov-
ernance providing welfare for the people. This would free the people from oppres-
sion, obstructing the realization of their true nature. Nevertheless, as Mary Elizabeth 
Berry has stated, it is a matter of historical fact that Japan was an authoritarian state 
in the prewar period.91 However, the career of Torio Koyata and his followers helps 
clarify that the Emperor-centric opposition worldviews of some prominent conserv-
atives did not perceive the ideal of the Imperial system as authoritarian in the sense 
of abusive despotism. Torio, who helped promote Imperial rule as beneficial to the 
interests of the people and saw the Emperor as a reification of principle, criticized 
feudal despotism as trenchantly as he did liberalism. In fact, he saw both as leading 
to a tyranny which prevented the true realization of a moral community.
Torio’s views sought justification in the transcendent principles of religion 
and thus appeared to some observers rigidly opposed to change. Nevertheless, 
the assumptions underlying his attitudes to state and society broadly overlapped 
with mainstream views current throughout the prewar period. In fact, Manabe 
Masayuki has referred to Torio’s political views as “Confucian minpon-shugi.”92 
The term minpon-shugi 民本主義, the “people as base,” was promoted by pre-
war Japanese liberalist thinkers denoting representative government, yet with the 
Emperor as sovereign. This concept was conceived in distinction to democracy, 
minshu-shugi 民主主義, in which the people are sovereign, and was seen as a form 
of constitutional government compatible with the unique nature of the Imperial 
Japanese polity. Minpon-shugi is a concept most closely associated with “lib-
eral” theorist Yoshino Sakuzō during the period of “Taishō Democracy.” Thus, 
some might quibble that this would be a superficial and anachronistic label for 
Torio’s Meiji-era thought. Yet, a comparison between the thought of the osten-
sibly more palatable Yoshino, surely thought to be radically more progressive 
than the “reactionary” Torio, reveals a shared paradigm of state society relations 
outside of democracy that allowed for a vibrant public sphere scrutinizing power 
and seeking to discipline a despotic state. This paradigm and its obvious parallels 
to Torio’s earlier discourse can be seen in the explanation of Yoshino’s theory of 
minpon-shugi provided in the classic article by Berry, which informed the work 
of Kyu Hyun Kim. Berry explains:
Yoshino Sakuzō … argued that “minority rule is always government in a dark 
chamber” where “excesses” and “abuses” are given license. Thus he insisted 
that policy be set “in accordance with the people’s opinions” and that suffrage 
be extended to guarantee a “just and equitable” government devoted to “the 
welfare of the people.” At the same time, Yoshino rejected “the dangerous 
theory of popular sovereignty,” embracing “loyalty to the Emperor” as the 
“essence of our national polity.” Like the overwhelming majority of politi-
cal actors in pre-occupation Japan, Yoshino Sakuzō continued to accept the 
premise of authoritarian rule: the power of decision lay finally in a leadership 
subordinate only to a sovereign Emperor. The challenge is to reconcile this 
authoritarian premise with the role claimed for popular “opinion” in opposi-
tion to “minority rule.”93
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Berry’s influential solution was the concept of a public sphere in which power was 
scrutinized and held in check without challenging the premise of the authoritar-
ian paradigm. However, the question of why the paradigm itself, at least among 
some prominent thinkers, was not viscerally felt to be inherently oppressive but 
in fact liberating also requires analysis. The solution is partially suggested in the 
quote which opens this article. Torio believed that true liberty and autonomy, as 
well as equality, were guaranteed by equal happiness and the meeting of fixed 
human needs which all individuals naturally share through the positive rights of 
state-provided welfare. As Torio argued, politics was for the sake of the happiness 
and welfare of the whole of the people and should conform to natural needs. It 
should not be dictated by foreign standards, nor be artificially conconted by cun-
ning and skillful politicians.94 This paradigm is only conceivable with the rejec-
tion of subjective differences among individuals in perceptions of self-interest. 
Liberal civil society, the space for voluntary cooperation and the negotiation of 
conflicting perceptions of self-interest, as well as popular sovereignty, the mecha-
nism to determine the direction of state policy through an electoral majority, are 
entirely unnecessary if all citizens share the same fundamental understanding of 
self-interest reflected in and enforced by the transcendent principles of the ethical 
state. Individual subjectivity, which legitimated pluralism and competition, in fact 
threatened the ethics of mutual cooperation and of a tightly bound collective sub-
jectivity needed for national strength. According to Torio, individual self-interest 
which deviated this ideal was thus viewed suspiciously in a Buddhist sense as 
delusions of the mind, as false consciousness.
Despite the reputation of Torio’s ideology as a reaction against modernity, his 
parliamentarian views reflect a modern ethnic nationalism rejecting the stagnat-
ing rigidity of class-based feudal despotism for a more broadly inclusive national 
politics. This allowed the critical independence to oppose national development 
at the expense of the human development of the people. Torio’s worldview was a 
product of one trend within the Japanese response to the crisis of nation-building, 
which out of an acute sense of geopolitical urgency emphasized the importance 
of expanding the sectors of the society who could be the bearers of the state. 
One purpose of his conception of a constitutional parliamentarian system was to 
harness this broad-based modern ethnic nationalism in an effort to politicize yet 
homogenize a national body activated by national cultural awareness, an impulse 
which perhaps sheds light on other anti-liberal developmentalist movements in 
East Asia and the world.
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The term zemskii sobor (“the assembly of the land”) was coined in the nineteenth 
century to refer to a number of different assemblies in the Tsardom of Russia.2 
It was contested in the historiographies of early modern Russia, with the discus-
sions revolving around the questions whether the individual instances of sobor 
(“assembly”) and sovet (“council”) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
could be seen as a coherent, albeit dynamic, institution; what constituencies (local 
and “social estate”) were represented there; what role they played in the rela-
tions between the autocrat and his subjects; and how they could be compared to 
“parliaments” and other assemblies in premodern and early modern Europe and 
Asia. Most of contemporary authors agree that the zemskii sobor was not a coher-
ent institution, and that it was not a “parliament” comparable to, for instance, the 
English Parliament or the Polish–Lithuanian Sejm (“assembly”) of the time. The 
historiographic debates on the zemskii sobor had intertwined with myth-making 
since before the consolidation of the term. The zemskii sobor was used by both the 
opponents and the proponents of parliamentarism in Russia, nourishing both auto-
cratic and democratic political mythologies. Furthermore, during the Revolution 
of 1905–1907, the Revolution of 1917, and the Civil War of 1918–1922, practical 
attempts were made to “reestablish” the institution. The Priamur Zemskii Sobor, 
which convened in Vladivostok in the summer of 1922, became the first assembly 
to bear such a name.
The current study charted the interpretations of the zemskii sobor in histori-
ography and positioned the term in the autocratic and democratic mythologies 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The historiographic debates on 
the zemskii sobor, be it a coherent institution or an umbrella term for discon-
nected assemblies, was stimulated by the lack of reliable sources on individual 
assemblies, which made the reconstruction of representation and proceedings 
impossible in many cases. When such reconstruction was possible, the situational 
representation of different localities and social groups at the assemblies, as well as 
the latter’s irregularity and incoherence, pointed to the embeddedness of individ-
ual assemblies in the hierarchical imperial governance. The heterogeneity of the 
interactions between the monarch and his subjects, which could be categorized 
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according to their social strata, locality, and position of service, contributed to 
the imagining of the zemskii sobor as an institution of pluralistic political repre-
sentation in a dynamic composite society, that is, an imperial “parliament,”3 even 
though there is no evidence that the historical sobors played such a role. At the 
same time, this heterogeneity also made the individual sobors part of the differen-
tiated yet centralized imperial autocratic governance, built through heterogenous 
practices,4 and hence a “non-parliament.”
This study benefited from the Cambridge approach to intellectual history. 
When discussing historical texts, produced by Russian-language intellectuals and 
bureaucrats before 1922, it foregrounded the performative aspect of the term’s use 
within concrete political circumstances and, following Quentin Skinner, under-
stood the contextualized texts as political actions in the authors’ pursuit of specific 
objectives rather than mere reflections.5 In this respect, this study defined political 
mythology as the narratives of the presumed phenomena of the past which were 
modified and applied to suit the political goals of the present. Given the chapter’s 
focus on the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the mythologies of the zem-
skii sobor were studied against the backdrop of Russia’s heterogeneous national-
ist discourse in its multiple and intersecting romantic and civic aspects.6
The variety of the sobors in terms of their composition and genesis and the lack 
of factual information on the individual assemblies made the term zemskii sobor 
applicable for both autocratic and democratic mythologies.7 In the autocratic 
mythology, it represented the popular consensus behind God’s anointed Romanov 
Tsars, referring to the 1613 “Zemskii sobor,” which approved the new dynasty, 
ending the Time of Troubles (1598–1613). This interpretation was employed in 
the legitimation of the Romanov dynasty, including during the imperial crisis of 
the early twentieth century, and became an important component of romantic and 
pragmatic monarchist nationalism. In the democratic mythology, it was a histori-
cal Russian “parliament,” or at least a precursor of one, which legitimized and 
constituted the Russian state. In this sense, the zemskii sobor was used for criticiz-
ing autocracy. If “reconvened,” it was anticipated to become a modern constitu-
ent assembly, similar to the French National Constituent Assembly of 1789, or a 
modern parliament, and the concept was built into the different approaches to the 
Russian civic nation. Both mythologies, as well as their intersections, informed 
political imaginations and designs of the imperial and postimperial government. 
Given the intersections of ideas and the changing agendas of the authors, the divi-
sion of the mythologies of the zemskii sobor into autocratic and democratic was 
schematic and based on the predominance of the Tsar or the people as the source 
of authority in the individual texts and on the extent of the proposed political 
changes.
Historiographies
The term zemskii sobor, denoting the assemblies in Russia of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, is a historiographic term. As such, it appeared in the 
1850s, together with the systematic discussion of the presumed institution. The 
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historiographic discussions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 
heavily influenced by the authors’ political views, including on Russia’s future. 
Over the course of the debates, however, more and more sources came to the 
knowledge of historians, providing the foundation for more neutral takes on the 
term and informing the contemporary historiographic discussion. The latter has 
unfolded since the second half of the twentieth century and featured direct polem-
ics between Soviet and international authors in the 1980s. Since their beginning 
in the nineteenth century, the debates have revolved around the position of the 
sobors in the system of autocracy, the connections between the central govern-
ment and localities (towns and provinces), and the existence or nonexistence of 
social estates in early modern Russia. There has been a growing consensus that 
the zemskii sobor was not a coherent institution, and some authors prefer not to 
use this term at all even when discussing the widespread process of consultation 
in early modern Russia.8
Historically, the word sobor was used for assemblies since the premodern 
period. It appeared in the ecclesiastical context in relation to Rus’ already in the 
eleventh century. A text, dated to the 1030s–1050s and surviving in a fifteenth-
century version, for instance, mentioned Prince Vladimir getting advice from 
the bishops on legislative matters and compared him to the Byzantine Emperor 
Constantin the Great, who issued legislation with the Sobor of Nicaea.9 In the 
premodern chronicles, the term continued to be used for Christian assemblies. 
The Kievan Chronicle, dated to the twelfth century and surviving in a fifteenth-
century version, discussed the relations between a sobor and a prince, portraying 
the former as an institution which could pass judgment whether a particular action 
was considered sinful.10
The word sobor began to be used for the nonexclusively ecclesiastical assem-
blies since the middle of the sixteenth century, but the term zemskii sobor was 
not used for describing such assemblies in the sources.11 Ivan IV (later known 
as “the Terrible”), who was crowned the first Russian Tsar in 1547, convened 
Sobor primireniia (“the Assembly of Reconciliation”) in 1549, following the dis-
turbances in Moscow in 1547. Since, apart from the clergy, the Sobor primireniia 
included the Boyar Duma (“the Council of Lords”), voevodas (“military gover-
nors”), and boyars’ sons, this assembly has usually been considered to be the first 
zemskii sobor by the proponents of the concept.12 The exclusively ecclesiastical 
sobors, however, also continued, and in 1551 Ivan IV convened the Stoglavyi 
sobor (“the Assembly of a Hundred Chapters”) for regulating religious life. In his 
supposed address to this sobor, the Tsar stressed that he was not only interested 
in the organization of the land (ustroenie zemskoe) but also in the matters of the 
Church.13
Other major nonexclusively ecclesiastical assemblies were held on the con-
tinuation of the war with Poland–Lithuania in 1566, on the “election” of Boris 
Fedorovich Godunov and Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov Tsars in 1598 and 1613, 
respectively, on the adoption of the legal Assembly Code (Sobornoe ulozhenie) 
in 1648–1649, and on the allegiance of the Cossack Hetmanate to the Tsar in 
1653. The available sources demonstrated that the members of the assemblies 
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were identified through a number of different categories. The 1566 assembly, for 
instance, included chancellery (prikaz) bureaucrats, gentry (dvoriane), and mer-
chants, in addition to the clergy and the Boyar Duma. The 1613 assembly, called 
the Zemskii sovet (“the Council of the Land”) in some of the sources, included 
townsmen, Cossacks, and peasants in addition to the groups mentioned in rela-
tion to the 1566 assembly. There are sources on further assemblies on different 
matters. Most of them were called sobor (1619, 1621, 1634, 1642, 1651), but 
there was also another sovet (1616). The membership was not always discussed 
in detail, with the “people of different rank [chin]” mentioned in the documents. 
The clergy, which participated in the larger assemblies, was referred to as the 
Osviashchennyi sobor (“the Holy Assembly”).14
The phenomenon of these assemblies was addressed by Russian intellectuals 
in the nineteenth century, with the development of modern history writing and the 
emergence of romantic nationalism. Nikolai Mikhailovich Karamzin, one of the 
first modern historians in Russia, used the terms velikaia duma zemskaia (“the 
great council of the land”), velikii sobor (“the great assembly”), duma zemskaia 
(“the council of the land”), and gosudarstvennyi sobor (“the state assembly”) 
when discussing such assemblies.15 Karamzin was the first to generalize the duma 
zemskaia as a larger assembly convened for discussing important state matters.16 
The term zemskii sobor was used by the Slavophile17 author Aleksei Stepanovich 
Khomiakov in a theater piece in 1833.18 Starting with the polemics between 
Konstantin Sergeevich Aksakov, another Slavophile, and Sergei Mikhailovich 
Solov’ev on the origins of the zemskii sobors in the 1850s, the term became fre-
quently used in the historiographic debates.19
K. S. Aksakov, Solov’ev, Afansii Prokof’evich Shchapov, Boris Nikolaevich 
Chicherin, Ivan Dmitrievich Beliaev, Nikolai Ivanovich Kostomarov, Vasilii 
Ivanovich Sergeevich, Nikolai Pavlovich Zagoskin, Ivan Ivanovich Ditiatin, 
Sergei Fedorovich Platonov, Valerii Nikolaevich Latkin, and other authors who 
wrote about zemskii sobors in the 1850s–1880s interlaced historical observa-
tions, based on scarce sources available then, with their political views and 
made program statements. Some of their works, based on the premise that the 
zemskii sobor was a coherent institution, are discussed in the following sec-
tions.20 Among the findings which proved influential for the twentieth-century 
debates were Solov’ev’s differentiated approach to the sobors and Platonov’s 
interpretation of the sobors as a medium of communication between the gov-
ernment and the localities in the process of administrative centralization of the 
Russian state.21
Vasilii Osipovich Kliuchevskii’s study, published in the early 1890s, proved 
especially influential. Kliuchevskii’s main conclusions were based on the study of 
the sobors of the sixteenth century. He argued that the participation in the sobors 
was based exclusively on the service position of a participant, who did not repre-
sent a particular social group but was summoned by the government to provide 
information. Kliuchevskii located the origin of the zemskii sobors in the admin-
istration of localities. According to Kliuchevskii, the zemskii sobors were always 
consultative and connected the Tsar to multiple government agents. Kliuchevskii 
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noted that in the seventeenth century, the sobors became truly representative but 
did not go into much detail on the matter.22
Later authors in the Russian Empire continued the research of individual sob-
ors and uncovered new sources. A major reinterpretation came with the develop-
ment of the Marxist historiography in the late imperial and Soviet periods. Mikhail 
Nikolaevich Pokrovskii integrated the zemskii sobor into his concept of feudalism 
in Russia. Noting its primitivity in class representation and unclear competence, 
Pokrovskii defined the zemskii sobor as an extraordinary body of “vassals,” with 
whom the Russian “suzerain” consulted and through which he acted.23 In an arti-
cle accompanying the first Soviet history textbook, authored by him, Pokrovskii 
defined the zemskii sobors as the assemblies of representatives of landowners and 
bourgeoisie, using the terms which were common for Soviet political discourse.24 
Konstantin Mikhailovich Takhtarev, a sociologist and a social democratic activ-
ist, defined the “Zemskii sobor” of 1613 as an assembly of estate representatives 
but stressed its role in ensuring national unity and saving the Russian state in his 
study of the state from a world history perspective, which he wrote in 1917 and 
devoted to the “participants of class struggle.” Takhtarev included many allu-
sions to the Revolution of 1917, defining, for instance, the zemskii sobor as a 
“genuine constituent assembly” or stressing the central role which “the union of 
towns and zemstvos [local self-government bodies]” allegedly played in saving 
the state. Takhtarev also understood the election of the first Romanov Tsar as 
limiting autocracy by “popular representation” (narodnoe predstavitel’stvo).25 At 
the same time, Takhtarev considered the institution’s capacity to ensure peace in 
the society limited, suggesting that the interests of the estates in the second half of 
the seventeenth century could not be reconciled.26
Nikolai Ivanovich Cheliapov, an early Soviet legal scholar, defined the zem-
skii sobor as a consultative medieval estate assembly and a representative body, 
similar to the French Estates General.27 Serafim Vladimirovich Iushkov and some 
other early Soviet scholars positioned the zemskii sobor, as a body of estate rep-
resentation, in the system of estate monarchy, itself part of the feudal period of 
the Russian history. This was not, however, a predominant view in the 1930s 
and the 1940s. The Small Soviet Encyclopedia described the zemskii sobors as 
“partially” similar to other estate assemblies, like the French Estates General. The 
Great Soviet Encyclopedia, in which Konstantin Vasil’evich Sivkov oversaw the 
articles on history, mentioned autocracy as a more important factor compared to 
estate representation, on one instance. On another instance, it called the zemskii 
sobor a body of central administration in the government’s policy of centraliza-
tion, directed against boyar opposition. On a third instance, the zemskii sobor was 
called a permanent body in the 1610s.28
Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Zimin, Lev Vladimirovich Cherepnin, and other 
Soviet historians of later generations interpreted the zemskii sobor as a proto-
parliament or an “estate representative” body, albeit a consultative one. Ruslan 
Grigor’evich Skrynnikov noted the broader representation already under Ivan IV, 
citing the presence of gentry, bureaucracy, and merchants at the 1566 sobor. He 
also argued that after Ivan IV’s death, the zemskii sobors acquired the functions of 
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a constituent body, which was at least nominally responsible for the elections of a 
new Tsar. Fedor I was “elected” by a presumed sobor in 1584, despite being heir 
apparent to Ivan IV. According to Skrynnikov, the 1584 sobor could be seen as 
a way to legitimize a new boyar government, given the mental illness of Fedor I. 
After Fedor I’s death, Boris Fedorovich Godunov, a boyar, was “elected” in 1598 
by a sobor, or, as Skrynnikov argued, sanctioned post factum by one in 1599. 
Skrynnikov noted that there were multiple candidates for the throne, with Fedor 
Nikitich Romanov, the future Tsar’s Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov’s father, being 
Godunov’s main competitor for the throne, but the formal “election” itself was not 
contested, and the power struggle took place in a noninstitutional context. Soviet 
historians also studied other institutions, such as the Boyar Duma, a smaller gov-
ernment council, a version of which existed as the Zemskaia duma in the second 
half of the sixteenth century. The zemskaia duma was hence not synonymous to 
the zemskii sobor, as the nineteenth-century authors implied.29
Peter B. Brown disagreed with the Soviet interpretation of the sobors, in 
particular with that of Cherepnin, pointing to the difference in the genesis and 
responsibility of each individual sobor, as well as their irregularity. Brown also 
mentioned the lack of evidence on their memberships and procedures, the diverse 
memberships of those sobors for which evidence was available, and the fact that 
the members of the sobors were predominantly appointed and not elected by their 
social peers. According to Brown, there were no constituencies for electing the 
sobor delegates, and all but three assemblies (1598, 1613, and 1648–49) seemed 
to be fully appointed. Peasants were present only at the 1613 assembly, which 
means that the absolute majority of the male population did not have any theo-
retical representative rights. Furthermore, Brown argued that there were no social 
estates in early modern Russia. He concluded that the zemskii sobors were dif-
ferent from the contemporaneous parliamentary bodies in Europe and were not 
quasi-legislative organs of contentious nobles and urban groups in the fiscal oppo-
sition to princes. As such, Brown defined them as irregular “government-sum-
moned consultative assemblies” and “consensus forums” (or “sounding boards”) 
which were used for surveying “public” mood on particular issues. For him, the 
disappearance of the sobors after the 1650s was hence a result of the bureaucracy 
becoming superior in information acquisition through the urban voevodas.30
Although the debates on sobors have continued, with some historians still com-
paring them to the assemblies of the estates of the realm in other European polities31 
and others viewing them as similar to the assemblies (kurultais) in Tatar polities, 
which together with the Grand Duchy of Muscovy succeeded the Golden Horde,32 
there has been a growing consensus in English-language studies of early modern 
Russia, with most scholars agreeing with Brown’s interpretation. Marshall Poe 
called the zemskii sobors “occasional royal councils,” which did not limit the author-
ity of the monarch.33 Sergei Bogatyrev noted that even the members of the 1566 
sobor, one of the more representative ones, saw themselves primarily as the servi-
tors of the Tsar rather than representatives of constituencies.34 Endre Sashalmi noted 
that if the assemblies could influence the government policy, this was only through 
the expression of “humble requests” which might or might not have been taken into 
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account.35 Brian Davies reaffirmed that the recognition of the local administrators’ 
capacity to gather information was the main reason for the sobors’ disappearance.36
Chester Dunning noted the different roles played by the assemblies during the 
Time of Troubles. He argued that False Dmitrii managed to remain on the throne 
without convening a zemskii sobor, but listed the lack of an election as a factor 
undermining Tsar Vasilii Ivanovich Shuiskii. He also discussed the 1611 Sovet 
vsei zemli (“the Council of the Whole Land”), a sobor-like institution, which 
resolved numerous minor conflicts between the diverse groups fighting against 
the Polish–Lithuanian forces. Dunning argued that during Mikhail Fedorovich 
Romanov’s early reign, the sobors helped the Tsar acquire local information and 
restore state administration, including the flow of taxes, but still foregrounded 
their bureaucratic functions, which strengthened autocracy, and also called 
them “sounding boards” with strong links to towns as the main revenue sources. 
According to Dunning, the members of the sobors acted as advisors loyal to the 
autocrat rather than any emerging “citizens.”37 The research on later periods of 
Russian history stressed that the formation of social estates in Russia was a prod-
uct of a top-down policy in the later decades of the eighteenth century,38 confirm-
ing that there could be no “estate-representative monarchy” before that. Catherine 
II made no references to sobors in her Instruction to the Legislative Commission 
of 1767, which she based on the works of the European Enlightenment authors.39
The constituent functions of individual assemblies also remained questioned. 
Discussing the 1613 assembly, Valerie Kivelson argued that the act of “electing” 
the Romanov Tsar was a confirmation of God’s choice by the Orthodox com-
munity. She concluded that popular will remained secondary to God’s will.40 In 
this respect, Kivelson rejected the electoral functions of the assemblies – the main 
feature which, according to Donald Ostrowski, made them similar to the kurul-
tais.41 Dunning, however, noted that the 1613 election was contested, though the 
contestation once again happened behind the scenes of the assembly.42
There are certainly still voices supporting the interpretation of the zemskii 
sobor as a coherent institution. Mikhail Markovich Krom continued to claim that 
the sobors of the seventeenth century were comparable to European representa-
tive institutions and were part of the bottom-up construction of a modern state. 
Krom argued that the sobors acquired legislative competence, with a sobor prom-
ulgating a legal code in 1649, and that by the middle of the seventeenth century, 
the sobors had normalized representation for gentry and townsmen.43 Richard 
Hellie considered the zemskii sobors proto-parliaments, focusing on the sobor 
of 1648–1649, and claimed that their very development into such representative 
assemblies led to their non-convocation since the 1650s.44 The vast majority of 
contemporary historians of early modern Russia, however, do not see the zemskii 
sobor as a proto-parliament or even as a coherent institution.
Autocratic mythology
The autocratic mythology of the 1613 assembly (Zemskii sovet) developed during 
the early years of the Romanov dynasty. The Romanov Tsars returned to the 1613 
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“election” in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The mythologization 
of the zemskii sobor as a monarchical institution, in which the Tsar was primary 
to the people, was reinforced by the Slavophiles in the 1830s–1850s and became 
especially popular among the monarchist nationalists in the early twentieth cen-
tury, during the crisis of the Russian Empire. The autocratic mythology was rein-
vigorated during the Russian Civil War and culminated in the attempted Romanov 
restoration at the Priamur Zemskii Sobor in Vladivostok in 1922.
The supporters of the Romanovs, the family of Anastasiia Romanovna 
Zakhar’ina-Iur’eva, Ivan IV’s first wife and Fedor I’s mother, attempted to sway 
the anticipated 1613 assembly in their favor. Avraamii Palitsyn, a religious and 
political figure, wrote during the preparations to the assembly that the Time of 
Troubles was the divine retribution for the sins of the Russians. According to 
Palitsyn, the Russian people could not comprehend God’s will and committed 
a number of errors, bringing the unworthy, Boris Fedorovich Godunov, False 
Dmitry, and Vasilii Ivanovich Shuiskii, to the Russian throne. Palitsyn argued that 
the person who had the qualities of a perfect Orthodox Tsar – piety, reason in gov-
ernance, and military valor – was Fedor Nikitich Romanov, and God wanted to see 
him on the throne. After the Russian people elected Boris Fedorovich Godunov, 
they were punished. Palitsyn also tried to convey the similarity between Fedor 
I, the last Tsar of the Rurik dynasty, and Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, Fedor 
Romanov’s son, in their piety, and suggested that if the pious relative of the late 
Tsar Fedor I was enthroned, God would grant Russia peace. This narrative had 
some effect but did not guarantee the victory of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, 
and the Romanovs’ supporters opted for popularizing the earlier legend of Tsar 
Fedor I bequeathing the authority to Fedor Nikitich Romanov.45
The notion of following God’s will at the 1613 assembly reflected in its main 
document, Utverzhdennaia gramota (“the Approved Charter”). According to the 
document, during the 1613 Zemskii sovet (or simply sobor), which convened for 
“electing” a Tsar, God sent “His Holy Spirit to the hearts of all Orthodox Christians 
of the whole great Russian Tsardom.” Electing Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov the 
new Tsar, the people followed God’s will. The assembly was accompanied by a 
general prayer which was supposed to reveal it. The document also mentioned 
rational arguments in support of the decision, noting the relation of Fedor Nikitich 
Romanov and the late Tsar Fedor I and even the alleged opinion of the Swedish 
King, whose forces occupied parts of the Russian state, that a Russian had to sit 
on the Russian throne. God’s will was nevertheless presented as the main source 
of the unanimous “election” of Mikhail Fedorovich, who was called “elected by 
God” in the text.46 The primacy of God’s will and mercy in the “election” of 
the Tsar was reaffirmed in later chronicles47 and Palitsyn’s Skazanie (“Tale”), 
which stressed that God heard the collective prayer and granted Russia the new 
Tsar.48 The manuscript Kniga ob izbranii na tsarstvo Velikogo Gosudaria, Tsaria 
i Velikogo Kniazia Mikhaila Fedorovicha (“The Book on the Election of Mikhail 
Fedorovich to the Throne of the Great Master, Tsar and Grand Duke”), which was 
written under the supervision of the boyar Artamon Sergeevich Matveev, who 
is occasionally called “one of the first Westernizers,”49 in the 1670s, mentioned 
 The assembly of the land (zemskii sobor) 111
deliberation about candidates and presented the “election” as a multistage pro-
cess, even though it also foregrounded God’s will.50
The autocratic mythology was revived in the nineteenth century. Karamzin’s 
approach to Russia’s early modern assemblies as an institution included the par-
ticipation of the people and hence contributed to democratic ideas, but the author 
himself foregrounded autocracy. He was critical of the limited autocracy during 
Tsar Fedor I’s rule with the Boyar Duma. According to Karamzin, after the elec-
tion of Boris Fedorovich Godunov Tsar in 1598, the Patriarch proclaimed to the 
sobor that “the voice of the people” was “the voice of God,” and hence the new 
Tsar was elected according to God’s will.51 Discussing the 1611 Sovet vsei zemsli 
(which he called duma zemskaia), Karamzin deemed the reestablished Russian 
government a “shadow” of one, since without an autocrat a government in an 
autocracy was “soulless.”52
The Slavophiles, who idealized ancient Russia and rejected Russia’s alleged 
inferiority to the West, became especially influential in creating a coherent auto-
cratic mythology of the zemskii sobors. Although it was A. S. Khomiakov who 
introduced the term to the nineteenth-century discussions, he did not use it when 
considering the nature of the supposed institution in 1839. According to A. S. 
Khomiakov, the “friendship of the government [the Tsar] and the people” mani-
fested itself in the “old custom” of “assembling deputies of all estates for the 
discussion of the most important state issues,” which survived under Tsar Aleksei 
Mikhailovich.53 The Slavophile K. S. Aksakov combined Khomiakov’s term and 
understanding of the alleged institution in his early-1850s manuscript and located 
the origins of the zemskii sobor in the Slavic traditional community (obshchina), 
which was based on giving up self-interest in favor of absolute consensus (edi-
noglasie) or love – the central idea of the romantic nationalism of the Slavophiles. 
He argued that the assemblies, such as veche (“assembly” or “council”), sobor, 
and duma, were the embodiment of the community’s moral activity and could 
not conclude before reaching a consensus. The first zemskii sobor, according to 
K. S. Aksakov, embodied the unification of the Russian land in one state under 
Tsar Ivan IV. After the unification, the land (zemlia) acquired the right to opin-
ion and speech, while the state enjoyed the unlimited right to action and legisla-
tion.54 The land was hence the new manifestation of the community. According to 
the Slavophiles, Russia’s increasing closeness to the West corrupted its popular 
order, resulting in the crisis of the institutions of the land and the emergence of 
the German bureaucracy around the Tsar, but a revival was deemed possible.55
K. S. Aksakov was also the first one to bring the concept of zemskii sobor into 
politics by including it into his 1855 memorandum to Alexander II. He stressed 
the connection between the government and the people in his understanding of 
the alleged institution. Applauding the “wisdom” of the Tsars, he claimed that 
they convened the zemskii sobors of those elected from all estates of Russia and 
offered them different issues for discussion. K. S. Aksakov argued, however, 
that the government was aware that it did not concede any rights to the zemskii 
sobors, while the people knew that the assemblies did not acquire any, asserting 
that the relations between the assemblies and the government were “friendly” 
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and “full of trust.” K. S. Aksakov maintained that such assemblies were radi-
cally different from parliaments but nevertheless stressed their role in surveying 
public opinion. This conformed to his main suggestion of gradually introduc-
ing full freedom of speech and press, when it would become clear that it was 
“inseparably connected to unrestrained monarchy.” Although K. S. Aksakov 
suggested convening a zemskii sobor when the government desired to ask for 
the country’s opinion, he opposed its immediate convocation. He deemed an 
immediate zemskii sobor pointless due to the remoteness of the nobles from the 
“popular foundations” and the fascination of both the nobles and the merchants 
with the West, which allegedly made it impossible to gather “the voice of the 
whole Russian land” at such an assembly. According to K. S. Aksakov, before 
a zemskii sobor could be convened, the freely expressed public opinion could 
perform its role. He also proposed convening assemblies of individual estates 
but emphasized that such assemblies and the future zemskii sobors were to be 
irregular and that their convocation was not supposed to be the government’s 
obligation.56
Although Tsar Alexander II did not implement K. S. Aksakov’s suggestions 
on the freedom of speech and press and the irregular estate assemblies, the gov-
ernment returned to the mythology of the “election” of the first Romanovs at the 
1613 Zemskii sovet. The introduction to Kniga ob izbranii na tsarstvo Velikogo 
Gosudaria, Tsaria i Velikogo Kniazia Mikhaila Fedorovicha, which was pub-
lished by an official commission on Royal decree in 1856, maintained that “the 
whole people” or “the people of the land” (zemskie liudi) decided that it was not 
possible to be “without a master,”57 reaffirming thereby the autocratic mythology 
of the assembly.
Some Slavophiles continued to use alternative terms when speaking of the 
premodern assemblies. Aleksandr Ivanovich Koshelev published a pamphlet in 
Leipzig in 1862 in which he called for a general zemskaia duma. Although it 
was supposed to be a consultative body, tasked with informing the Tsar about 
the needs of the country, Koshelev also expected it to form the cabinet, which 
connected it to the democratic slogans. He published another pamphlet on the 
zemskaia duma the same year.58 Later Slavophiles popularized K. S. Aksakov’s 
term and understanding of the zemskii sobor. Il’ia Vasil’evich Beliaev reaffirmed 
the connection of the zemskii sobor to the ancient Slavic veche in his 1866 popular 
history book. He also noted that after the unification of Russia under one Tsar, 
Ivan IV, “the first Russian Tsar convened the first veche of the whole Russian land 
or the zemskii sobor.” Citing the Tsar’s criticism of the boyar rule, I. V. Beliaev 
interpreted the assembly as the symbolic start of autocracy, since the Tsar took 
full authority himself. According to I. V. Beliaev, the assembly was highly emo-
tional. “The Tsar and the people burst into tears. This was the opening of the first 
zemskii sobor.”59 In his 1867 speech, the Slavophile I. D. Beliaev also argued that 
the zemskii sobor finished the unification of Russia and strengthened autocracy 
but noted that it was not similar to the previous veches, since it was convened by 
the will of the Tsar and included representatives and not the whole political com-
munities of towns, which were present at the veches.60
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In 1874, Konstantin Dmitrievich Kavelin, a former Westernizer and a former 
Slavophile, provided a different explanation for the possibility of representative 
institutions in autocracies. He generalized veches and zemskii sobors as a form of 
elected state representation, comparing them to the Estates General and assem-
blies in Germany, but argued that they predated absolutism. He concluded that 
the supposed limitation of state power (monarchy) through representation was 
hence invented in response to European history since the late eighteenth century 
(implying the French Revolution), but this did not mean that representation could 
not exist in other contexts.61 In his unpublished 1880 article, Kavelin translated 
his historical observations into the idea of a general zemskii sobor under the auto-
cratic Tsar, which was similar to the Slavophile designs but was based on com-
parative argumentation rather than on Russia’s exclusivity.62
The zemskii sobor was discussed in the top tier of Russia’s ruling elite as 
well. After the assassination of Alexander II, his brother Konstantin Nikolaevich 
Romanov was allegedly convinced that only the convocation of a zemskii sobor 
could save Russia.63 The Slavophiles nevertheless did not find support for a pos-
sible political reform among the new conservative ruling circles. Minister of 
Internal Affairs Nikolai Pavlovich Ignat’ev, who supported Slavophile ideas, pro-
posed to the new Tsar Alexander III to convene a consultative zemskii sobor of 
some 3,000 people simultaneously with his coronation in 1882. Ivan Sergeevich 
Aksakov, K. S. Aksakov’s brother, and Pavel Dmitrievich Golokhvastov, who 
were the main authors of Ignat’ev’s proposal, reinforced the autocratic mythol-
ogy in their publications, but Alexander III rejected it and made Ignat’ev resign.64
The zemskii sobor as a monarchist slogan, however, survived. In 1889, 
Aleksandr Alekseevich Kireev, a writer and a general, summed up the Slavophile 
suggestions of reintroducing the consultative zemskii sobors – the councils of the 
Tsar with the land – not for limiting the power of the ruler but for helping him 
with local information. The Tsar, according to Kireev, represented the single will, 
while the sovet zemli (“the council of the land”) represented the many minds. He 
argued that the Russian people needed a strong yet understanding government for 
the people’s self-improvement but rejected politicking. Kireev also stressed the 
unity of the state and the Orthodox Church as the ultimate ideal of the society.65
The idea of a revived zemskii sobor loomed large in response to the demands of a 
“popular representation,” an expression used for a parliament, by liberal and mod-
erate socialist intellectuals. The socialist turned conservative Lev Aleksandrovich 
Tikhomirov argued in 1902 that the direct communication between the supreme 
authority and the people was possible only in an organized nation, while in a dis-
organized one, the bureaucracy was a “mediastinum” which isolated the authority 
from the people. A parliament, according to Tikhomirov, could not reestablish 
the communication, since the deputies only expressed the will of the “politicking 
estate,” and in fact even increased the separation between the state and the nation. 
He asserted that only the creative and conservative (okhranitel’nyi) stratum could 
enable the government’s [the Tsar’s] communication with the “spirit of the peo-
ple.” According to Tikhomirov, such communication could take place in a zemskii 
sobor but could also occur directly through individuals.66
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The Slavophile interpretation of the premodern and pre-Petrine Russian state 
in general and the zemskii sobor in particular contributed greatly to the debates 
of a political reform shortly before and during the Revolution of 1905–1907.67 
In the fall of 1904, Petr Sergeevich Porokhovshchikov, a jurist and a right-wing 
author, proposed a “revival” of the zemskii sobor. In January 1905, a meeting of 
Saint Petersburg editors composed an address to Minister of Internal Affairs Petr 
Dmitrievich Sviatopolk-Mirskii, suggesting to convene a zemskii sobor of repre-
sentatives from all estates and classes with “the unlimited freedom of opinions.” 
The same month the idea was reaffirmed in a newspaper article by the publisher 
Aleksei Sergeevich Suvorin. Apart from establishing the communication between 
the Tsar and the “whole Russian land” and ensuring a strong government, Suvorin 
expected the zemskii sobor to raise the international prestige of Russian mon-
archy, especially among the Slavic peoples. In another article, published in 
February, Suvorin specified that the sobor was to consist of some thousand depu-
ties, while the elections were to be almost universal, including women and the 
ethnic non-Russians who knew the Russian language. The idea of the zemskii 
sobor was supported by several other Slavophile and right-wing authors at the 
time. Some monarchists seemed to agree on an irregular sobor, which would meet 
on the Tsar’s orders and be primarily used for channeling the needs of the peo-
ple to the Tsar. Its decisions would not be binding for the government.68 Nikolai 
Nikolaevich Mazurenko’s pamphlet, published in 1905, backed the program with 
historical arguments. Mazurenko claimed that Russian monarchs frequently con-
vened sobors for listening to the opinion of the people and interpreted Catherine 
II’s Legislative Commission of estate representatives as a zemskii sobor.69
Many right-wing intellectuals and activists agreed to a one-time sobor if the 
monarch deemed it necessary, but some of the monarchists, who opposed any 
changes which could threaten the autocracy, saw the very idea as a compromise 
and rejected it. Vladimir Andreevich Gringmut, a far-right author and a politician, 
for instance accused the Slavophiles of a “mystical or aesthetical” policy.70 Andrei 
Sergeevich Viazigin, a historian and later a member of the Third State Duma, also 
dismissed the idea completely. In 1905, he argued that the zemskii sobor existed 
when the “tops and bottoms” of the society had the same worldview. According 
to Viazigin, in the situation when the Russians were fragmented into numerous 
social strata, including classes, its revival was not possible. He also argued that 
the function of gathering local information could be easily performed by press, 
telegraph, and telephone and did not require a zemskii sobor.71
Officials also discussed a possible zemskii sobor since January 1905 in the 
context of the revolution and the disastrous Russo–Japanese War (1904–1905). In 
February 1905, the Council of Ministers under Nicholas II’s presidency consid-
ered a possible consultative and irregular zemskii sobor, elected from the estates, 
but there was no unity in the cabinet on the matter. In March 1905, Minister 
of Agriculture and State Property Aleksei Sergeevich Ermolov suggested in a 
letter, which was passed to Nicholas II, to establish a people’s zemskaia duma, 
freely elected from all classes and estates, for direct communication between the 
Tsar and the people on the most pressing issues. Anatolii Ivanovich Kulomzin, a 
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member of the State Council, proposed a bureaucratic sobor of the existing gov-
ernment bodies and four representatives from each province (from the clergy, the 
landowners, the merchants, and the peasants, respectively).72
The far right continued to oppose the idea of a sobor, but the zemskii sobor in 
Kireev’s interpretation became a popular idea among the broader right. Kireev 
criticized “bureaucratic autocracy” and deemed the zemskii sobor an alterna-
tive to revolution. His plan was to transform autocracy from bureaucratic into 
“consultative” through a sobor. In March 1905, the idea of combining autocracy 
with popular representation, put forward by Nikolai Alekseevich Khomiakov, 
A. S. Khomiakov’s son, was backed by a meeting of several leaders of provin-
cial nobility, but there were also provincial noble assemblies which rejected it. 
Interestingly, Fedor Dmitrievich Samarin, the son of another early Slavophile 
Dmitrii Fedorovich Samarin, rejected the idea of a sobor, claiming that it would 
inevitably turn into a parliament and stimulate the revolution. The same month, a 
group of right-wing politicians under Aleksei Aleksandrovich Bobrinskii united 
into a party, the Patriotic Union (Otechestvennyi soiuz), and discussed their own 
project of a zemskii sobor. Vladimir Iosifovich Gurko drafted the electoral regula-
tions, according to which the sobor was to include 612 deputies, elected from dif-
ferent groups of the population based on property or land qualifications, expecting 
that the peasants and the landowners would form the largest groups. The sobor 
was to convene for a short period to resolve the most urgent matters of state life, 
but it was also to form a standing body, the zemskaia duma of 128 members, 
which would participate in drafting legislation. The Patriotic Union debated on 
how not to prevent the intelligentsia from being elected to the sobor and resolved 
to raise the qualifications.73
A governmental commission, which was created on the initiative of Minister 
of Internal Affairs Aleksandr Grigor’evich Bulygin and began its meetings in 
March 1905, nevertheless resolved that a zemskii sobor was not suitable and 
suggested a permanent assembly of 400–500 people, the State Duma. In May 
1905, however, Nicholas II still expressed interest in a zemskii sobor. The idea 
gained momentum after the defeat in the Battle of Tsushima (May 14–15, 1905), 
with a possible sobor assembling to discuss the continuation of the war with 
Japan. The projects prepared at this time suggested the use of parishes (including 
the territorial divisions of non-Orthodox faiths) as the basic electoral units. The 
sobor, from 200 to 1,000 deputies, according to different projects, was expected 
to be convened as soon as possible, for instance, in August 1905. On May 23, 
however, Nicholas II presented Bulygin commission’s project of a bicameral 
consultative body, consisting of the State Duma and the State Council, to the 
Council of Ministers. At the special meeting on May 24, Bulygin cautioned that 
a possible zemskii sobor would lead to a constitution and turn into a constituent 
assembly, and the project of his commission prevailed. In June 1905, Nicholas 
II, however, still spoke of reestablishing the old connection between the Tsar 
and All Rus’, repeating the Slavophiles’ slogans, but approved the project of the 
consultative State Duma later that summer. On October 17, 1905, the Duma was 
made legislative.74
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Right-wing politicians nevertheless did not abandon the idea of a zemskii 
sobor, presenting it as an alternative to the legislative State Duma. In December 
1905, the far-right Union of the Russian People (Soiuz russkikh liudei), headed by 
Aleksandr Grigor’evich Shcherbatov, appealed to the Tsar, promising to defend 
autocracy and asking him to convene a “great zemskii sobor” of the Russian peo-
ple, based on faith and descendance, the people who had “enthroned” Nicolas 
II’s ancestor, in Moscow. The sobor was to be formed from the existing estate 
bodies.75 In 1906, ahead of the convocation of the First State Duma, a proclama-
tion of the Union of the Russian People defended autocracy but argued that the 
unity of the Tsar and the people was to be manifested through the consultation 
with the State Duma and the zemskii sobors. The latter were to be convened for 
discussing fundamental laws, “extraordinary” events of state life, and the general 
directions of domestic policy.76 In its 1906 program, the Union of the Russian 
People specified that the “original Russian Orthodox land-state community [zem-
sko-gosudarstvennaia sobornost’]” was to be manifested in the zemskii sobor or 
the State Duma of Orthodox Russians, based on the estate principle and elected 
from the Church or administrative units. All non-Orthodox peoples were to be 
included into the sobor or the Duma as petitioners.77
Sergei Fedorovich Sharapov, a founding member of the Union of the Russian 
People, was one of the main advocates of a zemskii sobor in the Slavophile under-
standing and included it into his vision of future Russia. In his political program, 
he specified that the future zemskii sobor was to be a consultative body and could 
not have constituent power.78 In his 1907 speech, Sharapov denounced the con-
vocation of the Third State Duma after the alleged complete failure of parliamen-
tarism, which for him manifested in the first two Dumas (1906 and 1907), and 
proposed to return “to the genuinely Russian foundations and the covenants of 
history” and to convene “a zemskii sobor” in Moscow instead.79
Tikhomirov was among the minority of right-wing intellectuals, arguing that 
the introduction of a “popular representation” was the only positive outcome of 
the 1905–1906 events. He nevertheless advocated a monarchist reform of the leg-
islature. Tikhomirov proposed to create a Legislative Council (Zakonodatel’nyi 
sovet) which would discuss and draft laws and pass them to the Tsar. The body 
was to be formed by appointment and through nomination from “organized soci-
etal institutions,” such as “zemstvos, municipal, social estate, and professional 
organizations.” Tikhomirov also suggested forming an elected People’s Duma 
(Narodnaia duma) which would deal with all matters on which the Tsar wanted 
“to consult with the people.” The People’s Duma was supposed to convene every 
three years for three to four months. According to his project, in extraordinary 
cases, the Tsar could also convene a zemskii sobor, which would consist of the 
Legislative Council, ministries, the supreme Church authority, the supreme leg-
islative authority, the supreme command, the People’s Duma, and further repre-
sentatives of social estates, as well as the individuals who performed meritorious 
service to the Fatherland.80
There is no evidence that the government seriously considered returning to the 
idea of a zemskii sobor despite its conflict with the oppositional State Duma, but 
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in June 1907, the month when the Second Duma was dissolved and the electoral 
law was replaced by a more restrictive one, marking the end of the Revolution of 
1905–1907, Prime Minister Petr Arkad’evich Stolypin mentioned a zemskii sobor 
(instead of the State Duma) in his notes on the planned dissolution of the parlia-
ment.81 In 1907–1917, the discussions of the zemskii sobor shifted to the back-
ground but continued. The Archangel Michael Russian People’s Union (Russkii 
narodnyi soiuz imeni Mikhaila Arkhangela), a far-right organization, campaigned 
for making the State Duma consultative in 1912. The zemskii sobors were to be 
a historical example for such a body of communication between the Tsar and the 
people, which did not limit autocracy. The organization also reaffirmed God’s 
will in autocratic decision-making, suggesting that the Tsar’s decisions were 
based on “God’s truth.”82 Shcherbatov returned to the idea of convening a zemskii 
sobor in extraordinary circumstances in a 1912 publication. He suggested that 
only “officials” of different social estates could be nominated to the sobors, while 
the ultimate selection was to be done by lot.83
The publications, accompanying the celebration of the 300th anniversary of 
the Romanov dynasty in 1913, foregrounded the monarchist and patriotic mean-
ings of the 1613 events. A popular brochure, for instance, stressed the general 
popular consensus in the election of the Romanovs.84 The historian Dmitrii 
Vladimirovich Tsvetaev stressed the connections of the zemskii sobors to local 
communal councils and celebrated both the unification of Russia around Moscow 
and monarchy.85 The popular print by Antonina Khristianovna Vestfalen placed 
Mikhail Fedorovich and his mother Marfa (Kseniia Ivanovna Shestova) at the 
center of the composition, while religious and lay figures, most likely representing 
the 1613 Zemskii sovet, bowed before them (see Figure 4.1).
With the Revolution of 1917, and especially the Civil War of 1918–1922, 
the political discussions of the zemskii sobor were revived. Some left politicians 
ironically called the Moscow State Conference (Gosudarstvennoe soveshchanie), 
which united deputies of the four imperial State Dumas and representatives of 
self-government bodies, soviets, the Army and the Navy, trade unions, coopera-
tive societies, non-Russian national organizations, and other groups on August 
12–15, 1917, a “zemskii sobor,” implying its alleged counterrevolutionary char-
acter, but the left members of the Provisional Government defended its convoca-
tion.86 In contrast with the 1905–1907 events, the zemskii sobor as a monarchist 
slogan was much less popular than the democratic takes on the institution in 
1917–1922.
In the monarchist sense, the idea of a zemskii sobor was evoked by anti-Bolshe-
vik politicians in Manchuria and the Russian Far East, with the mythology of the 
Time of Troubles playing a pivotal role. The monarchist Nikolai Aleksandrovich 
Andrushkevich, for instance, proposed the idea to the anti-Bolshevik Vladivostok 
government in 1921 as a way to resolve the crisis in whole Russia. Such an assem-
bly in a modified regional form was convened in Vladivostok on July 23–August 
10, 1922, under the name of the Priamur Zemskii Sobor. Although initially it 
was not clearly aimed at reestablishing monarchy, it marginalized moderate 
anti-Bolsheviks, foregrounding the ultra-royalists who indeed aspired to find a 
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new Romanov Tsar.87 The Priamur Zemskii Sobor became the first institution in 
Russian history to include the words zemskii sobor into its official name.
The Priamur Zemskii Sobor included delegates from the existing anti-Bolshe-
vik authorities, as well as representatives of the clergy, the military, public agen-
cies, nonsocialist organizations, landlords, rural population, trade and industrial 
class, Orthodox parishes, Old Believer communities, and other organizations. 
It also included the Main Army Mullah, apparently representing the Tatars and 
the Bashkirs among the anti-Bolshevik troops. Workers’ representatives were 
also formally included, but Communists and their supporters, as well as other 
socialists-internationalists, were not allowed to participate in the Priamur Zemskii 
Sobor. Uniting some 230 delegates, the assembly became a historical reenact-
ment, a new “Resurrection of Muscovy.” Its Presidium was located in front of an 
iconostasis-like screen featuring an icon of Jesus Christ and simpler depictions of 
archangels and Saint George. Although some of its members opposed reestablish-
ing monarchy, the sobor elected Mikhail Konstantinovich Diterikhs provisional 
dictator and sent a delegation to the members of House Romanov living abroad for 
finding a candidate for the throne. Ultimately, no candidate was provided by the 
Romanovs. Diterikhs, nevertheless, extensively used the mythology of the Time 
of Troubles in his short-lived regime (toppled in October 1922) and convened a 
Figure 4.1  A. Kh. Vestfalen. Izbranie na Vserossiiskii Prestol Tsaria i Velikogo Kniazia 
Mikhaila Fedorovicha [The election of Mikhail Fedorovich to the All-Russian 
Throne of Tsar and Grand Duke]. Saint Peterburg: Litografskaia masterskaia 
Imperatorskogo obshchestva pooshchreniia khudozhestv, 1913.
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consultative zemskaia duma. Furthermore, the planned reconstruction of regional 
government featured making the parishes basic administrative units.88 
Democratic mythology
The democratic mythology of the zemskii sobors emerged in the 1820s with the 
fusion of civic89 and romantic nationalism in the Decemberist Revolt of 1825. 
Since the 1850s, the evaluations of the zemskii sobors vis-à-vis European parlia-
ments accompanied the historiographic and political debates. The ideas of decen-
tralization proved especially important for the development of the democratic 
mythology. Since the 1860s, the idea of the zemskii sobor had attracted the atten-
tion of oppositional intellectuals who integrated it into their political programs, 
with the establishment of a zemskii sobor becoming a slogan of some Russian 
socialists and regionalists. Several historical works developed the vision of the 
zemskii sobor as a Russian “parliament” or a “proto-parliament,” but the term in 
such interpretation did not enter the mainstream liberal discourse. The democratic 
interpretations of the zemskii sobor nevertheless predominated during the Russian 
Civil War of 1918–1922, even though the concept proved marginal compared to 
the much more popular slogan of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.
The concept of an early modern representative institution was known to the 
Russian ruling elites (see Chapter 1 in this volume). The word sobor was some-
times used in the translated news on the European assemblies in the seventeenth 
century, for instance, when discussing the English Parliament in 1627–1628, but 
the term sejm (soim) was more frequent. The adjective zemskii was, however, 
often used in relation to foreign assemblies, dubbed zemskaia soim. The word 
parliament (parlament) was used in the discussion of English politics already in 
the 1640s.90
In the eighteenth century, foreign terms predominated, and it was only sovet 
which was continuously used for the projected and introduced collegial bodies, 
such as the Supreme Privy Council (Verkhovnyi tainyi sovet), which was supposed 
to limit autocracy in 1730, or the Imperial Council (Imperatorskii sovet), which 
was another proposed body for limiting autocracy in 1762.91 The participants of the 
1730 discussions did not reference the sobors at all and drew inspiration from 
the Sejm of Poland–Lithuania. Vasilii Nikitich Tatishchev, who authored one of 
the first modern takes on Russian history in the first half of the eighteenth century, 
also did not discuss the sobors as an institution when investigating Russia’s politi-
cal development.92
The nationalization (or vernacularization) of the discourse on modern rep-
resentative institutions happened in Russia before the terms entered historical 
mainstream. The statesman Mikhail Mikhailovich Speranskii became the first to 
introduce the word duma into the modern political discourse in his project of 
the legislative State Duma and the dumas at different levels of self-government 
in 1809. Furthermore, he did so with a direct appeal to the supposed attempts 
to limit autocracy under Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich through the council which 
included “part of the people.”93 Karamzin contributed to the rejection of the 
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State Duma by Alexander I by accusing Speranskii of the attempts to reduce the 
status of the monarch to that of the executive branch.94 The 1820 constitutional 
project, submitted by Nikolai Nikolaevich Novosil’tsev, the Russian official in 
charge of the Kingdom (Tsardom) of Poland at the time, used the Polish word 
sejm and the State Duma interchangeably for the projected parliament. Its lower 
Ambassadorial Chamber was to include zemskie posly “ambassadors of the land,” 
just like in Poland–Lithuania. Even though the term was also borrowed from the 
Constitution, which Alexander I granted to the Kingdom of Poland in 1815, just 
like sejm, the word zemskie was a Russian addition. The project was also rejected 
by Alexander I.95
Karamzin contributed to both autocratic and democratic takes on the historical 
assemblies. Karamzin wrote that it was the government around Tsar Fedor I which 
convened the velikaia duma zemskaia of the clergy, gentry, and all honorable peo-
ple for settling some general matters of the state, generalizing that such dumas 
were convened for important state decisions.96 Karamzin also implied the right of 
the duma zemskaia to depose a monarch, claiming that Vasilii Ivanovich Shuiskii 
told his opponents that only this institution of “great boyars and state ranks” 
could resolve the fate of the country and his own and depose him.97 Furthermore, 
Karamzin mentioned that the Russians considered limiting autocracy by delegat-
ing the authority in justice and taxation to the boyars and “civil legislation” to a 
zemskaia duma in the talks with the Poles during the Time of Troubles.98 As men-
tioned above, Karamzin also paid attention to the duma zemskaia existing without 
a Tsar during this period.99
Even though Karamzin’s detailed discussion of the duma zemskaia was pub-
lished in 1829, the future participants of the 1825 Decemberist Revolt used the 
terms duma and sobor in Karamzin’s interpretation of such a historical assembly 
in their political projects already in the first half of the 1820s. Ivan Dmitrievich 
Iakushkin drafted an address to Alexander I, suggesting to convene a zem-
skaia duma for overcoming Russia’s troubles, just like the Tsar’s ancestors did. 
According to Kondratii Fedorovich Ryleev’s testimony, if the Decemberist Revolt 
succeeded, the Great sobor of popular representatives would make decisions on 
the future of the dynasty, the system of government, and Poland’s independence. 
Nikita Mikhailovich Murav’ev, whose acquaintance with Karamzin’s studies was 
documented, included the archaic terms into his draft Constitution. In Murav’ev’s 
federalist project, the Supreme Duma (Verkhovnaia duma) was the lower chamber 
of the federal parliament, called the People’s Assembly (Narodnoe veche). Each 
state of the federation was also to have a bicameral parliament, with a derzhavnaia 
duma (“duma of a state”) being one of the chambers. Murav’ev reserved the right 
to amend the Constitution and elect a new Tsar for the “People’s” (Narodnyi) and 
State sobors. The constitutional project of Pavel Ivanovich Pestel’ also included 
a parliament, called Narodnoe veche, while the Derzhavnaia duma was the pro-
posed name for the cabinet. Pestel’ also spoke of a “controlling” (bliustitel’naia) 
branch of power, which was to be represented by the Supreme sobor (Verkhnovnyi 
sobor). Furthermore, his project featured the convocation of a constituent sobor 
(called “people’s” or “representative”). According to Pestel’, the latter could not, 
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however, be convened immediately due to the lack of foundations for representa-
tive rule in Russia and therefore a provisional government was needed after the 
revolt.100 After the Decemberist Revolt was suppressed, the suggestions to revive 
a supposed historical Russian assembly as a modern democratic institution sub-
sided for several decades.
Since the 1840s, the Westernizers, the opponents of Russia’s exclusivity, 
polemicized with the Slavophiles on the nature of historical institutions. In 1847, 
Vissarion Grigor’evich Belinskii rejected the idea that consensus at the veche 
and, in the case of Novgorod, between the veche and the prince was unique for 
the Slavic community. He argued that it embodied decision-making by majority 
and was hence the same as in constitutional states, including constitutional mon-
archies. He then argued that it was the Germanic peoples who developed the com-
munal principle by making law its foundation.101 The Westernizers also criticized 
the Slavophile moral idealism. Konstantin Nikolaevich Bestuzhev-Riumin, for 
instance, argued in 1862 that absolute consensus (edinoglasie) was incompatible 
with the civil society, which was based on the struggle of opinions and parties. He 
denounced the Slavophile interpretation of the zemskii sobor as the “veche of the 
whole Russian land,” arguing that the early modern sobors were an institutional 
development rather than a revival of an ancient assembly.102
In the early 1860s, however, historical terms again became popular among the 
critics of autocracy, stimulating the development of the zemskii sobor’s demo-
cratic mythology. The ideas of regionalism and decentralization proved especially 
important for Shchapov’s interpretation of the zemskii sobor, which he articulated 
in late 1860 in his first lecture at the University of Kazan.103 Shchapov located the 
origins of the zemskii sobors in the original “land-regional” (zemsko-oblastnaia) 
form of the “historical development of the Great Russian people.” According to 
Shchapov, the regions were lands and hence a regional popular assembly was 
called zemskii sovet. Shchapov argued that the 1613 “Zemskii sobor” (or sovet) 
embodied the “land-regional” form’s principle of zemskoe narodosovetie (“the 
people-council [system] of the land”) and formally limited autocracy. He argued 
that later sobors functioned on the same principle. According to Shchapov, in the 
second half of the seventeenth century, this form gave way to the “state-union” 
one, and the state began to play the leading role.104 A few months later, in May 
1861, Shchapov sent a letter to Alexander II outlining a reform project based on 
his theory. He proposed “reestablishing” the regional all-estate zemskii sovets and 
the central zemskii sobors (or sovets), elected by the former, as a continuation of 
the general revival of the ancient structure, which for Shchapov began with the 
emancipation of the serfs on February 19, 1861. The central sobors were sup-
posed to discuss state matters, represent provincial interests and needs, report on 
taxes, and provide information for legislation.105
In his letter to the imperial official Pavel Petrovich Viazemskii, written in 
October 1861, Shchapov outlined his federalist vision of future Russia, consist-
ing of self-organized communities, and based on zemskoe narodosovetie. He 
reiterated the claim that the Great Moscow zemskii sovet or sobor of 1613 lim-
ited autocracy by a written act, which the Tsars Alexei Mikhailovich and Peter 
122 Ivan Sablin and Kuzma Kukushkin 
I violated. Furthermore, Shchapov stressed that the people elected the Tsar but 
made the wrong choice. Shchapov then suggested that during the celebration of 
the 1,000th anniversary of Russia’s statehood, which was supposed to take place 
in 1862, the people should gather for a new zemskii sobor, either by themselves 
or after being summoned by the Tsar, “renounce the emperor and centralization, 
grant autonomy to Poland, Ukraine, Great Russia, Siberia, and all provinces, and 
create a federative social democratic constitution, the union, communal-demo-
cratic zemskoe narodosovetie.” Shchapov asserted that by initiating the bottom-up 
self-organization of the whole country through assemblies at different levels and 
ultimately through the “all-Russian great union or federal zemskii sovet, s”ezd 
(‘congress’), sobor” was the way for the Tsar to avoid a revolution. The Tsar, 
Shchapov argued, would naturally have to renounce autocracy.106 In March 1862, 
he published an article in a Saint Petersburg periodical on the zemskii sobors in 
the seventeenth century where he again mentioned the role of the 1613 assembly 
as a popular government and the act which supposedly limited autocracy.107
Aleksandr Ivanovich Gertsen and Nikolai Platonovich Ogarev, living in 
London, and other authors of the émigré opposition articulated the idea of the 
zemskii sobor as a manifestation of popular sovereignty even more prominently. 
Shchapovs’s letter to Viazemskii was copied and sent to Gertsen by the mem-
bers of the first Land and Freedom (Zemlia i volia) secret society (1861–1864) 
in early 1862.108 In late 1862, Gertsen used the terms duma and zemskii sobor as 
synonyms for a parliament, to which the cabinet should be responsible. His news-
paper Kolokol (“The Bell”) also published a proclamation of Russian officers in 
Poland then, which called for convening a zemskii sobor, elected from the whole 
Russian land, for establishing a union of autonomous regions and a rational sys-
tem, which was similar to Shchapov’s ideas. The same year, Petr Vladimirovich 
Dolgorukov, another émigré author, suggested establishing constitutional mon-
archy, with the zemskaia duma (which in his 1860 historical narrative of Russia 
was a synonym to zemskii sobor) being one of the parliament’s chambers. Petr 
Alekseevich Mart’ianov, a former serf, who also emigrated to London and met 
Gertsen and Ogarev there, outlined his vision of the future Russian state in a let-
ter to Alexander II and a pamphlet in 1862. In the letter, Mart’ianov proposed 
the concept of estateless people’s monarchy, headed by a zemskii Tsar. In the 
pamphlet, he defined the people as the zemstvo, which was oppressed by the state. 
In the new system, proposed by Mart’ianov, the representative government of the 
people was to be headed by the Great All-Popular zemskaia duma, the manifesta-
tion of the union and unity of the whole Slavic world.109
The term zemskii sobor predominated among the émigré opposition. In June 
1862, Ogarev, who advocated making Russia a federation of autonomous regions 
since 1861,110 interpreted the zemskii sobor as a parliament, limiting autocracy, 
in a draft address to Alexander II, which was approved by Gertsen and Mikhail 
Aleksandrovich Bakunin but never submitted. In early 1863, Gertsen claimed that 
the year 1862 was a pause, after the 1861 emancipation of the serfs, and the eve 
of the convocation of a zemskii sobor. The latter was supposed to limit autocracy 
through a constitution, which had to be composed by the people and the Tsar by 
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February 19, 1863. Gertsen concluded by urging Alexander II to trust his peo-
ple at the anticipated zemskii sobor. Over the course of 1863, Kolokol published 
Ogarev’s article Constitution and the Zemskii sobor. He defined the zemskii sobor 
as the congress of deputies, which was supposed to be elected from the whole 
zemstvo (most likely “the people” in Mart’ianov’s understanding) in estateless 
elections and to organize the Russian land according to the needs of the zemstvo. 
It was supposed to legalize land use rights, introduce elected administration and 
court, regulate the relations between regions, and establish a new system of gov-
ernment. The first zemskii sobor was supposed to be provisional and elected from 
districts. It was to establish the new system of the state, delimiting the borders 
between regions and granting the legal basis for regional dumas. The second zem-
skii sobor was supposed to convene, based on the new laws, as a permanent body 
of regional deputies.111
The words zemskii and zemstvo proved important for the continued reforms. 
During the preparations to the introduction of the zemstvo (zemskoe, “local” or 
“rural” in this context) self-government on provincial and district levels in parts 
of the Russian Empire, which was eventually implemented on January 1, 1864, 
there was a discussion of possible introduction of an empire-wide zemstvo body. 
In 1863, Minister of Internal Affairs Petr Aleksandrovich Valuev, who briefly 
employed Shchapov as an expert on Old Believers,112 presented the project of a 
Congress of State Deputies under the State Council to be elected by provincial 
zemstvo assemblies113 and cited the widespread praises to the zemskii sobors of 
the past in the note which accompanied it.114 Although Alexander II rejected the 
project, the discussions of a possible assembly continued. Among the representa-
tives of the nobility, who advocated the convocation of an assembly since 1858 
and mentioned a possible zemskaia duma since 1862, Vladimir Petrovich Orlov-
Davydov was the first to use the word sobor when speaking of an institution unit-
ing individual zemstvo assemblies in 1865.115
The limited character of the reforms stimulated radical opposition. The estate-
less zemskii sobor became one of the goals of the first Land and Freedom soci-
ety.116 Gertsen argued in 1867 that the convocation of a great sobor without the 
distinction of classes was the only means to reveal the true needs of the people and 
overcome the crisis in Russia without a coup, terror, and horror. Gertsen defined 
the sobor as “the first constituent assembly” or the first parliament, which would 
mean the freedom of speech and a legal foundation for progress.117 Mykhailo 
Petrovych Drahomanov, who initially supported the reformism of Alexander II, 
became radicalized during the suppression of the Ukrainian national movement. 
Supporting the slogans of federalism and decentralization, Drahomanov claimed 
during the 1877–1878 Russo–Ottoman War in the Balkans that Russia first needed 
to become a free country, a free federation of Slavs. He called for extending the 
competence of local self-government through a reform of the zemstvos and for 
an immediate election of a zemskii sobor, a transitional institution on the way 
to further reforms. Like for Shchapov and Bakunin, for Drahomanov the local 
units were the foundation of the future federation, organized in a bottom-up man-
ner. According to Drahomanov, the all-Russian zemskii sobor was expected to 
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immediately grant personal freedoms, freedom to all cultural and national groups, 
and self-government.118
The democratic understanding of the zemskii sobor spread within Russia 
among the members of the zemstvo bodies and in secret organizations. In 1879, 
Ivan Il’ich Petrunkevich and other zemstvo activists of the Chernigov Province 
supported the idea of a zemskii sobor. In his program of the zemstvo movement, 
published the same year, Petrunkevich, however, spoke of a constituent assembly 
as the movement’s goal.119 With the spread of the idea of a constituent assembly 
among the radical opposition, the term zemskii sobor consolidated as its synonym. 
The revolutionary organization People’s Will (Narodnaia volia), formed in 1879, 
included it in this sense into its program. Its members used the terms constitu-
ent assembly, zemskii sobor, and zemskoe sobranie (“the assembly of the land”) 
interchangeably.120
New historical interpretations of the zemskii sobor accompanied the political 
developments. Chicherin, whose 1866 work On Popular Representation became 
the first major study of parliamentarism in Russian, located Russia in Europe and 
defined the historical zemskii sobors as estate-representative institutions, which 
were comparable to their European counterparts. He nevertheless concluded that 
the geographic conditions, the lack of corporatist foundations and communal 
self-organization, and the peculiarities of elite development in Russia precluded 
the sobors’ development into a representative institution with political rights. 
Furthermore, the estate representation, according to Chicherin, was worked 
out in a top-down manner for organizing the disjointed and mobile population. 
Connecting his work to contemporary developments and discussing consultative 
assemblies, Chicherin argued against the revival of irregular assemblies like the 
Estates General and the zemskii sobors, suggesting that the new political situa-
tion demanded permanent institutions. He also maintained that introducing estate 
assemblies would only have negative consequences. According to Chicherin, it 
was only after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 that Russia started to organ-
ize the civil life on the principles of “universal liberty and law,” the principles 
which were at the foundation of all European peoples and the precondition for 
representative institutions. He nevertheless argued against the latter’s immediate 
introduction and in favor of the gradual development of social conditions.121
In his 1875 work, Sergeevich continued the comparative studies of the zemskii 
sobors and European parliaments, finding similarities with the Estates General 
and the English Parliament in the composition of some sobors. He also concluded 
that even though it was hard to determine the legal status of the sobors, they were 
not merely consultative. Sergeevich opposed both the Slavophile idealization of 
the sobors and their complete dismissal, calling them representative institutions in 
their embryonic state and deeming them “undoubtedly useful” for the direct com-
munication between the Tsar and the people, which inter alia countered adminis-
trative arbitrariness.122
The interpretations of the zemskii sobors as part of the gradual political devel-
opment contributed to the discussions of reforms. When commenting on his 
project of introducing consultation with local self-government in 1881, Mikhail 
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Tarielovich Loris-Melikov mentioned zemskaia duma and zemskii sobor, although 
he was against the revival of “ancient representation” under the new conditions.123
The possible formation of a zemskii sobor of self-government bodies found 
support among Loris-Melikov’s opponents, who rejected constitutionalism.124 
Rostislav Andreevich Fadeev, a general and a Panslavist author, summarized 
their ideas in several letters in 1879–1880, first published in 1881. According to 
Fadeev, the autocratic government had to rely on zemstvo instead of bureaucracy 
and officers in order to save Russia from “turning into hell.” A new, reformed, 
zemstvo, “organized and closely connected to the government,” was supposed to 
take place of the nobility as the stabilizing “social force” locally. Although Fadeev 
argued that zemstvo would limit only bureaucracy and not autocracy itself, he sug-
gested that the reform had to be developed locally by the representatives of three 
social estates – landowners, peasants, and merchants – to be united in provisional 
consultative committees. Despite the frequent appeals to autocracy, Fadeev’s pro-
ject was that of decentralization, since he expected zemstvo to acquire major fis-
cal and economic competence. Furthermore, the zemstvo reform was supposed 
to bring about the convocation of all-Russian consultative zemskii sobors by the 
government. Relying on Slavophile ideas and appealing to the “zemskii sobors” 
of the past, Fadeev expected the sobors only to inform the government about local 
needs, stressed the moral aspects of the proposed system, emphasized that the 
sobors had little in common with “the European parliament,” and firmly rejected 
a constitution as a contract between the Tsar and the people.125 Fadeev’s project 
hence fused autocratic and democratic understandings of the zemskii sobor.
The assassination of Alexander II by the members of the People’s Will on 
March 1, 1881, prevented him from approving Loris-Melikov’s consultation 
reform. During the prosecution of the organization’s members in 1882, Aleksandr 
Dmitrievich Mikhailov, one of them, used the term zemskoe uchreditel’noe 
sobranie (“the constituent assembly of the land”), which was to be universally 
elected. Iurii Nikolaevich Bogdanovich, another member of the organization, 
stressed in his testimony that the people were to decide all major state matters at 
a zemskii sobor when discussing the program of the People’s Will. Other mem-
bers, however, interpreted the zemskii sobor as an unneeded concession from the 
government. In 1882, Petr Lavrovich Lavrov opposed the simultaneous demands 
to convene a zemskii sobor from the government and the attempts to stage a coup 
against it, arguing that a zemskii sobor of nobles, bureaucrats, merchants, and rich 
peasants would not defend social interests.126
The connection between the terrorists of the People’s Will and the zemskii 
sobor proved important for the public debates, contributing to the rejection of 
the institution in its Slavophile version, proposed by Ignat’ev, in 1882. Despite 
the publications by I. S. Aksakov and Golokhvastov, other conservative authors 
opposed it. Rejecting the idea of a zemskii sobor, Mikhail Nikiforovich Katkov 
stressed that Andrei Ivanovich Zheliabov, one of the organizers of Alexander II’s 
assassination, and other radicals used it as their slogan.127 The Geneva newspaper 
Vol’noe slovo (“Free Word”) (1881–1883), which was edited by Drahomanov 
and was possibly a government-sponsored organ of a fictitious opposition group, 
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continued to use the term zemskii sobor in its more moderate constitutional reform 
suggestions.128 Vladimir Il’ich Lenin was among those who considered the con-
vocation of a zemskii sobor by the government as a means to Russia’s political 
liberation in the 1890s.129
In the 1890s and 1900s, zemstvo activists greatly contributed to the production 
of the oppositional discourse. According to Ivan Petrovich Belokonskii, a zem-
stvo employee, the liberal zemstvo opposition consolidated around 1891–1892, 
agreeing on the need for a “popular representation” (a parliament). In 1895, how-
ever, Nicholas II rejected the zemstvos’ interest in participation in the govern-
ment, pledging to defend autocracy. Dmitrii Nikolaevich Shipov, who chaired 
the Moscow Provincial Zemstvo Administration, nevertheless initiated unofficial 
congresses of provincial zemstvo heads in 1896. Although the government tried 
to prevent regular zemstvo congresses, zemstvo activists continued to meet and 
discuss possible reforms. The more radical part of the liberal opposition, active 
both in Russia and abroad, opposed a future zemskii sobor in 1903–1904, which 
some activists proposed, due to its unclear relations to autocracy and unclear 
membership. Although Shipov supported a consultative zemskii sobor, he con-
tinued to partake in the movement which shifted toward constitutionalism. The 
majority at the unofficial zemstvo congress (also known as the first “legal” one), 
which took place on November 6–9, 1904, in Saint Petersburg and was chaired by 
Shipov, supported a legislative “popular representation.”130
Some proponents of terrorism in the Party of Socialists Revolutionaries 
(formed in 1902) named the convocation of a popular zemskii sobor as the con-
dition for stopping the terror, since it would hold the arbitrariness of the gov-
ernment in check in a peaceful and civilized manner, in the early 1900s.131 The 
more radical left, however, rebuked the slogan. Responding to the assassination of 
Minister of Internal Affairs Viacheslav Konstantinovich fon Pleve by a Socialist 
Revolutionary in July 1904, an anarchist group opposed the slogan of a zemskii 
sobor, claiming that it would simply legalize the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, 
and called for the struggle against capital and the state in a proletarian uprising.132 
In November 1904, an Odessa anarchist-communist group dismissed the prom-
ises of “political freedom and a zemskii sobor” by the Socialist Revolutionaries 
and the Social Democrats, claiming that they would simply replace the autocratic 
oppression with constitutional and citing the violence against workers in politi-
cally free countries.133 During the Revolution of 1905–1907, in March 1905, a fur-
ther anarchist proclamation dismissed the zemskii sobor as a tool of exploitation 
to be used by the rich, again opposing the Social Democrats. It called for violence 
against the exploiters and concluded with the slogans against private property and 
the state.134 In April 1905, an anarchist proclamation dismissed the slogans of a 
zemskii sobor and a constituent assembly, as well as parliamentarism in general, 
claiming that socialists in a parliament only brought more harm.135 The same year, 
one anarchist group wrote in its proclamation: “Blessed is he who throws a bomb 
at the zemskii sobor on the first day of its convocation.”136
Interestingly, it was a right-wing author, Sharapov, who returned to the zemskii 
sobor in the context of decentralization after the introduction of the State Duma. 
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Sharapov’s 1907 futuristic “political fantasy” Dictator was anti-parliamentary, 
but it borrowed a lot from the democratic interpretations of the zemskii sobor. In 
the text, the future dictator of Russia (working under the Tsar) immediately dis-
solved the State Duma, abolished the new parliamentary system, and announced 
the convocation of a zemskii sobor, which was to work out the new fundamental 
laws. Sharapov not only defined the sobor as a constituent body but also suggested 
that it would divide Russia into large self-governing regions. Furthermore, self-
government bodies were supposed to discuss legislation before its final approval 
by the sobor.137 In a way, Sharapov returned to Fadeev’s ideas but was more influ-
enced by the democratic understanding of the zemskii sobor.
With the introduction of the State Duma, the zemskii sobor lost its relevance 
as a democratic slogan. The polemics on the historical sobors, however, con-
tinued. In 1905, Ioannikii Alekseevich Malinovskii, for instance, underscored 
both the development of representation at the sobors in the seventeenth cen-
tury and the supposed exercise of supreme authority by the 1648–1649 sobor. 
Citing the works of Sergeevich and Mikhail Flegontovich Vladimirskii-Budanov, 
Malinovskii claimed that the sobors were not merely consultative and concluded 
that the sobors proved that the principles of political and civil liberty were not 
alien to Russia.138 Boris Borisovich Glinskii included the zemskii sobors, as a 
representative institution and a kind of “popular rule” or democracy, into his nar-
rative of the struggle for constitution in a series of articles in 1905–1907. Like 
Shchapov, he maintained that Peter I destroyed the principle of democracy, noted 
the recent ban on using the term zemskii sobor in publications, and claimed that 
the idea survived among those who were dissatisfied with the existing order.139
Mikhail Vasil’evich Klochkov did not share such a view on the zemskii sobors 
in his popular publication in 1905. He acknowledged that historians had previ-
ously portrayed the zemskii sobors as “deeply popular” institutions but main-
tained that the introduction of new sources disenchanted them. Klochkov argued 
that the zemskii sobors lagged behind Western parliaments, since they were not 
convened according to law but in line with the desire of the supreme authority, 
were a primitive form of popular representation, and were hence hardly suitable 
for Russia at the threshold of a “new, better life.”140
The zemskii sobor, however, still had a place in the democratic mythology. 
Mikhail Vladimirovich Rodzianko, the Chairman of the State Duma, noted in 
his memoirs that for the official celebrations of the 300th anniversary of House 
Romanov in 1913, the members of the Duma were assigned places in the back, 
behind the State Council and the Senate. Rodzianko claimed that he had to tell the 
organizers of the ceremony that since the celebration had to be a popular festival, 
one should not have forgotten that in 1613 it was the people in the “Zemskii sobor” 
and not a group of bureaucrats who elected the Tsar. According to Rodzianko, 
the argument worked and the organizers made the Senate cede its place to the 
Duma.141
The zemskii sobor as a democratic slogan and a metaphor returned during the 
Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War of 1918–1922. Interestingly, it was the 
anarchist Petr Alekseevich Kropotkin who internalized the ironic interpretation of 
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the Moscow State Conference of August 1917 as a zemskii sobor and called it the 
“the sobor of the Russian land,” which needed to declare Russia a republic.142 In 
the anticipation of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, the Old Believer activ-
ist Nikolai Petrovich Anufriev published a pamphlet, comparing the “constituent 
assemblies” of 1613 and 1917. He claimed that the idea of sobor as the way to 
reestablish authority became part of the popular consciousness during the Time 
of Troubles and that the sobors were supposed to be permanent due to Mikhail 
Fedorovich Romanov’s minority, representing hence parliamentary statehood in 
modern terms, but the idea of a people’s Tsar failed. Anufriev concluded that 
the anticipated All-Russian Constituent Assembly could constitute Russia on new 
principles, similar to the 1613 “Zemskii sobor,” but in order to avoid new “trou-
bles” it needed to resolve social problems as well.143
The projects of a zemskii sobor emerged both on the left and on the right. 
According to some sources, Lavr Georgievich Kornilov, the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Russian Army, whose attempted coup failed in late August 1917, planned 
to establish a representative body during the anticipated dictatorial regime and 
to call this body a sobor, possibly a zemskii one. Vasilii Stepanovich Zavoiko, a 
businessman and one of Kornilov’s associates, was allegedly the main advocate 
of the idea. According to other sources, Zavoiko simply meant the inclusion of 
the clergy, the Local Council (Sobor) of the Russian Orthodox Church, which 
assembled on August 15, 1917, into the Extraordinary State Duma, the legislative 
authority he envisioned.144 During the Bolshevik–Left Socialist Revolutionary 
Coup of October 25–26, 1917, Grigorii Il’ich Shreider, the moderate Socialist 
Revolutionary Mayor of Petrograd, attempted to rally the opposition around the 
Committee of Public Safety. In order to strengthen its positions, Shreider initi-
ated the convocation of the “all-Russian zemskii sobor” of zemstvo and municipal 
self-government bodies, but only representatives of several provinces arrived by 
November 9, 1917, the planned opening date, and Shreider decided to call it the 
Conference of Representatives of Local Self-Government instead.145
Some participants of the White movement used the constituent assembly and 
the zemskii sobor as synonymous slogans and rhetorical devices during the Civil 
War. The government of Aleksandr Vasil’evich Kolchak in Siberia (1918–1920), 
for instance, refrained from recognizing Finnish independence, claiming that 
this could only be done by such an assembly. According to the program of the 
Western Volunteer Army in the Baltic region (1918–1919), the zemskii sobor (the 
constituent assembly) was supposed to determine the relations of the new postim-
perial states, fighting the Bolsheviks, with Russia, which in practice allowed it to 
ignore Latvian independence. In October 1919, the Czechoslovak politician Karel 
Kramarž proposed his draft Constitution of Russia to Russian émigrés in Paris. 
The project, which was later discussed in the anti-Bolshevik areas in the south of 
Russia, proposed a constitutional monarchy or a republic with a Tsar or a presi-
dent as the head of state. If the system was to become monarchical, then each Tsar 
was to be elected from the House Romanov by the parliament for life. Explaining 
this compromise between monarchy and popular sovereignty, Kramarž cited the 
300-year-long tradition dating back to the 1613 assembly.146
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The idea of the zemskii sobor as a democratic institution proved especially 
prominent in Siberia. On July 7, 1919, Ivan Aleksandrovich Iakushev, a Socialist 
Revolutionary and Siberian Regionalist, presented a proclamation to the popu-
lation of Siberia to the Irkutsk Provincial Zemstvo Assembly, calling for the 
convocation of a zemskii sobor as a parliamentary body. In the fall of 1919, the 
Socialist Revolutionary zemstvo activists in Irkutsk refused to participate in the 
State Zemstvo Conference, discussed by the Kolchak government, demanded the 
convocation of a legislative zemskii sobor instead, and proposed a democratic 
“buffer” state in Siberia. In November 1919, the Czechoslovak commander Radola 
Gajda joined Iakushev in organizing an uprising in Vladivostok, which was sup-
posed to end with the convocation of a zemskii sobor, but it was suppressed by 
Kolchak’s subordinates. The Siberian Regionalist Viktor Nikolaevich Pepeliaev, 
who became Kolchak’s Prime Minister later the same month, also called for an 
immediate convocation of a zemskii sobor.147
After the Kolchak government collapsed under the Bolshevik offensive and the 
successful Socialist Revolutionary coup in Irkutsk in early 1920, it was Zavoiko 
who proposed a zemskii sobor to the new non-Bolshevik authorities in the Far East. 
Zavoiko’s ideas were close to those of the Siberian Regionalists, as he aspired to 
start rebuilding Russia by organizing Siberia through a Siberian zemskii sobor.148 
In 1920, he published a draft Constitution in Japan. The draft pertained only to 
the Maritime Region but envisioned a reunited Russian federation and reaffirmed 
the idea of convening a zemskii sobor. It drew heavily on the US Constitution 
but included conservative elements, such as the elimination of political parties.149
When the Priamur Zemskii Sobor was about to convene in Vladivostok in the 
summer of 1922, there still was no consensus on what the assembly meant, and 
both the autocratic and democratic mythologies informed the discussions. Indeed, 
the Socialist Revolutionary slogan of a zemskii sobor as a legislative assembly and 
its more conservative reinterpretation by Zavoiko were still relevant. According 
to one account, the Priamur Zemskii Sobor was supposed to elect a provisional 
national government in order to organize the struggle against the Bolsheviks and 
build the state, while Diterikhs was the first one in the Vladivostok government 
to openly call for the restoration of monarchy, breaking with the moderates and 
aspiring to return to the pre-1905 period when the State Duma had not yet estab-
lished the “hated constitutional principles.”150
Conclusion
The political mythologies of the zemskii sobor developed simultaneously with 
historiography and at times ahead of it. History writing was also a way for some 
authors to participate in the political debates. The autocratic mythology, promoted 
by the Slavophiles, proved more coherent yet it did not achieve the desired rec-
ognition from the Tsars. Initially, the autocratic approach to the zemskii sobors 
was idealistic but it became more practical at the summit of its popularity in 1905, 
when it was discussed by the government as a way to avoid bigger concessions. 
The democratic mythology was more heterogeneous and, despite occasionally 
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fading to the background of the debates, lasted for some hundred years between 
the 1820s and the 1920s. The idea of zemskii sobor proved influential for the 
projects of reimagining the empire as a federation, while some radical intellec-
tuals also found the term useful when discussing a constituent assembly. The 
democratic discourse involved skepticism and criticism of the concept of zemskii 
sobor from the onset of the discussions, with many moderates becoming disillu-
sioned with it, but the concept survived as part of the romantic nationalist imagery 
and flourished as a symbol during the Civil War, with the zemskii sobor being 
imagined as a Russian constituent assembly, destined to mend the new Time of 
Troubles. The two mythologies were not isolated and overlapped in several pro-
jects, including the Priamur Zemskii Sobor of 1922.
Both mythologies lived on after the empire’s collapse. In 1964, the Supreme 
sobor as a “controlling” branch from the project by Pestel’ reemerged in the out-
line of a Constitution proposed by a group of right-wing dissidents. With the 
clergy anticipated to play a major role in it, the new version of the Supreme sobor 
was supposed to remind of the historical assemblies and embodied religious 
nationalism.151 In 1990, Aleksandr Isaevich Solzhenitsyn, the most prominent 
conservative dissident writer, quoted Shipov on the zemskii sobors and claimed 
that there had been no struggle between the Tsar and the people, very much like 
the Slavophiles. He also proposed a possible body, a sobornaia duma or a state 
duma, consisting of esteemed individuals with high morals, wisdom, and life 
experience as part of Russia’s future system of government.152
The democratic mythology informed the debates on the new Russian 
Constitution in 1993. The Russian Social-Ecological Union, a major environmen-
tal association, included the sobors into its proposals on Russia’s federal system, 
which it submitted to the Constitutional Commission. Russia was to be divided 
into lands, and the zemel’nyi sobor (“the assembly of the land”) was to be the 
supreme legislature of each land, which was reminiscent of both Murav’ev’s and 
Shchapov’s ideas.153 The nationalist Sergei Petrovich Pykhtin authored an alterna-
tive draft Constitution, in which the Zemskii sobor was the legislative body con-
sisting of three chambers: the State Duma, the Senate, and the State Council. The 
former two chambers were to be universally elected. The whole Zemskii sobor 
elected the President without debates for a five-year term. Although this project 
used the language of the imperial bureaucracy and the right-wing intellectuals, 
in essence it represented a modern democratic system, despite the election of the 
President without debate154 and once again demonstrated a fusion of democratic 
and autocratic mythologies of the zemskii sobor.
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It was indeed a grand political idea whereof even England could be jealous of 
us, this Council of State, which was heard over all big questions, conserved 
from the great political traditions of the Empire. … This admirable creation 
of the Brazilian spirit, which completed the other, no less admirable one taken 
from Benjamin Constant, the Moderating Power, united, thus, around the 
Emperor the political heads of the one and the other side, all of their consum-
mated experience, whenever it was necessary to hold consultations about an 
important public interest.2
Joaquim Nabuco (1849–1910)
This can be dealt with by a completely new invention of my own devising. When 
you inquire into the basic principles of our Constitution, you will see that sov-
ereignty resides firmly in the imperial house, and that in a crisis His Majesty’s 
judgment is to be the basis for the final decision. … There must be conscientious 
imperial advisers who can clearly ascertain the state of the nation and the senti-
ments of the people, and in the end secure what is in their best interests. I am 
convinced that only a Privy Council can provide the place where such advisers 
may be found.3
Itō Hirobumi 伊藤博文 (1841–1909)
Introduction
Advisory bodies to monarchs are among the most traditional forms of collective 
decision-making, but as institutions of modern states, they are among the least 
conspicuous ones. As monarchs had their powers limited by constitutional gov-
ernments or even became symbolical figures in parliamentary political systems, 
their advisory bodies lost their legislative attributions to parliaments and their 
executive attributions to the cabinet. Since the nineteenth century, a privy coun-
cil might seem like a relic from the autocratic past to an observer from Central 
Europe, the British Isles or her former colonies in North America. It was in this 
sense that Kenneth Colegrave wrote that the Japanese Privy Council had “almost 
no counterpart in contemporary Europe,” and belonged to the “England of the 
Stuarts or the France of Louis XVI.”4
5
The 22 Frimaire of Yuan Shikai
Privy councils in the constitutional 
architectures of Japan and China, 1887–1917
Egas Moniz Bandeira1
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But is that really so? Whoever, by whatever strange whim, decides to com-
plement his reading of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan of 1889 by the 
Constitution of the Empire of Brazil of 1824, will find a parallel between the 
two of them which he will not find between the Japanese Constitution and the 
constitutions from which it is thought to be derived. Title V, chapter 6, of the 
Brazilian Constitution stipulated that the Ministers of State shall countersign and 
be responsible for all acts of the executive branch of the government, while the 
next chapter institutes a Council of State to be heard in all “important matters” 
as well as in cases in which the Emperor “propose to exert any of the attributions 
of the Moderating Power.”5 While much more laconic, the Japanese Constitution 
had the same structure: art. 55 stipulated that the Ministers of State countersign 
all Laws, Imperial Ordinances, and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, while 
art. 56 laid down that the Privy Council “deliberate upon important matters of 
State.“6 Constitutional thought has also described both institutions in very simi-
lar terms: While the Brazilian Council of State has been claimed to have been the 
“brain of the monarchy,”7 the Japanese Privy Council was the “palladium of the 
constitution and of the law.”8
In both cases, it has been claimed that the consultative council was a spe-
cifically national element of the respective constitutional architecture. While the 
Brazilian statesman Joaquim Nabuco (1849–1910) claimed that the Council of 
State was an “admirable creation of the Brazilian spirit,”9 the Japanese states-
man Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909) spoke of a “completely new invention of my own 
devising.“10 But as a matter of fact, Brazil and Japan were by far not the only 
constitutions to show such a parallel treatment of the executive body of ministers 
and of the advisory body to the monarch. Next to the Portuguese Constitutions 
of 1822 and 1826,11 closely related to the Brazilian one, and the Spanish consti-
tutional charters, such as those of 1808 and 1812,12 the feature came up in other 
seemingly unrelated constitutions around the world, such as articles 41 and 42 of 
the 1845 Constitution of the Kingdom of Hawai’i and articles 54 and 55 of the 
1875 Constitution of the Kingdom of Tonga.13
Did these privy councils and councils of state appear around the globe coin-
cidentally and spontaneously? Using the example of three East Asian polities – 
the Japanese Empire, the Qing Empire, and the Republic of China – this chapter 
shows that they did not.14 By the nineteenth century, privy councils were all but 
a moribund relic of the past. Rather, they were building blocks of global con-
stitutional architecture which surfaced and were adapted in various parts of the 
world according to local needs. As Lorenz von Stein (1815–1890) explained to 
his Japanese interlocutors, the old privy councils of pre-constitutional times were 
transformed in three ways: some of them disappeared completely, others retained 
ceremonial roles, while some were transformed into significant organs counter-
balancing the cabinet or the parliament, being it within monarchic or republican 
constitutional frameworks.15 The first development occurred in many German 
states, while England is a prime example for the second type. Although these two 
types might lead to the impression of the institution being an anachronism, the 
third type also had a prominent representative in the middle of Europe, and one 
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which proved to be rather influential: the Napoleonic reinterpretation of the pre-
constitutional curia regis in the form of the constitutional Conseil d’État.
As the chapter shows, Japan and China opted for the third type, adapting the 
constitutional idea in a variety of local variants designed to meet the needs of 
the constitution-makers. Meiji Japan opted for the strong Privy Council through 
the mediation of German constitutional advisors, for such an institution prom-
ised additional constitutional stability in a context where the Emperor was to 
occupy a role at the top of the constitutional architecture. While the strong role 
of the Japanese Privy Council is well-known, the various Chinese refractions of 
the institution seem to have been inconspicuous in the formation of the mod-
ern political institutions of the Chinese state. Carrying a host of differing names 
not only in Chinese, but also in English translations, it is easy to overlook that 
not only the imperial “constitutional preparation” from 1906 to 1911 created 
a Privy Council, but that early republican constitutional architectures also fre-
quently foresaw such bodies. While, as most other new institutions, they were 
modeled on foreign institutions, mostly but not exclusively Japanese, they also 
played the role of being a traditional element within the new system, seen as a 
successor for indigenous institutions and as a way to accommodate old elites. 
The chapter shows that not only the late Qing Bideyuan 弼德院 (Privy Council), 
but also Yuan Shikai’s 袁世凱 (1859–1916) Canzhengyuan 參政院 (literally 
Political Participatory Council) were refractions of the concept. Thereby, it also 
highlights political continuities and discontinuities between the Qing Empire and 
Republican China. A privy council could be formed in both polities due to the 
structural similarity between constitutional monarchy and presidential republics, 
but it fell into oblivion when it came to be too strongly associated with monarchic 
and presidential strongmanship.16
From curia regis to pouvoir neutre
In Europe, perhaps the first place where the privy council lost its power to a respon-
sible subset of itself was England, and later by extension, the United Kingdom. 
In the mid-seventeenth century, during the English Civil War, the Privy Council 
was first abolished, but was then replaced with a Council of State, which again 
became a Privy Council to Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658). After 
this episode, the royal Privy Council was reinstated, but lost most of its pow-
ers to the Cabinet, which is formally a committee of the Privy Council. Except 
for its main ceremonial functions, the British Privy Council has retained some 
residual executive, legislative, and judicial functions: it may issue royal charters 
to grant powers to body corporates, and its Judicial Committee acts as the court of 
appeal in cases concerning crown dependencies, overseas territories, and certain 
Commonwealth states.
Similar developments also took place in continental European processes of 
constitutionalization, but they tended to go a step further: As these processes, 
beginning from the late eighteenth century, all engendered full-blown written con-
stitutions, the constitutional charters now tended to leave out these institutions. 
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For example, the Belgian Constitution of 1831 – an internationally influential 
document – does not mention the Crown Council (Conseil de la Couronne) at all. 
Although it continued to exist as a customary institution, it was only convened 
five times since the adoption of the Constitution in matters of supreme impor-
tance. In Germany, some constitutions mention the Privy Council, such as that of 
the Kingdom of Bavaria (1818)17 and of the Kingdom of Hannover (1833),18 but 
they often do so only in passing, and in many places, the institution was gradually 
sidelined during the century. This was the case, for example, in the most powerful 
of German states, Prussia. Although the institution saw a few short-lived revivals 
until the end of monarchy, the Constitution imposed by the King in 1850 does not 
mention the Staatsrat.19
However, as mentioned, the third type of advisory council – which paralleled 
the cabinet in the constitution – not only occurred in Brazil, Japan, Hawai’i, and 
others, but also in a very different central European context. The Council of State 
(Conseil d’État) of the French ancien régime was inherited by the Napoleonic 
Conseil d’État, founded in 1799 with the so-called Constitution of 22 Frimaire, 
Year VIII. In articles 52 and 53, the charter instituted the new Conseil d’État as 
part of the government, tasking it with devising draft laws and resolving admin-
istrative difficulties. Articles 54 and 57 set down the role of ministers, including 
their responsibility. The legislative power, on the other hand, was fragmented into 
three assemblies (Conservative Senate, Tribunal, and Legislative Corps). In the 
post-Napoleonic restoration, the Conseil d’État was sidelined, but it regained its 
importance in the July Monarchy installed in 1830 and was again constitutionally 
regulated in the Constitution of the 1848 Republic.
The text of the French Constitution of 1799 was not a perfect blueprint for sub-
sequent constitutions. The attributions of the council of state varied, as, e.g., it was 
not necessarily tasked with administrative adjudication, and the 1799 stipulation 
that three orators be chosen from the Conseil d’État to represent the government 
in the Corps Legislatif remained very specific to Consulate France.20 However, 
the strong position of the postrevolutionary French Conseil d’État next to the 
Ministers of State – who were not necessarily yet united in a cabinet – was key in 
inspiring similar constitutional architectures in Euro-America and beyond.21 As 
will be shown, it also figured as a significant element in the considerations that led 
to the adoption of the Japanese Privy Council.
Furthermore, the constitutional theory which came to underpin the constitu-
tional architecture of a Council of State alongside the State Ministers directly 
in Brazil and, in a more fuzzy way, in Japan, was also of French origin. Basing 
himself on Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre (1757–1792), the liberal French phi-
losopher Benjamin Constant (1767–1830) had conceived of the royal power as 
of a separate branch of government next to the executive branch of government, 
even though the monarch was at the head of both:
One will be astonished that I distinguish the royal power from the executive 
power. This distinction, still unknown, is very important. It is, perhaps, the 
key of every political organization. There are, says he (Clermont-Tonnerre), 
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two distinct powers within monarchic power: executive power, vested with 
positive prerogatives, and royal power, which is supported by memories and 
religious traditions.22
Although Benjamin Constant did not comment about the Council of State, this 
consultative council attached to the person of the monarch was soon conceived 
as the epitome of royal power itself. The Brazilian (1824) and Portuguese (1826) 
Constitutions expressly conceived the Council of State as being the instrument of 
the monarch’s “moderating power” (poder moderador), which, as expressed in 
art. 98 of the Brazilian Constitution,
is the key of the while Political organization, and is delegated exclusively to 
the Emperor, as Supreme Chief of the Nation, and its First Representative, 
that he incessantly watch over the maintenance of independence, equilib-
rium, and harmony of the further Political Powers.23
Hence, although privy councils had become at most ceremonial institutions in the 
Germanic-speaking parts of the world, it was far from an anachronistic rudimen-
tary institution on a global level. In the form of councils of state, advisory bodies 
to heads of state continued to flourish and be productive in new constitutional 
formations, especially in cases where they were deemed necessary for the consti-
tutional equilibrium between the several branches of government.
Japan: “The Cabinet executes, the Conseil d’État deliberates”
When, more than half a century later, Japanese leaders devised a constitution as 
a basis for the government of Japan, they encountered a situation which was in 
a way the opposite of the one to be found in many Euro-American polities. Real 
political power had laid with the Tokugawa family in Edo (present-day Tokyo) 
until the second half of the nineteenth century, while the Emperor had merely 
had a powerless symbolic function in Kyoto.24 The so-called Meiji Restoration 
abolished the power of the Tokugawa and at the same time nominally “restored” 
the position of the Emperor, who would thenceforth be the “head of the Empire, 
combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty,” and exercise “them according 
to the provisions of the present Constitution” (art. IV of the 1890 Constitution).25
However, the combination of sovereignty in the hands of the Emperor did not 
necessarily mean that he would be the main political operator of the Empire. The 
oligarchy which had just seized power from the Tokugawa government would 
not want to give up its position, and it deemed that entrusting too much power on 
the single person of the Emperor would be dangerous. Furthermore, constitution-
ally attributing the exercise of sovereignty to the Emperor was also a risky move 
for the stability of the constitution itself, for it made the Emperor highly vulner-
able in case he became involved in political struggles. Again, the Emperor had 
to be elevated above daily politics and put into a role less prone to controversies. 
Regular constitutional organs would take political responsibility and thus shield 
the Emperor from blame. 26
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It is well-known that the creators of the Meiji Constitution opted to adapt 
German models to address these constitutional challenges.27 Yet, the question 
of the Privy Council shows that constitutional law adopted by the Japanese 
government by suggestion of German advisors was not exclusively of German 
extraction, but drew from a broader pool of European statecraft. Although the 
Meiji Constitution did not expressly recognize the “moderating power” such as 
the Brazilian one did, the position of the Emperor under the Constitution came 
quite close to it. Albeit far from identic to it, the Japanese Privy Council came 
much closer to a Napoleonic Council of State than to the contemporary British or 
Prussian Privy Councils.
But what exactly gave the impulse for the creation of a Privy Council in Japan? 
Scholarship on the matter is divided.28 The first instinct of observers would be to 
see in it a vastly modified adaptation of the British Privy Council.29 Takii Kazuhiro 
瀧井一博 attributes the idea to Itō’s “study of European statecraft, especially under 
(Lorenz von) Stein.”30 Takii’s footnotes refer to Sakamoto Kazuto 坂本一登, who 
describes the Privy Council as the result of a debate between Itō – who favored 
a strong institution, supported by the German constitutional advisor Hermann 
Roesler (1834–1894) – and another pivotal figure in the constitutional drafting 
process, Inoue Kowashi, who favored a weaker council.31 Ernst Lokowandt con-
tends that it was “broadly modelled” on the Bavarian Staatsrat.32 Junko Ando’s 
detailed study of the German origins of the Japanese Constitution reports stark 
differences of opinion between the various advisors of the Japanese government, 
including Stein, Roesler, Rudolf von Gneist (1816–1895), and Gneist’s student 
Albert Mosse (1846–1925).33 According to Ando, Stein rejected the idea of a 
Privy Council as not compatible with a constitutional state (Verfassungsstaat) in 
which responsible ministers would counsel the Emperor, and at most approve of 
a Privy Council as a ceremonial body.34 Instead, she writes, the Japanese Privy 
Council largely conformed to the suggestions of Rudolf von Gneist, which she 
interprets as stemming from an “anachronistic” ideal image of the English politi-
cal system.35 According to Ando, the Gneistian position was reluctantly supported 
by Roesler, who was favorable of a limited Privy Council to deliberate on draft 
laws and ordinances.36
The divergences between Stein, Gneist, Roesler, Itō, and Inoue are supported 
by the primary sources. Gneist – a professor in Berlin – and Stein – a professor 
in Vienna – had advised a large number of Japanese statesmen on their trips to 
Europe, most notably Itō Hirobumi in 1882–1883.37 They were thus instrumen-
tal in forming the constitutional worldviews of the Meiji elites, and the trip to 
Vienna undertaken but many a leading Japanese statesman came to be known as 
the “Stein pilgrimage.”38 The concrete constitutional drafting process, however, 
began in 1886 and involved a small circle of Japanese drafters – apart from Itō and 
Inoue, Itō Miyoji 伊東巳代治 (1857–1934) and Kaneko Kentarō 金子賢太郎 
(1853–1942) – who would pose questions to Mosse and Roesler and deliberate 
about their answers, choosing what model to follow.39
Itō’s conception of the monarch as an arbiter between the powers was Steinian, 
but the vision of a strong Privy Council which he introduced into the drafting 
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process was not. The Constantian idea of the Emperor as a neutral power had 
quickly become popular in German liberal political philosophy, including with 
Lorenz von Stein.40 Von Stein devoted a large part of his scholarly attention to 
the legal, political, and social history of France and exclaimed “that nowhere the 
world knows a more profound and inexhaustible source of greater truths about 
constitution and society.”41 Next to several works on French social movements, 
he also published a three-volume history of the French state and French law. 
Von Stein deemed that a purely democratic solution would exacerbate social ten-
sions and that only a class-independent monarch standing above the other powers 
would be able to create a “kingdom of social reforms” (Königthum der socialen 
Reform).42
Stein’s conception of the monarch as a neutral, mediating power transpires in 
the lectures he gave to his Japanese guests in Vienna. On 15 February 1887, he 
told Prince Komatsu-no-miya Akihito 小松宮彰仁 (1846–1903) that the mon-
arch should “thoroughly consider the positions of both sides and decide on the 
possibility of determining which of them is right.” The monarch, Stein main-
tained, should “stand above the legislative and executive branches and oversee 
all affairs of the state.” On that occasion, Stein also told Prince Komatsu that the 
Emperor would permanently need “people personally loyal to His Majesty” to 
act as advisors. Prince Komatsu noted that the advisors should be united in two 
consultative bodies: one for military matters (junji naikyoku 軍事內局) and one 
for political matters (seiji naikyoku 政事內局).43
But Stein’s conception of monarchy required a much less prominent mon-
arch than Benjamin Constant’s, and he did not see the Constitution of the Year 
VIII as a realization of the monarch’s neutral power. When he spoke about the 
neutral power in his books about France, he did so to argue that it had been but 
halfway introduced in France with the July Monarchy installed in 1830.44 Stein’s 
words to Prince Komatsu about the monarch needing capable advisors did not 
refer to a privy council but rather to the cabinet, for the task of giving counsel 
to the monarch would behoove his ministers. In his conversations with Japanese 
statesmen, Stein consistently cautioned against a separate privy council to advise 
the Emperor aside the cabinet. In a lecture to the Elder Statesman (Genrō 元老) 
Kaieda Nobuyoshi 海江田信義 (1832–1906), he warned that such a constellation 
would “give rise to conflicts between the ministers and the privy council.”45 To 
Itō Hirobumi and his entourage, he declared even more adamantly:
A council of state46 is not the office to respond to consultations by the king. 
The right to take up consultations from and give advice to the king shall 
necessarily reside with the government, i.e. with the ministry. When the min-
istry is staffed by its members and able to be a pillar (of the governmental 
structure), the Council of State will be an entirely superfluous institution. The 
Council of State shall only be established while it is provisorily needed and 
shall serve the function of memorializing in necessary matters to the monarch 
while the ministry is exchanged. … This is also the result of the historical 
development. Therefore, when the constitutional system shall once be fixed, 
 The 22 Frimaire of Yuan Shikai 157
the Council of State shall lose fixed functions and become a merely honorary 
office.47
Rather, Itō’s ideas about the Privy Council stemmed from Rudolf von Gneist, 
which he then defended in the drafting process. Detailed records of Gneist’s 
conversations with Itō himself are not extant, but they seem to coincide with 
what Gneist told another Japanese visitor, Prince Fushimi-no-miya Sadanaru 
伏見宮貞愛 (1858–1923), three years later.48 Some other sources also give a 
glimpse of what Gneist told Itō. In a letter to the German minister in Japan, Karl 
Eisendecher (1834–1934), Gneist narrated that he had put his emphasis on “con-
structing a strong municipal constitution from below and installing a Council of 
State and Upper House from above.”49 In one point, however, Gneist differed 
markedly from European models with strong Councils of State: although gener-
ally favorable of including administrative judication into its responsibilities, he 
deemed it too early for Japan to do so.50
Prima vista, it would be natural to understand Gneist’s conception as an 
“anachronistic” understanding of England. If Stein concentrated his energies on 
the study of France, Gneist devoted much of his academic attention to English 
history, publishing several books on English constitutional law and constitu-
tional history.51 Gneist is known to have created an “English utopia,” writing 
about the Victorian United Kingdom as if it was still governed the same way as 
Elizabethan England.52 Yet, neither were his recommendations to Japanese politi-
cians an entirely “anachronistic” reverberation of Elizabethan England nor did 
the Japanese drafting process build on such a limited understanding of England.
For one, Gneist used a historically based comparative approach.53 Thus, he 
shows awareness that the Privy Council had lost much of its real importance 
in England, but retained it elsewhere, e.g., when he speaks of the Prussian 
Generaldirektorium (1723–1808) as a “collegially organized Council of State, in 
which the conduction of the highest affairs of state is connected with the decision 
about complaints by the subjects, similarly to the older English Privy Council 
and as in the French Conseil d’État.”54 Furthermore, when giving recommenda-
tions to Prince Fushimi, it seems that his reference is not so much the English 
Privy Council but the French Conseil d’État, for he defines the institution with 
a sentence attributed to none other than Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821): “The 
Cabinet executes; the Conseil d’État deliberates” (Naikaku wa kore o okonai; 
Sanjiin wa kore o gisu 內閣ハ之ヲ行ヒ參事院ハ之ヲ議ス).55 It also seems that 
at least Prince Fushimi understood the proposed organ to be closest to the French 
model, for his records constantly use the common Japanese translation for the 
Conseil d’État, Sanjiin 參事院.
When drafting the final constitution, Itō’s Gneistian view clashed with Inoue’s 
and Roesler’s. Roesler’s written statement on the question did “not support the 
establishment a Council of State with the status of a constitutional organ,” for it 
would be a source of conflict with the Cabinet.56 However, Roesler conceded that 
Cabinet ministers might not have the time and specialized knowledge for their 
decisions on laws and that legislative drafts were often “rough and imperfect.”57 
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Hence, he still could imagine a Privy Council limited to give counsel on laws and 
ordinance, even if he did not deem it to be necessary.58
Accordingly, Roesler’s draft Constitution of 1887 included no mention of the 
Privy Council.59 However, commissioned by Itō, he also drafted an organic law 
for the Privy Council, dated 6 April 1888, which gave the institution far-reaching 
powers. These included not only the power to interpret laws, but also to decide on 
budget and accounting conflicts between parliament and government.60 Inoue pro-
tested against this accumulation of powers, essentially arguing against the posi-
tion of the Emperor as a separated branch of government, i.e., implicitly rejecting 
the Constantian model:
In political matters, it is not possible to make a difference between Cabinet 
and Imperial House. … Should the Emperor now decide about divergences 
between the government and the parliament with the further assistance of the 
Privy Council, this will distinguish clearly between the government and the 
Emperor, and will serve as a proof to distinguish their characteristic inten-
tions. This will not be confined merely to the matters were they conflict with 
each other, but all actions of the government will be able to be explained as 
coming into existence outside of the Emperor’s pleasure.61
However, Inoue’s alternative proposal also explicitly adduced the French Conseil 
d’État as its model, for that institution, too, had no direct bearing with the par-
liament. In other words, Inoue did not see the Council of State as an instrument 
of the neutral power, but as a provider of services for the executive branch of 
government:
In sum, the Privy Council should not have this power and be put on top of the 
Cabinet and the Parliament. Therefore, the Privy Council’s legal interpreta-
tions should be restricted to answering questions from within the executive 
(including about the constitution). I reckon that it should not have a connec-
tion with the Parliament (i.e., the same as the French Conseil d’État).62
Itō’s letter to Inoue, which serves as an epigraph to this chapter, was a reaction 
to Inoue’s criticism. Therein, he defended his conception of the monarch as an 
arbiter in constitutional crises and of the Privy Council as the monarch’s helper 
in this task, which he claimed to be of his own devising. The new organ created 
after this exchange of opinions was a compromise between the two positions. 
The especially controversial responsibility in budgeting matters was withdrawn, 
as was the mention to resolving conflicts with the parliament, making it close to 
Inoue’s proposed Conseil d’État structure. Yet, in other ways, the new organ was 
also palpably Itōesque.
Itō’s hand can not only be seen in the name of the organ. Rather than Sanjiin, 
the organ was called “Agency for the Important and Confidential” (Sūmitsuin 
樞密院). At the same time as this was the name used to translate the English and 
constitutionally invisible German institutions and came close in meaning to the 
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English term “Privy Council,” it was also a reference to East Asian tradition of 
statecraft. In AD 765, the Tang Empire had created an “Agency for the Important 
and Confidential” to coordinate and supervise the Emperor’s paperwork. Now, 
more than a millennium later, the agency became a constitutional organ on the 
same level as the Cabinet, being thus separated from the administrative branch of 
government.
According to the Constitution, the Emperor would be relieved of daily political 
business to be conducted through responsible ministers of state. While the Privy 
Council served for the Emperor not to potentially give away all his powers to the 
Cabinet, it also provided additional checks on Imperial power. First, it took away 
his decision-making from the intransparent workings of the Inner Palace and insti-
tutionalized it.63 Second, the fact that the Privy Council would give recommenda-
tions by majority decision could reduce the Emperor to a “state notary public.”64 
The Cabinet and the Privy Council were closely intertwined, for the members of 
the former were always also members of the latter (but not vice versa). In a “divi-
sion of labor,” however, the Privy Councillors would be tasked with “planning 
far-sighted schemes of statecraft and of effectuating new enactments, after a care-
ful deliberation and calm reflection, by instituting thorough investigations into 
ancient and modern history, and by consulting scientific principles.”65
The provisions concerning the Privy Council were so flexible that it could 
accommodate for a strong Emperor, but that it could also function as an organ of 
its own even with an absent monarch.66 Thereby, the organ itself, rather than the 
Emperor personally, came close to being a fourth branch of the state, for, in the 
words of Itō’s commentary, it would be “the palladium of the Constitution and 
of the law.”67 Constitutional reality went beyond what the maxim “The Cabinet 
executes; the Conseil d’État deliberates” suggested. The Cabinet would ask the 
Privy Council for “counsel” on new draft laws twice: first before passing them to 
the legislative branch – which the fathers of the Meiji Constitution did not want 
to be too strong – and then again at the end of the legislative process. Hence, the 
Privy Council could de facto decide on draft laws. In spite of their close entangle-
ment, the “third chamber,” as it came to be known, developed a tense relationship 
with the Cabinet and clashed with it several times before it was dissolved after the 
Second World War.68
Qing Empire: An “Academy of Worthies” 
as “retirement home”?
While literature often stresses the strong position of the Japanese Privy Council 
as a “third chamber,” the Qing Privy Council has been commonly described as 
an “honorable, but powerless” organ.69 How can this be if the Qing Privy Council 
was widely thought to follow the model of the Sūmitsuin?
The imperial Privy Council, instated in 1911, only existed for a few months 
before the fall of the Qing Empire, and for a few days in 1917 during a short 
attempt at imperial restauration. Given this short period of existence, the conclu-
sion that the Qing Privy Council was an unimportant part of late Qing constitutional 
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architecture is somewhat premature. It certainly stood in the shadow of both the 
legislative Political Consultative Council (Zizhengyuan 資政院) and the execu-
tive Cabinet (Neige 內格): while the Zizhengyuan was being a catalyst of political 
opposition from provincial elites and the Cabinet was the object of sharp criti-
cism for consisting mainly of imperial kinsmen, the Privy Council did not enjoy 
much independent protagonism. Qing mainstream position was concerned about 
creating a dignified organ which would be a home to high officials in the transi-
tion from absolute to constitutional government. However, while debates on the 
institution showed some Qing specificities and emphasized different aspects than 
Japanese Constitution-making had, there was no shortage of voices calling for the 
Council to have a strong position independent of the Cabinet, and its structure 
closely resembled that of the Japanese Sūmitsuin. The council, thus bore the seeds 
of becoming an institution comparable in significance to the Japanese Sūmitsuin.
By the turn of the twentieth century, when a large-scale movement to demand 
constitutional reforms in China was taking shape, the encyclopedias of modern 
knowledge and textbooks of international law based on Japanese sources defined 
privy councils as bodies that “replied to consultations by the Emperor” and 
debated “important affairs of the nation.”70 Although such descriptions were often 
limited to monarchies and did not accordingly include France’s Conseil d’État, 
the equivalence of these institutions irrespective of the form of state was not com-
pletely lost in China either. This can be seen from the very imperial ordinance 
establishing the Privy Council in 1911, which declared that the institution would 
be equivalent to the privy councils and councils of state of the various countries 
of East and West.71
Late Qing literature unanimously stated the practical irrelevance of the 
English Privy Council, but reflected different assessments of the importance of 
the Japanese Privy Council. One of the more cautious assessments was offered 
by Wang Rongbao 汪榮寶 (1878–1933), who later became one of the members 
of the drafting team for the final constitution of the Qing Empire. The New Erya 
(Xin Erya 新爾雅), a seminal encyclopedia coedited by him in 1902, stressed 
that the Japanese Privy Council was not an administrative organ and that it was 
“only the highest consulting organ of the Tennō.”72 However, Wang Hongnian 
王鴻年 (1860–1911), who later became an assistant to the Chinese constitutional 
commission in Tokyo, gave a stronger assessment of the institution. In the first 
systematic Chinese textbook of constitutional law, published in 1902 and based 
on lectures given by Hozumi Yatsuka 穗积八束 (1860–1912), he stressed that the 
Japanese constitutional charter differed from European Constitutions by expressly 
mentioning the Privy Council, and that its powers competed with those of the 
Cabinet ministers.73 It is quite possible that such descriptions later created the 
misunderstanding that the cabinet and the privy council were strictly separated 
organs, which was not the case.
From the earliest proposals to establish a constitutional Privy Council in 1906, 
the central aim associated with it was creating a dignified space to accommo-
date the old élites who would otherwise have no place in the new constitutional 
system. This concern eclipsed the possible rivalry of the Privy Council with the 
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Cabinet and created the impression still prevalent in scholarship that the privy 
council would be a powerless organ. In 1906, Prince Duanfang 端方 (1861–1911) 
submitted a proposal for a provisional reorganization of central administration, 
which would precede the eventual constitution. His suggestion for the creation 
of a Shumiyuan (the same term as Japanese sūmitsuin 樞密院) actually gave it a 
more active position than the Japanese model, for it postulated that it actively con-
vene every ten days to provide counsel for the Emperor.74 However, his plan also 
could be understood as mainly aimed at the accommodation of those members of 
the Qing Grand Council (Junjichu 軍機處) and Grand Secretariat (Neige 内閣) 
who would not make it as prime ministers or ministers of the new government. 
For Duanfang, the original Grand Council had performed advisory functions such 
as those of a privy council,75 but should be integrated into the Grand Secretariat 
to form a powerful executive office. The supernumerary officials, in turn, would 
receive “a sense of dignity” (youchong zhi yi 優崇之意)76 from the “good method 
and beautiful meaning” (fa liang yi mei 法良意美)77 of the new Privy Council 
(Shumiyuan).
Prince Yikuang 奕劻 (1838–1917) submitted a similar proposal, which fig-
ured in the first official plan for political reforms in 1906 and remained influential 
throughout the period of late Qing constitutional preparation.78 Although it was 
not included in the reforms announced on the basis of this plan, it contained the 
only draft of an organic law for the organ and served in constitutional scholarship 
as a blueprint for the design of the Privy Council as late as 1910.79 Yikuang’s 
proposal differed in two main points from Duanfang’s. First, it did not foresee 
regular meetings of the Council. In itself, this did not necessarily mean much, for 
the passiveness of consultations just followed the Japanese model.80 However, the 
second difference indeed indicates that Yikuang saw the accommodation of no 
longer needed officials as the main function of the Privy Council. It also showed 
another important concern of late Qing constitutionalists: the Privy Council was 
justified with Chinese traditions and thought to be a traditional element in the 
nouveau régime. Although shumiyuan/sūmitsuin also had a Tang precedent, it had 
now become the official name of the Japanese council and the standard translation 
for privy council. Instead, Yikuang sought to give it a distinctively Chinese flavor 
by “using the name ‘Academy of Worthies’ (Jixianyuan 集賢院) of the Tang era 
and adopting the content of the Japanese Privy Council (Shumiyuan).”81 While 
the name chosen by Yikuang, “Academy of Worthies,” referred to an institution 
of “court-patronized litterateurs who engaged in compiling imperially sponsored 
scholarly works,”82 he described its function as being that of the “temple salary” 
(cilu 祠祿) system of the Song era, whereby retiring high officials were appointed 
to service at religious institutions.83
If the function of the Privy Council was really that of giving some “temple 
salary”-like position to retiring officials, it would not necessarily be an isolated 
element within constitutional architecture, but was possibly a significant factor 
in the constitutional balance. Allocating this function to the Privy Council could 
strengthen the other constitutional institutions by enabling them to fulfill their sub-
stantial functions. This was at least the argument of the pro-constitutional activist 
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Meng Sen 孟森 (1868–1938), who ran a column in the widely read magazine 
Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi 東方雜志). In 1909, the constitutional com-
missioner to Japan, Li Jiaju 李家駒 (1871–1938), submitted a report about the 
Japanese institutions to the throne, wherein the recommendations about the Privy 
Council conformed to the other examples discussed above. At the same time as 
he wrote that it should “roughly follow the example” of the Japanese Sūmitsuin, 
Li discussed it in the light of several sinecure positions in China’s administrative 
history, making clear that the body’s main function would be to “distinguish for-
mer high officials” and to provide counsel to the court.84 Meng’s comment on Li’s 
report painted one of the most vivid pictures of what Qing élites hoped the Privy 
Council to be. According to Meng, Li’s proposed Privy Council was a “retire-
ment home” similar to “posts such as that of postal director” in other countries.85 
Was that a bad thing, however? No. Meng pointed out that the projected proto-
parliament, the Zizhengyuan, could otherwise be misused for the same purpose, 
and argued that Li’s suggestion was apparently designed to “remove this function 
from the Zizhengyuan to the Privy Council in order to rescue the Zizhengyuan’s 
actual purpose.”86
Nonetheless, on the other side of the spectrum, there were also various calls to 
make the Privy Council strong and truly cabinet-rivaling. In 1910, when the call 
of the day was the “speedy introduction of a national assembly,” a censor called 
Qingfu 慶福 (dates unknown) submitted a memorial to the court, urging to speed-
ily introduce the Privy Council instead of the National Assembly and even before 
the Cabinet.87 He argued for a four-branch government system in the Constantian 
sense, with a “ruling branch” (tongzhi quan 統治權) being located above the three 
other branches. To this effect, he envisioned a Privy Council similar to the line 
defended by Rudolf von Gneist and Itō Hirobumi, composed of close aides and 
confidants who would be responsible to the Emperor in the same manner as the 
Cabinet would be to the parliament. In sum, the Council would serve to solidify 
the Emperor’s power as constitutional organ.
What policy did the court pursue in view of these recommendations and 
pressures on both sides? When the government unveiled its concrete plans for 
constitutional transformation in the summer of 1908, the Privy Council was not 
included in the hastily prepared Outline of a Constitution by Imperial Decree 
(Qinding xianfa dagang 欽定憲法大綱),88 indicating that the government did 
not see the Privy Council as an organ of the same level of significance as the 
Cabinet. However, the nine-year roadmap published at the same time foresaw the 
establishment of a Privy Council in the last year of “constitutional preparation” 
(1916), together with the promulgation of the constitution and the convening of a 
parliament.89 The document did not go into any details, but gave the institution a 
different name. It was not named “Agency for the Important and Confidential” as 
its Japanese counterpart, nor “Academy of Worthies” like Yikuang had proposed, 
but “Council to Assist (the Ruler’s) Virtue” (Bideyuan, an abbreviation for the 
expression fubi junde 輔弼君德). Gao Fang 高放 suggests that the new name 
reveals a different concern of the Court in creating the Privy Council, this time 
aimed at specifically Qing political circumstances. The Guangxu Emperor had 
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been held captive since a botched attempt at radical political reforms in 1898, 
whereas real power was residing with the Empress Dowager Cixi. Hence, Gao 
argues that the term “assist the (ruler’s) virtue” was aimed at Guangxu, for Cixi 
had come to understand the Privy Council as a way to restrict the Emperor, par-
ticularly in case she died and he came to power again.90
This concern became well-nigh immediately obsolete, for both Cixi and the 
Emperor died three months after. Nonetheless, the government did not aban-
don the idea. Following strong pressures to accelerate the constitution-building 
process, it established the Privy Council the same day as the Cabinet, on May 
8, 1911. Both the organic law and the detailed regulations issued in July were 
closely modeled on the Japanese equivalents.91 Besides deliberating on and inter-
preting the Constitution and related laws, the Council would have to deliberate 
on international treaties and on imperial orders and decrees issued in cases of 
emergency. Given these attributions, the Privy Council could well have evolved 
to take a strong position as the Japanese model.
The Privy Council would consist of 34 members, including the president and 
the vice president, and additionally count on ten consultants with “political knowl-
edge and experience,” a provision not contained in the Japanese model. All the 
13 ministers of the new Cabinet, as well as the heads of the Court of the Imperial 
Clan (Zongrenfu 宗人府) and of the Imperial Household Department (Neiwufu 
內務府) would become Privy Councillors (art. 4 of the organic law). Possibly 
due to an incomplete understanding of the Japanese model as provided by Wang 
Rongbao in his Xin Erya, this point turned out to be especially controversial and 
drew immediate criticism that the Privy Council could not perform its constitu-
tional duties because it was not independent enough from the Cabinet. The censor 
Fan Zhijie 范之杰 (1872–1957) categorically wrote that both institutions were 
supposed to be “independent organs, not having jurisdiction over nor interfering 
with each other,” arguing that the 16 Privy Councillors hailing from the Cabinet, 
the Imperial Household Department, and the Court of the Imperial Clan would 
impossibilitate any independent majority in the Privy Council.92 He claimed that
now, although the establishment of the Privy Council in our country alledg-
edly adopts Japan’s new institution, the Cabinet ministers are allowed to con-
comitantly serve as Privy Councillors, which seems to be drawing from the 
English system.93
His colleague Chen Shantong 陳善同 (1876–1942) was better aware of the 
Japanese laws. He tried to argue that the Japanese organic law actually did not 
design the Cabinet ministers as full members of the Privy Council, but only 
stipulated that they should participate within the bounds of their respective 
areas.94 However, Chen’s argument was not much more convincing than Fan’s: 
in Japanese constitutional practice, all Cabinet ministers were also created Privy 
Council members. While the number of Privy Councillors expanded over time, 
the proportion was not much lower than in China (in 1890, 10 out of 25; in 1911, 
10 out of 28).
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The few months of its existence were too short to show how the Privy Council 
would really have fared in constitutional practice, and it is impossible to say how 
the final constitution would have treated the Privy Council, for its draft has been 
lost. The extant private constitutional drafts do not foresee any Privy Council, 
charging the Cabinet with the task of counseling the Emperor.95 Cao Rulin 
曹汝霖 (1877–1966), a member of the Constitutional Office, although not one of 
the officially designed main drafters of the final constitution, writes in his mem-
oirs that the (no longer extant) constitutional draft established a Privy Council 
(Shumiyuan).96 However, the diary of Wang Rongbao, which is the main source 
on the aborted drafting process of the final constitution, does not record the inclu-
sion of a Privy Council, neither under the name Shumiyuan nor under the name 
Bideyuan.97 In 1911, the question does not seem to have attracted much attention 
from the group devising the final constitution.
Nevertheless, since the Bideyuan was established together with the Cabinet 
and as its organization closely followed the Japanese model, it could also well 
have lived up to a role of “third chamber” with the power to veto legal drafts 
coming from the Cabinet and demand alterations to them. Perhaps the most real-
istic assessment of the upcoming Privy Council was given in 1911 the Journal of 
Introductions to Law and Administration (Fazheng qianshuo bao 法政淺說報). 
In a detailed commentary on the new organic law, it explained that although privy 
councils were nominally the most important constitutional organ, they were in 
practice less significant than the cabinet. The significance of the emergent Privy 
Council in China, however, would largely depend on the clout of its members. 
If some figure of utmost importance came to preside over the Privy Council, the 
Privy Council would naturally take center stage in Chinese politics.98
Republic of China: the Consejo de Estado and 
the “fortune of the Republic of China“
As the Bideyuan disappeared with the fall of the monarchy, one could suppose 
that the institution of an advisory council to the head of state became obsolete. 
Indeed, neither the “Organizational Charter” (Zuzhi dagang 組織大綱) of the 
Provisional Government of the Republic of China, issued in November 1911, nor 
the Provisional Constitution (Linshi yuefa 臨時約法) of the Republic of China, 
issued in March 1912, contained anything else than provisions for a legislative 
body and the ministers of state.99 However, early Republican constitutional schol-
arship was divided on whether the newly founded Republic of China should adopt 
such a body. Of 18 private and party-sponsored constitutional drafts presented in 
the first years of the Republic, 5 included provisions for an advisory Council of 
State, while the 13 others did not.100 
Whereas the transition from autocracy to constitutional rule within the Qing 
prompted many to think about how to accommodate the old élites, this was much 
less of a concern in the Republic. The Nationalist Party’s (Kuomintang 國民黨) 
constitutional position paper (Zhuzhang quan’an 主張全案) of July 1913 at 
first supported the establishment of an Advisory Council (Guwenyuan 顧問院) 
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modeled after the French Conseil d’État and the Japanese Sūmitsuin.106 The revi-
sion of the position paper issued in August, however, rejected this proposal, for 
two reasons:
Suggestion no. 4 supported the establishment of an Advisory Council. This 
is extraordinarily unimportant. As deliberative institutions and a responsible 
government are already established, all important matters have to undergo 
deliberation before they are executed, without leading to rash decisions. If 
yet another Advisory Council is established, it will excessively delay things, 
and only increase the number of superfluous officials. Hence, (suggestion no. 
4) shall be struck.107
More than the problems of government efficiency and of creating possible sine-
cures, however, the fault line of the debate lay in the position of the head of 
state. Of the remaining four drafts, it is remarkable that two were drafted by the 
paramount figures of the late Qing constitutional movement: Kang Youwei and 
Table 5.1  Early Republican constitutional drafts containing proposals for Councils of State
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Liang Qichao. Now that there was no longer an Emperor, it was the President of 
the Republic who would be the head of state acting above the other branches of 
government.
In order to be able to perform such a role as a moderating power, the head of 
state would need a council of his own, just as Napoleon had needed in postrevo-
lutionary France and Itō Hirobumi had needed in Japan. In the most thoroughly 
worked out example of this kind of constitutional architecture, Liang Qichao drew 
from a wide knowledge about global constitutionalism and tapped a thitherto 
unused source of constitutional inspiration. Although a great number of transla-
tions of foreign constitutions had been published in late Qing times, it was only 
in 1912 and 1913 that the Political Science Magazine (Fazheng zazhi 法政雜志) 
began publishing translations of various South American constitutions.108 These 
included the 1833 Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile, based on an 
English translation by Charles Wesley Tooke (1870–1943), which Liang choose 
as the model for his draft.109 The well-read Liang aptly connected the dots and 
understood that both the Japanese Sūmitsuin and the Chilean Consejo de Estado 
were phenomena of the same global constitutional element, choosing the latter as 
his model. His words make clear that the purpose of such a council had nothing to 
do with the form of state as a monarchy or a republic:
France had a Council of State in the past, and Japan has an Advisory Privy 
Council, both of which are constitutional organs. Many of the various states 
of Germany and the various states of the United States also have similar 
organs. Their functions are to restrict part of the executive power and to be 
able to carry on the attributions of the National Assembly when it is not in 
session. Its purpose is utterly good! The constitution of Chile is the most 
complete one as to the organization of this institution, which is why we now 
roughly follow the model of that institution.110
Through Chilean intermediation, Liang’s draft, such as Kang’s and Wang 
Dengyi’s, followed the structure rooted in the Constitution of 22 Frimaire, Year 
VIII: it had one chapter devoted to the Ministers of State (Guowuyuan 國務員) 
and another one dedicated to the Advisory Council of State.111 The three drafts 
– Li Chao’s differed by only having a short article on the Council of State – 
shared other similarities. Perhaps responding to the criticisms of the Bideyuan, 
they did not commingle the Council with the Cabinet, expressly forbidding the 
Councillors of State to concomitantly be Ministers or Members of Parliament 
(Liang, art. 71; Kang, art. 59; Wang, art. 63). They also strengthened the repub-
lican over the monarchic element, for the President would only appoint five of 
the thirteen (Liang, art. 68, and Wang, art. 61) or fifteen (Kang, art. 59) mem-
bers of the Council. Yet, the President had to hear it when taking a number of 
measures roughly comparable to those ere enumerated in the organic law of the 
Bideyuan. These included the appointment of the Prime Minister, the dissolution 
of the National Assembly, the promulgation of emergency measures, declarations 
of war and peace treaties, as well as proposals for constitutional amendments. In 
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sum, the Council would still basically be the advisory body to the President in a 
similar way as the Sūmitsuin was in Japan and as the Bideyuan had been thought 
to become in the Qing Empire.
Even though the idea of such an advisory council to the President only occurred 
in a minority of the constitutional drafts presented at the time, it had considerable 
appeal in midst of the chaotic parliamentary politics of the early Republic, and 
was particularly attractive to one person – namely, the ambitious President him-
self, Yuan Shikai. In midst of the political struggles of the inchoate Republic, 
Yuan Shikai had dissolved the National Assembly by the turn of 1913–1914, and 
installed two provisional assemblies instead: a Political Assembly (Zhengzhi huiyi 
政治會議) dealing with legislative matters, and a Constituent Assembly (Yuefa 
huiyi 約法會議).112 New institutions had to be created for a new constitution.
In this situation, Yuan not only promoted the idea of an advisory council, but 
also applied it to a greater extent than any of the five constitutional drafts. Yuan’s 
immediate basis was none of these, but rather an idea suggested by one of his for-
eign constitutional advisors, namely, the Japanese Ariga Nagao 有賀長雄 (1860–
1921). Ariga had undertaken a trip to Europe from 1886 to 1888, where he studied 
in Berlin and in Vienna. In his 1889 System der Staatswissenschaft (Kokkagaku 
國家學), he based his comments about advisory councils on Lorenz von Stein’s 
lectures, including the doctrine of the monarch as a “moderating” (chōwa 調和) 
power as one of the rationales for the Council of State (kokuji komon 國事顧問, 
glossed as Sutātsurāto スターツラート).113 His own opinion on the institution, 
which he added after his comparative exposition of the various types of advisory 
councils, was that “one should definitely institute it before it happens that either 
the legislature or the executive hold excessive powers.”114
When a constitutional government became an option for the Qing Empire, 
Ariga devoted great attention to the movement, an interest which persisted after 
the proclamation of the Republic.115 The change from monarchy to republic did 
not matter much for him, for what China needed was a virtuous man at the helm, 
no matter whether that man was an emperor or a president.116 After Yuan Shikai 
made him his constitutional advisor in 1913, he worked out a memorandum call-
ing for a Republican Advisory Council (Gonghe guwenyuan 共和顧問院). The 
Council was modeled after the Sūmitsuin and should be tasked with counseling 
and giving suggestions to the President, drafting the final constitution, interpret-
ing the constitution, and resolving problems between the legislative and executive 
branches.117
Yuan Shikai’s execution of the idea went much further than this. In May 1914, 
he promulgated another provisional constitution, which gave him far-reaching 
powers.118 The basis had been a constitutional draft by another foreign advisor of 
Yuan’s, the US American Frank Johnson Goodnow (1859–1939).119 Goodnow’s 
draft had not included an advisory council, but it favored a strong position of the 
president, and Goodnow himself wanted the Constitution to “adopt more fully 
the French system of government.”120 An advisory council to the President was a 
fitting addition to his draft. Besides the legislative branch (the Lifayuan 立法院), 
art. 49 of the resulting Constitutional Compact determined the establishment of a 
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Political Participatory Council (Canzhengyuan, see Figures 5.1 and 5.2), which 
replaced the Political Assembly.
According to art. 49, the Council should “respond to consultation by the President 
and deliberate on important political matters.”121 Its organic law, promulgated by the 
Constituent Assembly in May 1914, i.e., nearly 10 months before the organic law of 
the National Assembly, gave it the right of constitutional interpretation and exten-
sive advisory rights in important areas of politics (articles 2 and 3 of the organic 
law).122 The most far-reaching powers of the Council, however, were scattered 
through the Constitutional Compact: with the consent of the Political Participatory 
Council, the President would be able to pass emergency ordinances (art. 20), over-
rule parliamentary legislation (art. 34), and close the National Assembly (art. 17).
Taken in isolation, these rights were not necessarily uncommon; but their 
elaboration in the Constitutional Compact made for quasi-dictatorial powers of 
the President. For example, other drafts, such as Liang Qichao’s, also contained 
the President’s right to dissolve the National Assembly (art. 50).123 However, 
the Constitutional Compact contained two aggravating factors, which strength-
ened the President even more. In contrast to Liang’s proposal, all of the Political 
Participatory Council’s 50–70 members (see Figure 5.3) should be selected by the 
Figure 5.1  Canzhengyuan kaiyuan shi zhi menshi [Decorated gate at the opening of the 
Political Participatory Council]. Dongfang zazhi 東方雜誌 11, no. 2 (Minguo 
3 [1914]).
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Figure 5.2  Canzhengyuan mennei zhi yongdao [Corridor within the premises of the 
Political Participatory Council]. Dongfang zazhi 東方雜誌 11, no. 2 (Minguo 
3 [1914]).
Figure 5.3  Canzhengyuan quanti sheying [Group photo of the Political Participatory 
Council]. Dongfang zazhi 東方雜誌 11, no. 2 (Minguo 3 [1914]).
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President personally, and after the dissolution of the parliament he would have 
an extraordinarily long time (six months vs. one in Liang’s draft) to call new 
elections.
The consent of the Political Participatory Council for such presidential meas-
ures was such a matter of course that Frank Goodnow did not even mention that 
it was required when commenting on the new constitutional document two weeks 
later in the Peking Gazette. In Goodnow’s words, “a real controlling power of 
legislation is vested in the President and the legislature is regarded … almost to 
the position of an advisory body.” Not mentioning the Sūmitsuin either, Goodnow 
explained that the powers of the President were the same as those of the Japanese 
Emperor, as was the relationship to the legislature. Such a status befitted China’s 
status of development, for “Chinese traditions” were “executive rather than legis-
lative.” Just as in Japan, however, Goodnow saw room for constitutional change 
toward the legislative following the political maturing of the Chinese people.124
Although the Peking Daily News, the unofficial mouthpiece of the govern-
ment, found the idea “useful,” because “the trial” of parliamentary government 
“in the past has proved a failure,”125 a large part of Chinese public opinion quickly 
denounced the Political Participatory Council. For them, the Council was a 
“museum of antiquities and a collection of old paintings”126; it was Yuan’s per-
sonal instrument to further his dictatorial ambitions and to deprive the National 
Assembly of its rights.127 One Shanghai magazine published a particularly scath-
ing pseudonymous article on this institution filled with “drunkards, gluttons, anal-
phabets, punks, and living clay puppets.”128 Whereas the Qing had operated the 
Zizhengyuan, it was “utterly weird, utterly odd, and truly unimaginable” that a 
“republic claiming to be democratic” also had such a thing.129 The article ended 
with the ironic remark:
Hurray! How blessed it is, the Political Participatory Council of the Republic 
of China! Hurray! How blessed they are, the Political Participatory Councillors 
of the Republic of China! Having the such an organ and having such people is 
a characteristic of the Republic of China, and it is the fortune of the Republic 
of China! Now that I’ve finished writing I can’t help but laughing out loud.130
The Canzhengyuan was disbanded after the failure of Yuan Shikai’s monarchic 
experiment and his subsequent death. In 1916–1917, the Peking government still 
proposed a State Council of Elders (Guolaoyuan 國老院), which did not take 
off because of fierce opposition to the idea particularly in southern China.131 Sun 
Yat-sen 孫逸仙 (1866–1925), for example, addressed a telegram to President Li 
Yuanhong 黎元洪 (1864–1928), arguing that a third chamber was superfluous in 
China’s republican context.132 Later, the institution of a Privy Council (Council 
of State) was reenacted in monarchic contexts – first as a short revival of the old 
Bideyuan for a few days during an attempt at imperial restauration in 1917,133 and 
second from 1932 to 1945 in the Japanese-backed Empire of Manchuria.134
Although Republican China saw several other consultative organs at the level 
of the central government, these occupied a different place in the constitutional 
architecture than the monarchic and presidential privy councils of yore. When 
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the Republic reutilized the term “political participation” in the 1930s, it did so 
in the form of a National Political Participatory Assembly (Guomin canzhenghui 
國民參政會). As China was officially in an era of “political tutelage” by the rul-
ing Kuomintang and there was no regular national assembly, such participatory 
assemblies should provide a modicum of popular representation and consulta-
tion.135 The Napoleonic idea of an advisory council to the head of state, however, 
survived in rudimentary form. Since 1948, the Law on the Office of the President 
of the Republic of China provides for a body of up to 30 “senior advisors” (zong-
tongfu zizheng 總統府資政). As a constitutional organ on the level of the cabinet 
and the parliament, the Privy Council had become too strongly connected to Yuan 
Shikai’s strongmanship to survive.
Conclusion
Advisory councils to the head of state have been a common element of modern 
constitution-building across the world. They have developed in different forms 
across time and space. Whereas in some places they have become merely cer-
emonial or disappeared altogether, they have proved to have considerable appeal 
in others. Both their loss of importance and their continuing appeal were due to 
their position outside of the three-branch scheme of government. Being subordi-
nated to the monarch, they tended to lose their importance where the monarch’s 
powers waned in favor of legislative parliaments and executive ministers of state. 
In some constitutional orders, however, the institution served as a counterbal-
ance to precisely these emerging powers, and in particular as an instrument of 
the monarch’s “neutral” or “moderating” power on top of the other branches of 
government.
In Central Europe, this model of a strong privy council persisted most notably 
in the Napoleonic reinterpretation of the old curia regis, the Conseil d’État, but 
it also became very popular in non-European constitution-building. In Japan, the 
Privy Council – Sūmitsuin – was a central element in ensuring the influence of the 
Meiji oligarchy. It served as a supplement to a deliberately weak parliament and 
as a balance to the Cabinet, to which it was at the same time intimately connected. 
While it strengthened the monarch vis-à-vis other powers, it also provided a check 
to the monarch’s absolute autocracy, and could even accommodate a politically 
absent Emperor.
As in many other aspects of constitution-building, Japan’s Sūmitsuin served a 
model for constitution-building in China – both for the Qing Empire and for the 
Republic of China. This particular Japanese element is not often recognized: the 
late Qing Privy Council – the Bideyuan – did not exist for long enough to be polit-
ically active, and was readily classified as “honorable, but powerless.” Indeed, 
accommodating old élites who would otherwise find no place in the nouveau 
régime was a significant element in Qing debates, but as the system was laid out 
in the same way as in Japan, it bore the seeds for a more powerful role of the Privy 
Council. Such a powerful council emerged in the Republic of China. Several of 
the early constitutional drafts espoused the idea, and Yuan Shikai ended up using 
it in order to further his personal ambitions.
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In both Japan and China, the institution became obsolete because it became 
associated with obsolete political systems. In Japan, the Sūmitsuin was abol-
ished after the cataclysm of the Second World War and the adoption of a new 
Constitution in 1947. In China, Yuan Shikai’s ambitions, which culminated in 
his attempt to secure emperorship for himself, ended the constitutional trajectory 
of the institution, relegating the presidential advisors to a secondary nonconstitu-
tional role. Yet, the fate of East Asian privy councils shows that the Sūmitsuin was 
far from being a mere Japanese idiosyncrasy. The concept was a global element of 
constitutionalism, which, locally adapted, played a significant role in modern East 
Asian constitution-building.
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In September 1906, Petr Opochinin, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Kavkaz, 
a semi-official media outlet of the Caucasus Viceroyalty, shared his thoughts on 
the significance of what he believed was the culmination of the revolutionary 
transformation experienced by the Russian Empire.
That was a great moment of the first encounter between the Russian people 
and the Russian Tsar after a long separation. They had been silently and lov-
ingly looking into each other’s eyes and, in the end, they understood one 
another, so that now their progressive union can be broken neither by a right-
wing extremist [chernosotenets], nor by a stubborn and insane bureaucrat, 
nor by a frenzied Social Democrat, nor by a mad anarchist.2
The moment he referred to was the Tsar’s October Manifesto of 1905, by which 
Nicholas II granted basic civil liberties to the population of the Russian Empire 
and announced the establishment of the imperial legislative body, the State 
Duma.3 The metaphor of a “first encounter” in its own way captured the mood that 
was reigning all over the empire in the midst of the Revolution: people, with their 
demands and aspirations, became as visible for the regime as never before, they 
gained the right to speak out and a chance to be heard. Opochinin’s metaphor, 
however, also implied that this new, more “progressive” form of political order 
could exist autonomously from the newly born sphere of mass politics, secured 
merely by the people’s loyalty to the throne and the Emperor’s patronizing love.4 
It goes without saying that the fanciful images of mutual love had little to do with 
the turbulent revolutionary reality of the day. Yet, the language that heralded the 
birth of the new bonds of intimacy between the Tsar and his subjects, exemplified 
by Opochinin’s wording, in a very tangible way opened up an opportunity for new 
forms of popular engagement in the revolutionary reordering of intra-imperial 
relations.
Among the great diversity of the imperial population no other social category, 
according to the long-standing political mythology of the state, enjoyed such a 
close and direct patronage and benevolent care from the Tsar as the Cossacks, 
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with their image as pillars of the throne and the Orthodox faith firmly entrenched 
in the imperial imagination.5 Whereas the first communities of Cossack freeboot-
ers appeared as early as the sixteenth century along such rivers as the Dnieper, 
Don, Terek, and Yaik, in the eighteenth century, the Cossack hosts refashioned 
themselves as military communities in the service of the empire, dependent on 
the Tsars’ will. By the end of the Tsarist regime, 11 Cossack hosts populated the 
imperial fringes from the Black Sea steppes to the Pacific coast.6 These late impe-
rial Cossack communities shared almost no similarities with the original adven-
turers of the early modern era (part of them were created by the state from scratch, 
from people of different social backgrounds, to maintain the Tsarist rule in the 
empire’s Asian possessions). Rather than being an archaic rudiment of a distant 
past, the late imperial Cossack estate was, to a considerable extent, a surpris-
ingly modern phenomenon that owed much to imperial social creativity. In the 
early twentieth century, the authorities reinvented the Cossacks as guardians of 
the domestic order, fulfilling police functions to fight social unrest. In 1905–1906, 
Cossacks gained notorious fame as the nemeses of the Revolution. However, their 
actual experiences of the Revolution went far beyond the superficial image of sup-
pressors of popular will.
One particular aspect of discussions about the ideas and practices of parlia-
mentarism, representative democracy, or self-governance in the Russian Empire 
brought about by the Revolution of 1905–1906 is a tradition to consider them as 
essentially linked to the agenda of the liberationist movement or the tasks of the 
nationalist mobilization. The aim of this study is to challenge this vision by look-
ing at how such ideas played out in an assertively conservative, imperial-loyal 
context. The article deals with a largely neglected and short-lived experiment in 
self-governance attempted by the Cossacks in the North Caucasus in 1906. It had 
as much to do with a revolutionary search for new possibilities of popular partici-
pation in political life as with a belief that this search was a return to primordial 
traditions that existed in the past.
Nowadays, the term rada is mostly known as the name of the modern-day 
Ukrainian parliament. It echoes the name of the representative political body that 
emerged in revolutionary Kyiv/Kiev in March 1917, Tsentral’na Rada, the Central 
Council. In turn, its name referred to a historical practice of general Cossack 
assemblies in the Zaporozhian Sich, one of the oldest and most remarkable early 
modern Cossack communities, which existed on the lower Dnieper River from the 
late sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries.7 For the newly emerged Ukrainian 
polity in 1917, the Zaporozhian Sich was a precedent of Ukrainian statehood, 
while the historical phenomenon of Cossack rada served as proof of an intrinsic 
propensity of Ukrainian people to democratic self-organization.8
The myth of historical continuity of Ukraine from the Zaporozhian Sich, 
however, has a major disruption. Disbanded in 1775, tens of thousands of the 
Zaporozhian Cossacks ended up in the territory that was at that time the south-
ernmost borderland of the Russian Empire, the steppe lands to the north of the 
Caucasus mountains, bounded by the Kuban River to the south and the Sea of 
Azov and the Black Sea to the west. The territory, granted to the Cossacks by 
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Empress Catherine II “for eternal ownership,” turned into a large Ukrainian settler 
colony known as Chernomoriia, or the Land of the Black Sea Cossacks. In 1860, 
it was renamed to Kuban oblast (province; a type of administrative unit in the 
Russian Empire), which also included a part of the so-called Caucasus Fortified 
Line (or simply Liniia), populated by largely Russian-speaking Cossacks. In 
the following years, as the government launched a large-scale colonization of 
the Caucasus highlands with the simultaneous expulsion of the native Adyghe/
Circassian people to the Ottoman Empire, Kuban oblast expanded far into the 
mountainous area. This region, hitherto known as Circassia, came to be called 
Zakuban’e, literally – the land beyond the Kuban.9
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Kuban Cossack conservative elites, 
dissatisfied with dramatic transformations of the social, economic, and cultural 
life in the Kuban countryside, increasingly appealed to the mythologized image 
of the Zaporozhian Sich as a means to navigate uncertainties of the present and 
secure the Cossacks’ privileged status. In what was a classic example of an 
invented tradition, they relied on purported “Zaporozhian” legacies to advance 
their claims, and the Revolution of 1905 gave impetus to one such initiative.10 
More than ten years before the Rada emerged in Kyiv, another rada convoked 
in the administrative center of Kuban oblast, Ekaterinodar, in December 1906. 
It was the first and only assembly with such a name that existed not after but 
within the empire; not against, but thanks to it, sanctioned by the Emperor and 
spearheaded by local authorities. That is all the more striking given that the Rada 
of 1906 was itself a product of the Revolution, an extraordinary phenomenon 
inherently at odds with the imperial system of rule. Even more ironically, the 
Rada was a profoundly conservative initiative brought about by the State Duma 
debates on the role of the Cossacks in suppressing protests all across the empire. 
In essence, it was a local response to these debates – a forum convened to assert 
the Cossacks’ loyalty to the throne and their readiness to safeguard the monarchy 
from the revolutionary turmoil.
The Cossack land
The revolutionary crisis that swept the Kuban region in 1905 did not affect 
Cossack stanitsas (settlements) as profoundly as urban centers with masses of 
non-Cossack laborers. Yet, local authorities were fearful to see the symptoms 
of a potentially much more dangerous phenomenon. The so-called agricultural 
movement – peasants’ grievances over land shortages, which spread across the 
Russian Empire – was seen as an imminent threat that was about to reach the 
Kuban countryside.11 Indeed, in December 1905, one of the military units of the 
Kuban Cossack Host, the 2nd Urupskii regiment, joined the revolutionary move-
ment by taking up arms against the command. In early January 1906, the head of 
Kuban oblast introduced martial law in the whole region. The official newspaper 
attributed it to “the first symptoms of the agrarian movement.”12
There were many social and political reasons for the Cossack insubordination. 
And yet the economic factor did serve as a fertile ground that made the growth of 
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the discontent among the Cossacks formerly unaccustomed to any sort of political 
action possible. One of the leaders of the mutiny, Aleksei Kurganov, recalled that 
the unfair distribution of lands in the mountain area of Transkubania was one of 
the reasons that prompted the whole regiment to rebel against its commanders. 
While Cossacks in the lowlands, wrote Kurganov, had 30 desiatinas of land (1 
desiatina is equivalent to approximately 1.1 hectares), there were such stanit-
sas in Maikop district that did not even have three desiatinas at their disposal. 
Even worse, while rank-and-file Cossacks suffered from the lack of land, generals 
and officers possessed the best arable lands in the region. Kurganov demanded to 
enlarge land allotments and to take measures for relieving the plight of his fellow 
Cossacks.13
The crisis in Transkubania did not come as a surprise to the authorities or 
the public. Rather, it was a long-lasting effect of the poorly engineered govern-
mental settler colonial project, the failure of which became evident soon after it 
began. The project, implemented in the early 1860s with an eye to consolidate 
the imperial grip over the new territorial acquisition, conquered after decades of 
protracted struggle against the Adyghe people, was also an attempt to showcase 
the Russians’ colonizing potential and their ability to successfully adapt to any 
geographic circumstances. Visions of Cossack colonizers bringing civilization to 
the “savage” and “virgin” Caucasus valleys galvanized bureaucrats and members 
of educated public alike. However, much to their chagrin, the Cossacks proved 
unable to fit in the new environment, and their economies remained largely unsus-
tainable for decades.14
The pressing calls for solving the land problem in Transkubania remained the 
most recurrent theme of local discussions on the pages of Kuban periodicals, both 
conservative and liberal. By the end of 1906, the Kuban Cossack elites resolved 
the issue in quite an inventive way. They saw the way for solving the land problem 
in what the Cossacks believed to have been the experience of their own past. The 
Kuban Host employed the Zaporozhian myth, as a way out of the revolutionary 
situation, to alleviate the land problem and to organize important segments of its 
life according to the principles of self-governance and representative democracy.
On December 1, 1906, a large Cossack assembly convened in Ekaterinodar 
to distribute the lands in possession of the Kuban Host among different Cossack 
communities in the most equitable way possible. A total of 506 delegates, all 
belonging to the Cossack estate and representing every Cossack settlement of the 
oblast, came together for a 16-day-long session.15 Their task was to jointly, through 
detailed discussions, redraw the map of the Kuban Host’s landholdings and to 
supply the most destitute communities with additional plots of land. The assembly 
adopted the name rada, which referred to the ancient tradition of Zaporozhian 
self-rule, when the Cossacks of the Sich convened general gatherings to tackle 
a wide variety of issues concerning political questions and their everyday life. 
Indeed, the Rada of 1906 became an unparalleled phenomenon in terms of its rep-
resentative, egalitarian mechanisms and aspirations. Even more curious, however, 
was the fact the Rada owed its existence to a profoundly illiberal, conservative 
initiative launched by the semi-official regional newspaper Kubanskie oblastnye 
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vedomosti (hereinafter, KOV), being closely intertwined with and echoing events 
that took place at another, all-imperial assembly, first convened the same year – 
the State Duma.
Metropolitan Russia encounters the Cossacks
The elections to this legislative organ, announced by the October Manifesto of 
1905, in Kuban oblast were held in a rather calm manner, as opposed to heated 
competition in other, industrially developed and politically variegated, areas 
of the Russian Empire.16 The population of Kuban, divided into two separate 
curiae – of the Cossacks and of the non-Cossack estates – voted for electors in 
their settlements, and the chosen representatives, in their turn, selected the depu-
ties for the Duma among themselves in a ballot in Ekaterinodar. Three deputies, 
elected from the Cossack curia, Nikifor Kochevskii, Kondrat Bardizh, and Petr 
Grishai, had a considerable administrative experience of running economic and 
military affairs of their respective stanitsas (Dolzhanskaia, Batalpashinskaia, and 
Zelenchukskaia) during their tenure as stanitsa atamans.17
All of them were rather liberal-minded and, eventually, during the Duma ses-
sions, sided with the Constitutional Democrats, while Bardizh joined the party 
as its member. At the same time, the election of their candidatures went unop-
posed by the Cossack conservatives. An editorial of KOV characterized the depu-
ties positively, listing everyone’s merits as those of distinguished administrators. 
Even the lack of education, as was the case of Grishai, was touted as a virtue: 
although he could not express his thoughts “stylistically correctly,” he did it in a 
clear and competent way.18
On the day of the deputies’ departure for St. Petersburg, the Host organized 
the farewell at a high level, with a public prayer in the Ekaterinodar cathedral, 
attended by the Host’s leadership. Both the authorities and the conservative sup-
porters of the Cossack traditional values believed that the deputies would uphold 
the broadly defined, common interests of the Kuban Cossacks and, most likely, 
hoped that they would counterbalance the non-Cossack deputies with their explicit 
liberationist agenda.19
The actual political discussions that took place at the Tauride Palace, the seat 
of the State Duma, elucidated profound discrepancies among the Cossack rep-
resentatives and made it clear that the notion of Cossack interests was far too 
meaningless to suggest any concrete program of legislative action. Deputies from 
the Duma’s Cossack caucus, who had different political leanings and were elected 
from different hosts, failed to elaborate the common agenda and expressed oppos-
ing points of view on basic matters pertaining to Cossack life. One major discus-
sion – and the only one in which the Kuban Cossack deputies took part – became 
a landmark moment for both the participants of the debates and the Kuban public 
that kept an eye on reports about sessions of the parliament.
On June 13, the Duma raised a question that was relevant to the Cossack hosts 
and to the population of the empire at large. Cossacks’ notorious participation 
in dissolving mass rallies throughout the Russian Empire, from its core to its 
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most remote corners, and the police service that the Cossacks carried out in great 
variety of towns and cities, became the first – and frightening if not painful – 
encounter of the imperial metropole with the real, not mythologized Cossacks, 
and the Cossacks’ role in fighting the Revolution naturally became a subject of 
the parliament’s proceedings. The parliamentary hearings of the Duma’s request 
to the War Minister, in which a special commission accused him of violating a 
range of laws and rules in view of the supposedly illegitimate mobilization of the 
Cossacks on police service, spectacularly turned into an emotional drama as soon 
as the Cossack representatives took the floor. The parliament, composed mostly 
of liberal-minded deputies who claimed to represent the people that were affected 
by the Cossack actions, became a stage for a performed court hearing.20 It brought 
together two “warring sides”: the representatives of those who beat the people 
appeared before the representatives of those who were beaten. Following the sce-
nario of the political performance, the Cossack deputies were making excuses for 
the actions of their electors. For instance, one deputy from the Oblast of the Don 
Host depicted a truly apocalyptic vision of the Cossacks’ role in the Revolution: 
“It was like a slaughter. It was as if the Tatars or other ancient enemies marched 
through Rus’ with the whistle of whips [nagaiki], leaving behind nothing but 
tears, tears, tears!” Lavishly exaggerating Cossack brutality, most of the deputies 
at the same time put all the blame on the imperial government, the military author-
ities, and the arbitrary exercise of power in general. The same deputy assured the 
Duma that it was the “lawlessness” that “moved the Cossacks to Rus’ and made 
them hated by it.”21 Another Don representative condemned the Tsarist military 
upbringing for turning the once free Cossacks into “living, artificially bestialized 
[ozverennye] machines.”22 Several deputies from other regions emphasized the 
fundamental and striking discrepancy between the myth of the Cossacks they had 
been taught about and the personally experienced reality. A deputy from Simbirsk 
gubernia (governorate; the main type of administrative division in the Russian 
Empire) expressed his disappointment that throughout his youth, from primary 
school to university, the figure of the Cossack epitomized for him “all the best and 
free that the Russian people had.” This image, he bewailed, was endlessly distant 
from the actual Cossack behavior he had an unfortunate chance to observe.23
For a deputy from Kiev gubernia, the encounter with the Cossacks came as a 
shock that made him disenchanted with the image of Cossackdom altogether. He 
went as far as to speculate that the Cossacks stationed in his native region were not 
Cossacks at all as long as they shared no similarities with the brave Zaporozhian 
Cossacks he knew about from literature and Ukrainian folklore: “they do not look 
like Cossacks, they are something vague, not ours at all, because a Cossack is 
Little Russian [Ukrainian] by origin.” After everyone gained first-hand knowl-
edge of those Cossacks, the deputy rhetorically asked, “would [they] sing about 
the Cossacks all over Ukraine as before?”24
Naturally, the liberationist stance in this discussion was not the only one. A 
few deputies opposed the very idea of challenging the necessity of the Cossack 
mobilization. Their arguments ranged from the insistence on unquestioned subor-
dination to the will of the Tsar and the government, whatever it might be, to the 
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more nuanced and tactical support for the Cossack participation in suppressing the 
Revolution as the justification of the Cossack existence as a privileged estate. As 
one deputy wondered, “if the Emperor did not need the Cossacks, then, I think, he 
would have dissolved them altogether.”25
Both groups claimed to act on behalf of the ordinary Cossacks and to be the 
real exponents of people’s opinion and aspirations. To substantiate their argu-
ments, most of the deputies referred to letters at their disposal, handed to them 
by rank-and-file Cossacks before they departed for St. Petersburg, nakazy (“man-
dates”). These mandates, one of the most salient features of the emergent mass 
politics in the Russian Empire of 1905–1906, were demands to the Duma deputies 
on the part of their electors to act on their behalf and in their interests.26 Whereas 
monarchists read aloud the letters, whose compilers expressed loyalist feelings 
and their unconditional readiness to obey orders and to fight with the rioters as 
long as necessary, liberationists demonstrated letters of complaint, whose authors 
lamented about unbearable hardships of mobilization. In his turn, Kochevskii, 
speaking in support of the request to the war minister, asserted that his fellow 
Kuban Cossacks had given him a mandate, in which they commissioned him “not 
to ask but to demand the immediate disbandment” of the Cossack regiments and 
battalions taking part in suppressing the popular protests.27
The discussion of the Cossacks’ role in the Revolution, which bore resem-
blance to an orchestrated, performative tribunal before an imperial-wide audi-
ence, provoked an angry reaction among the Kuban official circles and in the 
semi-official press. One author of KOV, condemning the speeches by Bardizh 
and Kochevskii, warned that the need to fight the Revolution was self-evident for 
all the Cossacks, because otherwise the Cossacks risked “to lose everything that 
our ancestors acquired with the help of arms and what we now possess.”28 The 
implication was clear: the loyal service was the guarantee of the Cossack estate’s 
well-being, secured by the state. Another correspondent went as far as to invite 
stanitsas assemblies to pass resolutions denouncing the speeches by Bardizh and 
Kochevskii and even to exclude them from the Cossack estate.29
Moreover, the appeal to the voices of ordinary Cossacks, to the instruction 
they had ostensibly given to Kochevskii and his fellow deputies, the reference to a 
certain mandate, prompted a counter-initiative on the part of the Kuban conserva-
tives. The official newspaper, denying that any sort of instructions had actually 
been given to the deputies, put forward the idea to elaborate a real mandate to the 
deputies, “so that they would not dare, in front of the whole Russia, to present 
their thoughts, opinions, and convictions as the thoughts, opinions, and convic-
tions of all the Cossacks.”30
After Nicholas II, with his increasingly negative attitude toward the Duma, 
dissolved it in July 1906 and announced the elections to the second convoca-
tion of the parliament, KOV once again raised the question of the elaboration 
of the mandate for next cohort of Duma representatives. An anonymous author 
of a newspaper article outlined his view of how to proceed with this matter. To 
determine the principal needs of the Cossacks, he proposed to convene a common 
council, which would consist of five representatives from every settlement (three 
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from Cossacks and two from non-Cossacks), and of one high rank officer from 
every military unit on actual service or administrative institution of the Host.31
If conservatives proposed the idea of the mandate elaboration as a means to 
accuse Bardizh and Kochevskii of not having the right to speak on behalf of the 
Kuban Cossacks, liberationist press, too, adhered to the initiative, inverting at the 
same time its accusatory implication. Kirill Zhivilo, who responded with an arti-
cle in the left-wing local newspaper Svoboda, argued that in view of the absence 
of any instruction that the deputies were to follow, they could not bear responsi-
bility to the Host for the presumed breach of obligations. Instead, it was the Host’s 
fault for not having entrusted the deputies with a precise mandate.32
Meanwhile, the initiative developed rapidly. In early September, KOV urged 
stanitsas not to defer with composing resolutions concerning the council.33 Even 
before this call was published, the question of the council had already been dis-
cussed and well received at the grassroots level in at least one stanitsa. A res-
olution, passed by the assembly of stanitsa Blagoveshchenskaia, expressed its 
full support for the idea of the council. In the meantime, the planned convention 
received its own, remarkable title. It is not clear who and when decided to name 
it rada, but the name was already in use in early September 1906. Whereas the 
assembly used the word “council” (sovet), KOV used the word rada in the title 
of its article, referring to the Zaporozhian tradition of regular mass assemblies.34
At the same time, the initiative took a completely new turn. Instead of becom-
ing a council for elaborating instruction for the future deputies, it turned into 
a consultative body, which was entrusted with the mission of solving the long-
pressing land question by means of more equitable reallocation of land to the 
benefit of the Cossack settlements in Transkubania.
The tradition restored
In early November, the head of the oblast and the acting ataman (nakaznoi ata-
man; the leader of the host), Nikolai Mikhailov, proudly informed the Host that 
the Emperor approved the convocation of the Rada – the name that became offi-
cial from that time on and was confirmed by the Emperor’s signature. Mikhailov’s 
order proclaimed: “Let the Cossacks come together to the general gatherings and 
select two representatives each, and the latter would come together into a single 
Cossack ‘rada.’”35
That is how the Zaporozhian tradition, ostensibly restored, was utilized to serve 
as an ideological underpinning of the new organ. Although its declared task was 
narrow, the overtly revolutionary and subversive rhetoric easily found its way into 
the Rada’s rostrum. The famous statistician Fedor Shcherbina, authorized as the 
spokesman of the Rada and subsequently elected as its chair for his expert knowl-
edge of the local land situation, publicly expressed his gratitude to Mikhailov for 
the restoration of the ancient Cossack custom. His opening speech presented the 
Rada’s convocation as the turning point in the history of the Kuban Cossacks, 
whose administrative organization from that moment on was supposed to go back 
to its Zaporozhian roots. Shcherbina denounced the imperial encroachment on the 
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rights and privileges of the Kuban Cossacks and decried the losses for the local 
economy caused by the imperial centralization:
The Cossack self-rule, land needs, economic issues, domestic life, in short – the 
whole ancient Cossack governance [uriad] was being changed, rebuilt, and abol-
ished without any participation of stanitsas, of the working rank-and-file Cossacks 
and, as the impartial Cossack history states, not to our advantage.
A century of obscurity ended with the recreation of the Rada. “And now, after 
one hundred years,” said Shcherbina,
thanks to the care of our Koshevoi Bat’ko [father of the Kish/Kosh; an archaic, 
Zaporozhian term for the Cossack community], we are elected by all the Cossack 
population from the stanitsas, which have been in oblivion for over a century, to 
the Host’s Rada in order to solve the single most important of our issues.
Addressing Mikhailov with the Zaporozhian title complemented the whole pic-
ture – not merely the Rada was restored, but the Zaporozhian chief stood in charge 
of it.36 What is more, as Shcherbina told Mikhailov at another occasion, the ata-
man was “twice as bat’ko to the Kuban Cossacks – the koshevoi bat’ko of the 
Kuban Cossack Host and the bat’ko of the Host’s Rada.”37 It is not clear whether 
Shcherbina invented this “fatherly” Zaporozhian metaphor or just popularized it 
during this major event, but the metaphor firmly entered the official use.
Just as semi-officially, and at the same time in the same informal manner, 
Mikhailov was praised in even more flattering terms. At a deputies’ dinner in 
Ekaterinodar’s garden, an amateur Cossack poet from Eisk district performed 
a song in public, calling Mikhailov the hetman (the title used by heads of the 
Ukrainian Cossack polity) of the Black Sea Cossacks:
Our Cossack rada
Used to convene for centuries;
If Mikhailov were not here
We would not have the rada.
You, Mikhailov, the ataman of ours
The Hetman of the Kish
Do not forget the Black Sea Cossacks
And their good fame.
Kozats’kaia rada nasha
Sbyralas’ vikamy;
Ne bulo b u nas Mykhailova
Ne bulo b i rady.
Ty, Mykhailov, otaman nash
Koshovyi het’mane
Ne zabud’ zhe chornomortsiv
I ikh dobroi slavy.43
The Cossack Rada, a debut poem by Oleksandr/Aleksandr Piven’, one of the 
most prolific local writers who authored a vast number of best-selling collec-
tions of humorous stories, folk tales, and poetry, published on the occasion of 
the assembly, repeatedly portrayed it as a restored tradition that was meant to 
bring harmony and prosperity to the lives of Black Sea, Line, and Transkubania 
Cossacks (a difference he consistently laid stress on). Piven’ characterized the 
rada as a custom practiced by the Zaporozhian Cossacks, discontinued for a cen-
tury and renewed again as soon as the right moment came:
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Many things
[The Cossacks] were doing there
At the host’s rada
Because they learned to follow
That tradition
Already in the Sich…
One hundred years have passed
After that
And the tradition was gone
Dead for an age!
And only now












Znov do nas vernuvsia!44
Piven’ depicted the hundred years that passed after the dissolution of the Sich – 
that is, the whole historical experience of the Black Sea Host from its emergence 
and up to the Revolution – as a wasted time marked by nothing but miseries. It 
was only the Rada that put an end to the Cossacks’ hardships:
The Cossack has lived
Not so much
One hundred years in Kuban
These years had nothing
To be praised for
Because they were bad
This bad life
Has passed
The old tradition is back
So for the rada
For the meeting
We, Cossacks, are being called
Prozhyv kozak
Ne tak, ne siak










In Piven’s poem, the restoration of the Rada was not only the revival of the 
ancient custom – it rendered insignificant the last 100 years that separated the 
Cossacks from their ancestors, diminishing the temporal distance and bringing 
them closer to the bygone era of the Sich. Even such a gesture as Mikhailov’s 
bow to the delegates, which evoked an image of Zaporozhian atamans’ symbolic 
submission to the Cossacks’ will, lumped together the present and the past:
When at the Rada,
He bowed down
To the whole public
It appeared again,
It seemed






Mov, staryna blyz’ko …46
The Zaporozhian rhetorics, engendered by the Rada and endorsed officially, 
was entrenched even in locales that had little connection with Chernomoria. A 
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resolution passed in early 1907 by the Cossack assembly of stanitsa Yaroslavskaia 
in Transkubania expressed gratitude to Mikhailov for his patronage over the 
Kuban Cossacks. Calling him “our Chieftain Koshevoi Bat’ka” (a Russian ren-
dition of the Ukrainian title), the authors of the resolution thanked Mikhailov 
for the establishment of the rada, “which has almost been blurred out from our 
memory.”38
The invented character of the tradition did not go unnoticed. The historian Petr 
Korolenko authored an article for KOV, dedicated to the history of rada as a polit-
ical practice. Recognizing its importance for both Zaporozhia and Ukraine, he 
pointed out that it lost its significance after Ukraine fell under the rule of Russia. 
The Black Sea Cossacks did not and could not know this practice in its original 
meaning. The Rada of 1906, Korolenko argued, resembled a sort of assembly that 
was indeed practiced in Chernomoria in the late eighteenth century, but its com-
petence was limited to solving a rather narrow range of issues.39
At the same time, Korolenko celebrated the Rada in another article in a liberal 
newspaper, devoted to the history of the land of the Kuban Cossacks. In a simi-
lar vein to Shcherbina, he offered quite a critical reassessment of the imperial 
treatment of the Kuban Cossacks and their Zaporozhian ancestors, which contra-
vened the officially established view of the benevolent autocracy and the uncon-
ditionally loyal Cossacks. Korolenko, hardly an overt and ardent Ukrainophile, 
gave a perspective that one could easily confuse with that of Ukrainian national 
activists. The land of the Cossacks was known as Ukraine (the term he itali-
cized) already in the twelfth century, and its population, which he practically 
interchangeably called “Russes,” “Ukrainian Cossacks,” and “Ukrainians,” 
organized themselves as early as the thirteenth century to defend Ukraine from 
the nomadic tribes. The independent and heroic era of the Ukrainian Cossacks 
lasted, as the reader could conclude, for nearly half a millennium and came to 
a close due to the reforms initiated by Peter I. Just as he broke the state order 
of Russia, Peter “did not leave Zaporozhia in peace, too.” Zaporozhians, on 
whose land the Tsar began building fortresses and stationing garrisons, “finally 
lost their temper” (etogo uzhe ne sterpeli) and, during the war with Sweden, 
joined forces with Charles XII, who promised to restore their former rights and 
privileges – a voluntary and reasonable choice, which Korolenko did not call a 
treason.
The description of the Zaporozhian life in the mid-eighteenth century, after the 
reemergence of the Sich under the control of St. Petersburg, portrayed an almost 
idyllic picture of Zaporozhia, fully restored in its rights. Korolenko italicized the 
word rada throughout the text, attracting attention to the term that so remarkably 
entered into the local official discourse, referring to it as an example for the Kuban 
Host to follow, albeit a hardly achievable one:
The rada of the host managed all the host’s affairs. The Cossacks were com-
plete masters and owners of their land. Newcomer settlers used land allot-
ments on conditions of the Cossacks and were still considered subjects of 
the Zaporozhian Host, obliged to fulfill all the military and rural obligations.
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Korolenko drew poorly covered analogies with the contemporaneous situation of 
the Kuban Host’s most acute social problem – the presence in the region of hun-
dreds of thousands of non-Cossack immigrants from the empire’s internal prov-
inces, inogorodnie (outlanders; literally, people from other towns), who, many 
Cossacks believed, challenged their right over the land. Besides, he emphasized 
that similarly to the ancient history of the Sich, the more recent history of the 
Kuban Cossacks demonstrated that the risk of losing the land still remained. It 
was the project to resettle the Black Sea Cossacks to Transkubania en masse in 
the early 1860s. The realization of the plan, he argued, did not materialize only 
because of the charter of Catherine II, by which she granted the Cossacks the land 
for “eternal ownership.” The powerful document, which the Black Sea Cossacks 
“put forward in front of themselves” for their protection, like a magical shield, 
defended the Cossacks from the imperial encroachments – the task that from that 
time on the pompous monument of Catherine II in Ekaterinodar with its bronze 
replica of the charter was designed to carry out.40
Korolenko’s article was just one among the texts by local intellectuals, for 
whom the Rada became a good occasion to reflect upon the question of the Kuban 
and – more particularly – Black Sea Cossack land as the Zaporozhian legacy and 
Cossacks’ rights on it as opposed to rights of the empire. Were the Black Sea/
Kuban Cossacks the sole proprietors of the fertile lands, granted by Catherine 
II for eternal ownership? How inviolable was that right? How “eternal” was the 
“eternal ownership” in fact? The historian and cartographer Nikolai Ivanenkov 
responded rather negatively, stating that it was not once that the state violated the 
rights of the Cossacks to the land, bestowed by Catherine II, as was demonstrated 
by the resettlement projects of the 1860s.41
The Rada successfully completed its task. Several commissions that were 
formed to elaborate the project of land readjustment reached a mutually sat-
isfactory agreement. The most important stipulation of it implied that largely 
impoverished and land-hungry settlements beyond the Kuban received 32,000 
desiatinas of arable reserve land in former Chernomoria and 20,000 desiati-
nas of the land of similar quality in former Linia. In return, former Line and 
Black Sea Cossack stanitsas obtained forest areas in Transkubania. The suc-
cessful outcome of the work of the commissions, which suited every negotiating 
side, caused a surge of overall satisfaction, conceptualized on the official level 
in terms of mutual solidarity and Cossack kinship. On the wave of enthusi-
asm, Rada members even determined to send a telegram to the Emperor that 
expressed the idea of the Cossack unity, achieved and perceived as a result of 
bargaining.42
Mapping the Host
Ja-Jeong Koo attached great importance to the rhetoric of brotherhood, so mani-
fested at the days of the Rada’s closure. He argued that the convocation of the 
Rada was a moment of revolutionary significance in the process of fundamen-
tal transformation of the Kuban Cossacks’ self-image, which asserted “the new 
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organic Cossack identity” and led to “the evolution from soslovie to ethnos,” 
accomplished during the time of the Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War.47  
I suggest looking at this rhetoric from a different angle. I argue that, instead of 
being a starting point of convergence of several previously dissociated “sub-
hosts,” as Koo pointed out, the discussions of the land question waged at the 
Rada and local press were quite a radical departure from the official image of the 
uniform Kuban Host, established in the 1860s.
The deputies of the Rada divided themselves into several groups not along the 
lines of Kuban oblast’s administrative division but according to geographic and 
historical criteria. Thus, the deputies found themselves not as the representatives 
of Maikop district or Eisk district but as the spokesmen of Chernomoria, Old 
Linia, New Linia, and Transkubania. The reason for it were different regulations 
that determined the amount of land per capita, since each territory initially pos-
sessed different legal status and was demarcated separately.48 The invocation of 
these four regions was a technical matter, deriving from the size of land plots. 
And yet, from the very outset, the regional division was interpreted in social and 
cultural terms. The Cossacks of New and Old Linia were referred to simply as 
the Line Cossacks, as contrasted to the Black Sea Cossacks and the Cossacks 
of Transkubania. At the opening session of the Rada, Mikhailov appealed to 
the Cossacks as if they constituted three different groups: “Black Sea, Line, and 
Transkubanian Cossacks, exchange here your thoughts on the raised issue, talk 
ardently, tell the truth to each other even if it is unpleasant.”49
At the concluding session of the Rada, the chair of the Black Sea Cossack 
representatives proudly asserted that “the black cat that had crossed the paths 
of the Black Sea, Line, and Transkubania Cossacks a long time ago, no longer 
exists,” referring to the same three groups. As he added, thanks to the Rada, the 
Kuban Cossacks became “united into a single fraternal family of the Host.” But 
the Kuban Cossack fraternity, itself, was meant to be a fraternity of these pre-
cisely three groups.50
The framing of agrarian discontent in socio-historical terms was not an exclu-
sive peculiarity of discussions within the walls of the Rada. Polemics, unleashed 
on pages of the press in the previous months, too, readily employed these very 
same divisions in order to seek equitable distribution of land (for some) or to 
defend their land against encroachments (for others). Authors boasted venerable 
origin of their respective communities to support their claims and, consequently, 
denied the right of others to be treated on equal footing. Several authors from 
Chernomoria, for example, went as far as to call the Cossacks of Transkubania 
“rabble” on the ground that they had come from various places, had been artifi-
cially included into the Cossack estate, and in view of this did not possess the 
honorable genealogy of a sort of the Black Sea or Line Cossacks. As one cor-
respondent put it, the Cossacks beyond the Kuban “had nothing in common with 
the past of the glorious Kuban [sic!] or Black Sea Cossacks.”51
In the same way, another correspondent from Transkubania (who happened to 
be his namesake) noted that stanitsas of the mountain territories were populated 
partially
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by the Cossacks of the glorious Don Host, partially by soldiers of the glorious 
Caucasus army that conquered the Caucasus, and partially by Little Russians 
from Kharkov, Poltava and other gubernias, who were kindred to the Black 
Sea Cossacks.
At the same time, he continued, “if we speak about rabble, then, Zaporozhia, from 
which the glorious Black Sea Host emerged, was rabble as well.” In view of this, 
the correspondent asked, “how could it be that they are the native sons, and we 
are the stepsons?”52 This kind of rhetoric was echoed during Rada’s sessions. As 
reported by one of its members, a certain representative of Black Sea Cossack 
stanitsas called the Cossacks from Transkubania “adoptees,” referring to their 
inferior and nonnative status within the Kuban Host’s family.53
These discussions, which preceded the Rada, and which continued with 
new vigor at its meetings, brought seemingly obsolete appellations back 
into the official discourse. Historical communities of Chernomoria and Linia 
reemerged again as subjects of legal practice, and it was particularly true for 
the Black Sea Cossacks. On the one hand, deputies representing the inhabit-
ants of Black Sea Cossack stanitsas eagerly appealed to historical rights of 
Chernomoria on its own territory, this time defending it not from inogorodnie 
settlers, but from their fellow Kuban Cossacks of non-Black Sea Cossack ori-
gin. Even the author of the semi-official brochure about the Rada characterized 
Chernomoria, as it was represented at the Rada, as “the restored Zaporozhian 
Host, which settled on its own lands within definite borders and formed a com-
pletely separate region.” On the other hand, speakers from other stanitsas no 
less eagerly portrayed the Black Sea Cossacks as a miserly collective owner 
of spare land and reproached them for their unwillingness to share it with their 
needy brethren.54
The Black Sea Cossacks’ eventual generosity was rewarded at the last day of 
the Rada. In the Host’s cathedral, the priest Arsenii Belanovskii turned it into a 
triumph of the Zaporozhian symbolism.
How many years have passed since Hetman Sahaidachnyi, fearsome to ene-
mies but always dear and close to the Cossack heart, put all his energies 
and his life for the benefit of “his native children and Ukraine [svoikh rid-
nykh ditok i Ukrainu]”? How can the memory of this “eagle of Zaporozhia” 
ever die in the Cossack’s heart? How can anyone, who loves his mother-
land, forget that this gatherer of the shattered Ukraine freed the shrines of 
the Orthodox faith from defilement, let the enslaved Dnieper breathe freely, 
and … went into battle with people’s darkness and ignorance, taking care of 
the Cossacks’ enlightenment? 
The God, proclaimed the priest, would disown the Cossacks who would forget 
their ancestors. “And now I will say with particular solemn joy – and I am saying 
it here, in the Holy of Holies, at the throne of God – that you, the Kuban–Black 
Sea Cossacks did not forget your heroic ancestors.” Belanovskii praised the Host 
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as not merely the descendant of the Zaporozhian forefathers, but as a collective 
reincarnation of the spirit of chief Zaporozhian leaders. Coming together at the 
Rada “under the mace of the Zaporozhian unanimity,” the Cossacks, he proudly 
asserted, “resurrected” the spirits of their Zaporozhian ancestors.55
The Tsar’s loyal Cossacks
The Rada had almost nothing in common with the initial idea conceived by 
Kuban Cossack conservatives. The only reminiscence of the Rada’s original 
task—to assert the Cossacks’ loyalty to the crown—were Mikhailov’s words, 
expressed at the assembly’s closure ceremony, in which he encouraged the dep-
uty audience to send delegates to the new Duma who “would not be ashamed 
of their Cossack rank and for their service, so important for the Tsar.”56 The 
administration did not allow the Cossack delegates to discuss other issues 
of political relevance. Given the potential perils of the Rada’s turning into a 
platform for seditious proclamations, authorities ensured that it would remain 
aloof from any discussions concerned with politics. According to Shcherbina’s 
memoirs, Mikhailov warned him in private that discussions at the Rada should 
not touch upon political matters – a condition, imposed by the Emperor him-
self. Otherwise, Mikhailov assured, he would be obliged to dissolve the Rada 
immediately.57
Shcherbina recalled that the Rada had an occasion to make sure how thor-
oughly the administration monitored the implementation of the directive. One 
time, a certain Rada member raised the issue of the 2nd Urupskii regiment’s 
mutiny, proposing to send a delegation to Nicholas II to express loyalist feelings 
and beg pardon for the Kuban Host’s guilt. Mikhailov’s senior assistant, Mikhail 
Babych, prevented the discussion, which all but broke out. He pardoned the Rada 
for the first time but threatened to shut it down if it happened again.58
The issue of the mutiny, though, made its way into the Rada’s floor as 
Mikhailov spoke on it at the concluding session. Evoking the plotline of Nikolai 
Gogol’s Taras Bulba, the ataman resorted to the famous Zaporozhian fiction as 
an allegorical reference point for the explanation of what had happened. When 
Bulba learned about the treason of his own son, Mikhailov said, he did not allow 
anyone to punish the son. Instead, Bulba killed him himself. The Kuban Cossacks 
that suppressed the mutiny, Mikhailov continued, are the Bulbas of the nowadays.
The Kuban Cossacks are not guilty of any crime and they do not have to 
apologize for anything. Those, who are ashamed to be Cossacks or for whom 
being a Cossack is disadvantageous, then – good riddance, let them go out 
from the Host.59
Beyond the assembly’s hall, however, the issues of the mutiny and of the 
Rada’s convocation often blended into a single whole – a question of the col-
lective guilt and collective loyalty. The author of the song at the delegates’ 
dinner sang that
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The Black Sea Cossacks are loyal fellows,
So loyal are their stanitsas,
Nowadays the Tsarina’s charter
Will prove it. […]
Nicholas, our Tsar and Father,
Tell us just a word,
Hey, you, Black Sea Cossacks, –
So we are all ready.60
Chornomortsi virni khloptsi,
Virni ikh stanytsi,
Shcho dokazhe v nashi vremia
Hramota Tsarytsi . . .
Nikolaiu Tsar’ nash Bat’ko,
Skazhy odno slovo,
Hei nu khloptsi, chernomortsi, –
Tak my vsi i hotovi.
In another song, written by an unknown Cossack from a stanitsa in Transkubania, 
this question went more articulated:
Tsar, do not be angry with us
Not all are guilty
That among us showed up
Damned betrayers.
Upon the whole Host 
They put a black stigma
And covered with shame
The honest name of the Kuban Cossacks.61
Ne hnivaisia na nas Tsariu
Ne vsi vynuvati,
Shcho mizh namy ob’iavylys’
Zradnyki prokliati.
Na vse viisko p’iatno cherne
Vony polozhyly
I kubantsiv chesne imnia
Soromom pokryly.
A Cossack parliament?
The local administration was present at the Rada in full composition: the senior 
and junior assistants of the acting ataman, the chief of staff, the district atamans, 
generals on active service and those retired, councilors of the provincial board, 
etc.62 Such supervision kept the Rada’s discussions under control, but at the same 
time it authorized its work, giving an appearance of full legitimacy to everything 
that was happening at its sessions. The assembly’s meetings went smoothly and, 
with the single exception of the case mentioned above, did not cause any com-
plaints from the part of the officials. It gave its members room for hope. The 
Rada’s gathering was not conceived to be a one-time event. Its organizers, partici-
pants, and the local public envisaged that it would become a long-lasting institu-
tional instrument of tackling the most urgent social, economic, and administrative 
issues of the day. This conviction was reflected in the mere fact that it was often 
referred to as “the first rada,” either by its deputies or in the press.63
Even before the closure of the Rada, the press published a proposal on the 
agenda of the Rada’s next convention. Its author suggested raising the issue of 
improving the system of medical care in the oblast (since only a few settlements 
were lucky to have a doctor).64 In his opening speech, Shcherbina expressed his 
hope that “the present Host’s Rada will not be an exceptional case, but a general 
rule for solving all the most important military and rural questions, affairs and 
undertakings.”65 Likewise, at the concluding session, he once again addressed 
to the ataman his belief that due to the restoration of the rada many other issues 
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would be solved in the future. He suggested improved education, fishery develop-
ment, construction of channels and irrigation, the connection of the Kuban River 
with the Black Sea, building lines of communication, and land that had been taken 
over by officers being given back to the owners. To this end, he even proposed 
to build a special building (khata) for the next Rada’s conventions.66 The Rada’s 
deputies, as a local newspaper reported, voiced unanimous support for making the 
Rada a regular institution in charge of Cossack needs.67
Mikhailov believed that the Rada would raise the prestige of the Host in the 
eyes of the government. In January 1907, he went to personally report about its 
results first to Tbilisi/Tiflis, where, according to his companion, the Viceroy of the 
Caucasus Illarion Vorontsov-Dashkov and the chief of staff of the Caucasus mili-
tary district expressed their full satisfaction and support, and then to the Emperor. 
Pleased with the outcome of the assembly, Mikhailov presented to Nicholas II 
an album, containing photos of the Rada’s delegates. The Emperor, as the press 
proudly noted, looked through the photos and even recognized some of them as 
former guards of his Convoy.68
The resolutions of the Rada were approved in the capital and acquired the force 
of law.69 But the seeming personal bonds between part of the Rada and the Tsar, 
however, did not result in its institutionalization as a consultative regional body. 
Despite the hopes of some and the firm beliefs of others, no second rada ever con-
vened again. According to some vague information published in the press, in early 
1907, an uncertain number of Kuban Cossack representatives elaborated a man-
date for the newly elected deputies to the Second Duma, where they outlined a 
vision of the Host possessing a broader autonomy and self-governance, as well as 
broader electoral rights that would enable the Cossacks to elect representatives to 
the “supreme Cossack representative institution, the Rada.” A number of reports 
in liberal newspapers rejoiced at the Cossacks’ sudden political “maturity,” char-
acterizing their demands as “unexpected liberalism” and even a “betrayal of loy-
alty” to the oppressive regime on the part of Cossack electors.70
Later that year, the question of the second rada was overshadowed by – and 
to a large extent conflated with – the issue of the introduction of zemstvo to 
the Cossack provinces of the Caucasus, contemplated by the administration in 
Tiflis.71 To this end, the head of the oblast organized a meeting in Ekaterinodar in 
October, mostly composed of members of local officialdom. Participants of the 
meeting stressed the need to transform the local administration along the lines of 
self-governance but disagreed over the form of zemstvo concerning diverging 
interests of Cossacks and inogorodnie. To further elaborate the foundations of 
the zemstvo functioning, the meeting decided to convoke two separate radas at 
once – apart from a Cossack rada, a special rada of inogorodnie was supposed to 
convoke at the same time.72 In November, Mikhailov went to Tiflis to present the 
viceroy a petition about the convocation of the second rada, but the further fate 
of the petition remains unclear. Various newspaper reports expressed divergent 
statements, claiming that the second Rada did not meet sympathies on the part of 
the Caucasus administration or, alternatively, the administration left the question 
of the rada open.73
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Still, the October meeting in Ekaterinodar in 1907 was followed by a conven-
tion in the administrative center of Labinskii district, Armavir, in February 1908. 
The latter was particularly reminiscent of yet another rada, although on a smaller 
scale, uniting up to 200 participants that included heads of stanitsas and represent-
atives of local intelligentsia. The delegates met to discuss questions concerning 
education, roads, medicine, the spread of agricultural knowledge, forestry, and the 
development of cooperatives, but all those issues remained in the background as 
the most heated and protracted discussions revolved around the issue of zemstvo, 
which turned out a veritable stumbling block for all the participants involved. The 
question was whether to include inogorodnie or to make it an exclusive Cossack 
institution. It was not resolved and postponed for the future.74
The question of the zemstvo remained unsolved and the idea of the second 
rada never became a reality. Apparently, the central authorities, who experienced 
recurring troubles even with the State Duma, did not dare approve of establish-
ing a separate organ that was not envisaged by the state legislation, due to sus-
picions of its potential ambition. In subsequent years, some of the state officials 
implicitly accused the Rada of institutional separatism. In 1913, a member of the 
State Council, Count Fedor Uvarov, while talking with Cossack representatives in 
Vladikavkaz about the issue of zemstvo, denounced this idea on the ground that 
it would “very much resemble the former Cossack Rada and, in the end, it would 
be a state within the state.” Remarkably, the case of the Rada was not a subject of 
the discussion, but served as an obvious, well-known example of what the empire 
should avoid while dealing with its periphery.75
How was it possible?
At first glance, the Rada’s aims, be it the elaboration of parliament deputies’ 
instruction, as it was initially conceived, or the redistribution of lands, as it 
happened to be in the end, were quite moderate in their ambitions. Indeed, the 
Cossacks’ aspiration to make the Rada into an institution that would run Kuban 
Cossack affairs on a regular basis, a complete “restoration” of the Zaporozhian 
administrative practice, was far too bold to come true. And yet even the occa-
sional, one-time implementation of this ostensible Zaporozhian tradition to solve 
the problem of land shortage was a radical move in and of itself, fraught with 
unwelcome repercussions for the imperial administration. Allowing to convene a 
local mini parliament of a sort, the government set a precedent for the mechanism 
of popular participation in self-government. Even more strikingly, the govern-
ment allowed the assembly to adopt a name with strong seditious connotations, 
which directly referred to the experience of autonomy and statehood that the Sich 
and Ukraine once had.
How did it happen? How did the Rada, instead of elaborating the mandate, 
acquire a completely new function? Although the flow of documentation that 
would allow answering this question in full measure is yet to be found, a detailed 
summary of the correspondence conducted by authorities at various levels, anon-
ymously published in a local liberal periodical, reveals the major steps of the 
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decision-making process. Whereas the Duma speeches raised controversies over 
the issue of the Kuban Host’s public representation at the parliament, the Host’s 
administration took pains to settle the issue of land shortage. According to the 
Kuban Host’s prospective solution made in April 1906, vast amounts of spare 
land, which still was in common possession of the Kuban Host, was to be dis-
tributed among Cossack settlements according to the geohistorical principle. The 
reserve land, located on the territory of former Chernomoria, was supposed to be 
divided among former Black Sea Cossack stanitsas only. Correspondingly, the 
reserve land of the former Line Host was supposed to be reallocated exclusively 
among stanitsas within the territory of the former Line Host. The Cossack settle-
ments of the mountainous territories beyond the Kuban River, in particular the 
neediest ones, were to receive vacant forest areas, formerly owned by the state and 
passed into the Host’s possession in 1889.
This project, which reflected the Host’s adherence to the notion of historical 
rights of the former hosts over their respective lands, met with objections from the 
Main Administration of the Cossack Hosts (GUKV), which determined to meet the 
needs of mountainous stanitsas in fertile soil by providing them with steppe areas 
of the Black Sea and Line Cossack lands. Thus, the Cossacks of Transkubania had 
to receive their own shares of lands, once constituting Chernomoria and Linia. 
The Host, refusing to fully carry out the directive of its superiors, only agreed to 
make minor concessions and to exempt as little land as possible from the posses-
sion of the stanitsas of Chernomoria (calculated 10 desiatinas per soul). It was 
only the Military Council that resolved the discussion by acknowledging that nei-
ther local nor central officials had complete information about the land situation. 
On October 19, it decreed to grant the acting ataman the right to convoke a “land 
commission” (zemleustroitel’naia komissiia), which would consist of two depu-
ties from every settlement of the oblast, to resolve the situation on the grassroots 
level.76
The idea of the commission was not the invention of the Military Council but the 
result of Mikhailov’s endeavor. It can be assumed that at some point in August or 
September the head of the oblast or someone from the Host’s administration seized 
the initiative of convening the assembly to elaborate the mandate and adapted it 
for another task. It was with this idea in mind that Mikhailov went to Tiflis and, 
after that, to St. Petersburg to seek permission from his superiors. On September 
29, he had a talk with Nicholas II over the issue of the council, and the latter, as 
the further fate of the initiative suggests, sanctioned the proposition.77 The Rada’s 
case progressed promptly and just twelve days after the Military Council decreed 
to convene the “commission,” the Emperor approved the decree officially.78
Although it is not possible to trace in detail how the authorities in Tiflis and 
St. Petersburg addressed the case of the Rada, or who played the pivotal part 
in permitting the assembly, a semi-official anonymous account, most probably 
written by Shcherbina, testifies that when Mikhailov requested permission from 
the Viceroy, the latter expressed his moral support, but did not give his written 
approval, as he was not willing to assume responsibility for such a risky initiative. 
Instead, he suggested that Mikhailov seek the Emperor’s permission.79
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The viceroy’s endorsement and his apparent personal part in the whole initia-
tive should not be underestimated, for the very idea of the Rada and the principles 
it was based on well corresponded to the model of rule he adopted during his 
tenure. Count Illarion Vorontsov-Dashkov’s mission as the head of the Caucasus 
Viceroyalty, established in early 1905, was to ameliorate social and ethnic ten-
sions that plagued the imperial order in South Caucasia. In striking contrast to 
the manner of rule practiced by his predecessors and provincial governors else-
where in the empire, his patterns of governance turned out to be surprisingly 
liberal-looking and ran counter to the conservative ideologies of the regime.80 
Vorontsov-Dashkov’s liberalism, however limited and moderate it was, was a 
major departure from the previous policy of steadfast Russification and implied 
considerable toleration of the local cultural diversity and, moreover, the encour-
agement of the local population’s initiative. In his manifesto to the population of 
the Caucasus, which declared the principles of the viceroy’s rule for the prospec-
tive years, Vorontsov-Dashkov announced his intention to rely on all public forces 
and, so as to learn more about the needs and aspirations of the local inhabitants, 
to convoke assemblies of representatives elected from social groups, including 
nobility, townsfolk, rural communities, and clergymen. Coming together, as the 
viceroy expected, they would be able to speak out about the most urgent measures 
they wished him to implement.81
The mechanism of consultative assemblies composed of people’s representa-
tives to solve pressing social and political problems that state functionaries felt 
unable to solve on their own was first tested in February 1906. The so-called 
Armenian-Tatar (Azeri) convention was an attempt by Vorontsov-Dashkov to put 
an end to the most dramatic conflict in the South Caucasus – massacres between 
Armenian and Muslim populations sparked during the Revolution – by bring-
ing together representatives of warring parties who would address the issues that 
ignited the conflict.82 As Kavkaz characterized the convention, it was the first time 
when the “principle of popular representation” was used in the Caucasus on a 
broad scale, unseen anywhere else in the empire. The “implementation of this 
principle in practice,” the newspaper declared, was “the main task of our time. 
One cannot solve pertinent matters of people’s life without letting the people 
speak out, without listening to them.” 83
The overall political enthusiasm throughout the Russian Empire, the emer-
gence of political parties, the electoral process to the State Duma, and the proc-
lamation of civil liberties made the notion of popular representation – and along 
with it the ideas of autonomism and federalism – the catchwords of the time, 
especially in the Caucasus.84 Discussions about Georgian autonomy became a 
recurrent feature of local intellectual life, with speeches and roundtables on this 
topic gathering hundreds of listeners.85 Kavkaz, where reports on these activities 
were actively published, saw the Armenian-Muslim convention as the model 
for a possible Georgian assembly drawn from the members of all social groups 
that would discuss and decide on the nature and extent of Georgian autonomy.86 
Others insisted on the necessity to organize a special Caucasus council, or a 
seim, composed of deputies from all over the Caucasus, functioning as the 
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parliament of the viceroyalty with legislative competence in matters of local 
significance. 87
The Ukrainian public sphere was also swept by the same spirit. Urges to 
convoke “our own free rada” that would rule the Ukrainians of all classes and 
estates, permeated the pages of leading periodicals during the Revolution.88 Yet 
it was Ekaterinodar, not Kiev/Kyiv, where an assembly called Rada opened 
its sessions in 1906. At the time of its convocation, commentators rightfully 
noticed that whereas no conventions of representatives of this kind were 
allowed throughout the empire, especially concerning such acute issues as the 
land question, Kuban oblast, despite being under martial law, presented a strik-
ing exception.89 Fedor Shcherbina claimed credit for the eventual approval of 
the Rada. In his memoirs, he expressed his confidence that the Emperor was 
driven by his knowledge of the history of Zaporozhia. Shcherbina assured that 
Nicholas II had learned about the great “historical significance” of rada as early 
as his childhood from the book, written and presented to him by Shcherbina 
in 1888, during his and Alexander’s III visit to Ekaterinodar. But if this testi-
mony reveals us much about the intentions behind the welcoming ceremony of 
Alexander III, it hardly can be taken for granted with regard to the events that 
took place 18 years later.90
Whether or not any historical knowledge guided the Tsar and the Military 
Council, they were doubtlessly guided by purely pragmatic reason – to improve 
the economic plight of the Cossacks, to relieve real or impeding social tensions 
that might have been caused by land shortage, and to prevent possible acts of 
disobedience of Cossack military units. The government, thus, forestalled the 
Revolution by making a modest, but highly significant revolutionary step toward 
the needs of the Cossack population. Naturally, it hardly could be possible else-
where in the empire, while the Kuban region was seen as loyal enough to venture 
into such a risky experiment. As a result, the imperial government appreciated the 
Rada’s achievements in the issue of land demarcation. What is more, it allowed 
the Don Cossacks to solve their respective land question collectively, with the 
help of the same procedure. In Don, a “Host consultative assembly” convened in 
1909 (although Nicholas II permitted its convocation as early as March 1907). As 
in the Kuban region, its participants and the local public styled it as the restora-
tion of an old tradition, the krug (“circle”). In contrast to the Rada, however, it did 
not adopt the “historical” name officially, and the usage of the word “Krug” was 
rather limited to the unofficial sphere.91
The idea of the rada made a spectacular “return” after the Russian Empire 
ceased to exist, in the wake of the February Revolution of 1917, this time as a rev-
olutionary government of the Kuban region. The recent experience of 1906 offered 
a ready-to-use template during a new crisis – and a well-remembered name to 
adopt. Even though debates followed among Black Sea and Line Cossack del-
egates as to whether the new organ should be called according to a Zaporozhian 
tradition, or in line with the old Don practice, the krug, the rada was the choice 
most of the Cossacks opted for.92 In so doing, an invented tradition of 1906, the 
rada, served as an already established tradition to rely on for the Rada of 1917.
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Conclusion
Just as it was throughout the empire, the Revolution of 1905–1906 was a 
major turning point in social, political, and cultural developments in the Kuban 
region. One of the Cossacks’ responses to the Revolution was the establish-
ment of the Rada, conceived as an autonomous, quasi-parliamentary organ for 
running the local affairs. The initiators of the Rada designed it as a restoration 
of the ancient Zaporozhian custom. In the end, reference to the experience 
of the past made the convention of the Rada possible, but only as a one-off 
event. The Rada’s task was to redistribute the spare lands of the Host. Yet, 
additionally, discussions at its sessions brought to the fore the collateral ques-
tion of the enduring disunion of the Kuban historical territories. In a sense, the 
Rada objectified the ideas of Chernomoria and Linia and rendered the division 
between them fixed, tangible, and possible to be spoken about publicly. The 
idea of Chernomoria with all its cultural linkages to the “metropole” Ukraine 
and its Zaporozhian pride, which officially ceased to exist in 1860, came to the 
fore as a given reality.
Notes
1 This chapter was made possible thanks to the financial support of the Canadian 
Institute for Ukrainian Studies (the Petro Czornyj Memorial Endowment Fund). 
The author is grateful to the participants of the workshop at Heidelberg University 
“Eurasian Parliamentary Practices and Political Mythologies: Imperial Legacies, 
Diversities, and Representations in the 20th and 21st Century” (June 17–18, 2019), 
as well as to Alexander Semyonov and Mark Bassin for their valuable comments and 
suggestions.
2 Goresmekhov [P. Opochinin], “S beregov Nevy,” Kavkaz, September 3, 1906, 2.
3 Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1988); Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: Authority Restored (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: A Short History 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).
4 On the application of a similar trope of the encounter between the government and 
the people with regard to the 1861 Peasant Emancipation, see Mikhail Dolbilov, 
“Russification and the Bureaucratic Mind in the Russian Empire’s Northwestern 
Region in the 1860s,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 5, no. 2 
(2004): 246–247; Dolbilov, “Russian Nationalism and the Nineteenth-Century Policy 
of Russification in the Russian Empire’s Western Region,” in Imperiology: From 
Empirical Knowledge to Discussing the Russian Empire, ed. Kimitaka Matsuzato 
(Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007), 145–46. On the “scenario of love,” see 
Richard S. Wortman, “Nicholas II and the Revolution of 1905,” in Russian Monarchy: 
Representation and Rule (Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2013), 199–218; 
Wortman, Scenarios of Power: From Alexander II to the Abdication of Nicholas II, vol. 
2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Boris Kolonitskii, “Tragicheskaia 
erotika”: obrazy imperatorskoi sem’i v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Novoe 
literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010). See also Andrew M. Verner, The Crisis of Russian 
Autocracy: Nicholas II and the 1905 Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1990).
5 Robert H. McNeal, Tsar and Cossack, 1855–1914 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1987); Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, The Cossack Hero in Russian Literature: A Study 
in Cultural Mythology (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992); Serhii 
210 Oleksandr Polianichev 
Plokhy, The Cossack Myth: History and Nationhood in the Age of Empires (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Tomasz Hen-Konarski, “Cossacks and Gauchos: 
Myths of Masculinity in the Political Struggles of the River Plate and Ukraine, 1830s 
through 1840s” (Ph.D. diss., Florence: European University Institute, 2017).
6 Brian J. Boeck, Imperial Boundaries: Cossack Communities and Empire-Building in 
the Age of Peter the Great (Leiden: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Thomas M. 
Barrett, At the Edge of Empire: The Terek Cossacks and the North Caucasus Frontier, 
1700–1860 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999); Shane O’Rourke, Warriors and 
Peasants: The Don Cossacks in Late Imperial Russia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
2000); O’Rourke, “From Region to Nation: The Don Cossacks 1870–1920,” in Russian 
Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930, ed. Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and 
A. V. Remnev (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007); Andriy Posunko, 
“The Ambiguities of Cossackdom: The Case of the Pontic Steppe, 1775–1830s” (Ph.D. 
diss., Budapest: Central European University, 2018).
7 On the Zaporozhian Cossacks, see Serhii Plokhy, The Cossacks and Religion in Early 
Modern Ukraine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
8 O. W. Gerus, “Manifestations of the Cossack Idea in Modern Ukrainian History: The 
Cossack Legacy and Its Impact,” Ukrains’kyi istoryk 1–2 (1986): 22–39; Frank Sysyn, 
“The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology,” Social Research 
58, no. 4 (1991): 845–864; Plokhy, The Cossack Myth.
9 For the sake of convenience, I romanize these names as Chernomoria, Linia, and 
Transkubania.
10 Oleksandr Polianichev, “Rediscovering Zaporozhians: Memory, Loyalties, and Politics 
in Late Imperial Kuban, 1880–1914” (Ph.D. diss., Florence: European University 
Institute, 2017); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
11 Ja-Jeong Koo, “Universalizing Cossack Particularism: ‘The Cossack Revolution’ in 
Early Twentieth-Century Kuban’,” Revolutionary Russia 25, no. 1 (2012): 1–29. For 
further discussion about the agricultural movement, see Burton Richard Miller, Rural 
Unrest during the First Russian Revolution Kursk Province, 1905–1906 (Budapest: 
Central European University Press, 2013). As David Darrow has argued, the crisis, 
inextricably linked to peasants’ assumptions about the amount of land sufficient to 
maintain households, was rooted in the very category of the land allotment, elabo-
rated for fiscal purposes in the pre-Emancipation era. See David W. Darrow, Tsardom 
of Sufficiency, Empire of Norms: Statistics, Land Allotments, and Agrarian Reform in 
Russia, 1700–1921 (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2018).
12 “Letopis’ oblastnoi zhizni,” Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti [hereinafter, KOV], 
January 10, 1906, 1; “Prikaz po Kubanskoi oblasti № 3 ot 20 yanvaria 1906 g.,” KOV, 
January 24, 1906, 1.
13 Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie na Kubani v 1905–1907 gg. (Krasnodar: Krasnodarskoe 
knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1956), 212. See also I. F. Muzhev, Kazachestvo Dona, Kubana 
i Tereka v Revoliutsii 1905–1907 gg. (Orzhonikidze: Severo-osetinskoe knizhnoe 
izdatel’stvo, 1963).
14 Oleksandr Polianichev, “Fruits of Colonization: Cossack Settlers in the Western 
Caucasus, 1861–1870,” CAS Sofia Working Paper Series 11 (2019): 1–42.
15 Voiskovaia rada (Ekaterinodar: Tipografiia “Osnova,” 1907), 3.
16 On the electoral process, see Terence Emmons, The Formation of Political Parties and 
the First National Elections in Russia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1983).
17 M. M. Boiovich, ed., Chleny Gosudarstvennoi Dumy (Portrety i biografii). Pervyi 
sozyv. 1906–1911 (Moscow: Tipografiia Sytina, 1906), 457–462.
18 “Chleny Gosudarstvennoi Dumy ot kazach’ego naseleniia Kubanskoi oblasti,” KOV, 
June 1, 1906, 2.
 A rada for the empire 211
19 “Provody deputatov v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu,” Kuban, June 9, 1906, 3.
20 On the State Duma, see Alexander Semyonov, “‘The Real and Live Ethnographic Map 
of Russia’: The Russian Empire in the Mirror of the State Duma,” in Empire Speaks 
Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire, eds. 
Ilya Gerasimov, Jan Kusber and Alexander Semyonov (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 191–228; 
Rustem Tsinchuk, “Peoples, Regions, and Electoral Politics: The State Dumas and 
the Constitution of New National Elites,” in Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 
366–97.
21 Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Stenograficheskie otchety. 1906 g., vol. 2 (St. Petersburg: 





26 O. G. Bukhovets, “The Political Consciousness of the Russian Peasantry in the 
Revolution of 1905–1907: Sources, Methods, and Some Results,” The Russian 
Review 47, no. 4 (1988): 357–374; L. T. Senchakova, ed., Prigovory i nakazy krest’ian 
Tsentral’noi Rossii 1905–1907 gg. Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 
2000).
27 Gosudarstvennaia Duma, 1330.
28 Stanichnik, “Neskol’ko slov po povodu rechei Bardizha i Kochevskogo, proiznesen-
nykh imi 13 iiunia s. g. v Gosudarstvennoi Dume,” KOV, September 21, 1906, 2.
29 Kubanskii kazak, “Vnimaniiu vsekh istykh kazakov kubantsev,” KOV, September 7, 
1906, 2. See also S. Yu. Kiriushin and D. V. Sen’, “‘Svoi sredi chuzhikh, chuzhoi sredi 
svoikh’: Sud’ba belogo komissara K. L. Bardizha,” Gumanitarnaia mysl’ Yuga Rossii 
1 (2005): 143–162.
30 “K rospusku Gosudarstvennoi Dumy,” KOV, July 13, 1906, 2.
31 P. Bash., “On the mandate for the Cossack deputies,” KOV, August 18, 1906, 1.
32 K. Zhivilo, “Kubanskomu kazaku,” Svoboda, September 26, 1906, 4.
33 Kubanskii kazak, “On the resolutions concerning the council,” KOV, September 6, 
1906, 1.
34 “K voprosu o ‘voiskovoi rade’,” KOV, September 2, 1906, 1.
35 N. I. Mikhailov, “Prikaz po Kubanskomu kazach’emu voisku ot 4 noiabria 1906 goda 
№653,” KOV, November 5, 1906, 1.
36 “Kazach’ia rada,” KOV, December 3, 1906, 1.
37 “Zakrytie kazach’ei rady,” KOV, December 20, 1906, 2.
38 “Resolution of stanitsa Yaroslavskaia,” KOV, March 15, 1907, 1.
39 P. Korolenko, “Rada,” KOV, December 9, 1906, 2.
40 P. Korolenko, “Kazaki i ikh zemlia,” Novaia zaria, December 9, 1906, 2; December 
10, 1906, 2–3. On the resettlement project and its consequences, see Polianichev, 
“Rediscovering Zaporozhians,” 62–76. On the monument to Catherine II in Ekaterinodar, 
see Aleksandr Polianichev, “Ekaterina II kak kazach’ia mat’: Pamiatnik imperatritse v 
Ekaterinodare i zaporozhskii mif Kubani,” in 400-letie doma Romanovykh: politika 
pamiati i monarkhicheskaia ideia. 1613–2013, eds. V. Lapin and Yu. Safronova (St. 
Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Evropeiskogo universiteta v Sankt-Peterburge, 2016), 132–
163.
41 N. Ivanenkov, “Prava na zemli Kubanskikh kazakov,” KOV, January 5, 1906, 2.
42 “Kazach’ia rada,” KOV, December 9, 1906, 1.
43 KOV, December 10, 1906, 2.
44 [Oleksandr Piven’], “Kozacha rada”. Poema na ukrains’kii movi iz pobytu kozakiv 
Kubans’koho viis’ka (Umanskaia: Tipografiia M. F. Bykova, 1907), 33.
45 Ibid., 33–4. Piven’s poem was criticized by contemporaries for its lavish praise on the 
Rada’s achievements. A Ukrainian newspaper reproached him for depicting Kuban as 
212 Oleksandr Polianichev 
an “earthly paradise” thanks to the activity of some “fantastical ‘Cossack rada’.” See 
Ye. Vinchenko, “Bibliohrafiia” [Bibliograhy], Rada, February 6, 1908, 4.
46 Piven’, “Kozacha rada,” 38.
47 Ja-Jeong Koo, “Universalizing Cossack Particularism: ‘The Cossack Revolution’ in 
Early Twentieth Century Kuban’,” Revolutionary Russia 25, no. 1 (2012): 20.
48 “Proizvodstvo mezhevykh rabot v Kubanskoi oblasti,” KOV, May 22, 1882, 1–2.
49 “Kazach’ia rada,” KOV, December 3, 1906, 1.
50 “Kazach’ia rada,” KOV, December 9, 1906, 1.
51 Kos’ma Shevyrev, “Neskol’ko slov pravdy ‘po voprosu o pozemel’nom ustroistve v 
Kubanskoi oblasti’,” KOV, September 1, 1906, 1–2.
52 Vasilii Shevyrev, “Korrespondentsiia. St. Dagestanskaia,” KOV, July 9, 1906, 2.
53 Chlen voiskovoi rady, “Po povodu utverzhdeniia postanovleniia pervoi voiskovoi rady 
o zemel’nom voprose,” KOV, March 14, 1907, 2.
54 Voiskovaia rada, 9–10.
55 “Zakrytie kazach’ei rady,” 2.
56 “Zasedaniia Kazach’ei Rady zakonchilis’,” Novaia zaria, December 21, 1906, 2.
57 F. A. Shcherbina, “Fakty kazach’ei ideologii i tvorchestva,” in Kazachestvo: Mysli 
sovremennikov o proshlom, nastoiashchem i budushchem kazachestva (Paris: Izdanie 
“Kazach’ego soiuza,” 1928), 361.
58 Ibid., 364–366.
59 “Zakrytie kazach’ei rady,” 2.
60 “Kazach’ia rada,” KOV, December 10, 1906, 2.
61 I. Kasinenko, “Pisnia zakubantsia (Po povodu rady),” KOV, December 15, 1906, 2.
62 Voiskovaia rada, 4.
63 Chlen pervoi rady, “K predstoiashchim vyboram v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu,” KOV, 
December 29, 1906, 1; Kasinenko, “Pisnia zakubantsia,” 2.
64 Stanichnik, “Pis’mo predstaviteliam kubanskoi voiskovoi rady,” KOV, December 17, 
1906, 2.
65 Voiskovaia rada, 6.
66 “Zakrytie kazach’ei rady,” 2; Voiskovaia rada, 27–28.
67 “Zasedaniia Kazach’ei Rady zakonchilis’,” 2.
68 “Deputatsiia u Nachal’nika oblasti,” KOV, December 29, 1906, 1; “Letopis’ oblast-
noi zhizni,” KOV, January 13, 1907, 1; D. K. Mikhailopulo, “Kazach’ia rada,” KOV, 
January 23, 1907, 1; KOV, February 20, 1907, 2.
69 Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii 3, 28887.
70 “Do vyboriv po Ukraini. Kubanshchyna,” Rada, February 14, 1907, 3; “Po Ukraini,” 
Ridne slovo, February 17, 1907, 10.
71 Zemstvo was an institution of rural self-government in provinces of “metropole” Russia 
(although by the end of the empire, they had been introduced in a number of border-
land provinces as well). On zemstvo, see Terence Emmons and Wayne S. Vucinich, 
eds., The Zemstvo in Russia: An Experiment in Local Self-Government (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982).
72 Kazak-roditel’, “Kazakam negde uchit’ detei,” KOV, September 23, 1907, 2; Sotnik M. 
A. Karaulov 2-i, “Soveshchanie o zemstve na Kubani,” KOV, November 7, 1907, 2; “Z 
Kubani. Zavedennia zemstvo,” Rada, December 15, 1907, 3; “O zemstve u Kubantsev 
i Tertsev,” in Severokavkazskii al’manakh, ed. B. M. Gorodetskii (Ekaterinodar: 
Tipografiia “Osnova,” 1908): 243–47.
73 “Letopis’ oblastnoi zhizni,” KOV, November 28, 1907, 1; “Z Kubani. Zavedennia zem-
stva.”
74 P. Kapel’horods’kyi, “Zemstvo i inohorodni na Kubanshchyni,” Rada, March 18, 1908, 
1; March 19, 1908, 1; March 20, 1908, 1; March 21, 1908, 1.
75 “Graf Uvarov o kazach’em zemstvo,” KOV, September 26, 1913, 2.
76 N, “Zemel’nyi vopros v Kubanskoi oblasti,” Novaia zaria, December 13, 1906, 2–3.
 A rada for the empire 213
77 “Letopis’ oblastnoi zhizni,” KOV, October 7, 1906, 1.
78 Mikhailov, “Prikaz po Kubanskomu kazach’emu voisku ot 4 noiabria 1906 goda 
№653,” 1.
79 Voiskovaia rada, 5.
80 Stephen Badalyan Riegg, “Neotraditionalist Rule to the Rescue of the Empire? Viceroy 
I. Vorontsov-Dashkov amid Crises in the Caucasus, 1905–1915,” Ab Imperio 3 (2018): 
115–139; D. I. Ismail-Zade, Graf I. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, namestnik kavkazskii 
(Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2005); Amiran Urushadze, “Kavkaz v kontse XIX – nachale 
XX v.: problemy upravleniia i modernizatsii na yuzhnoi okraine Rossiiskoi imperii,” 
Quaestio Rossica, no. 2 (2015): 144–157.
81 I. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, “K naseleniiu Kavkazskogo kraia” [To the population of the 
Caucasus region], 1 April 1905, RGIA [Russian State Historical Archive], f. 1276, op. 
19, d. 1, l. 5.
82 “Zasedanie soveta Namestnika Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva na Kavkaze s uchast-
iem delegatov ot armianskogo i musul’manskogo naseleniia po voprosu o raspriakh 
mezhdu oznachennymi narodnostiami,” Kavkaz, February 24, 1906, 2; February 25 
1906, 3; February 26 1906, 3; February 28 1906, 2–3; March 1, 1906; March 4, 1906, 
3; March 7, 1906, 2; March 8, 1906, 2; “K armiano-tatarskomy s”ezdu,” Kavkaz, 
March 7, 1906, 3. On the massacre, see Leslie Sargent, “The “Armeno-Tatar War” in 
the South Caucasus, 1905–1906: Multiple Causes, Interpreted Meanings,” Ab Imperio 
4 (2010): 143–169.
83 “Posle s”ezda,” Kavkaz, March 10, 1906, 2.
84 Tatiana Khripachenko, “Poniatiia federatsiia, detsentralizatsiia, avtonomiia v sotsial-
isticheskom i liberal’nom diskursakh Rossiiskoi imperii (konets XIX – nachalo XX 
veka),” in ‘Poniatiia o Rossii’: k istoricheskoi semantike imperskogo perioda, vol. 2, 
eds. Alexei Miller and Denis Sdvizhkov (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2012); 
Khripachenko, “National Challenges to Decentralization: Autonomy and Federation in 
the Russian Liberal Discourse, 1900–1914” (Ph.D. diss., Budapest: Central European 
University, 2014); Mark von Hagen, “Federalisms and Pan-movements: Re-imagining 
Empire,” in Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 494–510; Ikeda Yoshiro, “Toward 
an Empire of Republics: Transformation of Russia in the Age of Total War, Revolution, 
and Nationalism,” in Comparing Modern Empires: Imperial Rule and Decolonization 
in the Changing World Order, ed. Uyama Tomohiko (Sapporo: Slavic-Eurasian 
Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2018), 119–146; Ivan Sablin and Alexander 
Semyonov, “Autonomy and Decentralization in the Global Imperial Crisis: The 
Russian Empire and the Soviet Union in 1905–1924,” Modern Intellectual History 
17, no. 2 (2020): 543–560. See also Alexander Semyonov, “Imperial Parliament for a 
Hybrid Empire: Representative Experiments in Early 20th-Century Russian Empire,” 
Journal of Eurasian Studies 11, no. 1 (2020): 30–39.
85 “V Tiflise,” Kavkaz, March 14, 1906, 4.
86 “Tiflis, 22-go marta 1906 goda,” Kavkaz, March 22, 1906, 1.
87 “Zasedanie kavkazskogo yuridicheskogo obshchestva v subbotu, 8-go aprelia sego 
goda,” Kavkaz, April 11, 1906, 3; April 13, 1906, 2–3; April 25, 1906, 3; May 3, 1906, 
3; A. Khakhanov, “Gruzinskaia pechat’ o Gosudarstvennoi Dume i avtonomii Gruzii,” 
Russkaia mysl’ 6 (1906): 63–72.
88 V. D., “Do ukraintsiv,” Ridne slovo, December 24, 1905, 13; “Pryhovor,” ibid., 14; Hr. 
Kovalenko, “Lysty do selian pro narodni prava,” Ridne slovo, February 10, 1906, 5; 
Vasyl Domanyts’kyi, “Ukrains’ka presa v 1906 rotsi,” Ukraina 1, pt. 2 (1907), 48–65. 
For an analysis of Ukrainian nationalist aspirations in the early 20th century, see Olga 
Andriewsky, “The Politics of National Identity: The Ukrainian Question in Russia, 
1904–12” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1991).
89 “Zemel’ne pytannia na Kubani,” Ridne slovo, December 9, 1906, 9.
90 Shcherbina, “Fakty kazach’ei ideologii i tvorchestva,” 361.
214 Oleksandr Polianichev 
91 Boris Kornienko, Pravyi Don: Kazaki i ideologiia natsionalizma (1909–1914) (St. 
Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Evropeiskogo universiteta v Sankt-Peterburge, 2013), 78–95; 
S. G. Svatikov, Rossiia i Don (1549–1917): Issledovanie po istorii gosudarstvennogo 
i administrativnogo prava i politicheskikh dvizhenii na Donu (Belgrade: Donskaia 
istoricheskaia komissiia, 1924), 539–540.
92 [P. L. Makarenko], “Tragediia kazachestva,” Vol’noe kazachestvo – Vil’ne kozatstvo 124 
(1933): 9; Ja-Jeong Koo, “From an Estate to a Cossack Nation: Kuban’ Samostiinost’, 
1917,” Europe-Asia Studies 66, no. 10 (2014): 1649–1678; A. N. Nikitin, Suverennaia 
Kuban’: Opyt otechestvennogo parlamentarizma (Moscow: Natsional’nyi institut 
biznesa, 2010).
Bibliography
Andriewsky, Olga. “The Politics of National Identity: The Ukrainian Question in Russia, 
1904–12.” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1991.
Ascher, Abraham. The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1988.
———. The Revolution of 1905: Authority Restored. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1992.
———. The Revolution of 1905: A Short History. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2004.
Barrett, Thomas M. At the Edge of Empire: The Terek Cossacks and the North Caucasus 
Frontier, 1700–1860. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.
Bash, P. “On the mandate for the Cossack deputies.” Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, 
August 18, 1906, 1.
Boeck, Brian J. Imperial Boundaries: Cossack Communities and Empire-Building in the 
Age of Peter the Great. Leiden: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Boiovich, M. M., ed. Chleny Gosudarstvennoi Dumy (Portrety i biografii). Pervyi 
sozyv. 1906–1911 [Members of the State Duma (Portraits and biographies). The first 
convocation. 1906–1911]. Moscow: Tipografiia Sytina, 1906.
Bukhovets, O. G. “The Political Consciousness of the Russian Peasantry in the Revolution 
of 1905–1907: Sources, Methods, and Some Results.” Russian Review 47, no. 4 (1988): 
357–374. doi: 10.2307/130502.
Chlen pervoi rady. “K predstoiashchim vyboram v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu” [To the 
forthcoming elections to the State Duma]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, December 
29, 1906, 1.
Chlen voiskovoi rady. “Po povodu utverzhdeniia postanovleniia pervoi voiskovoi rady o 
zemel’nom voprose” [On the approval of the first Host’s Rada’s decree on the land 
question]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, March 14, 1907, 2.
“Chleny Gosudarstvennoi Dumy ot kazach’ego naseleniia Kubanskoi oblasti” [Members of 
the State Duma from the Cossack population of the Kuban oblast]. Kubanskie oblastnye 
vedomosti, June 1, 1906, 2.
Darrow, David W. Tsardom of Sufficiency, Empire of Norms: Statistics, Land Allotments, 
and Agrarian Reform in Russia, 1700–1921. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2018.
“Deputatsiia u Nachal’nika oblasti” [Deputation at the Head of the oblast]. Kubanskie 
oblastnye vedomosti, December 29, 1906, 1.
“Do vyboriv po Ukraini. Kubanshchyna” [To the elections in Ukraine. The Kuban region]. 
Rada, February 14, 1907, 3.
 A rada for the empire 215
Dolbilov, Mikhail. “Russification and the Bureaucratic Mind in the Russian Empire’s 
Northwestern Region in the 1860s.” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian 
History 5, no. 2 (2004): 245–271.
———. “Russian Nationalism and the Nineteenth-Century Policy of Russification in the 
Russian Empire’s Western Region.” In Imperiology: From Empirical Knowledge to 
Discussing the Russian Empire, edited by Kimitaka Matsuzato, 141–158. Sapporo: 
Slavic Research Center, 2007.
Domanyts’kyi, Vasyl. “Ukrains’ka presa v 1906 rotsi” [The Ukrainian press in 1906]. 
Ukraina 1, pt. 2 (1907): 48–65.
Emmons, Terence. The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in 
Russia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.
Emmons, Terence, and Wayne S. Vucinich, eds. The Zemstvo in Russia: An Experiment in 
Local Self-Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Gerus, O. W. “Manifestations of the Cossack Idea in Modern Ukrainian History: The 
Cossack Legacy and Its Impact.” Ukrains’kyi istoryk 1–2 (1986): 22–39.
Goresmekhov [Opochinin P.]. “S beregov Nevy” [From the banks of the Neva]. Kavkaz, 
September 3, 1906, 2.
“Graf Uvarov o kazach’em zemstve” [Count Uvarov on the Cossack zemstvo]. Kubanskie 
oblastnye vedomosti, September 26, 1913, 2.
Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Stenograficheskie otchety. 1906 g. [The State Duma. Verbatim 
records. 1906]. Vol. 2. St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, 1906.
Hen-Konarski, Tomasz. “Cossacks and Gauchos: Myths of Masculinity in the Political 
Struggles of the River Plate and Ukraine, 1830s through 1840s.” Ph.D. diss., Florence: 
European University Institute, 2017.
Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Ismail-Zade, D. I. Graf I. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, namestnik kavkazskii [Count I. I. 
Vorontsov-Dashkov, the Viceroy of the Caucasus]. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2005.
Ivanenkov, N. “Prava na zemli Kubanskikh kazakov” [Rights on the Kuban Cossacks’ 
lands]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, January 5, 1906, 2.
“K armiano-tatarskomy s”ezdu” [To the Armenian–Tatar congress]. Kavkaz, March 7, 
1906, 3.
“K rospusku Gosudarstvennoi Dumy” [On the dissolution of the State Duma]. Kubanskie 
oblastnye vedomosti, July 13, 1906, 2.
“K voprosu o ‘voiskovoi rade’” [To the issue of the ‘host’s rada’]. Kubanskie oblastnye 
vedomosti, September 2, 1906, 1.
Kapel’horods’kyi, P. “Zemstvo i inohorodni na Kubanshchyni” [Zemstvo and inogorodnie 
in Kuban]. Rada, March 18, 1908, 1; March 19, 1908, 1; March 20, 1908, 1; March 21, 
1908, 1.
Kasinenko I., “Pisnia zakubantsia (Po povodu rady)” [Song of a Transkubania Cossack 
(Regarding the Rada)]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, December 15, 1906, 2.
“Kazach’ia rada” [The Cossack Rada]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, December 3, 1906, 1.
“Kazach’ia rada” [The Cossack Rada]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, December 9, 1906, 
1.
“Kazach’ia rada” [The Cossack Rada]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, December 10, 
1906, 2.
Kazak-roditel’. “Kazakam negde uchit’ detei” [The Cossacks have nowhere to teach 
children]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, September 23, 1907, 2.
216 Oleksandr Polianichev 
Khakhanov, A. “Gruzinskaia pechat’ o Gosudarstvennoi Dume i avtonomii Gruzii” 
[Georgian press on the State Duma and the autonomy of Georgia]. Russkaia mysl’ 6 
(1906): 63–72.
———. “National Challenges to Decentralization: Autonomy and Federation in the 
Russian Liberal Discourse, 1900–1914.” Ph.D. diss., Budapest: Central European 
University, 2014.
Khripachenko, Tatiana. “Poniatiia federatsiia, detsentralizatsiia, avtonomiia v 
sotsialisticheskom i liberal’nom diskursakh Rossiiskoi imperii (konets XIX – nachalo 
XX veka)” [Concepts of federation, decentralization, and autonomy in socialist and 
liberal discourses of the Russian Empire (late 19th–early 20th century)]. In ‘Poniatiia 
o Rossii’: k istoricheskoi semantike imperskogo perioda [Concepts about Russia: 
Towards historical semantics of the imperial period]. Vol. 2, edited by Alexei Miller 
and Denis Sdvizhkov, 99–142. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2012.
Kiriushin, S. Yu. and D. V. Sen’. “‘Svoi sredi chuzhikh, chuzhoi sredi svoikh’: Sud’ba 
belogo komissara K. L. Bardizha.” Gumanitarnaia mysl’ Yuga Rossii 1 (2005): 
143–162.
Kolonitskii, Boris. “Tragicheskaia erotika”: obrazy imperatorskoi sem’i v gody pervoi 
mirovoi voiny [Tragic erotic: Images of the imperial family during World War I]. 
Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010.
Koo, Ja-Jeong. “Universalizing Cossack Particularism: ‘The Cossack Revolution’ in Early 
Twentieth Century Kuban’.” Revolutionary Russia 25, no. 1 (2012): 1–29.
———. “From an Estate to a Cossack Nation: Kuban’ Samostiinost’, 1917.” Europe–Asia 
Studies 66, no. 10 (2014): 1649–1678.
Kornblatt, Judith Deutsch. The Cossack Hero in Russian Literature: A Study in Cultural 
Mythology. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992.
Kornienko, Boris. Pravyi Don: Kazaki i ideologiia natsionalizma (1909–1914) [The right-
wing Don: The Cossacks and the ideology of nationalism (1909–1914)]. St. Petersburg: 
Izdatel’stvo Evropeiskogo universiteta v Sankt-Peterburge, 2013.
Korolenko, P. “Kazaki i ikh zemlia” [Cossacks and their land]. Novaia zaria, December 9, 
1906, 2; December 10, 1906, 2–3.
———. “Rada.” Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, December 9, 1906, 2.
Kovalenko, Hr. “Lysty do selian pro narodni prava” [Letters to peasants about people’s 
rights]. Ridne slovo, February 10, 1906, 5.
Kubanskii kazak. “On the resolutions concerning the council.” Kubanskie oblastnye 
vedomosti, September 6, 1906, 1.
Kubanskii kazak. “Vnimaniiu vsekh istykh kazakov kubantsev” [To the attention of all true 
Kuban Cossacks]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, September 7, 1906, 2.
“Letopis’ oblastnoi zhizni” [Chronicle of the regional life]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, 
January 10, 1906, 1.
“Letopis’ oblastnoi zhizni” [Chronicle of the regional life]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, 
October 7, 1906, 1.
“Letopis’ oblastnoi zhizni” [Chronicle of the regional life]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, 
January 13, 1907, 1.
“Letopis’ oblastnoi zhizni” [Chronicle of the regional life]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, 
November 28, 1907, 1.
[Makarenko, P. L.]. “Tragediia kazachestva” [The tragedy of Cossackdom]. Vol’noe 
kazachestvo – Vil’ne kozatstvo 124 (1933): 6–11.
McNeal, Robert H. Tsar and Cossack, 1855–1914. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987.
 A rada for the empire 217
Mikhailov, N. I. “Prikaz po Kubanskomu kazach’emu voisku ot 4 noiabria 1906 goda 
№653” [Order on the Kuban Cossack Host no. 653, November 4, 1906]. Kubanskie 
oblastnye vedomosti, November 5, 1906, 1.
Mikhailopulo, D. K. “Kazach’ia rada” [The Cossack Rada]. Kubanskie oblastnye 
vedomosti, January 23, 1907, 1.
Miller, Burton Richard. Rural Unrest during the First Russian Revolution Kursk Province, 
1905–1906. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2013.
Muzhev, I. F. Kazachestvo Dona, Kubana i Tereka v Revoliutsii 1905–1907 gg. 
Orzhonikidze: Severo-osetinskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1963.
N. “Zemel’nyi vopros v Kubanskoi oblasti” [Land question in the Kuban oblast]. Novaia 
zaria, December 13, 1906, 2–3.
Nikitin, A. N. Suverennaia Kuban’: Opyt otechestvennogo parlamentarizma [Sovereign 
Kuban: The experience of the Russian parliamentarism]. Moscow: Natsional’nyi 
institut biznesa, 2010.
O’Rourke, Shane. Warriors and Peasants: The Don Cossacks in Late Imperial Russia. 
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.
———. “From Region to Nation: The Don Cossacks 1870–1920.” In Russian Empire: 
Space, People, Power, 1700–1930, edited by Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen and A. V. 
Remnev, 218–238. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007.
“O zemstve u Kubantsev i Tertsev” [On zevstvo at the Kuban and Terek Cossacks]. In 
Severokavkazskii al’manakh [North Caucasus almanac]. Edited by B. M. Gorodetskii. 
Ekaterinodar: Tipografiia “Osnova,” 1908. 243–247.
[Piven’, Oleksandr]. “Kozacha rada”. Poema na ukrains’kii movi iz pobytu kozakiv 
Kubans’koho viis’ka [“The Cossack Rada.” A poem in Ukrainian language on the life 
of the Kuban Host]. Umanskaia: Tipografiia M. F. Bykova, 1907.
Plokhy, Serhii. The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001.
———. The Cossack Myth: History and Nationhood in the Age of Empires. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012.
“Po Ukraini” [In Ukraine]. Ridne slovo, February 17, 1907, 10.
Polianichev, Oleksandr. “Ekaterina II kak kazach’ia mat’: Pamiatnik imperatritse v 
Ekaterinodare i zaporozhskii mif Kubani” [Catherine II as the Cossack mother: The 
monument of the Empress in Ekaterinodar and the Zaporozhian myth of Kuban]. In 400-
letie doma Romanovykh: politika pamiati i monarkhicheskaia ideia. 1613–2013 [400 
years of the Romanov dynasty: The politics of memory and the idea of monarchy, 1613-
2013], edited by V. Lapin and Yu. Safronova, 132–163. St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo 
Evropeiskogo universiteta v Sankt-Peterburge, 2016.
———. “Rediscovering Zaporozhians: Memory, Loyalties, and Politics in Late Imperial 
Kuban, 1880–1914.” Ph.D. diss., Florence: European University Institute, 2017.
———. “Fruits of Colonization: Cossack Settlers in the Western Caucasus, 1861–1870.” 
CAS Sofia Working Paper Series 11 (2019): 1–42.
Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii [Complete collection of the laws of the Russian 
Empire]. Series III. 28 vols. St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1911.
“Posle s”ezda” [After the congress]. Kavkaz, March 10, 1906, 2.
Posunko, Andriy. “The Ambiguities of Cossackdom: The Case of the Pontic Steppe, 1775–
1830s.” Ph.D. diss., Budapest: Central European University, 2018.
“Prikaz po Kubanskoi oblasti № 3 ot 20 yanvaria 1906 g.” [Order on the Kuban oblast no. 
3, January 20, 1906]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, January 24, 1906, 1.
218 Oleksandr Polianichev 
“Proizvodstvo mezhevykh rabot v Kubanskoi oblasti” [Implementation of surveying works 
in the Kuban oblast]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, May 22, 1882, 1–2.
“Provody deputatov v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu” [Seeing off the deputies to the State 
Duma]. Kuban’, June 9, 1906, 3.
“Pryhovor.” Ridne slovo, December 24, 1905, 14.
“Resolution of stanitsa Yaroslavskaia.” Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, March 15, 
1907, 1.
Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie na Kubani v 1905–1907 gg. [The revolutionary movement in 
Kuban in 1905–1907]. Krasnodar: Krasnodarskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1956.
Riegg, Stephen Badalyan. “Neotraditionalist Rule to the Rescue of the Empire? Viceroy I. 
Vorontsov-Dashkov Amid Crises in the Caucasus, 1905–1915.” Ab Imperio 3 (2018): 
115–139. doi: 10.1353/imp.2018.0061
Sablin, Ivan, and Alexander Semyonov. “Autonomy and Decentralization in the Global 
Imperial Crisis: The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union in 1905–1924.” Modern 
Intellectual History 17, no. 2 (2020): 543–560. doi: 10.1017/S1479244318000252
Sargent, Leslie. “The “Armeno-Tatar War” in the South Caucasus, 1905–1906: Multiple 
Causes, Interpreted Meanings.” Ab Imperio 4 (2010): 143–69. doi: 10.1353/
imp.2010.0054
Shcherbina, F. A. “Fakty kazach’ei ideologii i tvorchestva” [Facts of the Cossack ideology 
and creativity]. In Kazachestvo: Mysli sovremennikov o proshlom, nastoiashchem i 
budushchem kazachestva [Cossackdom: Thoughts of contemporaries about the past, 
present, and future of the Cossackdom]. Paris: Izdanie “Kazach’ego soiuza,” 1928.
Shevyrev, Kos’ma. “Neskol’ko slov pravdy ‘po voprosu o pozemel’nom ustroistve v 
Kubanskoi oblasti’” [Some words of truth “on the issue of the land settlement in the 
Kuban oblast”]. KOV, September 1, 1906, 1–2.
Shevyrev, Vasilii. “Korrespondentsiia. St. Dagestanskaia” [Correspondence. Stanitsa 
Dagestanskaia]. KOV, July 9, 1906, 2.
Semyonov, Alexander. “‘The Real and Live Ethnographic Map of Russia’: The Russian 
Empire in the Mirror of the State Duma.” In Empire Speaks Out: Languages of 
Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire, edited by Ilya Gerasimov, 
Jan Kusber and Alexander Semyonov, 191–228. Leiden: Brill, 2009.
———. “Imperial Parliament for a Hybrid Empire: Representative Experiments in Early 
20th Century Russian Empire.” Journal of Eurasian Studies 11, no. 1 (2020): 30–39. 
doi: 10.1177%2F1879366520902868
Senchakova, L. T., ed. Prigovory i nakazy krest’ian Tsentral’noi Rossii 1905–1907 gg. 
Sbornik dokumentov [Resolutions and mandates by peasants of Central Russia, 1905–7. 
Collection of documents]. Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2000.
Sotnik M. A. Karaulov 2-i. “Soveshchanie o zemstve na Kubani” [Meeting on zemstvo in 
Kuban]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, November 7, 1907, 2.
Stanichnik. “Neskol’ko slov po povodu rechei Bardizha i Kochevskogo, proiznesennykh 
imi 13 iiunia s. g. v Gosudarstvennoi Dume” [Some words with regard to the speeches 
by Bardizh and Kochevskii, spoken by them on June 13 of this year in the State Duma]. 
Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, September 21, 1906, 2.
Stanichnik. “Pis’mo predstaviteliam kubanskoi voiskovoi rady” [A letter to representatives 
of the Kuban Host’s Rada]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, December 17, 1906, 2.
Svatikov, S. G. Rossiia i Don (1549–1917): Issledovanie po istorii gosudarstvennogo i 
administrativnogo prava i politicheskikh dvizhenii na Donu [Russia and the Don 
(1549–1917): Research on the history of the state and administrative law and political 
movements in the Don]. Belgrade: Donskaia istoricheskaia komissiia, 1924.
 A rada for the empire 219
Sysyn, Frank. “The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology.” 
Social Research 58, no. 4 (1991): 845–864.
“Tiflis, 22-go marta 1906 goda” [Tiflis, March 22, 1906]. Kavkaz, March 22, 1906, 1.
Tsinchuk, Rustem. “Peoples, Regions, and Electoral Politics: The State Dumas and the 
Constitution of New National Elites.” In Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 
1700–1930, edited by Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen and A. V. Remnev, 366–397. 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007.
Urushadze, Amiran. “Kavkaz v kontse XIX – nachale XX v.: problemy upravleniia i 
modernizatsii na yuzhnoi okraine Rossiiskoi imperii” [The Caucasus in the late 19th–
early 20th century: Problems of administration and modernization in the southern 
borderland of the Russian Empire]. Quaestio Rossica, no. 2 (2015): 144–57.
V. D. “Do ukraintsiv” [To the Ukrainians]. Ridne slovo, December 24, 1905, 13.
“V Tiflise” [In Tiflis]. Kavkaz, March 14, 1906, 4.
Verner, Andrew M. The Crisis of Russian Autocracy: Nicholas II and the 1905 Revolution. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Vinchenko, Ye. “Bibliohrafiia” [Bibliograhy]. Rada, February 6, 1908, 4.
Voiskovaia rada [The Host’s Rada]. Ekaterinodar: Tipografiia “Osnova,” 1907.
von Hagen, Mark. “Federalisms and Pan-movements: Re-imagining Empire.” In Russian 
Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930, edited by Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen 
and A. V. Remnev, 494–510. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007.
———. “Nicholas II and the Revolution of 1905.” In Russian Monarchy: Representation 
and Rule, 199–218. Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2013.
Wortman, Richard S. Scenarios of Power: From Alexander II to the Abdication of Nicholas 
II. Vol. 2. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Yoshiro, Ikeda “Toward an Empire of Republics: Transformation of Russia in the Age of 
Total War, Revolution, and Nationalism.” In Comparing Modern Empires: Imperial 
Rule and Decolonization in the Changing World Order, edited by Uyama Tomohiko, 
119–146. Sapporo: Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2018.
“Z Kubani. Zavedennia zemstva” [From Kuban. The introduction of zemstvo]. Rada, 
December 15, 1907, 3.
“Zakrytie kazach’ei rady” [Closure of the Cossack Rada]. Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti, 
December 20, 1906, 2.
“Zasedanie kavkazskogo yuridicheskogo obshchestva v subbotu, 8-go aprelia sego goda” 
[Session of the Caucasus Legal Society on Saturday, April 8 of this year]. Kavkaz, April 
11, 1906, 3; April 13, 1906, 2–3; April 25, 1906, 3; May 3, 1906, 3.
“Zasedanie soveta Namestnika Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva na Kavkaze s uchastiem 
delegatov ot armianskogo i musul’manskogo naseleniia po voprosu o raspriakh 
mezhdu oznachennymi narodnostiami” [Session of the Council of the Viceroy of 
His Imperial Majesty in the Caucasus with the participation of delegates from the 
Armenian and Muslim population on the issue of the feuds between the mentioned 
nationalities]. Kavkaz, February 24, 1906, 2; February 25, 1906, 3; February 26, 1906, 
3; February 28, 1906, 2–3; March 1, 1906; March 4, 1906, 3; March 7, 1906, 2; March 
8, 1906, 2.
“Zasedaniia Kazach’ei Rady zakonchilis’” [Sessions of the Cossack Rada ended]. Novaia 
zaria, December 21, 1906, 2.
“Zemel’ne pytannia na Kubani” [The land question in Kuban]. Ridne slovo, December 9, 
1906, 9.





Sometime in the late 1980s, my mother and I were visiting a Turkish family in 
western Turkey. We were sitting with several women and small children in the 
living room, where, as was the custom, the TV was on, showing a parliamentary 
debate. Nobody was paying attention to the TV, until suddenly a fistfight involv-
ing at least a dozen deputies broke out on screen. Twice as many deputies rushed 
over, trying to separate the fighting ones. The women in the living room reacted 
with mildly amused disapproval: “Look what kind of deputies we have! This is 
what they call democracy and civilization! Don’t they know that foreigners are 
watching?!”
To this day, it is not uncommon for such brawls to break out in the Turkish 
National Assembly, as well as in many other (but, interestingly, not all) parlia-
ments around the world.1 Parliamentarians, like all other people, sometimes do 
not follow their own rules, the internal regulations (Turkish: içtüzük, Ottoman 
Turkish: nizamname-i dahiliyesi), which, across the globe, ban the use of physi-
cal violence in the house. Such rule-breaking by deputies, however, is of specific 
delicacy, as parliaments not only have laws, but also make them. To put it dif-
ferently: internal regulations are laws that prescribe how laws ought to be made. 
Nonobservance or bending of internal rules (such as election fraud, manipulation 
of votes, threats or violence against political adversaries, nonobservance of quota 
rules) may happen in the very process of passing legislation, and may therefore 
jeopardize either the legitimacy of the laws enacted by such illegal means or, even 
worse, that of the parliamentary system as such.
From a historian’s point of view, internal regulations and their more or less 
faithful observance by deputies can be instructive for a better understanding of 
parliamentary systems and their change over time. To check regulations against 
their application means to study the relationship between parliaments and the 
other institutions in constitutional regimes. This is what the present chapter aims 
to do for the parliamentary experience of the late Ottoman Empire during its First 
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(1876–1878) and Second (1908–1920) Constitutional Periods, as well as for the 
years leading up to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey (1920–1923). 
During those three years, and in fact until 1927, the Great National Assembly 
(Büyük Millet Meclisi, from 1921 onward: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, hence-
forth: TBMM) officially followed the internal regulations of the last Ottoman 
Chamber of Deputies (Heyet-i Mebusan, from 1908 onward: Meclis-i Mebusan). 
However, faithfulness with the late Ottoman internal regulations decreased mas-
sively during the period of transformation from empire to nation-state. I will 
argue that these violations can be explained as results of two diverging yet paral-
lel trends that had already been present in late Ottoman times: the first was a drive 
toward a strengthening of parliament vis-à-vis other constitutional institutions. 
The second may be described as the prevailing of an authoritarian spirit in the 
guise of parliamentarism.
Historical context: the Tanzimat period
Compared to many other monarchies among its contemporaries, the Ottoman 
Empire was not particularly late at becoming a constitutional state: the first 
Ottoman Constitution was promulgated in 1876, roughly 5 years after that of the 
German Reich, 35 years after that of Belgium, and 18 years prior to that of Japan. 
This first experiment in representative government, however, was short-lived, 
starting in 1877 with the assembly and ending in 1878 with the dissolution of the 
lower chamber, which was followed by 30 years of autocratic rule under Sultan 
Abdülhamit II (r. 1876–1909).2
The Ottoman Constitution of 1876 was not the first modern text to lay 
down certain principles of government: the famous reform Edict of Gülhane, 
proclaimed in 1839, promised security of life, honor, and property, as well as 
regular and fair taxation and conscription systems for all Ottoman subjects.3 
The document, which promised a long list of reforms, is today considered the 
starting point of the modernization period known as Tanzimat.4 Its text, how-
ever, makes frequent reference to Islamic divine law, the Sharia. The Edict was 
firmly grounded in a traditional Islamic, premodern understanding of govern-
ance, in which inequality before the law was considered normal and subjects, 
in return for just rule, were obliged to obey their ruler.5 A second reform edict 
was issued as a result of massive Western diplomatic pressure in 1856. This 
document, which is known as Reform Edict (Islahat Fermanı), no longer men-
tions the Sharia. Instead, the Sultan declared that “my subjects, who in my sight 
are all equal, and equally dear to me”6 would be taxed equally and would all be 
subject to military service (which they would be able to avoid by sending proxies 
or paying a fee). The text thus implicitly contradicted the conception of Islamic 
law, in which non-Muslims were considered as protected, yet inferior subjects 
who were not allowed to bear arms and who had to pay a special head tax, the 
cizye.7 Apart from introducing the idea of equality, the document also contained 
a long list of rights and privileges granted to Christian communities, such as that 
to establish and renovate churches. It thus contained in nuce the contradiction 
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between the two modern principles of equality before the law on the one hand 
and minority rights on the other.
We know today that the Tanzimat reforms, despite and possibly because of 
their rhetoric of justice and reordering, were accompanied by a strong and increas-
ing sense of injustice among the population.8 Probably the most important rea-
son for this was that the political project promising political equality contrasted 
sharply and coincided with increasing economic inequality.9 Moreover, the era of 
reform provided the populace with a new set of concepts that they could use when 
expressing their grievances, of which there were many.10 To name but a few: 
those living in the countryside suffered from arbitrary taxation, indebtedness, and 
rampant banditry, while city dwellers witnessed the twin effects of the Ottoman 
economy’s integration into world markets: the Ottoman producing sector faltered 
in the face of cheap European imports, the very goods that the nouveau riche, 
in violation of traditional sensibilities, were displaying more and more openly.11 
Moreover, local conflicts in the provinces, which were usually triggered by eco-
nomic conflict, came to be framed as inter-religious strife, facilitating interven-
tions of the European Great Powers into Ottoman domestic affairs.12
By far the best-studied current of criticism of all these developments is that 
voiced by the so-called Young Ottomans, a group of bureaucrats and intellectu-
als who, from the 1860s onward, used the new medium of the newspaper, first at 
home and then from their European places of exile, to rally for the promulgation 
of an Ottoman constitution and the establishment of an Ottoman parliament.13 
The introduction of government accountability and public discussion of all mat-
ters pertaining to the state, they believed, would finally bring about the security 
of life, honor, and property that the 1839 Gülhane Edict had so utterly failed 
to bring about. They further believed that a parliament, by helping to redress 
their grievances, would satisfy those Christian populations within the Ottoman 
realm who were increasingly drawn toward nationalist ideas. The introduction 
of a constitution and a parliamentary system was, in other words, expected to do 
nothing short of saving the Ottoman state, and quite instantly so. Like political 
counselors in earlier Ottoman centuries, the Young Ottomans presented the idea 
of political consultation not as a new idea but as the reinstatement of an ancient 
principle of Islamic governance, thus trying to make it palatable to an inherently 
conservative society in which innovation was not considered a virtue, but rather 
a threat.14
By the 1860s, several territories that still – if only nominally – belonged to 
the Ottoman state already had constitutions and representative assemblies. This 
was true for Serbia (autonomous since 1830, constitutional since 1859), Bulgaria 
(1879), the Danube Principalities (1859), and Tunisia (1860).15 Representative 
government was on the rise in those territories that were still under full Ottoman 
sovereignty as well. On the local level, forms of representation such as councils 
of elders and headmen in villages, as well as councils of notables and guild lead-
ers in cities, had been around for a long time.16 Over the course of the nineteenth 
century, these local institutions were reorganized by the central state and com-
plemented by provincial councils. A Sultanic decree issued in 1840 stipulated 
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the formation of councils that would have at least some members elected among 
the population, usually from among the religious leaders and other notables in all 
provinces and sub-provinces of the empire.17 Moreover, between 1862 and 1865, 
the Armenians, Orthodox Greeks, and Jews of the empire were allowed to draw 
up organic laws for their communities, establishing councils that resembled small 
parliaments insofar as their lay members were elected.18 The Young Ottoman 
Namık Kemal pointed to these assemblies “as possible models for a chamber of 
deputies.”19 The provincial law of 1864 foresaw the establishment of elected pro-
vincial councils not only in all Ottoman provinces, but also in the district centers, 
a principle extended to municipal councils in 1870. The implementation in cities 
and towns, however, appears to have taken some time. Only males had suffrage, 
and both (male) active and passive voting rights were tied to tax qualifications 
that excluded the poor. There were quotas for non-Muslims on the councils, who 
would be elected by their respective communities.20
The Constitution of 1876
The promulgation of the Ottoman Constitution in 1876 can be attributed to a con-
tingency of domestic and international factors. A serious financial and economic 
crisis during which the empire defaulted on its foreign debt led to a coup d’état 
led by reformist forces around Midhat Paşa. In the course of these events, Sultan 
Abdülaziz (r. 1861–1876) was first deposed and then died under suspicious cir-
cumstances. The putschists brought crown-prince Murat to the throne, who was 
known to be leaning toward a constitution but soon turned out to be mentally ill. 
After only six months, he was replaced by his brother Hamit (Abdülhamit II), who 
agreed to promulgate a constitution.21
The Constitution that was drafted in the following months was built on the 
existing structures and practices discussed above. It declared Ottoman territory 
to be inviolable and allocated sovereignty with the eldest prince of the house of 
Osman (art. 3). The Sultan could not be held accountable in any way, his person 
was declared sacred (art. 5). The Constitution introduced a parliament composed 
of two chambers: the Senate (Heyet-i Ayan), whose members would be named for 
life, and the Assembly of Deputies (Heyet-i Mebusan), who would be elected for 
a legislative period of four years (art. 69).22 There would be one deputy for every 
50,000 male inhabitants (art. 61) (in practice, however, the representation rate 
differed considerably between different parts of the empire).23 All male Ottoman 
citizens above the age of 30 who could speak Turkish could run as candidates, 
unless they claimed to hold citizenship of another state, were domestic servants 
of another person,24 were standing trial or had been sentenced in court, had gone 
bankrupt without rehabilitation, or “lay notoriously in disrepute for their con-
duct.”25 After another four years, potential deputies would be required to also 
read Turkish and, “to the extent possible,” write it (art. 68). Unlike their peers in 
other countries, such as the German Reich,26 the Ottoman deputies were salaried, 
being entitled to 20,000 kuruş (equalling 200 gold Lira) plus travel expenses per 
parliamentary year (art. 76).27 Both chambers would sit four months per year, 
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from November until the beginning of March (art. 43). Deputies were not allowed 
to hold any other public office except a minister post (art. 76). They were free to 
express their opinions and to vote as they liked (art. 47). They could not be pros-
ecuted for their opinions, unless a two-thirds majority of the chamber decided to 
strip them of their immunity (art. 48). The lower chamber had a quorum of half 
the deputies plus one (art. 51). Bills or changes to existing laws would usually be 
brought forward by the cabinet. Deputies could also ask for laws to be changed 
but had to send their proposals to the Grand Vizier, who would submit them to 
the Sultan, who would decide whether or not to charge the State Council (Şura-yi 
Devlet) with preparing such a bill (art. 53).28
The first and second elections of 1876 and 1877 were performed according to 
a provisional electoral law, stipulating that deputies would be elected by and from 
among the existing district and provincial councils, which were controlled by the 
respective local notables.29 The candidacy age was set at 25 (5 years younger than 
prescribed in the Constitution).30 Autonomous regions such as Mount Lebanon 
and de facto independent ones such as Egypt were not represented in the cham-
ber. The number of deputies for each district and province was set by the central 
government, while the provincial governments decided about quotas for Muslims 
and non-Muslims.31 Apart from allowing for a relatively quick election process, 
electing deputies from among the existing councils had the advantage that those 
who were sent “happened to be eminently conversant in imperial issues.”32 As 
for the deputies’ social backgrounds, Kemal Karpat has noted that almost all 
deputies, regardless of the professions they named in the parliamentary statistics, 
were part of the “upper propertied class” in the provinces.33 This was a social 
background very different from that of the Young Ottomans, who, as part of the 
new bureaucracy-intelligentsia, usually depended on salaries and hailed from 
Istanbul.34 Since property in (still officially state-owned) agricultural land had 
only become fully tradeable since 1858, and land, now under increasingly capital-
ist conditions, continued to be the main means of production, we may well say 
that the chamber represented the interests of the economically dominant class 
(Karpat makes this point but, somewhat misleadingly, speaks of a “new middle 
class”).35 Unlike the European bourgeoisie, however, this class was often identical 
with those urban elites of the ancien régime (higher ulema, guild leaders and mer-
chant families) who had managed to acquire landed property. As property own-
ers, the deputies were interested in reliable, accountable governance and liberal 
legislation, but their interests were far from adversary to those of the state. There 
was also no aristocracy standing in their way. With regard to their ethno-religious 
background, the deputies were quite diverse: the first Heyet-i Mebusan (HM) had 
119 deputies, of which 71 were Muslims, 44 Christians of various denominations, 
and 4 Jews. The second had 113 deputies: 64 Muslims and 49 non-Muslims.36 
The Heyet-i Mebusan was initially a relatively weak parliament (just like the 
contemporary ones in Prussia and Austria-Hungary).37 Compared to the three other 
constitutional institutions that were involved in law-making (the Sultan, the State 
Council, and the Senate), the Heyet-i Mebusan’s rights were limited to grilling 
ministers and merely asking for investigations against them. Whether pertaining 
 Ottoman parliamentary procedure  225
to legislation or disciplinary action, all final decisions were taken by the Sultan, 
who possessed an absolute veto right and was not responsible before the law.38
The First Constitutional Period was rather short: the first Chamber of Deputies 
sat between March 19, 1877, and June 28, 1877. Following a second round of elec-
tions, the second legislative period started in December 1877, ending prematurely 
in February 1878, when Sultan Abdülhamit II, in the midst of the Russo–Ottoman 
War of 1877–1878, dissolved the chamber and abrogated the Constitution.
Within these five months, the chamber managed to discuss (among others) such 
important public matters as a major uprising in Montenegro,39 the Russian dec-
laration of war in April 1877,40 the resulting further aggravation of the Ottoman 
state’s financial situation,41 and the budget law.42 (Robert Devereux notes that 
“parliamentary control of financial matters was the one field in which both Palace 
and Porte appear to have scrupulously observed both the letter and the spirit of the 
Constitution”).43 The HM also debated the question of military service for non-
Muslims and notions of a shared Ottoman citizenship.44 It refused to change the 
law for the proclamation of a state of emergency,45 insisted on a liberalization of 
the press law,46 passed a new provincial law,47 and an electoral law. The last-men-
tioned, however, only came into effect during the Second Constitutional Period 
(1908 and onward) because it had not passed the Senate by February 1878.48 The 
very first legal document to be passed by the chamber were the rules of conduct 
for its own work. They were discussed in the third, fourth, and fifth sessions, on 
March 23–25, 1877. Following the Sultan’s approval, the nizamname was pub-
lished and came into force on May 14, 1877.49
Researchers disagree about the models followed by the committee that was in 
charge of drafting the text of the nizamname. According to Servet Armağan, it 
was the Italian and Belgian regulations, according to Devereux, “contemporary 
European parliaments, especially the French and the British.”50 Al-Barazi gives the 
names of the committee members as Ziya Bey, Namık Kemal, Chamich Ohannes, 
Ramiz Efendi, Sava Paşa, Abdin Bey, and Hayrullah Efendi.51 Unfortunately, 
there are no minutes of this committee available. We only know that the draft was 
submitted to the State Council on February 17, 1877, and ready for discussion in 
the HM by March 23, 1877.52
The nizamname of 1877 was composed of 16 sections setting the rules for the 
following procedures: (1) the appointment of preliminary chairmen and prepara-
tion of election documents, (2) the election of chairmen and minute takers, (3) 
formation of branches and committees, (4) preparation of and voting on bills, (5) 
the interpellation of bills by ministers, (6) complaints about ministers, (7) discus-
sion of bills, (8) petitions to the parliament, (9) declaration of urgency for bills, 
(10) voting, (11) minutes, (12) deputies’ absence, (13) punishments for violations 
of the rules, (14) discipline in the chamber, (15) the relationship with the Senate 
(Heyet-i Ayan), and (16) miscellaneous articles dealing with protocol, deputies’ 
resignation, and the coming into force of the nizamname.53
According to the nizamname, the Chamber President ought to have been 
elected by secret ballot, and the deputies’ choice ought to have been sanctioned 
by the Sultan. Instead, Sultan Abdülhamit II, in a “flagrant violation of Article 
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77” of the Constitution, had already named Ahmet Vefik Efendi54 (later Paşa, an 
experienced diplomat and respected intellectual) as President in February. Since 
the Istanbul elections had not taken place at this point, Ahmet Vefik was not even 
a deputy yet, and the electors later had no choice but to sanction the Sultan’s deci-
sion.55 Although the document was technically not in force yet, this was also a 
violation of articles 9 and 10 of the nizamname. According to a British newspaper, 
Yusuf Ziya[eddin Al-Khalidi],56 deputy for Jerusalem and former mayor of that 
city, delivered a 20-minute speech denouncing this action.57 The speech appears 
to have been censored from the minutes, and it is likely that such censorship was 
also performed later on. This point limits the minutesʼ source value considerably. 
Another caveat when dealing with the minutes is that only those of the public 
sessions were published. The public ones sometimes mention decisions taken in 
nonpublic sessions, such as the one taken during the third session that the HM, in 
addition to Fridays, would also not sit on Sundays.58 There were also secret meet-
ings, which are not discussed in the minutes at all.59
Ahmet Vefik Efendi, President of the first HM, assumed that the rules of pro-
cedure, such as those about leave of absence for deputies, were already to be 
observed even before the deputies were aware of them. This created some irrita-
tion.60 Overall, however, the minutes of these three sessions convey the impression 
that the deputies, far from challenging the nizamname, simply asked questions: 
what exactly were the five branches (şubeler) that the assembly would often be 
divided into for, and how were they different from committees (art. 2)?61 Why 
were bills that had been rejected by the assembly only to be brought back in after 
two months’ time? What exactly was an absolute majority? Why would budgetary 
laws be debated only once, and all others twice? This apparent tameness of the 
debate is probably partly due to the above-mentioned censorship. Another reason 
may be the deputies’ relative lack of experience, or their awareness of the quite 
authoritarian constitutional framework that they were operating in. That said, it is 
interesting to note that the deputies’ right to “grill” ministers was debated quite 
extensively.62 It was exactly this practice that would turn out to be the most chal-
lenging for governments.
Overall, the nizamname prescribed a rather authoritarian framework. 
Attendance was mandatory, and a deputy who, without asking for permission, 
did not show up for more than five sessions (or committee/branch meetings) in a 
row would be counted as absent without leave, being punished by publication of 
his name in the official gazette (art. 88). The President had far-reaching compe-
tences, and Ahmet Vefik Paşa, who held that office during the first period, made 
ample use of them, enforcing attendance, observance of time limits, and thematic 
coherence of speeches. His successor during the second parliamentary period 
(1877–1878), Hasan Fehmi Paşa, is said to have maintained a less strict style. 
Both fulfilled their duties rather faithfully, only rarely letting the vice presidents 
chair sessions.63
A peculiarity of the nizamname are the five branches (şubeler) of the chamber. 
These were to exist parallel to thematic commissions (for defense, petitions, etc.) 
and to review bills one by one, so that all branches would have seen all documents 
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before they were debated in plenary sessions. Devereux speculates that this rule 
was deliberately designed to slow down the parliament’s work.64 Another rea-
son may be that these branches, which were supposed to be reshuffled every two 
months by lot, were designed to provide substitutes for party groups, which did 
not exist in the first HM, in order to allow deputies to discuss matters in relatively 
small groups. Indeed, the branches seem to have been reshuffled every month, 
probably accomplishing relative familiarity of deputies among each other.65
Section 10 of the nizamname (articles 57–72) described in great detail how 
voting would be performed. There were three kinds of voting: open voting by 
raising hands, open voting by calling every single deputy and him shouting “yes” 
“no” or “abstention,” and finally, secret voting, either by name, with red and white 
pieces of paper, or without, with black and white balls.66 The nizamname was not 
always followed to the letter, but usually in spirit, for instance, when secret ballots 
were cast not with black and white balls but only white ones.67 Attendance was 
not as bad a problem as in Prussia and later the German Reich, where usually not 
more than a third of the (unremunerated) deputies cared to show up.68 The parlia-
mentary minutes were regularly published, not only in the official gazette, but also 
in the Istanbul papers, a fact that in itself must have transformed Ottoman political 
culture tremendously. There also existed some official provincial newspapers at 
this point, and the minutes may have been published in them as well.69
Judging from the (censored) minutes published in Vakit that contain only 
selected verbatim speeches, the first HM in the spring and summer of 1877 was a 
very orderly parliament (the second in winter 1877–1878 a little less so). The few 
deputies dominating the debates were experienced politicians and lawyers who, 
at times adamantly, insisted on proper observance of the constitutional frame-
work. My observations fit Karpat’s, who has noted that the deputies pressed the 
state for reliable and orderly taxation, a business-friendly legal framework, pri-
vatization of state land, and a rational, regularly paid bureaucracy.70 The chamber 
also made use of its constitutional right to bring complaints against ministers and 
request their trial, even interpreting this to mean that former ministers could be 
held accountable as well.71 As a result, the relations between the chamber and the 
other constitutional institutions deteriorated quickly, soon reaching the point of 
hostility. It is telling that the second HM no longer passed bills, instead addressing 
the myriad of grievances and problems all over the empire, and contributing to the 
fall of Grand Vizier Edhem Paşa.72 On February 14, 1878, Abdülhamit II, mak-
ing use of his constitutional right to do so, “temporarily” closed the chamber by 
simply having a declaration read out during its session. In it, he declared that “as 
a necessity of the present exceptional circumstances, the parliament be prorogued 
as of today.”73
These exceptional circumstances were the ongoing peace negotiations with 
Russia, during which the Porte was probably unwilling to be disturbed (or rather: 
embarrassed) by an assembly that had already before, in the Montenegrin crisis, 
adamantly opposed any ceding of Ottoman territory to the insurgents.74 In early 
1878, the Ottoman army was facing a humiliating defeat and the Ottoman state 
was soon, in the Treaty of San Stefano, forced to give up major Balkan territories 
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and the famous three districts (elviya-yi selase): Kars, Ardahan, and Batum in 
eastern Anatolia. Several contemporary observers speculated that neither the 
Sultan nor the government could be bothered with a patriotic parliament more 
royal than the king.75 Following the closing of parliament, ten deputies who had 
been particularly outspoken government critics were exiled from Istanbul.76
In the following 30 years, the Constitution continued to be in force only on 
paper. It was printed in the annual provincial yearbooks, and members of the 
Senate continued to receive their salaries, maintaining their place in state proto-
col.77 Abdülhamit II ruled autocratically, with the help of press censorship and 
a sophisticated spying system. The gravity center of power shifted back from 
the Grand Vizierate (known as the “Sublime Porte” in English), where it had 
been located during the Tanzimat period, to the Palace. After the territorial losses 
sanctioned by the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, Abdülhamit II managed to avoid 
another major war and further major territorial losses.78 He continued to pursue 
the reforms of the previous decades, if with a more authoritarian note, establish-
ing military and civilian high schools, building railways, telegraphs, and tighten-
ing the grip of the state in rural areas.79 Ironically, the school system that was 
expanded during his rule produced the very movement that would eventually 
result in his downfall: his military high schools and middle schools offered social 
mobility and a western-style education to penniless Muslim boys from the prov-
inces. In 1889, students of the medical military academy in Istanbul founded a 
secret society that came to be known as the Committee of Progress and Union 
(later: Committee of Union and Progress, henceforth: CUP) and quickly spread 
to other schools and beyond.80 In the first years of the twentieth century, these 
unionists started to cooperate with other oppositional groups, such as liberals 
(who, unlike the CUP, favored decentralization of the Ottoman state) and social-
ist Armenians, their shared objective being the restoration of the Constitution 
and the reconvening of the parliament.81 As Tarık Zafer Tunaya has observed, 
all these groups tended to regard constitutionalism “not as a tool, but as a goal 
in itself.”82 Their revolutionary agenda was influenced by other parliamentary 
movements, especially those in Russia and Iran and the respective constitutional 
revolutions in 1905 and 1906.83
The 1908 Revolution
In July 1908, the CUP took advantage of a general crisis in Ottoman Macedonia, 
forcing Abdülhamit II to restore the Constitution.84 The reintroduction of the 
Constitution was met with enthusiasm and high expectations by all ethno-reli-
gious groups throughout the empire. Press censorship was lifted, and the Ottoman 
reading public experienced a press boom of unprecedented proportions.85 
The first international reactions to the Revolution were hostile: autonomous 
Bulgaria declared its full independence, and Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-
Herzegovina, which had been under its military occupation since 1878. Moreover, 
many problems that had been repressed under Abdülhamit’s rule, now resurfaced, 
and there was a series of violent strikes.
 Ottoman parliamentary procedure  229
The Second Constitutional Period
The first general elections for a new lower chamber were held in November 1908, 
this time according to the two-stage system described in the election law of 1877 – 
which had in the meantime been approved by Sultan Abdülhamit II.86 The new 
number of seats (between 240 and 288, there is no agreement on this point) indi-
cates either considerable population growth since 1876 or closer observance of 
the rate of representation, or both.87 There is disagreement concerning the ethnic 
composition, too. According to Feroz Ahmad, 147 deputies were Turks (including 
Kurds, Circassians, and other Muslims from Anatolia), 60 Arabs, 27 Albanians, 
26 Greeks, 14 Armenians, 10 Slavs, and 4 Jews.88 As for the professional and 
class backgrounds of deputies, a contemporary observed that the biggest group 
were the men of religion (“nearly forty”), followed by landowners and members 
of the liberal professions, and finally, “seven or eight” members of the CUP, who 
were deputies for Salonica, Edirne and Istanbul.89 The last category is not a pro-
fessional one, but we know that the CUP-deputies were journalists, government 
clerks and officers – products of the Hamidian public schools.90
The numbers given above indicate that the new parliament was dominated by 
members of the traditional elites, who, in this first election, were often supported 
by the CUP, but not necessarily in line with its program. With the exception of 
the Armenians, who already had two rivaling parties prior to 1908, a spectrum 
of political parties only started to truly unfold in the course of the first years of 
parliamentary practice.91 Relations between the CUP and all other groups soon 
cooled considerably, and an opposition party, the Liberal Union, emerged.92
The new lower chamber, now called Meclis-i Mebusan (Chamber of Deputies, 
MM), was opened with a formal ceremony on December 17, 1908. Ahmet Rıza, 
a distinguished Young Turk intellectual who had spent almost 20 years in exile, 
was elected its first President. In his very first speech, he spoke of “national sover-
eignty,” and many deputies preferred to call their parliament “national chamber” 
(millet meclisi) rather than use the actual name.93 This terminology indicates that 
the 1908 chamber, already during its first sessions, considered itself to be repre-
senting a nation that was not identical with the state.94
Before discussing the application of the rules of conduct, it seems necessary 
to at least briefly outline the general legal and political situation within which 
the Chamber of Deputies worked. The Revolution of 1908 had reintroduced the 
Constitution, but it had also ushered in a period of heightened conflict, extralegal 
measures, and violence. Following the Revolution, the state of emergency was 
declared and not lifted until 1918 (it is a matter of debate how much this mat-
tered).95 The year 1908 saw an explosion of strikes, and an attempted counter-
putsch in Istanbul (April 1909) triggered an anti-Armenian and anti-Assyrian 
pogrom in Cilicia that killed between 10,000 and 30,000 people.96 Political assas-
sinations, such as that of journalist Hasan Fehmi (1909) and Mahmut Şevket Paşa 
(1913), became more frequent. There were uprisings in Yemen and Albania in 
1910 and 1911, and Italy invaded Tripolitania in 1911. With the outbreak of the 
First Balkan War in October 1912, the empire entered its last – and final – decade 
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of war. In January 1913, the CUP putsched itself into full control of the executive. 
During these years, the Meclis was dissolved four times: in February 1912 (fol-
lowed by new elections), in August 1912 (with new elections only taking place in 
1914), in November 1918, and, for the last time, in April 1919.97 In the course of 
the decade between 1908 and 1918, 1,061 “temporary” laws, i.e., laws that were 
not subject to parliamentary control, were issued by cabinets, the most famous one 
being the law of April 1915 ordering the deportation of all Ottoman Armenians.98 
This record of extralegality and violence has to be taken into account when assess-
ing the workings of the Chamber of Deputies.
The constitutional revision of 1909
The new MM initially operated within the rather tight framework set by the 
1876 Constitution, which the deputies were determined to change. In January 
1909, a parliamentary commission was formed and tasked with making sug-
gestions for a constitutional revision. A failed coup attempt in April 1909 
(known in Turkish as the March 31 Incident, the date according to the Julian 
calendar) provided the CUP with an opportunity to force Abdülhamit II to 
resign and replace him with his much more cooperative brother, Mehmet Reşat 
V. Following his enthronement, the MM revised the Constitution, deleting 
1 paragraph, adding 3 new ones, and changing 21.99 The revised text came into 
force on August 8, 1909.
In a nutshell, the revised Constitution accomplished a “transfer of sovereignty 
from the Sultan to the nation.”100 The revised text reconfirmed such fundamental 
principles as personal liberty (art. 10), freedom of the press (art. 12), equality 
before the law for all Ottomans (art. 17), inviolability of the domicile (art. 22), 
protection of private property (art. 21), and the ban of torture (art. 26).101 Additions 
to the 1876 text concerned the privacy of correspondence (art. 119) and the right 
of assembly for all Ottomans (art. 122). The revision also strengthened the MM 
considerably: according to the revised text of art. 3, sovereignty continued to rest 
with the Sultan. However, 
(o)n his accession the Sultan shall swear before Parliament, or if Parliament 
is not sitting, at its first meeting, to respect the visions of the Şeriat (…) and 
the Constitution, and to be loyal to the country and the nation.102 
The Sultan, whose expenditures, as well as those of the palace, became subject 
to parliamentary control (art. 6), only retained the right to name the Şeyhülislam 
(the grand müfti, issuer of legal opinions for Istanbul and cabinet member) and 
the Grand Vizier.103 Such important decisions as the making of peace, the declara-
tion of war, and the conclusion of international treaties could still be made by the 
Sultan and his Grand Vizier, but now required approval by the General Assembly 
(i.e., by both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies) (art. 7). The Sultan’s abso-
lute veto right was turned into a suspending one (art. 54), and it became possible 
for the Chamber of Deputies to insist on a bill (or its rejection) even against the 
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cabinet (art. 35).104 Ministers became responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, 
both collectively and personally (art. 30). Both chambers could now propose bills, 
which would be sent to the respective other chamber, and, if approved, from there 
to the Sultan. The article describes his task merely as “confirming” the bill, the 
State Council is no longer mentioned at all (art. 53). The session period of the MM 
(previously November till the end of February) was extended to November – end 
of April every year (art. 43).
Changes to the articles dealing with changes to the Constitution (art. 116) and 
with the range of authority of courts were proposed, but not approved by the 
necessary two-thirds majority.105 Some other changes, such as that to have some 
of the senators elected, were not approved by the Senate.106 One lone deputy pro-
posed that not only the male half of a district’s population should be represented 
by a deputy, and that the number of people represented per deputy should be 
raised to 100,000 accordingly. Such a change would not have introduced female 
suffrage (the election law clearly limited the vote to males)107 but the other depu-
ties reacted as if it did, refusing to consider such a change.108
Adaptation of the internal regulations
The constitutional revision of 1909 made it necessary to adapt the internal regu-
lations of the MM accordingly. A parliamentary commission that was formed 
to this end in 1910 submitted a draft regulation to the chamber in 1911, which 
in turn sent it to another committee. It is probably due to the political turmoil 
of 1912 that a new draft was prepared and approved by the chamber only after 
the 1914 elections. This text contained 20 instead of 16 sections and a total of 
182 instead of 105 paragraphs.109
A comparison between the internal regulations of 1877 and 1909 reveals that 
most changes were adaptations to the new Constitution and the increased impor-
tance that the MM had within it: those six sections that cannot be found in the 
1876 text deal with issues that were either far less important or not relevant at all 
in 1876: Section 5 discusses the proposition of bills by the Meclis.110 Section 9 is 
devoted to the discussion of budget laws, which could now be rejected altogether. 
Section 10 regulates temporary laws, the new name for laws issued by the cabinet 
only – an old practice now supposed to become the exception. Section 18 regulates 
the internal administration of the parliament, including a library. Two other new 
sections seem to reflect previous parliamentary experience or insufficiency of 
previous rules, namely section 6, which details the conduction of sessions, and 
section 17 containing the duties of the parliamentary President, his vice presi-
dents, and the minute keepers. Section 3, which discusses the examination of the 
deputies’ election documents, had previously been part of section 1.
Most changes, however, were additions of paragraphs to previously existing 
sections that reflect the increased importance of those procedures. Section 2 (pre-
viously section 3) discussing the forming and responsibilities of branches and 
commissions was extended from 13 to 20 paragraphs. The section about bills, 
which had only contained three paragraphs, now included seven. Questions and 
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Explanations, formerly comprised of five paragraphs, now contained 20. The sec-
tion about relations to the Senate was extended from three to eight paragraphs. 
The stipulations concerning punishments for violations of the rules by parliamen-
tarians (for such offenses as prolonged absence without leave, but also disruption 
of speeches or sessions) became more detailed.
Application of the nizamname in the 
Meclis-i Mebusan, 1908–1920
As the new nizamname would only be passed in 1914, deliberations and debates 
up to that point should have been conducted according to the older rules issued in 
1877. It may seem that the deputies, by amending the 1876 Constitution almost 
single-handedly, preemptively performed tasks that they officially only gained 
with the 1914 nizamname. This was not the case, as they followed art. 116 of the 
1876 Constitution, which allowed the Meclis to suggest changes to articles of 
the Constitution by a two-thirds majority, send them off to the Senate, and if the 
Senate also passed them with the same majority, submit them to the Sultan for 
approval.111 The elderly Mehmet V acquiesced in the changes.
In the 1908 parliament, there were several cases of deputies whose election 
was challenged by the Meclis. These included one deputy whose election cre-
dentials were (initially) found to be incomplete, several accused of corruption 
or notoriety, and one who was found not to be resident in his electoral district.112 
The rule that all deputies had to know Turkish was not always observed: the four 
Dashnak Armenian deputies did not speak Turkish, and in at least one instance, 
a deputy seems to have read his resignation letter out in Arabic.113 Attendance, 
too, appears to have been unsatisfactory: two deputies from [Kut] al-Amara in 
present-day Iraq, whose election credentials had been accepted, never showed up 
in Istanbul. Their cases were discussed only in 1910, and it was decided to have 
new deputies elected from their districts. Such a procedure was not discussed in 
the nizamname, but the Senate had previously decided that 91 days of absence 
without leave would annul a deputy’s mandate.114 As for the conduct of sessions, 
observation of rules for speeches, questions, and so forth, it seems that the cham-
ber was generally observant of those rules. There were at times hot debates, but 
overall, the deputies seem to have fought with words, not fists.115 Outside of ses-
sions, however, considerable violence was used against deputies. After losing its 
majority in the Istanbul by-elections of 1911, the CUP made use of violence, 
threats, and intimidation in order to win again in the early elections (known as 
“elections with the stick”) of 1912.116 In 1914, the CUP negotiated quotas with the 
Greek and Armenian leaders, and the resulting parliament was more representa-
tive of the different ethnic groups than any previous one, also containing more 
Arab deputies than before.117 Prior to the empire’s entry into the First World War, 
the new Meclis made four changes to the Constitution that can be read as strength-
ening the Chamber of Deputies: it became harder for the Sultan to dissolve the 
chamber, new elections had to be held quicker than previously (four instead of 
six months after a dissolution of parliament), and budget laws were specified to 
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be valid for only one year.118 In February 1915, deputy salaries were more than 
doubled to 50,000 kuruş.119
Things deteriorated quickly with the Ottoman entry into the First World War. 
In what is today considered the beginning of the Armenian Genocide, more than 
200 Armenian intellectuals and community leaders in Istanbul, including four 
current members of the MM, were arrested and deported in April 1915.120
During the war years, the MM continued to work, helping to keep up the appear-
ance of a constitutional regime that had actually been turned into a dictatorship.121 
The session period was shortened again from six to four months, and the chamber 
often merely sanctioned “temporary” laws that had previously been passed by 
the cabinet.122 Some browsing in those years’ minutes conveys the impression of 
business as usual, the subject mostly being budgets of state institutions and minor 
regulations. Moreover, the more political bills betray the chamber’s character as 
a mere accomplice of CUP policies: In 1916, Turkish was made the empire-wide 
compulsory language for business transactions and correspondence of foreign 
companies (such as those running railways, tramways, etc.). Additional changes 
to the Constitution accomplished a strengthening of the central administration: in 
1916, it became easier for the Sultan (by now a puppet of the CUP) to dissolve the 
chamber and harder to dismiss a cabinet.123 Another change made it possible for 
nonresidents to run for deputy of up to three electoral districts.124 
On November 4, 1918, during the first postwar session of the MM, several Greek 
deputies put forward a motion concerning the wartime massacres against Armenians 
and forced deportations against Greeks. During the ensuing debate, however, most 
of the Muslim deputies no longer listened to them.125 At this point, the CUP had 
officially dissolved itself, and the Armistice of Moudros had been signed. From 
November 13, 1918, onward Allied troops started to occupy parts of the country: 
the French occupied Cilicia and the Italians occupied the south-western part of 
Anatolia around Antalya. In May 1919, Greek forces landed in Smyrna/İzmir. 
These landings provoked at first scattered and then more organized resistance on 
the part of the Muslim population, especially in those areas where Muslim refugees 
had been settled in houses of Christian deportees: wartime policies of social engi-
neering now pitted returning survivors against incoming refugees.126
The last Ottoman election in late 1919 was boycotted by Armenians, Greeks, 
and the Liberal Party, and the resulting Meclis was dominated by the movement 
of the “Societies for the Defense of Rights,” a coalition of former CUP mem-
bers and provincial Muslim notables from Anatolia and Thrace. This movement 
held several congresses in 1918 and 1919. The Erzurum (July–August 1919) 
and Sivas (September 1919) congresses elected a preliminary government called 
the “Representative Commission” (Heyet-i Temsiliye). The last MM convened 
in January 1920, adopting the “National Pact,” a document that famously stated 
the territorial claims of the nationalist movement, on January 28, 1920.127 The 
chamber was dissolved in March 1920, following the full Allied military occupa-
tion of Istanbul. At this point, the Heyet-i Temsiliye issued a call for new elec-
tions to a Great National Assembly (Büyük Millet Meclisi, henceforth: BMM) to 
be convened in Ankara. The call explicitly stated that non-Muslims must not be 
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elected to the new parliament, which indeed did not happen.128 It also lowered the 
threshold for electability to the age of 25.129 Eighty-eight former members of the 
MM became part of the BMM, which first convened in Ankara on April 20, 1920. 
The other deputies were representatives of the Societies for the Defense of Rights 
from all over Anatolia and Thrace.
With the BMM (the adjective “Türk” would only be added in February 1921), 
the movement against the Allied occupation and partition of the remains of the 
Ottoman Empire gained a pillar of legitimization whose importance can hardly 
be overstated. Based on the BMM, which claimed to represent the nation (under-
stood as the community of all non-Arab Muslims in the empire), the movement 
could form a government that would, for the next three years, function as a coun-
ter-government to that in Istanbul. The BMM was clearly a continuation of the 
MM insofar as it adopted its internal regulations and, at least theoretically, oper-
ated within the Ottoman constitutional framework. In 1921, it passed a number 
of additions to the Constitution that are considered the embryo of the modern 
Turkish Constitution, famously stating that “sovereignty is vested in the nation 
without any condition.”130 On the other hand, however, the new parliament had 
revolutionary character insofar as its function differed fundamentally from that 
of its predecessors: it was cut off from the other Ottoman constitutional institu-
tions, namely the State Council, the Senate, and the cabinet in Istanbul, which, 
according to the Ankara government, were hostages of the Allied occupation. The 
Ankara governments were formed out of the BMM, which was their sole source 
of legitimacy, and, as there was no new state yet, Mustafa Kemal had himself 
elected President of the parliament in order to legitimize his de facto leadership. 
As a result of this central legitimizing function, the first BMM was much more 
powerful than any of its predecessors (and all successors, too). It initially had 
legislative, judicative, and executive functions, the latter being represented by the 
Ankara governments, which called themselves “government of the (T)BMM.” 
In line with its indispensability, the TBMM sat year-round. Vested with the right 
to draft and pass laws by the MM’s rules and the Ottoman Constitution, and no 
Sultan or Senate to block bills, the BMM was able to pass even such laws that its 
own governments violently opposed. In the following years, the Ankara cabinets 
passed many decrees and other minor legal texts, but anything that was called a 
law had to pass through the BMM. This bottleneck function led to many rather 
serious conflicts between governments and the BMM, especially during the first 
legislative period (1920–1923). A case in point is the 1920 law for the prohibition 
of alcohol.131 The Ankara government opposed the bill due to fiscal concerns – 
alcohol taxes were an indispensable source of revenue – but the chamber never-
theless passed the law.132 It is telling that Ali Şükrü, one of the most prominent 
advocates of that law who later evolved into an important member of the opposi-
tion, was murdered in March 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Paşa’s bodyguard.133
As mentioned above, the BMM theoretically combined legislative and execu-
tive powers. The latter, however, could only be fully implemented over time, and 
with the help of the notorious “independence tribunals” from 1920 onward.134 
Unlike all later TBMMs, the first one of 1920–1923 was really elected by local 
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people, and it was a very “heterogeneous and unruly body” that frequently 
opposed legislation proposed by the government.135 Therefore, the minutes of the 
first legislation period are much more instructive (and more fun to read) than the 
ones dating from later periods. Similar to the late Ottoman MM, the TBMM was 
initially united, but soon split up into two major groups (known as the first and 
second group) that later crystallized into parties. As already in 1912, the main 
point of contention was the role of the state: the first group, which would evolve 
into the People’s Party, favored a strong central state, while the second group 
called for more liberal, accountable and business-friendly policies. Members of 
the second group tended to be from areas that were not under Allied occupation 
(also not from the lost Balkan territories, where most former CUP members hailed 
from), and were more likely to have a liberal profession than a state job.136
The first TBMM was dissolved in 1923, after it had become clear that a major-
ity for the acceptance of the Lausanne Peace Treaty would not be reached.137 The 
ensuing elections were performed according to a new election law (passed in April 
that year) that no longer contained tax requirements for voters and lowered the 
voting age (still only for males) to 18.138 Only three candidates belonging to the 
oppositional “second group” and very few independent candidates were elected 
to the TBMM.139 All others belonged to the newly formed People’s Party (Halk 
Fırkası) led by Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk). Like this, the power of the TBMM 
was brought under control of the People’s Party. In the following three decades, 
there were only two short experiments with oppositional parties in 1924–1925 
and 1930. The period between 1923 and 1946 in Turkey is therefore known as the 
“single-party period.”
Throughout this period, discontent can only rarely be traced through the par-
liamentary minutes. Bills were voted through with only very little or no previous 
deliberation, and the parliament “functioned more as an extension of the execu-
tive than as a real check on the government.”140 Instead, resistance seems to have 
been voiced mostly in two arenas whose minutes are unfortunately unavailable: 
first, the meetings of the parliamentary group of the People’s Party, and second, 
the meetings of the commissions in charge of certain parts of the legislation.141 
There are two other indications of discontent in the TBMM: the first is newspaper 
reports from behind the scenes (which are instructive only until 1925, when the 
oppositional press was closed), and the second is the number of deputies who put 
up passive resistance by voting with their feet.142 The number of deputies actually 
voting was often lower than that of those who were either present, but did not 
bother to vote, or did not show up in the first place.143 The casting of dissenting 
votes was a risky business: according to F. W. Frey, only five deputies who dared 
do so during the single-party period were reelected.144
When the TBMM first convened in April 1920, there were some discussions 
concerning the procedural rules for this new parliament. Deputies were aware 
that the 1914 nizamname of the MM did not fully match the new parliament 
anymore, and therefore decided to task a commission with changing it accord-
ingly.145 It is not entirely clear which articles were changed between 1920 and 
1927. The few changes that were actually recorded concerned very minor points, 
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but surprisingly left issues such as the person of the Sultan and the number of 
commissions untouched.
In the following section, I shall discuss the text of the internal rules of conduct 
(according to the 1914 text) and compare it to the actual procedure followed in the 
parliament. First, I shall point at some obvious but mostly organizational issues. 
Second, I shall study one of the parliament’s most important decisions, namely 
the 1923 alteration of the Basic Law (Teşkilat-i Esasiye Kanunu) which changed 
the form of the Turkish state to a republic, and show in which points the procedure 
followed here deviated from the nizamname. At the end of the paper, I will make 
some remarks concerning the changes made in the 1927 nizamname.
Rules for plenary sessions
Both the 1914 and the 1927 rules mention that plenary sessions were usually open 
to the public, but could be made nonpublic or secret upon a request by at least 
15 deputies or by a minister. Nonpublic sessions were relatively frequent in the 
1920s and especially common when ministers were grilled about possible cases 
of misconduct or corruption. In those nonpublic or secret sessions that I have 
studied, there is a sense of disappointment among the deputies, who had expected 
to hear more, or had anticipated disciplinary consequences that eventually did not 
materialize.146
According to §44 of the 1914 text and §81 of the one from 1927, a plenary 
session was only valid if more than half of the deputies showed up. In both 
public and secret sessions, the chairman would have a list of speakers, and only 
those on the list were allowed to speak. Interruptions were officially illegal, but, 
at least in the TBMM, appear to have been fairly normal: the minutes convey 
the impression of a natural discussion, with frequent short comments being 
made and questions asked to the speakers. (§84 of the 1927 text mentions the 
possibility for deputies to ask the chairman for permission to make short com-
ments). Speakers had to speak from the lectern and were not allowed to speak 
for longer than 15 minutes (so, filibustering was not possible, §48). This rule was 
not applied to government policy statements. (Atatürk’s famous six-day speech 
of 1927, known simply as “the Speech” (Nutuk) in Turkish, was delivered at a 
Party congress.)
As before, bills had to be read twice before they could be voted on, and they 
had to be scrutinized by at least one commission before they could be put to vote. 
The rule introduced in 1877 according to which at least five days needed to pass 
between the first and second reading, in order to allow deputies to contemplate 
the bill, was maintained (§63 in 1914, §76 in 1927). It was possible to declare a 
bill “urgent” and have the assembly vote on that matter. If a bill was approved 
as “urgent,” it could be passed without a second reading. The new rules passed 
in 1927 also mention that the rule could only be changed upon written request 
submitted by the government.
Both nizamnames mention three kinds of voting: open voting by raising hands, 
open voting by calling every single deputy and him shouting “yes,” “no,” or 
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“abstention,” and finally, secret voting, either by name or without it, with colored 
pieces of paper.147 This, too, was a continuation of the 1877 rules.
The most obvious deviation of the TBMM practice from the 1914 nizamname 
is the number of chairmen. Unlike his predecessors in Ottoman times, the official 
TBMM Chairman was also (de facto) state President and head of the government. 
Mustafa Kemal, who was elected to that office in April 1920, clearly was not inter-
ested in chairing the parliament in its day-to-day affairs, preferring to act as a grey 
eminence in the background. (He was more of a night person, and important policy 
decisions were usually anticipated at his rakı table.) He needed the title of parlia-
ment Chairman merely as a source of legitimization for his de facto office of state 
President. Therefore, the three (rather than two) vice chairmen were the de facto 
“real” chairmen until 1923, when Mustafa Kemal became President of the new state.
Commissions and branches
The system of a division into five branches (şubes) of Ottoman times seems to 
have been all but abandoned in 1920: deputies were no longer recorded as mem-
bers of certain branches in roll calls. In 1920, one deputy suggested that branch 
meetings were impossible due to an insufficient number of rooms in the new par-
liament building in Ankara.148 However, in 1923, the purely administrative task 
of checking electoral credentials of new deputies was clearly performed by five 
branches.149
The TBMM also deviated from the nizamname in initially having only 11, 
rather than 15, commissions. According to art. 12 of the nizamname, the 15 per-
manent commissions of 15 members each were to deal with (1) petitions, (2) 
forests, mining, and agriculture, (3) land registry and immovable property, (4) 
postal and telegraph services, trade and industry, taxes and customs, (5) foreign 
affairs, (6) domestic affairs, (7) public health, (8) justice, (9) military affairs, (10) 
religious affairs and pious endowments, (11) financial law, (12) bills, (13) educa-
tion, (14) budget law, and (15) public works.150
The TBMM initially had only 11 commissions, whose members were not 
elected (another violation of the rules) but (according to İhsan Ezherli) simply 
decided by themselves which commission they wanted to join.151 The TBMM 
(at least in this first period) lacked commissions dealing with petitions and with 
budget law. Some other tasks were now named differently (such as “national 
defense commission” instead of “military commission”). Some commissions had 
as few as 5, others as many as 25 members. A commission tasked with drawing 
up a constitution was soon added,152 and a commission for petitions seems to have 
been formed again by 1927.153 According to the 1914 nizamname, all deputies had 
the right to attend all commission (and branch) meetings, and to ask for the docu-
ments considered there.154 The nizamname of 1927 changed this rule by stipulat-
ing that particular ministers or one-third of the commission members could ask 
for closed (so-called “secret”) meetings.155 According to a specification added in 
1947, “secret” meant that any information shared there was supposed to remain 
secret.156
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A case in point: the declaration of the Republic in October 1923
An interesting case in point against which to compare practice to the rules is the 
October 1923 change of the Basic Law (Teşkilat-i Esasiye Kanunu) that officially 
changed the form of state to a republic. This may seem a minor change at first 
sight: after all, the Sultanate had already been abolished in November 1922, and 
the civil authorities of Istanbul had accepted Ankara’s rule in early 1923. That 
said, Turkey had been a monarchy for at least 400 years, and the Sultan still acted 
as the Caliph of Islam, not least because loyalty to him continued to be an impor-
tant pillar of governance in the country. The word “republic” had never been a 
part of nationalist propaganda during the War of Independence, which many peo-
ple had joined simply to get rid of Allied occupation (and their returned former 
Christian neighbors). It therefore does not come as a surprise that an interview 
in late September 1923, in which Mustafa Kemal casually mentioned that the 
time had come to call the state what it was anyway – a republic – caused serious 
opposition in the TBMM. We know from newspaper reports that many deputies 
opposed not so much the idea of a republic itself but that of creating the office of a 
state President whose holder would be able to act much more independently from 
parliament than he previously had as President of the TBMM – one is tempted 
to say: his powers would be reminiscent of those of the Sultans.157 The issue, in 
other words, was that a division of powers was proposed to the parliament that 
was holding them alone and was unwilling to share them.
Mustafa Kemal, whom we must call the de facto, if not de jure President of the 
nascent state, tasked an expert commission that was comprised of several minis-
ters, the parliamentary commission for the Constitution, and several hand-picked 
experts to work out the relevant changes to the constitutional text. He did this 
without even consulting the TBMM. The special commission met in the Ankara 
train station, a point that an oppositional newspaper satirized like this:
As far as we know, republics are born not in train stations, but in national 
assemblies. The only thing that emerges from train stations are – trains. But 
gentlemen like Ağaoğlu Ahmet and Ziya Gökalp [two of the experts, who 
were not deputies] have quite some self-confidence. As far as they are con-
cerned, it is the easiest thing for a train station to produce a republic or a 
constitution, and for a national assembly to produce an express train.158
We know from contemporary newspapers that the proposed changes were also 
discussed in several meetings of the Party group in parliament (which, given that 
almost all deputies were Party members, was almost identical with the General 
Assembly). According to the newspaper reports, many deputies strongly opposed 
the bill in those meetings, and were adamant at refusing to grant constitutional 
rights to the President that were quite similar to those previously enjoyed by the 
Ottoman Sultan. We do not know much more about those meetings, but it is likely 
that some changes were made in order to appease parliamentary opposition within 
the Party. Apparently, opposition was so strong as to suggest that a majority would 
not be found. At this point, Mustafa Kemal saw to it that the government resigned. 
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He basically blackmailed the assembly by only letting them have a competent 
government if they first approved of the republic.159
The bill was brought to the General Assembly on October 29, 1923, as an 
“urgent” bill, meaning that only one consideration was enough and that the text 
did not have to be circulated several days before consideration. (This was in con-
formity with the rules.) The bill included some very serious changes, including 
the stipulation in art. 12 that the Prime Minister (who was to be named by the 
President) could form governments even when the parliament did not sit, and have 
the government approved by the parliament later. Yunus Nadi, the chairman of 
the constitutional committee, rather lamely explained that this “not sitting” merely 
referred to holidays and other short periods of time.160 I think that this point must 
have raised red flags, as it was reminiscent of Sultan Abdülhamit’s “temporary” 
dissolution of the parliament in 1878, which had actually lasted 30 years.
The deputies, however, did not raise this point. Apart from one lone deputy 
who suggested that the presidential election be left to the next assembly, the law 
was voted through, first paragraph by paragraph, and then as a whole (this again 
was in accordance with the rules). What is intriguing, however, is that neither 
the number of deputies present nor their votes were recorded in the minutes (as 
was usually done). According to §105 of the nizamname of 1914, constitutional 
changes had to be supported by at least two-thirds of all deputies (including 
absent ones) for the change to be valid. (The rules passed in 1927 are even clearer 
on this point: one-third of all deputies had to declare their willingness to change 
the Constitution in writing, and the Constitution could only be changed by a two-
thirds majority.)161 It is possible that İsmet (Eker), who was chairing the session 
as second vice president, refrained from performing a roll call because he knew 
that the quorum would not be met. Nobody mentioned the two-thirds majority 
requirement. The law was simply voted on openly, by raising hands. The minutes 
of this session, however, never mention any numbers, merely stating that the “bill 
was accepted unanimously” (müttefikan kabul edilmiştir efendim).162
How many deputies voted for the republic? The total number of deputies elected 
to the second assembly in 1923 was 325, so a two-thirds majority would have 
required 216 or 217 votes.163 Judging from the minutes of other sessions around that 
time, during which votes were counted, it is highly unlikely that even 200 deputies 
bothered to show up. For instance, Mustafa Kemal was elected chamber President 
on August 13, 1923, with 196 of 197 votes cast.164 His election as President of the 
Republic on October 30, 1923 (the day after the suspicious decision concerning the 
republic) was accomplished unanimously with only 159 votes.165 These numbers, 
together with the suspicious non-counting of votes on October 29, 1923, strongly 
suggest that the decision to turn the Ottoman state into a republic was taken in vio-
lation of both the Ottoman Constitution and the TBMM’s internal rules.
For a historian of early Republican Turkey, it is not particularly surprising to 
discover that one of the most important constitutional changes in that country’s 
history was voted on in a fashion that was technically illegal. People lived in revo-
lutionary times, and they were not only aware of it, but said so. Mustafa Kemal 
Paşa said more than once that “the revolution’s law is superior to preexisting 
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legislation.”166 To be sure, the establishment of the TBMM and of a government 
in Ankara in themselves violated the Constitution, and many of the laws issued 
between 1920 and 1923 – such as the one abolishing the Sultanate, issued in 
late 1922 – had revolutionary character. One may well say that that Ottoman 
Constitution was merely an empty shell by 1923, when the republic was declared.
The issue at hand, however, was different in the case of the 1923 vote because 
what was at stake here was not legality, but legitimacy. At least in their own per-
ception, the deputies in the TBMM had started off with very little of the former and 
much of the latter – but they were rapidly losing their legitimacy by 1923, when 
the Independence War had been won and the common enemy had been crushed. If 
the constitutional change of 1923 was indeed made by a chamber that did not meet 
the quorum, this happened not because the deputies wanted a republic but because 
they did not: it was a decision taken by a parliament against itself. The lack of a 
counting of votes strongly suggests that not only the Ottoman Constitution but 
also parliamentary freedom, and thus the internal regulation, were an empty shell, 
too: maintaining its tremendous power only on paper, the parliament had been 
hijacked by its own government, whose decision it could merely sanction, but no 
longer challenge in any meaningful way. In this, the TBMM had started to resem-
ble the wartime MM under CUP rule. Now, however, it was not the government 
that broke the rules, but the parliament itself.
The longue durée approach followed here suggests that, in authoritarian states 
such as inter-war Turkey, there is a direct relationship between the constitutional 
rights of an assembly and the level of violence and threats used against its mem-
bers. The Ottoman Empire, and later Turkey, remained first an autocratic and then 
an authoritarian state throughout the period studied here. During this time, how-
ever, the Chamber of Deputies saw an increase in its constitutional powers, such as 
that to draft and pass laws by itself and pass them on directly to the Sultan (accord-
ing to the 1909 constitutional amendment). This competence was even further 
bolstered when the BMM started to operate without the Sultan, the Senate, and 
the State Council. It is striking that the two earlier Ottoman Chambers of Deputies 
were rather pedestrian institutions that usually played by their own rules, confining 
themselves to criticizing governments and holding debates about important issues. 
This, I argue, is due to their relative insignificance compared to the other consti-
tutional institutions, which broke the rules quite frequently. Once parliamentary 
power increased, however, there was a surge in violence used against deputies, in 
electoral fraud, and eventually, in rule violations by parliament itself. This, I argue, 
was due not to the increase in powers as such but to the relationship between de 
jure and de facto powers of parliament and the importance of parliamentarism for 
the political legitimization of the emerging one-party regime in Turkey.
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A Modern History, new rev. ed. (London: I.B. Tauris; Distributed by St. Martin’s 
Press, 1998). A good selection of articles dealing with the first Ottoman parliament, 
its legal status and the identity of its members is provided in Herzog, Christoph, and 
Malek Sharif, eds., The First Ottoman Experiment in Democracy. Istanbuler Texte 
und Studien 18. (Würzburg: Ergon, 2010).
3 See Butrus Abu-Manneh, “Gülhane, Edict of,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, THREE. 
doi: 10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_27541. For an English translation of the orig-
inal document, see Jacob C. Hurewitz, ed., The Middle East and North Africa in 
World Politics: A Documentary Record, 2nd ed., rev. and enl (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1975), 269–271. I have worked with the transliterated Ottoman 
text in A. Şeref Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Tanzimattan Bugüne Kadar 
(Ankara: Ajans Matbaa, 1957), 3–5.
4 See R. H. Davison, “Tanẓīmāt,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. doi: 10.1163/1573-
3912_islam_COM_1174.
5 See Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript,” Die Welt 
des Islams 34, no. 2 (1994), 173– 203. The underlying principle, known as the circle 
of justice, can be traced back to pre-Islamic empires in Mesopotamia. See Linda T. 
Darling, A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East: The 
Circle of Justice from Mesopotamia to Globalization (London: Routledge, 2013).
6 Hurewitz, The Middle East. The Ottoman original text does not mention individuals, 
but “classes of subjects”: ((N)azarı madalet eseri müşfikanem de müsavi bulunan kaf-
fei sunufı tebeai): Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Tanzimattan, 7.
7 This status of inferiority and protection for Christians and Jews was known as dhimma 
(in Ottoman Turkish: zimmet). See Cl. Cahen, “D̲h̲imma,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, 
2nd ed. doi: 10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_1823.
8 Probably the thorniest area of reform was that of rural taxation. The abolition of tax 
farming, though promised as early as 1839, could not be implemented: see Stanford 
J. Shaw, “The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, no. 4 (1975): 421–459. Attempts at tax 
reform often led to uprisings such as the one 1841 in Niş. See Ahmet Uzun, Tanzimat 
Ve Sosyal Direnişler. Niş İsyanı Üzerine Ayrıntılı Bir İnceleme (1841) (Istanbul: Eren 
Yayıncılık, 2002).
9 The contrast between promise and implementation of reforms was probably most pro-
nounced in eastern Anatolia, where the Ottoman state, having destroyed traditional 
power structures in the 1840s, was unable to maintain law and order. The resulting 
power vacuum was filled by local warlords who often “taxed” the sedentary popula-
tion in addition to regular state taxes. See Nadir Özbek, “The Politics of Taxation 
and the “Armenian Question” during the Late Ottoman Empire, 1876–1908,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 54, no. 4 (2012): 770–797.
10 On the use of Tanzimat rhetoric in petitions, see Attila Aytekin, “Peasant Protest in 
the Late Ottoman Empire: Moral Economy, Revolt, and the Tanzimat Reforms,” 
International Review of Social History 57, no. 2 (2012): 191–227. Masayuki Ueno, 
“‘For the Fatherland and the State’: Armenians Negotiate the Tanzimat Reforms,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES) 45, no. 1 (2013): 93–109.
11 See Şerif Mardin, “Super-Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the 
Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century,” (1974) in Şerif Mardin, Religion, Society, 
and Modernity in Turkey (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 135–163.
12 Virtually all “nationalist” uprisings of the nineteenth century were triggered by very 
non-nationalist, local conflicts. See Ramazan H. Öztan, “Nationalism in Function: 
‘Rebellions’ in the Ottoman Empire and Narratives in Its Absence,” in War and 
Collapse: World War I and the Ottoman State, eds. M. H. Yavuz and Feroz Ahmad 
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2016), 161–202.
242 Ellinor Morack 
13 See Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the 
Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas, Modern intellectual and political history 
of the Middle East (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000); Nazan Çiçek, 
Young Ottomans: Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the Late Nineteenth 
Century, Library of Ottoman Studies 20 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010).
14 To legitimize the idea of parliamentarism, they cited suras 3:159 and 42:38 from the 
Qur’an. Namık Kemal used the Qur’anic verse “and seek their counsel in all affairs” 
from sura 3:159 as the title of one of his most famous articles. For a detailed discus-
sion of his thought, see Mardin, The Genesis of Young, 283–336.
15 Louise Fawcett, “Neither Traditional nor Modern: Constitutionalism in the Ottoman 
Empire and Its Successor States,” Journal of Modern European History 6, no. 1 
(2008): 116–136.
16 On earlier forms of (limited) representative government in cities, see Roderic 
H. Davison, “The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government 
of the Ottoman Empire,” in The Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle 
East. The Nineteenth Century, eds. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers 
(Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 93–108; Nora Lafi, “The 
Ottoman Municipal Reforms between Old Regime and Modernity: Towards a New 
Interpretative Paradigm,” in 1. Uluslararası Eminönü Sempozyumu Tebliğler Kitabı 
- 1st International Symposium on Eminönü the Book of Noticifications (sic), ed. Fatih 
Sadırlı (Istanbul: Eminönü Belediyesi, 2006), 348–355.
17 Davison, “The Advent,” 96.
18 For a discussion of the organic laws for the Armenian, Orthodox, and Jewish com-
munities, as well as other possible sources of inspiration for the Ottoman Constitution 
of 1876, see Aylin Koçunyan, “The Transcultural Dimension of the Ottoman 
Constitution,” in Well-Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History, 
eds. Pascal Firges et al., The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 
235–258.
19 Davison, “The Advent,” 102.
20 B. Lewis et al., “Baladiyya (Turkey),” in Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. doi: 
10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0095.
21 See Stanford Jay Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and 
Modern Turkey: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975/Stanford J. Shaw, Ezel Kural 
Shaw, 1st ed., 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Zürcher, 
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Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History. The Ottoman Empire and its 
Heritage. Boston: Brill, 2014.
Fishman, Louis. “Understanding the 1911 Ottoman Parliament Debate on Zionism in Light 
of the Emergence of a ‘Jewish Question’.” In Late Ottoman Palestine: The Period of 
Young Turk Rule, edited by Yuval Ben-Bassat and Eyal Ginio, 103–124. Library of 
Ottoman Studies 29. London: Tauris, 2011.
Frey, Frederick W. The Turkish Political Elite. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965.
Georgeon, François, ed. ‘L’ ivresse de la liberté’: La révolution de 1908 dans l’Empire 
ottoman. Collection Turcica 17. Paris: Peeters, 2012.
———. Abdülhamid II (1876–1909): Le crépuscule de ‘Empire ottoman. Deuxième 
édition. Biblis 161. Paris: CNRS éditions, 2017.
Goloğlu, Mahmut. Devrimler ve Tepkileri, 1924–1930 [Revolutions and Their 
Repercussions, 1924–1930]. Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1972.
Güneş, İhsan. Türk Parlamento Tarihi. Meşrutiyete Geçiş Süreci: I. ve II. Meşrutiyet: I. 
Cilt [Turkish Parliamentary History. The Period of Transition to Constitutionalism: The 
I. and II. Constitutional Periods: I. Volume]. Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 
Yayınları, 1996.
Hanioglu, M. Ş. “The Commitee of Union and Progress and the 1908 Revolution.” In ‘L’ 
ivresse de la liberté’: La révolution de 1908 dans l’Empire ottoman, edited by François 
Georgeon, 15–27. Collection Turcica 17. Paris: Peeters, 2012.
Hartmann, Elke. Die Reichweite des Staates: Wehrpflicht und moderne Staatlichkeit 
im Osmanischen Reich 1869–1910. Krieg in der Geschichte Band 89. Paderborn: 
Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016.
Herzog, Christoph, and Malek Sharif, eds. The First Ottoman Experiment in Democracy. 
Istanbuler Texte und Studien 18. Würzburg: Ergon, 2010.
Hobsbawm, Eric J. The Age of Revolution. Mentor Book. New York: World Publishing 
Group Co, 1969.
Hurewitz, Jacob C., ed. The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary 
Record, 2. ed., rev. and enl. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975.
İba, Şeref. Osmanlı’dan Günümüze İçtüzük Metinleri [Internal Regulations from Ottoman 
Times to Today]. Ankara: TBMM, 2007.
Jäschke, Gotthard. “Die rechtliche Bedeutung der in den Jahren 1909–1916 vollzogenen 
Abänderungen des türkischen Staatsgrundgesetzes.” Die Welt des Islams 5, no. 3 
(1917): 97–152.
Karal, Enver Z. Osmanlı Tarihi. IX. Cilt. İkinci Meşrutiyet ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1908–
1918) [Ottoman History. IX. Volume. The Second Constitutional Period and the First 
World War (1908–1918)]. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1996.
Karpat, Kemal H. Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and 
Essays. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
———. “The Ottoman Parliament of 1877 and Its Social Significance.” In Kemal H. 
Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays, 
75–89. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
 Ottoman parliamentary procedure  253
———. “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908.” In Kemal H. Karpat, 
Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays, 27–74. 
Leiden: Brill, 2002.
Kaya, Yelda. “A Fissure in ‘Unanimous Democracy’: Parliamentary Contestations over 
Property Rights on Land in Early Republican Turkey.” Middle Eastern Studies 55, no. 4 
(2019): 540–556, doi:10.1080/00263206.2019.1566706
Kayalı, Hasan. “Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1919.” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 3 (1995): 265–286, doi:10.1017/
S0020743800062085
Kévorkian, Raymond H. The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History. London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2011.
Koçunyan, Aylin. “The Transcultural Dimension of the Ottoman Constitution.” In Well-
Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History, edited by Pascal Firges 
et al., 235–258. The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage. Leiden: Brill, 2014.
Koß, M. Parliaments in Time: The Evolution of Legislative Democracy in Western Europe, 
1866–2015. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
Lafi, Nora. “The Ottoman Municipal Reforms Between Old Regime and Modernity: 
Towards a New Interpretative Paradigm.” In 1. Uluslararası Eminönü Sempozyumu 
Tebliğler Kitabı - 1st International Symposium on Eminönü the Book of Noticifications, 
edited by Fatih Sadırlı, 348–355. Istanbul: Eminönü Belediyesi, 2006.
Lévy-Aksu, Noémi, and François Georgeon, eds. The Young Turk Revolution and the 
Ottoman Empire: The Aftermath of 1908. Library of Ottoman Studies 59. London: 
Tauris, 2017.
Lewis, B., R. L. Hill, Ch. Samaran, A. Adam, A. K. S. Lambton, C. C. Davies, M. 
A.Zaki Badawi, and J. Prins. “Baladiyya (Turkey).” In Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. 
doi:10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0095
Mardin, Şerif. The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of 
Turkish Political Ideas. Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East. 
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000.
———. “Super-Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of 
the Nineteenth Century.” In Şerif Mardin, Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey, 
135–163. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006.
Matossian, Bedross D. “From Bloodless Revolution to Bloody Counterrevolution: The 
Adana Massacres of 1909.” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 2 (2011): 152–173. 
doi:10.1353/gsp.2011.0123
———. Shattered Dreams of Revolution. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014.
Mertoğlu, M. Suat. “Yusûf Ziyâ el-Hâlidî.” In TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi 44, 32–34. 
Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi (İSAM), 2013. https :/ /is 
laman siklo pedis i .org .tr /y usuf- ziya- el -ha lidi
Morack, Ellinor. “The Ottoman Greeks and the Great War: 1912–1922.” In The World 
During the First World War, edited by Helmut Bley and Anorthe Kremers, 213–228. 
Essen: Klartext, 2014.
———. The Dowry of the State? The Politics of Abandoned Property and Nation-Building 
in Turkey, 1921–1945. Bamberger Orientstudien 9. Bamberg: Bamberg University 
Press, 2017.
Moroni, Ileana. “Continuity and Change in the 1909 Constitutional Revision: An Ottoman 
Imperial Nation Claims Its Sovereignty.” In The Young Turk Revolution and the 
Ottoman Empire: The Aftermath of 1908, edited by Noémi Lévy-Aksu and François 
Georgeon, 265–317. Library of Ottoman Studies 59. London: B. Tauris, 2017.
254 Ellinor Morack 
Okutan, M. Ç. Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları [The Policies Towards Minorities 
During the Single-Party Era]. 1. baskı. İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları Siyaset 
Bilimi 9. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004.
Olgun, Kenan. 1908–1912 Osmanlı Meclis-i Mebusanı’nın Faaliyetleri ve Demokrasi 
Tarihimizdeki Yeri [The Activities of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies 1908–1912 
and its Significance for Our History of Democracy]. Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve 
Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, 2008.
———. “Türkiye’de Cumhuriyetin İlanından 1950’ye Genel Seçim Uygulamaları.” [The 
Implementation of General Elections from the Proclamation of the Republic to 1950] 
Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi 27, no. 79 (2011): 1–36.
Özbek, Nadir. “The Politics of Taxation and the ‘Armenian Question’ During the Late 
Ottoman Empire, 1876–1908.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 54, no. 4 
(2012): 770–797.
Öztan, Ramazan H. “Nationalism in Function: "Rebellions" in the Ottoman Empire and 
Narratives in Its Absence.” In War and Collapse: World War I and the Ottoman State, 
edited by M. H. Yavuz and Feroz Ahmad, 161–202. Salt Lake City: University of Utah 
Press, 2016.
Polk, William R., and Richard L. Chambers, eds. The Beginnings of Modernization in the 
Middle East. Nineteenth Century. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1968.
Sadırlı, Fatih, ed. 1. Uluslararası Eminönü Sempozyumu Tebliğler Kitabı - 1st International 
Symposium on Eminönü the Book of Noticifications (sic). Istanbul: Eminönü Belediyesi, 
2006.
Shaw, Stanford J. “The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System.” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, no. 4 (1975): 421–459, doi:10.1017/
S0020743800025368
Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel K. Shaw. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: 
The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975 / Stanford J. Shaw, Ezel Kural Shaw, 1st ed. 
2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
Sohrabi, Nader. “Global Waves, Local Actors: What the Young Turks Knew About Other 
Revolutions and Why It Mattered.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 44, 
no. 1 (2002): 45–79, doi:10.1017/S0010417502000038
TBMM Basın ve Halkla İlişkiler Müdürlüğü. “TBMM Albümü 1920–2010: 1. Cilt 1920–
1950.” [Deputy Album of the Turkish Great National Assembly 1920–2010] Accessed 
March 19, 2013. http: / /www .tbmm .gov. tr /TB MM _Al bum /C ilt1/ index /html 
Toledano, Ehud R. Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East. Seattle [u.a.]: 
University of Washington Press, 1998.
Tunaya, Tarık Z. Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler: I. İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi 1908–1918 
[Political Parties in Turkey: I. The Second Constitutional Period 1908–1918], 2nd ed. 
İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984.
Tunçay, Mete. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması: 1923–1931 
[The Establishment of Single-Party Rule in the Republic of Turkey: 1923–1931]. 
Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1981.
Ueno, Masayuki. “‘For the Fatherland and the State’: Armenians Negotiate the Tanzimat 
Reforms.” International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES) 45, no. 1 (2013): 93–
109, doi:10.1017/S0020743812001274
Uzun, Ahmet. Tanzimat ve Sosyal Direnişler. Niş İsyanı Üzerine Ayrıntılı Bir İnceleme 
(1841) [The Tanzimat and Social Resistance. A Detailed Study of the Niş Uprising 
(1841)]. Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 2002.
 Ottoman parliamentary procedure  255
Yavuz, M. H., and Feroz Ahmad, eds. War and Collapse: World War I and the Ottoman 
State. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2016.
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Though democracy was on the banners of all Russian revolutions, the resulting 
regimes stubbornly drifted in an authoritarian direction, producing weak judici-
aries and weak legislatures. Constitutional reforms in Russia – in 1906, 1936, 
and 1993 – faded again and again into token democracies, where elections – a 
cornerstone of democracy – took place, while constitutional liberties were praised 
in theory but violated in practice. I suggest here my interpretation of the nominal 
nature of democratic institutions under Stalinism – elections, a constitution, sovi-
ets, and the Supreme Soviet – focusing on the Constitution of 1936 but placing it 
in a larger national and historical context.
In June 1936, the draft of the new Soviet Constitution was published for public 
discussion. It announced that the USSR was becoming a nonantagonistic socialist 
society and, accordingly, it canceled restrictions on voting rights and introduced 
universal suffrage, a secret ballot, separation of powers, an open judicial process, 
and the right of the accused to a defense. It declared freedom of the press, the 
right to assemble, and the inviolability of the individual, housing, and correspond-
ence. In view of the Bolsheviks’ previous fixation on class struggle, this liberal, 
inclusive law was an unexpected swing in official policy. This turn to democracy, 
which nobody had demanded, was interpreted by historians in various ways: as 
fake, as a retreat from I. V. Stalin’s model of socialism, or as an intended but 
unrealized democratic reform.2 Not only the Stalinist version of democracy but 
Soviet socialism as a whole was treated by many scholars as fictitious, as specta-
cle, simulation, imitation, self-representation, virtual reality, simulacrum,3 or an 
instrument of social mobilization. M. Mamardashvili discussed the hyperreality 
of Soviet life; E. Dobrenko, socialism as representation; and E. Schulmann, the 
problem of dormant institutions when speaking about modern Russia.4 Thus, the 
dilemma of duality – the discrepancy between self-presentation and practice that 
pervaded all of Soviet and Russian life – is recognized by scholars who try to 
make sense of it from various perspectives. I argue here that the intentional decep-
tion explanation of the duality phenomenon does not always work. The sources 
of the nominal nature of the Soviet Constitution of 1936 and of Soviet democracy 
included other things: the ontological dichotomy between the representation and 
the reality of Russian life, pressure from traditional sociocultural practices that 
confronted the modernizing project with its legal culture, the Bolsheviks’ way of 
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thinking, and a perceived urgency for social transformation that was unfavorable 
for democracy.
The secret internal communications of the leaders show that the government 
introduced the new Constitution to achieve international, ideological, and politi-
cal goals.5 The conventional explanation stresses that the Constitution was a 
propagandistic trick designed for external use: to impress the West, which was 
experiencing economic crisis, with the alternative of socialism, and to enhance 
the Soviet Union’s reputation among Western democracies and attract allies. New 
documents show that international factors did play a role, but they were secondary 
to domestic goals. Among the domestic political goals was the managerial goal of 
improving the effectiveness of government and its ability to exert control through 
a new election law – using democratic procedures to motivate, revitalize, remove, 
and to purge sluggish, corrupt, unreliable officials.6
Here, I suggest looking once again, and very rigorously, at the ideological 
reason for a new Constitution7 – the attainment of socialism – often degraded by 
historiography as pure deception and propaganda. But internal communications 
convey that the leaders took very seriously the dictum of the attainment of social-
ism and the “new order of classes.” The Stalinist vision of achieved socialism and 
a transformed society explains why the idea of election reform with the enfran-
chisement of former enemies arose in 1933–1935 and soon led to an entirely new 
constitution.
Lenin’s and Stalin’s views of democracy and socialism
Socialism belonged to a metanarrative that structured the Revolution, the policies 
of War Communism, the socialist offensive, and the five-year plans, even though 
it often challenged the Bolsheviks’ positions in power. When Stalin launched the 
socialist offensive in 1928, he projected socialism as the result of a five-year plan. 
In this, he followed V. I. Lenin’s plan of building socialism, elaborated in “State 
and Revolution” and later articles. Lenin envisioned socialism as democratic, but 
in a specific form and not attained all at once. He saw the soviets as a new form of 
popular majoritarian democracy in opposition to liberal European democracy with 
its concern for minority rights. In the USSR, directly elected local soviets sent 
delegates to periodic congresses of soviets at various levels, and since 1937 the 
Supreme Soviet was elected directly. The USSR Supreme Soviet was the highest 
legislative organ in the country (its Presidium acted as such between its sessions), 
with the Council of People’s Commissars serving as an executive body.8
While imagining a proletarian, or socialist, democracy representing the 
majority of the working people in the future socialist state, Lenin reserved a 
severe critique for bourgeois parliamentarism. He asserted that bourgeois parlia-
mentary democracy’s claims of popular sovereignty were deceptive because real 
power was exercised behind the scenes by the capitalist bourgeoisie due to tricks 
with the legislatures.9 While Lenin’s skepticism about parliamentary democ-
racy partially reflected his Machiavellianism, such views were not rare among 
the contemporary left in Europe who were disillusioned with “parliamentary 
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governments [that] failed to address the crises” associated with the First World 
War.10 Theoreticians concur that the parliamentary systems were poorly 
equipped to work effectively in emergency situations that require quick deci-
sions. To bourgeois parliamentarianism meant “for the minority,” Lenin con-
traposed electoral and representative institutions for the majority in the future 
socialist democracy.
However, democracy would not be introduced in full immediately after the 
Revolution. Following Karl Marx, Lenin demanded a temporary restriction of 
democracy by the dictatorship of the proletariat, first of all, to suppress the resist-
ance of the exploitative classes. The dictatorship of the proletariat was seen as a 
transitional revolutionary measure in the name of the majority until the founda-
tions of a socialist economy and a new society could be created. The delay in 
introducing a full-fledged democracy and the rule of law was the Bolsheviks’ 
practice under conditions of a revolutionary “state of emergency,” as Giorgio 
Agamben called it. Second, the dictatorship of the proletariat would provide 
time to educate workers, to prepare them for their new roles in administering 
the socialist society, and to indoctrinate society in socialist values. This implied 
that the Russian population was not yet literate or mature enough for full democ-
racy. But Stalinists liked to repeat Lenin’s point that “the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat would already be more ‘democratic’ than any European parliamentary 
democracy because it would rule in the interests of the overwhelming majority 
(laborers – OV), whereas European democracies ruled in the interests of the 
bourgeoisie.”11
Lenin’s plan formed the foundation of Stalin’s policy of building a socialist 
economy, fomenting cultural revolution, focusing the second five-year plan on 
creating a classless society. At the Eighth Congress of Soviets in 1936, the dicta-
tor praised the growth of the new working class and the creation of new cadres 
of intelligentsia, and emphasized the new nature of the kolkhoz (collective farm) 
peasantry,12 thus implying that the new soviet public is socialist and loyal now 
that “exploitative elements have been eliminated.” Purges of society of exploita-
tive (petty) bourgeois elements and former people were an integral part of this 
concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Such a paradoxical view of democracy (as a dictatorship at the beginning) 
was further modified and even deformed in the USSR in the peculiar way that 
I describe here. While we see an attempt at democratic socialist governance in 
the early Soviet state, it was gradually curtailed in the soviets,13 factory com-
mittees,14 and public organizations, and by establishing a one-party system. 
Historians attribute the failure of the Soviet democratic transition to various fac-
tors: both the catastrophic circumstances themselves15 and the leaders’ percep-
tions of threat; in Erik Van Ree’s view, because Lenin’s radical and opportunistic 
view of democracy was flawed from the start;16 the Bolsheviks’ “deep-seated 
preference for centralization”; the insufficiency of democratic traditions, liter-
acy and legal culture in the country; and Stalin’s personal role. The Bolsheviks’ 
Realpolitik adjusted the ideal of democracy to circumstances on the ground and 
at the top.
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Discourse of democracy in the mid-1930s
After the “successful” implementation of industrialization, collectivization, 
and cultural revolution, at the Seventeenth Party Congress, Stalin announced 
that Lenin’s plan of constructing socialism had been realized. Consequently, in 
1935–1936, we see some moderation in policies justified by having achieved 
socialism. The reform of the Constitution was a part of this larger discourse of 
moderation and democratization in political, economic, judicial, and ideological 
developments in 1933–1936, including the move to legal reform and the lower 
tide in repressions. The moderation of policy17 stems from two different govern-
ment contexts: sometimes it was a pragmatic adjustment or ad hoc correction after 
the “excesses” of collectivization (Realpolitik); at other times – on the level of 
metadiscourse – the relaxation was motivated by the expectation of the advent of 
socialism in accordance with Lenin’s plan.
The Constitution belonged to this metadiscourse, evident in a retreat from class 
rhetoric and a shift toward the new discourse of democracy and even parliamen-
tarism. The members of the Constitutional Drafting Commission studied foreign 
constitutions very seriously: they consulted the texts of constitutions and elec-
toral laws from England, Belgium, Poland, Germany, Norway, Czechoslovakia, 
and Switzerland, and the text of the French “Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen” (1789). These internal consultations proved genuine interest 
rather than public relations theater. The scrupulous work of the Constitutional 
Commission while preparing the draft in 1935–1936 leads Samantha Lomb to the 
important conclusion that “these [civil] rights were so carefully crafted because 
they were not simply propaganda but real programs the state sought to imple-
ment.”18 We do not know the details of the discussions in the Commission and 
sub-commissions’ meetings because they were not stenographed. But later M. I. 
Kalinin recognized publicly that the new Soviet election system would resemble 
the French one.19 V. M. Molotov in Pravda, November 30, 1936, stated: “All 
the best in the democratic systems of other states we brought in and added to 
our Constitution to apply to the conditions of the Soviet state.”20 At the Seventh 
Congress of Soviets on February 6, 1935, Molotov, after repeating Lenin’s cri-
tique, used the term “parliament” in relation to the Soviet organs: 
All the best in parliamentarianism – direct, equal, and secret elections of rep-
resentatives to the organs of state government with universal participation of 
all working people, as our Constitution demands, all these should be realized 
now in the Soviet Union. Thus, we have the further development of the soviet 
system in the form of a combination of the directly elected local soviets with 
a kind of (svoego roda) directly elected Soviet parliaments in the [union] 
republics and all-union Soviet parliament.21
After the first meeting of the Commission on July 7, 1935, the newspapers 
Pravda, Izvestia, Komsomol’skaia pravda, Economicheskaia zhisn’, and the jour-
nal Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo started publishing articles about Western and 
Japanese constitutions. The articles’ major propagandistic goal was to present the 
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“unsightly background of bourgeois constitutionalism” and the “degeneration of 
Western parliamentarianism.” All the authors displayed profound contempt for 
either democratic, fascist, or monarchical constitutionalism by means of scorn 
and irony. They emphasized the function of European parliaments as masking 
the bourgeois dictatorship in democratic wrapping. They described restrictions of 
voting rights for women and the military, as well as residency and income quali-
fications. The articles on the European constitutions on the pages of Pravda jux-
taposed descriptions of the hard life of working people under these constitutions 
to contrast the written rights with actual conditions.22 In 1935–1936, the four-
volume collection The Constitutions of Bourgeois Countries was published.23 In 
Prosecutor A. Ia. Vyshinskii’s article, accompanying the publication of “[t]he 
Statute on the Elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR” in July 1937, the 
critique of bourgeois constitutionalism received more detailed and expansive 
development with references to foreign juridical literature.24 These public refer-
ences to the Western constitutions, in-house examination of their models in the 
Commission, and the straightforward use of the word “parliament” in relation to 
the Soviet legislature was a shift. It tells us about the organizers’ self-confidence 
and their belief that “the time had come to move to a full Soviet democracy.”25 It 
seems they did not fear that such publications would make the readers compare 
the suppression of civil rights in Europe and in the USSR. The public, curious 
about Western democracies, accepted these publications with noticeable inter-
est. People appreciated European freedoms and often compared them to Soviet 
ones. In these highly ideological articles, the attentive reader might notice that 
even under “degenerative democracy,” multiple workers’ and peasants’ parties 
existed in Europe and monarchical Japan, and they could find striking similarities 
between the political systems of fascist Italy and the Soviet Union. Workers talk-
ing in 1937 said: “We have no democracy; our democracy is fake; any bourgeois 
country has more democracy than the USSR.”26
Why was the democratic constitution introduced?
In the mid-1930s, in both public and confidential settings, the Party leaders – I. 
V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, G. G. Iagoda, and A. S. Enukidze – repeatedly declared 
that the goals of the great socialist offensive had been largely achieved – in the 
economy and in the social and class structure. According to Stalin’s Marxism, as 
soon as the economic base had been transformed through the five-year plan and 
collectivization, it should almost automatically reshape society. Granting demo-
cratic liberties and voting rights to the former “enemies” in 1936 grew from the 
Marxist maxim that the new socialist relations of production, combined with edu-
cation, propaganda, and appropriate “cleansings” of society would shape a new 
consciousness and a new Soviet unity of “friendly classes” and nationalities.
As a result, direct, equal, and universal elections by secret ballot – a core of the 
participatory direct democracy envisioned by Lenin in full-fledged socialism – was 
introduced by the 1936 Constitution, which ended the disfranchisement of former 
people, kulaks, and priests – 2.5 percent of the voters, according to Molotov.27 
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Other liberties granted by the Constitution were in line with an understanding of 
the new conditions in the country as socialist. Therefore, the new Supreme Soviet 
replaced the earlier Congress of Soviets as the supreme legislative body. The USSR 
Supreme Soviet was supposed to be elected in December 1937 with multiple can-
didates according to the new rules. The 1936 Constitution finalized and celebrated 
the ideological program of building socialism and announced a shift to democracy.
The Stalinists’ wishful thinking projected socialism as being real. In 1936, 
Stalin and the government were sincere in their belief.28 Ideological dogma, men-
tal filters, and tailored information that they received distorted their perception of 
reality. Their aspirations for the future and their proclivity to see the present as 
it ought to be – representing the future as if it were already here – contributed to 
their wishful thinking. The writer M. M. Prishvin in his diary from 1950 dissected 
this kind of worldview:
To the question about the number of prisoners in the USSR, [his] answer 
was: whatever the number, it doesn’t make a difference. … Stalin is right, of 
course … when he declares we don’t have prisoners. He believes in commu-
nism so firmly that he sees the current situation with prisoners as temporary 
and insignificant; he believes in free speech so firmly that he degrades the 
current censorship: it will pass away soon [anyway].29 
J. Arch Getty explains:
The objective realities of the 1930s were perhaps not as important as the 
Bolsheviks’ perceptions of them, not least because the Bolsheviks acted on 
their perceptions. Like all politicians, the Bolsheviks interpreted their world 
and created representations of it that were, for them, reality.30 
How earnestly the Stalinists took these anticipated transformations is seen in top-
secret internal communications and in their practical steps toward a new soci-
ety: the new Constitution’s enfranchisement of “former people”; the intended 
shift in OGPU (Joint State Political Directorate) methods (from extrajudicial 
repressions in favor of legality, surveillance, and prophylactics, though barely 
realized); permission in 1936 for previously distrusted Cossacks to serve in the 
Red Army. More, they expanded welfare, and in the hungry years of 1936–1937 
directed food aid to the peasants now “converted” into kolkhozniks (contrasting 
with the treatment of peasants as saboteurs during the 1932 famine). All these 
steps relaxed the official policy toward the groups of the population seen earlier 
as enemies. Practical implementation of the Constitution was contested elections 
by secret ballot held in the Party and trade unions in the spring and summer 
1937 with up to 70 percent rotation of cadres. Discussing this innovation, Wendy 
Goldman asks:
Was Stalin’s invocation of democracy simply a smoke screen? … Was it a 
cynical ploy by Stalin and his supporters to strengthen and centralize power 
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by inciting the rank and file against their regional leaders? Or was it part of a 
genuine belief that the Party could be purged of oppositionists and revitalized 
at the same time? 
She answers: “Democracy was not peripheral, not a smoke screen, not a collection 
of meaningless slogans designed to mask the ‘real’ meaning of events.”31
Then, if in 1936 the Constitution was not a deception, why at some moment in 
1937 did it turn out to be a sham? Why were its norms broken and extralegal mass 
repressions begun? Let’s look at Stalin’s shift, first in the short term and then in 
the long term.
Why did the Constitution turn out to be a sham?
The outcome of the state-sponsored popular discussion of the Constitution in the 
summer and fall of 1936 dashed the high hopes of Stalin that society had been 
successfully transformed. Besides the mobilizational, integrational, educational, 
and legitimization functions of the discussion,32 I would like to draw readers’ 
attention to its monitoring function. Organizers were very persistent in gathering 
information on the popular comments and they reprimanded lackluster cadres for 
nonreporting. The USSR TsIK33 collected 43,000 comments, plus copious reports 
went to Party leaders from newspapers, localities, the NKVD (Soviet security 
and intelligence body), as well as personal letters. Prishvin assumed in his diaries 
that the discussion had become a kind of test for Sovietness, after which freedom 
would be allowed: “[The government] … expects real hosannas [praise] … from 
the people, and then, after they [the government] are confident of the genuineness 
of the hosannas, [they will] say, … Speak, write whatever you want freely.”34
However, the unexpected reactions of society to the Constitution brought disil-
lusionment to its organizers, who anticipated unanimous support from the alleg-
edly Sovietized society. The popular clamor for civil rights and support ‒ real 
and orchestrated ‒ for the innovations of the Constitution contrasted with mass 
discontent, disapproval of the new liberties, warnings about numerous enemies, 
and demands for the continued segregation of “former people.” On top of that, the 
public, especially peasants, complained about scarcity, excessive taxes, bureau-
cratic arbitrariness, and the disruption of religious freedoms. Threats of anti-Com-
munist uprisings in case of war, condemnations of the kolkhozy, and distrust in 
the Constitution were recorded in the reports from different agencies as “anti-
Soviet moods.” The expansion of the franchise (got 10.8 percent of all recorded 
comments) met extremely articulate opposition – against the enfranchisement of 
“former people,” kulaks, clergy, and individual farmers. Arguing with Stalin’s 
programmatic thesis that all classes had become socialist and friendly, many 
commentators warned about resilient anti-Soviet attitudes among the population: 
“Former merchants, kulaks, and other exploiters have not yet transformed them-
selves and forgotten their former wealth. During elections they can propagate their 
views and attract unstable, hesitant citizens. Former people should be restricted 
in their rights.” “In the future war, priests may betray the socialist fatherland.”35 
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There were numerous fears among the public that old enemies – especially for-
mer kulaks and priests – could use the new constitutional liberties and suffrage 
to obstruct the construction of socialism. Tellingly, it is exactly these two groups 
that became the first targets of mass operations against commoners in 1937. These 
warnings about enemies came now from various sources: in addition to the regular 
OGPU–NKVD svodki (summaries) on popular moods, the USSR TsIK collected 
materials from the soviets, localities, and newspapers. After reading an article by 
the TsIK secretary I. A. Akulov, in Izvestia, summarizing the comments, a British 
intelligence analyst concluded: “Akulov would have us believe that the bulk of 
public opinion is unwilling to accept so ‘liberal’ a Constitution, and would pre-
fer to see the paternal government endowed with more effective powers for the 
suppression of dangerous thoughts.”36 We know from Stalin’s discussion of the 
popular comments at the Eighth Congress of Soviets that he picked up the same 
kind of message.37
Worse, two months later, Stalin received another sobering piece of informa-
tion: results of the 1937 Census showed that society lagged behind the expected 
progress already acclaimed on the eve of the census.38 Illiteracy had not been 
completely overcome, religiosity remained high (57 percent claimed to be believ-
ers), and population growth was below extrapolated numbers. The results were so 
discouraging that the census data was suppressed and the statisticians paid with 
their lives for figures that dissatisfied the government.39
First, the popular commentaries on the Constitution and, second, the results 
of the 1937 Census revealed to Stalin the lack of progress in society and made 
him change his mind. Stalin’s protracted conflict with regional Party–state clans40 
and the inflammatory role of the new NKVD head N. I. Ezhov provides the back-
ground for his change of heart. On top of that, several developments during the 
winter of 1936–1937 could have influenced Stalin’s reversal in views on soci-
ety and politics. International developments – the insurgence of the opposition in 
Spain and the November 1936 German–Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact – height-
ened Stalin’s fears and insecurity. His internalization of the popular discussion 
of the Constitution can provide the missing piece in the puzzle explaining why 
relative moderation ended and mass repressions began. Only then, in the winter 
of 1936, did the Constitution become a sham. The 1937 February–March Central 
Committee Plenum of the VKP(b) (the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)) 
made clear that Stalin had changed his mind and moved toward repressions against 
masses.41 Following purges in the military in June 1937, operations against believ-
ers and tserkovniki (derogative name for priests), and then kulaks and anti-Soviet 
elements began in the summer of 1937 as a “final blow” to potentially disloyal 
sectors of the population.
Thus, the Constitution was not an intentional trick from the very beginning. 
We never find in the leaders’ internal communications on the Constitution, now 
available in the archives, any suggestions to declare one thing but do another 
thing. Instead, a perceived conflict between paradigmal expectations of trium-
phant socialism and the need to deal with the “imperfections” on the ground ren-
dered the Constitution pro forma.
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The 1936 failed shift to democracy was not the first. A. Medushevskii stresses 
the continuity of sham constitutionalism in twentieth-century Russia: in the 
Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire of 1906, the Soviet Constitutions of 
1918, 1924, 1936, 1977, and in the 1993 Constitution.42 Here, he follows Max 
Weber’s view about the token nature of the 1906 reform, exemplified in the crea-
tion of the Duma, which did not effectively constrain the monarchy. Reform was 
seen by Weber more as the product of difficult circumstances and the disinterest 
of society in liberalism rather than of the Russian people’s “immaturity for con-
stitutional government.”43 We see a certain zigzag pattern in history when both 
Nicholas II and Stalin, under very different circumstances, introduced freedoms 
but then withdrew or emasculated them.
Nominal Soviet institutions
The case of Stalin’s Constitution is the most striking, but examples of the nomi-
nal, pro forma character of democracy in Soviet Russia are abundant: soviets, 
trade unions, “the active Soviet public (obshchestvennost’),” the state-sponsored 
popular discussion of the Constitution,44 etc. The soviets were gradually stripped 
of their decision-making power and redefined as organs of local administration.45 
Decisions were taken in the Party’s Central Committee or Politburo but published 
under the name of the USSR TsIK. In the countryside, pressure and tutelage from 
the authorities, and the promotion of the poor and the Communists in soviet elec-
tions – all of these caused distrust and kept the villagers away from the soviets. Low 
participation in 1924 led to the cancellation of results in 40 percent of rural local 
elections. To keep the kulaks out of the soviets, the state directive from September 
1926 expanded the constituency of the disenfranchised, but despite that, due to 
“unsatisfactory” results – the election of kulaks – authorities had to cancel them 
in many places. Finally, in the winter of 1927–1928, the Politburo postponed 
elections to the soviets for a year because of the peasants’ rage.46 Apart from the 
soviets, a number of agencies were organized by the state – officially, to represent 
the interests of the peasants: cooperatives, committees of peasants’ mutual aid 
(KKOV), and credit funds, but in reality they promoted the exploitative interests 
of the state rather than the interests of the peasants. Villagers protested: “The 
soviets and the Communist Party do not express the interests of the peasants.” 
“Neither committees of the poor, nor KKOVs satisfy us, middle peasants.”47 But 
the Party incessantly tried to “revive” the lifeless soviets and inculcated control-
lable proxies. The power levers of competing peasant communes, including their 
budgets, were shifted to the soviets and finally the communes, the countryside’s 
last independent institution, were abolished in 1930.
“The active Soviet public” (sovetskaia obshchestvennost’), like workers’ and 
peasants’ correspondents,48 among others, was cultivated in the place of civil soci-
ety for which all possible venues, such as cafés, printing presses, and associations, 
were barred. The trade unions, initially active in political and economic participa-
tion, in 1921–1922 were made responsible for mobilizing workers for production 
tasks and were allowed only “to correct blunders and excesses resulting from 
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bureaucratic distortions of the state apparatus.”49 Simon Pirani describes the pro-
cess of curtailing the workers’ democracy in 1922–1923, gradually confining 
it to secondary questions. Unions were “involved in implementing rather than 
making decisions.” The initial workers’ democracy was substituted by political 
mobilization campaigns where “workers were consigned to a supportive, passive 
role.” It was a kind of social contract: workers publicly displayed their support 
in organized street demonstrations and orchestrated meetings, donation and state 
loan campaigns in exchange for some privileges, higher rations, and opportunities 
for promotion.50 Effective here was the state mechanism of sponsoring pseudo 
organizations, artificial and under Party control, substituting live and organic 
agencies: the Orthodox Church by the Renovationist branch, independent peasant 
unions and peasant communes by the KKOVs and rural soviets, artistic and public 
organizations of the 1920s by the state-sponsored unions of writers, artists, etc. 
The tools of taming were substitution, repression, propaganda, infiltration,51 and 
splitting (razlozhenie) from the inside. When and to what degree these policies 
were conscious and intentional is a difficult question. But in the case of splinter-
ing the Peasant Union movement and the Orthodox Church hierarchy, the OGPU 
destroyed them very purposefully and consciously.52
However, sometimes it was self-delusion. The leaders believed in the power 
of socialist conditions and “Party enlightenment” to shape society. In 1917, Lenin 
did not see the public in Russia as being mature enough for full democracy or 
able to intelligently participate politically. Following Marx and in the state of 
emergency during the Civil War, Bolsheviks limited democracy to the dictator-
ship of the proletariat to discipline the soviets, electors, factory committees, and 
the press53 to behave in required ways under close Party scrutiny and backed up 
by terror. The immediate need to hold power took preeminence over the demo-
cratic ideal – Lenin and then Stalin got a taste of centralization and state violence 
as a quicker way to transform society in a time of perceived emergency and they 
delayed democracy. Besides economic transformation, they announced the need 
to enlighten the public and shape its socialist values, to purge enemies, and only 
then grant society freedom, as Stalin did in 1936. But his illusion of successful 
Sovietization of society was short-lived.
The form and content dichotomy
After a review of the specific circumstances of 1936–1937 and why the 
Constitution was not fully implemented in practice, I move now to consider 
the long-term factors that underlie the persistent Soviet pattern of democratic 
form without content. The overarching context was the dichotomy in Russian 
life. Indeed, well recognized in historiography, the conflict between the state 
modernization drive and traditionalist society is a part of this dichotomy. Old, 
informal norms and practices, rooted in the legacy of a traditionalist society,54 
often competed with formal legal structures and official ambitions. The political 
system was permeated by this duality: the turn to legality in the 1934–1936 legal 
reform contrasted with the continuation of extralegal practices; the freedom of 
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conscience declared in all Soviet constitutions contrasted with religious perse-
cution; the figurative power system of the soviets was paralleled by the actual 
power of the Party – the Supreme Soviet remained a token organ that did little 
more than approve decisions already made by the Politburo, and its ordinary 
deputies performed the role of political marionettes. Idealistic socialist realism 
perfectly expressed this dichotomy. The gap between the government’s inten-
tions and their realization contributed to dualism that, from the outside, was 
seen as political zigzags or deception. We observe multidirectional and mean-
dering policies throughout the interwar period: (1) a tactical retreat from War 
Communism to the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921; (2) cancellation of 
the NEP in 1928 and resumption of a socialist program; (3) Stalin’s article 
“Dizziness from Successes” in March 1930; and (4) the unexpected liberalism 
of the 1936 Constitution and then the turn to mass repression. Such consistent 
inconsistency cannot be attributed solely to personal whims or the dishonesty of 
the leaders or revolutionary chaos. The cause of such duality was fundamental 
and structural. Such radical policy changes resulted from the incompatibility of 
the Bolsheviks’ utopian ambitions with the pressures of reality. The resulting 
strains were aggravated by voluntarism,55 maladministration, the dogmatism and 
intransigence of the leadership, and the breakneck speed of transformation. Not 
only Soviet constitutionalism but also Stalinism as a whole was so contradictory 
because policymakers were guided by the socialist ideal, yet at the same time had 
to cope with the “imperfections” they saw on the ground ‒ a backward popula-
tion and economy, unmanageable local officials, and a frightening international 
environment. Implementing the socialist project, speculative and detached from 
reality, too often caused unexpected and unintended results (like mass migration 
after collectivization) that required adjustments, which in turn produced zigzags 
and multidirectional politics (like legal reform in 1934–1936 and simultaneous 
extralegality in urban purges).
The supremacy of representation in the construction of Soviet social reality 
was not entirely new. It had old historical roots. Since Peter the Great, Russia had 
“pretended to be something it was not.”56 Alexander Sokurov ponders Russian 
preoccupation with the theatricalization of reality back to the eighteenth cen-
tury in his movie Russian Ark. With the tradition of Potemkin villages and a 
historical pattern of simulating European civilization,57 Stalin’s socialism-build-
ing belonged to just such a “catch-up discourse” and compensation for “the old 
Russian trauma of inadequacy vis-à-vis Europe.”58 Evgeny Dobrenko highlights 
the purely representational character of socialism as a whole in his retrospective 
of an older Russian proclivity toward representationalism at the expense of real-
ism. The advent of socialism in 1936 belonged to discursive accomplishments, 
described as “the spectacle of socialism” by Dobrenko, and as a performance by 
Alexei Yurchak and Jeffrey Brooks.59
The dichotomy of Soviet life has been examined by many scholars from various 
angles. Terry Martin and Michael David-Fox60 discussed modern versus neotra-
ditionalist elements in policies. S. Fitzpatrick, R. Suny, and L. Viola emphasized 
the need to distinguish the level of intentionality, with its hyperplanning, from 
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the unexpected consequences and the uncontrollable chaos on the ground (in our 
case, the idealistic Constitution versus a frustrated and divided society).
While ideological claims departed from practice, commonsense citizens tried 
to come internally to terms with the incongruity between anticipation of the prom-
ised bright socialist future and the hardships of every day. That is why the expres-
sion “in principle” was so common in the language. Coping with this dichotomy, 
in order to survive and remain sane, citizens learned to speak Bolshevik and to 
display politically correct behavior, which took precedence over the content of 
their inner values,61 interpreted as double-thinking by observers. Alexei Yurchak 
reasons that this gap between performance and content widened in late post-Stalin 
socialism.62 It produced cynicism in society, which together with other factors 
finally eroded the communist edifice that had failed to keep its promises. Notably, 
this dual pattern persists today. Post-Soviet sociological studies undertaken by 
Western and Russian scholars evaluating the attitudes of Russian citizens toward 
democracy during the 1990s and 2000s evidence that while a big majority of 
Russians regard democracy as ideal, they increasingly support V. V. Putin’s 
undemocratic political practices.
Again, it would be simplistic to see official representationalism only as a pure 
and intentional deception, despite the obvious Machiavellianism of Soviet polity. 
Close reading of historical documents produces an impression that Stalinists suc-
cumbed to self-deception about the success of socialism as Stalin seems to have 
sincerely believed in the power of will or words to realize the Marxist project: 
“The role of so-called objective conditions has been reduced now to a minimum, 
while the role of the Party has become crucial.” He insisted, for example, that 
“realization [of the first five-year plan] depends exclusively on ourselves, on our 
ability and our will to use the very rich possibilities we have.”63 Because Stalin 
was the main architect of the policies, his mentality was an important factor in 
the representation of Soviet democracy. The scholars who tried to peek inside 
the dictator’s mind pointed to his wishful thinking, among other characteristics.64 
Richard Sakwa argues: “Stalin remained something of an idealist in the sense 
that for him ideas (schemas) could take on an almost material reality.”65 Merab 
Mamardashvili called this phenomenon “logocracy”: “A sort of magical mindset 
where it was thought that words constituted reality itself. … If something has no 
name … we cannot grasp it.”66 Numerous of his utterances provide evidence that 
Stalin firmly believed in the power of words and their potential to shape reality, 
which Sarah Davies and James Harris called logocentrism.67 In the 1920s, the 
idea that one could change a person’s mind by using the right words was quite 
influential – the idea that “language can serve as the ultimate vehicle for the kind 
of transformation sought by revolution.”68 The successor of the Enlightenment, 
Stalin thought that words of education and propaganda, whether Party propaganda 
or “kulak agitation,” were omnipotent in their ability to change personality and 
its psychology. Consequently, he saw rival ideologies and texts as “equivalent 
to political rebellion.”69 Desired norms were imposed on society via rhetorical 
tools like assigning names (“democracy,” “socialism,” “kulak,” “enemy of the 
people”), monopolizing the power of naming and producing political ideas,70 or 
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inculcating speech, behavior, and thinking patterns to enforce the state’s agenda. 
Discursive strategies structured social reality by encouraging language patterns in 
line with official ideology, such as “achievements of socialism,” and discourag-
ing “wrong” patterns. The words “famine,” “repressions,” and “peasants’ revolts” 
were excluded from the official public agenda and therefore hidden, becoming 
“nonexistent,” replaced by the euphemisms “food difficulties” and “kulak sabo-
tage.” Such a mentality predetermined Stalinists’ annoyance with the lag of real-
ity behind desideratum.
Law and practice
The representational and performative nature of socialist and democratic dis-
course was also a product of resilient sociocultural practices in relations between 
the state and society71: among others, reliance on informal, personalized practices 
rather than on legal norms. Historically, the latter only slowly established them-
selves both in the elite, bureaucracy, and peasantry. The model of “the supremacy 
of the ruler to the law [as] an attribute of monarchical rule in Russia”72 can explain 
such traditional negligence of the law. Only in the mid-nineteenth century did the 
new legal ethos emerge with its recognition of the importance of law in Russian 
judicial administration, but among the peasantry customary law continued to 
dominate.73 These fragile foundations of legal consciousness could hardly be 
strengthened in Soviet practice when the law had been rejected in the Revolution, 
when law contradicted established informal practices,74 and when implementation 
of one law contradicted another law.75 The persistence of informal practices (blat, 
for example) was another side of distrust of institutions at the bottom of society.
“Revolutionary” suspension of law during the Civil War period and the con-
stant resort to extrajudicial measures later did not enforce legality in the bureau-
cracy or legal consciousness in the population and ultimately contributed to poor 
manageability of the state apparatus. As P. Solomon notes, “the antilaw tendency 
in Soviet legal thought,” so pronounced in the 1920s, “had always appealed to the 
hearts and minds of many Party officials.”76 The 1920s and 1930s saw a persistent 
pattern of cessation and reemergence of the extrajudicial power of the political 
police toward specific groups and offenses. On the one hand, the suspension of 
law accelerates and simplifies procedure; on the other, it conflicts with a ruler’s 
need to control the state machinery. A clear legal framework adds legitimacy 
and stability to the system of power77 as the Constitution of 1936 projected. The 
turn to a traditional legal order in the mid-1930s, in order to revive the author-
ity of law and enforce centralization and manageability, was inconsistent and 
was finally interrupted by the extralegality of the Great Terror. Tellingly, the 
Prosecutor’s Office – the institution designed to oversee compliance of the law 
with the Constitution – by its own hands waived the constitutional demand of the 
prosecutor’s sanction on arrest. On August 7, 1937, Prosecutor A. Ia. Vyshinskii 
issued the appropriate instruction to the legal agencies: “There is no need to fol-
low the legal procedure and preliminary sanction on arrest.”78 It was restored in 
November 1938. It was common practice for laws to be ignored by implementers 
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at the local level (the cases are too numerous to be presented here): churches were 
often closed without the required sanction of the local soviet and the TsIK; when 
the Politburo ordered stopping repressions “immediately” starting November 16, 
1938, shootings in NKVD cellars continued even during December.79 Both local 
executives and the current legislature commonly ignored the law.
The gap between current laws, instructions, and the Constitution was one of 
the mechanisms of the nominal nature of democracy in Stalinism. Just before his 
quiet cancellation of the constitutional norm of the prosecutor’s sanction for arrest 
on August 7, 1937, Vyshinskii stated:
Soviet state justice is characterized by the unity and coherence of all its parts. 
In our Constitutional justice, there is no contradiction between its individual 
institutions, and there is no contradiction or even the slightest divergence 
between the principles it proclaims and their practical implementation. … 
The Constitution of December 5, 1936, and the electoral law of July 9, 1937, 
are in complete unity.80 
Constitutional legal norms authorized by government bodies were time and again 
degraded or modified by numerous often secret instructions and decrees issued by 
the NKVD, the prosecutor, or the Party. Their instructions bent the Constitution 
to meet the convenience of one or another agency. The Tatar ASSR (Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic) NKVD chief questioned Moscow in January 1937:
For us, the line to follow in our conduct [in relation to exiled kulaks] is not 
clear in connection with the new Constitution. We ask you to clarify if all 
previous orders of the USSR NKVD on this subject remain in effect, or if we 
should rely on the corresponding articles of the Constitution and apply them 
to those people as citizens of the USSR enjoying all rights as citizens.81 
We can see the answer to this question from practice: when, after the 
1936 Constitution, the NKVD prioritized its own decrees and Politburo direc-
tions. Soviet polity often lived according to informal practices and normative acts.
Deportation of the kulaks in the collectivization and construction of special 
settlements was a good example of this incongruence. Legal formalization of the 
repressions lagged behind their implementation. First, extrajudicial deportations 
started and only afterward did the construction of the quasi-legal foundation for 
them begin. Many peasants were deported without trial or formal verdict and did 
not know their terms:
We do not consider ourselves to be deprived of rights according to the court 
decision, but only by the NKVD [power], because we did not hear any sen-
tence, any trial, but they simply exiled us to another area and that’s it.82 
As Lynne Viola and Sergei Krassil’nikov wrote, the mass banishment during 
collectivization was conducted not by the judiciary but by Soviet administrative 
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organs. According to the law, such an administrative procedure could inflict only 
individual (not family) deportation and only free (not forced) labor, and was lim-
ited to five years. The extraordinary practice of family deportation, with forced 
labor and no terms of exile, violated the law and created a legal vacuum around 
the question of subsequent liberation that in turn allowed authorities to manipulate 
the issue with bylaws and instructions according to their immediate needs.83
L. Viola and S. Krassil’nikov conclude: “Normative acts quenched the power 
of law.” The authors abstain from using the term “the legal status of spetsperese-
lentsy” (special settlers or deportees), as the notion of legality does not reflect the 
reality of deportees’ conditions.
It was a quasi-legal procedure, with norms and rules not restricted by any 
legal or justice institutions, but established and changed by political author-
ity. … The law was an instrument in the hands of regime organs [NKVD] 
supervising the groups of special settlers.84 
Restoration of their civil rights according to the 1936 Constitution was incom-
plete and sabotaged at every level of administration. It is worth noting that all 
instructions and laws (if carried out) were interpreted by implementers in favor 
of tightening and restriction rather than softening. We see a common practice 
whereby the Constitution, law, or decree granting rights to citizens was truncated 
by normative instructions or nonfulfillment on the local level. In this light, it is 
emblematic that Stalin rejected most popular amendments to the Constitution in 
1936 by reasoning that they instead belonged to current legislation. They were 
supposed to be disregarded.85
Elections
Free elections are at the core of democracy and were in the center of the 
1936 Constitution. The mechanism of elections and Soviet manipulations is a 
large topic deserving further studies.86 Here I only briefly present a few exam-
ples of subverted elections in 1936–1937 at the grassroots. Before that, open vot-
ing by raising hands under OGPU surveillance, rather than by secret ballot, and 
voting for the whole list of candidates presented by the organizers effectively 
“usurped democracy.”87 The new Constitution’s voting rules were spontaneously 
tested in the fall of 1936 during the elections to the local and all-union soviet 
congresses, even before the Constitution’s formal adoption, and were expanded 
to Party organizations and trade unions from May through the summer of 1937. 
The party, soviets, and the NKVD were not ready to implement new constitu-
tional norms despite official encouragement to criticize and dismiss ineffective 
officials in the campaign of criticism. The NKVD with its civil war mentality saw 
the 1936 pre-election mobilization of the population, inspired by new freedoms, 
as anti-Soviet agitation and regularly reported on the revival of socially alien ele-
ments, who were formally absolved by the Constitution.88 The old practice of 
control over elections continued. It was the duty of Party organizers to “direct 
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election campaigns,” organizing 100 percent turnout and selecting and verifying 
the candidates. However, newly enfranchised persons were often removed from 
the voting lists in 1937. “It [is] the responsibility of local soviets to ensure that 
voter lists [are] compiled correctly.”89 But those in the soviets who had deported 
kulaks in 1930 were not interested in reinstating the voting rights of returnees. 
In the 1936 discussion, they regularly articulated that they anticipated revenge.90
Nomination of candidates was a crucial moment that allowed the party-state 
to manipulate the process. The Party and soviet officials arranged the nomination 
of desirable candidates. If this filter did not work for some reason, the unwanted 
candidates were excluded from the voting lists or arrested by the NKVD. The 
plenum of the Gorkii Krai Party Committee in September 1936 directly instructed 
Party officials to scrutinize the cadres of the candidates and to manage the elec-
tions of the deputies to the soviets’ congresses.91 And of course, the NKVD did 
its job searching enemies. In October, it reported with alarm that voters had nomi-
nated and elected to the local soviet congresses anti-Soviet elements, lishentsy 
(the disenfranchised), or former counterrevolutionaries. The NKVD quickly dis-
missed such delegates from the congress list: in Malaia Vishera, Podporozhie, 
Novoselskii raion in Leningradskaia oblast’, Zeldskii raion in Odesskaia oblast’, 
and other places.92 The kulak lishenets Afanasii Popov in the Caucasus was 
deprived of his deputy mandate in the middle of the congress by the NKVD, 
while delegates “Khoptiar, suspected in spying, and Zaidman, a Trotskyist,” in 
Vinnitsa oblast’, were arrested.93 Security bodies and the Party directly intervened 
in the elections, blocking undesirable candidates and imposing their nominees. 
In Tikhvin raion, Leningrad oblast’, the voters declined the candidacy of village 
soviet chair Sokolov, but the raion representative said, “[y]ou can vote him out, 
but my word is final: Sokolov will stay chair.”94 A disunited and unorganized 
population could not effectively promote and defend their candidates from the 
ground or oppose the state security forces. Pessimistic citizens moaned: “Even if 
the people elect their representatives, the Bolsheviks, under the conditions of their 
dictatorship, will do everything to dismiss them.”95
Another method of manipulation was “an informal quota system,” or raznari-
adka. For example, the Gorkii krai soviet leader instructed his staff: “Elections to 
the krai [Soviet] Congress should guarantee [the winners to include] 34 percent 
women, 40–45 percent nonparty people, 22 percent workers, and 30 percent kolk-
hozniks.”96 This sorting took place at the moment of nomination. Such a system 
of Party backing of loyal candidates made deputies much more dependent on 
their supervisors than on their constituencies. Under such conditions, the demo-
cratic principle of accountability of the deputies to the electorate did not work. 
Thus, already in the fall of 1936 the local elections of delegates to soviet con-
gresses saw the failure of implementation of the new freedoms. Elected former 
kulaks, lishentsy, and members of now banned parties were blocked illegally via 
something akin to “criminal checks,” or they were simply arrested. The elec-
tions remained phony. Getty convincingly argues that the mass repressions of 
1937 were of a preemptive character in view of the coming free elections to the 
Supreme Soviet in December 1937. In the summer, the ballots were printed to 
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accommodate several candidates. Scared by the revival of its perceived enemies, 
the Party quietly canceled contested elections in October, but elections remained 
universal and direct by secret ballot. In December, the people were disappointed 
to find only one name on each ballot. The intelligent and critically minded 
Leningradian Liubov’ Shaporina wrote in her diary:
During the studies of the election law in all enterprises and institutions, the 
public asked if they could take the ballot and go home to ponder what can-
didate to vote for. Answer: yes. I entered the booth where I was supposed 
to read the ballot and choose my candidate to the Supreme Soviet … [but] 
we have on the ballot one name, selected in advance. I had a laugh attack 
in the booth. For a time, I could not make the appropriate calm face. At the 
exit I met Iurii with a stony expression on his face. I raised my collar [to 
hide my face – OV] – it was incredibly laughable. In the yard I met Petrov-
Vodkin and Dmitriev. V. V. [Dmitriev] talked about something and wildly 
laughed. … We all laughed.97
The tool of democracy was firmly in the hands of the rulers – they reserved it 
only for the low- and middle-rank cadres. Criticism against high targets was not 
intended by the masterminds in the Kremlin in an official campaign of criticism 
targeting incompetent or corrupt officials in 1936–1937. Rather, they exploited the 
democratic tools of criticism and elections to discipline the intermediate bureau-
crats by using the hands of the people. British diplomat MacKillop observed in 
September 1936 that a Soviet citizen, invited to criticize,
must … surrender his critical faculty and [not] use it for the still immovable 
establishment of those in high office – he must not use it against them – by 
helping them to detect and to eliminate the inefficient among those minor 
office-holders with whom he comes into daily contact and by generally 
reducing that sense of security among elected persons.98 
However, this tool of controlled democracy did not always work as expected by 
the Kremlin. Getty describes how the Party and soviet functionaries cunningly 
diverted the critiques and purges to the lower-ranking officials and thus escaped 
the blow of criticism from below and democratic rotation.
Conclusion
The Constitution of 1936 and the democratic elements of socialism were 
not always a pure deception; they were also a part of the initial grand project. 
However, the democratic impulse envisaged by Marx and Lenin in full social-
ism became hollow under a combination of factors: the pressure of catastrophic 
circumstances (sometimes self-inflicted), the perceived urgency of socialist trans-
formation, the revolutionary Manichean mentality and Machiavellianism of the 
leaders, and the legacy of the traditionalist peasant culture embodied in steady 
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informal sociocultural practices. A multivalent dichotomy, a gap between ideal 
and social practice and between ambitious intentions and actuality, was a result 
of the utopianism of the socialist project and, more broadly, in significant part it 
was a product of the belated and “catch-up” mode of Russian modernization, and 
of a complex of geopolitical inferiority that defined the nominal nature of Soviet 
democracy. It looks like a sham from an outside perspective but looks idealistic 
from inside the communist paradigm. Stalin’s regime benefited from controlled 
democracy when it purged the bureaucracy by the hands of the people, or when it 
purchased a kind of temporary legitimacy in the eyes of both outsiders and insid-
ers – all without many constraints. As for the people, they learned the language of 
democracy and got some training and experience in elections, but in the long run, 
the token nature of Soviet democracy produced mass disillusionment with and 
distrust of either the government, the institutions per se, or ideology. This finally 
corrupted the citizens’ psyche and eroded the moral foundation and legitimacy of 
the Soviet regime.
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A sheet of paper in his hand, his head slightly tilted, an array of microphones in 
front and his most loyal supporters behind, red lanterns swaying overhead. The 
image of Mao Zedong’s proclamation of the founding of the People’s Republic is 
ingrained in public memory. The festivities on October 1, 1949, marked the begin-
ning of a new era in Chinese history with cheering masses and a military parade. 
The founding ceremony (kaiguo dadian 開國大典) was, however, not only a 
show of force of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation 
Army. The line of supporters standing shoulder to shoulder with CCP leaders on 
Tian’anmen Gate embodied the promise of political stability and an inclusive gov-
ernment.1 Among them were eminent figures such as Shen Junru 沈鈞儒 (1875–
1963), Zhang Lan 張瀾 (1872–1955), Song Qingling 宋慶齡 (1893–1981), and Li 
Jishen 李濟深 (1885–1959) as representatives of several left-leaning smaller par-
ties and associations that had formed during the Republican period (1912–1949). 
Under the direction of the CCP’s United Front Work Department (tongzhanbu 
統戰部), they had laid the groundwork for the convening of a new political body, 
the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference (CPPCC), in September 1949.
The CPPCC modeled its corporatist structure and function on Republican pre-
cursors to draw intellectuals and political activists into the Communist system 
of government. By inviting left-leaning elites to join the bridge-building process 
during the turbulent months of dissolution and reconstruction in 1948–1949, the 
CCP heralded an era of “New Democracy” (xin minzhu 新民主). Democracy, a 
term that had pervaded Mao’s writings for years, now had to be filled with con-
crete meaning. The first CPPCC’s preparations, however, were as much a process 
of inclusion as of exclusion and a preemptive move to stifle demands for a genu-
inely democratic form of government.
The pomp and circumstance of the enraptured masses and the military parade 
on October 1 outshone the preceding ceremonies of the first CPPCC. Likewise, 
in historical scholarship, the preparations for the CPPCC have received little 
attention, mainly because historians tended to dismiss it as mere political theatre. 
Gerry Groot has offered the most comprehensive analysis to this day, but his focus 
rests on the events themselves, not, for example, their portrayal in contemporary 
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media.2 This chapter thus revisits the months preceding the first CPPCC and 
focuses on the following three points: first, it takes the symbolism of the first 
CPPCC seriously and reconsiders its role in strategically constructing an image 
of the CCP’s popular support. Second, it will bring the public perception of the 
preparations leading up to the first CPPCC to the fore, arguing that the rehearsal 
was just as important as the performance itself. Third, the first CPPCC is exam-
ined as part of a more significant endeavor to create a coherent foundation myth of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). These three issues are central to our under-
standing of the narrative of a “New Democracy,” which constitutes a fundamental 
source of legitimacy of the PRC’s system of government until today.3
Changing visions of legitimate rule in the republican period
Before we can turn to the events leading up to the convening of the first CPPCC 
in September 1949, we have to revisit the attempts to form similar advisory bod-
ies during the preceding two decades. Only then can we grasp the historical sig-
nificance and the symbolic deviations from previous attempts to use consultative 
bodies for the expansion of regime legitimacy.
From the last decades of the nineteenth century to the end of the Republican 
period, Chinese perceptions of the relationship between the individual, the col-
lective, and the state witnessed dramatic change. Former subjects of imperial rule 
now laid claim to their rights and duties as citizens. These changes became most 
apparent in discourses on citizenship and nationalism, the emergence of new pub-
lic institutions, and a new education system.4 Progressive intellectuals examined 
foreign political alternatives as members of study societies or joined forces in 
nationalist organizations and political parties.5 Moreover, an increasingly self-
confident urban workforce made their demands heard through protests, boycotts, 
and strikes. Such mass movements of the early Republican period further paved the 
way for more popular modes of forming and expressing political opinions and the 
emergence of mass political parties in the mid-1920s.6 However, how exactly 
the will of the masses was to enter political decision-making processes was a 
contested issue.
Early experiments with popular voting had proven in the eyes of many observ-
ers that “elections merely aggregated private interests, which could be manipulated 
by unscrupulous campaigners for personal benefit.”7 Nonetheless, even though 
the elites were divided on the question of popular voting, they united behind the 
demand for a greater involvement of intellectuals and experts as counsels to the 
government, which was firmly in the hands of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang 
國民黨, GMD). They believed that their expertise would improve political deci-
sion-making and that they could act as mediators between the government and 
the common people’s interests. The self-image of many intellectuals, their trust in 
the moral character of talented men, and the primacy of a strong government over 
civil liberties were reminiscent of the justification of merit-based appointments 
for political offices during the late imperial period. In 1931, the GMD govern-
ment gave in to the intellectuals’ demands as its reputation decreased with every 
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concession to Japanese aggression. They extended an invitation to prominent 
public figures (except Communists) to join a National Emergency Conference 
(Guonanhui 國難會), which met in Luoyang in April 1932.8
Contemporary critics unmasked the conference as a mere political gesture to 
counter a growing sense of disillusionment caused by the empty promises of an 
inclusive and representative form of government and the related loss of legiti-
macy. After the disclosure of the list of participants, the famous intellectual Tao 
Xingzhi 陶行知 (1891–1946) derided it as a “celebrity conference” (mingren 
huiyi 名人會議), in which fame outranked expertise. None of the participants ever 
fended for themselves through manual labor, but they would still claim to speak 
on behalf of China’s common people (dai laobaixing shuohua 代老百姓說話). 
“The deterioration of politics in recent years stems from this word dai. … How I 
wish that this grievous word will no longer be included in future dictionaries of 
the Chinese Republic,” Tao concluded reproachfully.9 Other prominent figures 
like Shi Liangcai 史量才 (1880–1934) joined the call for a boycott of the National 
Emergency Conference. They demanded to replace it with an assembly of real 
political influence, yet the GMD was not willing to put its monopoly of power 
up for discussion.10 Even GMD delegates voiced concerns over the lack of repre-
sentative bodies as a counterweight to one-party rule.11
In 1938, the GMD started a renewed attempt to appease calls for a more demo-
cratic form of government by establishing the Guomin canzhenghui 國民參政會, 
the “National Political Participatory Assembly.” Again, the real power of the coun-
cil did not meet expectations. Peng Juyuan 彭菊園 (dates unknown) described the 
longing for structures that would represent the will of the people (minyi jiguan 
民意機關). In Peng’s view, a genuinely democratic council would have to meet 
four criteria: first, it would need to be large enough to represent the diversity of 
China’s large population; second, its members would have to be selected through 
democratic procedures; third, it would have to hold the highest decision-making 
power; and fourth, participation in this council should be open to people from all 
parts of China.12 The National Political Participatory Assembly fell short in all 
four points. However, we see here the yardstick for measuring later proposals for 
consultative or even legislative assemblies: size, elective procedures, legal status, 
and the representation of all regions and social groups.
With the Japanese defeat and the end of the Second World War, the external 
threat’s unifying power diminished, and the GMD’s and CCP’s competition for 
popular support entered a new round. In 1945, the American and Soviet govern-
ments pressured both parties to return to the negotiation table and to sign the 
“Double Tenth Agreement”13 on October 10. As part of this agreement, a Political 
Consultative Conference (Zhengzhi xieshang huiyi 政治協商會議) was to be held 
as the first step toward the drafting of a constitution and a reformed united gov-
ernment, including the so-called democratic parties and groups (minzhu dangpai 
民主黨派, DPGs).14 However, when the conference finally convened in January 
1946, the government had failed to implement the necessary reforms promised 
in the agreement. Not surprisingly, the public expectations of the conference 
merely ranged from cautiously optimistic to fatalistic.15 Already the concluding 
 People’s Political Consultative Conference  285
celebrations of the consultative conference were disrupted by attacks on DPG 
representatives. Both CCP and GMD refocused on solving the conflict through 
the power of the gun rather than persuasion.
Ultimately, the failure of the GMD to make political concessions, as well as the 
persecution of DPG members, helped the Communists to portray themselves as 
a conciliatory force pressured into a military confrontation. As Lyman van Slyke 
noted, at this point, the language of CCP propaganda changed accordingly from 
an “anti-feudal united front,” to a “new democratic united front,” reaching its 
climax in an even broader “anti-Chiang front” against the head of the GMD gov-
ernment Chiang Kai-shek蔣介石 (1887–1975).16 Furthermore, the CCP began to 
set up elected representative bodies in the areas under their control to showcase 
their willingness to cooperate across party divisions.17 In short, the CCP decided 
to revive the “old” consultative conference (jiu zhengxie 舊政協) of 1946 not 
because it had been a functioning political body but, on the contrary, as a potent 
symbol of democratic promises broken by the GMD, which were finally to be 
realized by the CCP with a “new” consultative conference (xin zhengxie 新政協). 
The choice of the name “consultative conference” rather than, for example, “par-
ticipatory council” (canzhenghui 參政會) projected an image of a transitional 
assembly that was to mediate between political forces and to pave the way for a 
new form of government. That this body would become a permanent part of the 
PRC’s political system was not apparent at this stage.
Legitimizing Communist rule
With the decision to grant the CPPCC – and thereby the minor political parties 
and nonaligned intellectuals – an official status within the state apparatus, the 
CCP leadership broke with the model of the Soviet Union. Years earlier, Mao 
Zedong had coupled the ideal of an inclusive constituency with a Marxist avant-
garde leadership in his writings on “New Democracy.” For him, historical mate-
rialism and scientific communism justify the rule of the working class led by 
the Communist Party over the people. Following this logic, the working classes, 
commanded by party members, possess the highest level of social consciousness 
and are thus the driving force in the linear historical progress toward socialism 
and communism. This role as a vanguard of historical change legitimizes party 
authority, while the power of the state rests on the claim that it represents the 
interests of the people.18
In Communist China, the oxymoron of the “people’s democratic dictatorship,” 
a term Mao coined in 1949, exemplifies this logical friction between the rule of 
the few and the will of the masses. Only the Communist Party, he declared, pos-
sessed the necessary knowledge and foresight to create a glorious classless future. 
Under the leadership of the CCP, the masses (minzhong 民眾) could unite and rise 
up to create a democracy for the people (renmin 人民) and a dictatorship for the 
reactionaries (fandongpai 反動派).19 Accordingly, the only relevant bestowers of 
legitimacy are the masses. All those who refuse to follow the CCP are counter-
revolutionaries and hence irrelevant to the construction of legitimacy.20
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It was not Mao, however, who first put the theory of a Communist-led “peo-
ple’s democracy” into practice. After the Second World War, the “new democra-
cies” of Eastern Europe set precedents for alternatives to the Soviet state system.21 
By inviting all toilers to participate in a (nominal) coalition government, they 
established a much more inclusive policy than the Soviet “dictatorship of the pro-
letariat.”22 When the CCP leadership decided that China too would follow a path 
independent of the Soviet model, they invoked special historical conditions.
The popular democratic dictatorship in China includes representatives and 
political groups of the liberal bourgeoisie which wish to fight imperialism, 
feudalism, and bureaucratic capital. This is the difference [from the Soviet 
Union]. This circumstance is explained by the fact that China is a semi-colo-
nial country and that in a period of revolution and after its victory, we will 
need for a long time a concentration of all the forces in the fight against 
imperialism and its agents.23
Mao’s principle of a people’s democratic dictatorship is only the normative 
dimension of the construction of the legitimacy of CCP rule. A shared belief in the 
logic and truth of Marxist theories is the precondition for its acceptance. Yet, in 
the transition period of the late 1940s, a large part of China’s elites still embraced 
a vision of legitimacy based on constitutionalism, deliberation, and inclusiveness. 
Because there was not a unified “Legitimitätsglaube” (belief in legitimacy) in a 
Weberian sense,24 the new regime could not solely rely on ideological persuasive-
ness. David Beetham identifies three different factors that are essential for creat-
ing a belief in legitimacy. First, “the legal validity of the acquisition and exercise 
of power,” second, “the justifiability of the rules governing a power relationship 
in terms of the beliefs and values current in the given society,” and third, “the 
evidence of consent derived from actions expressive of it,” such as political ritu-
als.25 Even nondemocratic rulers “need to credibly anchor their legitimacy claim 
in the hearts and minds of the people.”26 Hence, after the abolition of the “old” 
political system in 1949, the CCP needed a new narrative of how this regime not 
only received an ex-post approval but also how it was created through consensual 
deliberations between Communist and non-Communist leaders.
In short, as the proclamation of the People’s Republic drew closer, the plan-
ning for the CPPCC was part of the Communists’ strategy to tie the normative-
ideological legitimation of power and the popular belief in legitimacy together. 
All of China and the world were watching how the CCP would “set the stage” 
for the CPPCC.27 Every official communiqué, every gesture of goodwill toward 
the DPGs, and every negotiation report contributed to the stabilizing of CCP rule 
during the transition period. The CCP later combined these narrative threads and 
memorialized them as part of a political myth of the founding of the People’s 
Republic. Christopher Flood’s understanding of political myth as “an ideologi-
cally marked narrative which purports to give a true account of a set of past, pre-
sent, or predicted political events and which is accepted as valid in its essentials 
by a social group”28 is instructive in this respect. How exactly the events leading 
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up to the first CPPCC unfolded and whether we can glimpse behind the scenes of 
the “ideologically marked narrative” will be discussed in the following section.
Inviting the protagonists and setting the stage
With its historical baggage of the “old” consultative conference, the reconvening of 
a “new” conference became a political tightrope act: if the CCP convened a meet-
ing before it could be sure that DPG representatives would participate, it would 
lose face. Furthermore, the convening of a consultative conference before military 
victory was within reach would undermine the historical significance of the event, 
which could then no longer serve as a prelude to the institutionalization of the new 
government. Mao thus hesitated to proclaim the founding of the PRC before stra-
tegic locations, such as the Beiping (Beijing) and Nanjing, had come under CCP 
control.29 On the other hand, if the CCP waited too long, the Americans might pres-
sure the GMD to reconvene a consultative conference driving a wedge between the 
Communists and the intellectuals and DPGs. From early 1948 onward, the CCP 
began to stage a process of planning and consultation by forming a “Preparatory 
Committee of the New Consultative Conference” (Xin zhengxie choubei hui 
新政協籌備會). They hoped to bring the DPGs to commit themselves publicly in 
support of a CCP-led government prior to the founding of the PRC.
With the “Labor Day Call” (Wu yi kouhao 五一口號) on May 1, 1948, the CCP 
extended a formal invitation to all peasants, workers, and Chinese youth of the “free-
dom movement” (ziyou yundong 自由運動) as well as the intellectuals, the “free 
capitalist class” (ziyou zichan jieji 自由資產階級), the DPGs, prominent public fig-
ures (shehui xianda 社會賢達),30 and all other patriots to participate in the formation 
of a “Democratic United Government” (minzhu lianhe zhengfu 民主聯合政府).31 
The CCP, however, refrained from directly naming people or groups in the call, 
thereby giving the impression of being open for cooperation with all political forces 
that could commit to anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism, anti-bureaucratic capitalism, 
and the fight against Chiang Kai-shek. Cosignatories of this appeal were, among oth-
ers, leaders of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Guomindang (Zhongguo 
guomindang geming weiyuanhui 國民黨革命委員會), the Chinese Democratic 
League (Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng 中國民主同盟), the National Salvation 
Association (Jiuguohui 救國會), and the Zhigong Party (Zhigongdang 致公黨).32
Interestingly, the cosignatories vanished from most official PRC historiogra-
phies.33 In 1949, the image of a concerted effort of the CCP and smaller political 
parties lent credibility to the call for creating a united government. Today, the 
mentioning of other parties chips away some of the glory that the CCP claims for 
its vanguard spirit in promoting a “New Democracy.” Yet, even in official narra-
tives that omit the cosignatories, the CCP remains a convener and arbiter, not a 
controller of events and a symbol that by publicly endorsing the call, the DPGs 
implicitly accepted CCP leadership. However, as Groot has pointed out:
[T]the support of MPGs [DPGs] did not necessarily mean unqualified 
endorsement for all CCP policies or its ultimate program. What the MPGs 
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[DPGs] failed to realize was that the CCP was going to transform them to 
suit its new agenda.34
By 1948, the CCP had already infiltrated or cooped some of the DPGs, diminish-
ing their independence.35 Yet up until today, the Labor Day Call is a central ele-
ment of the CCP’s construction of legitimacy.36
Not all of those responding to the Labor Day Call were already influential 
political forces. A response to the call could also elevate small associations that 
had previously been politically insignificant to a level of national importance. As 
A. Doak Barnett rightfully predicted in December 1948,
the alliance of these splinter groups in Hong Kong with the Communist Party 
lifted the names of their leaders from relative obscurity to prominence in the 
seething rumor markets of present-day China. … It is probable, therefore, 
that some time next year press dispatches and other reports of developments 
in China will contain the names of many political parties, groups, and leaders 
in China that heretofore have been virtually unknown, even to many people 
within their own country.37
The assembling of figures that might not all be famous, but representative, for 
example, of China’s scholars, scientists, teachers, or business people, might not 
have hurt the cause of projecting representativeness. Broad strata of Chinese 
society that felt marginalized by the Communist rhetoric of class struggle should 
identify with these delegates, and thereby another “celebrity conference” could be 
avoided. Overall, the CCP narrative of an enthusiastic response of all progressive 
forces and notable Chinese intellectuals to the Labor Day Call has to be called 
into question.
Once left-leaning DPG leaders had publicly endorsed the Labor Day Call, 
the ball was in the playing field of the CCP again. Yet the Communists waited 
another three months until they reacted to the endorsement. In August 1948, Mao 
Zedong invited a carefully selected group of 55 DPG representatives and “demo-
crats” (minzhu renshi 民主人士) to the areas under CCP control to initiate the 
consultations for the establishment of a united government. Initially, the CCP 
had planned to convene the consultative conference by autumn in Harbin, but 
the military situation changed dramatically during the summer of 1948. When 
the Communist forces advanced quicker than expected, the consultative confer-
ence was rescheduled to coincide with the proclamation of a new government.38 
To uphold the image of a busy preparation process until a military victory was 
secured, the CCP finally brought prominent figures, for example, the writer Mao 
Dun 茅盾 (alias Shen Dehong 沈德鴻, 1896–1981) and his wife Kong Dezhi 
孔德沚 (1897–1970), Li Jishen of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese 
Guomindang,39 as well as Shen Junru of the Chinese Democratic League, to the 
“liberated areas.”40
By involving a maximum number of political activists in this streamlined pro-
cess, the Communists killed three birds with one stone: first, by inviting these 
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prominent figures to the areas under their control, the CPP could shield them from 
the influence of their opponents. As Mao Zedong lamented in December 1948:
Now the Americans … sent their diplomatic workers and journalists to the 
leaders of the right-wing of the democratic league – Luo Longji, Zhan[g] 
Lan, Hua Nanshe, and to the leader of the revolutionary committee of the 
Guomindang Li Jishen (he is en route to the liberated areas), so as to conduct 
among them provocative work and efforts to lure [them in]. We already paid 
attention to this and must do our best to make sure that the Americans will not 
achieve the aim of their intrigue.41
Indeed, when GMD member Huang Shaohong 黃紹竑 (1895–1966) flew to Hong 
Kong in January 1949 to convince Li Jishen to come to Nanjing and act as a 
mediator between the GMD and the CCP, he arrived only to find that Li had left 
days earlier.42 Li and the other prominent figures, among them the political activ-
ists Zhu Yunshan 朱蘊山 (1887–1981) and Peng Zemin 彭澤民 (1877–1956), 
who secretly boarded a cargo ship for Dalian in December 1948, felt they were 
no longer safe in Hong Kong. The CCP’s offer to smuggle those political leaders 
persecuted by the GMD out of the city was thus hard to decline. Once the group 
arrived in Dalian, Zhou Enlai 周恩來 (1898–1976) personally arranged a fine 
hotel, a banquet, and even a new set of clothes against the harsh Northern winter.43
Second, the CCP leadership was eager to prove that they took the concerns of 
the smaller parties seriously and organized inspection tours, study sessions, and 
called for informal discussions. In a speech to fellow CCP cadres, Dong Biwu 
董必武 (1886–1975), who had been involved in the consultations, concluded 
in August 1949 that when they had published the Labor Day Call in May 1948 
to convene the consultative conference, the DPGs still embraced diverse views. 
Contested issues were especially the leadership status of the CCP, the possibil-
ity of peace with the GMD, China’s dependency of the United States and Great 
Britain, and reservations against the Soviet Union.44 In their meetings with the 
visiting intellectuals, the CCP put such questions as the continuation of class 
struggle after the Communist victory,45 the decision on how a “democratic” politi-
cal system could look like, and which role the DPG leaders would take in the 
new government up for discussion.46 These exchanges offered a platform for the 
probing of common ground and the honing of arguments. In other words, in the 
early months of 1949, the CCP tested the ideological toolkit that they continued 
to employ after 1949 to convince China’s intellectual elites of the CCP’s rightful 
rise to power.
And third, the sojourn of the DPG leaders in the model communes of the 
“liberated areas” held a propagandistic value. Intellectuals like Zhang Bojun 
章伯鈞 (1895–1969) or Shen Junru possessed a valuable social and cultural capi-
tal that enabled them to communicate effectively with social groups beyond the 
Communists’ reach. Writings of Li Jishen, Shen Junru, and Zhang Bojun from the 
year 1948 illustrate how these political thinkers reframed the plans for a new con-
sultative conference in a way that resonated more with the Republican elites than 
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the anti-capitalist or anti-bureaucrat slogans of the Communist camp. Li, speak-
ing for the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Guomindang, reinterpreted 
the political writings of Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan 孫中山, 1866–1925) and 
claimed that the CCP’s proposal of convening a consultative conference was in 
accordance with Sun’s demands for representative institutions. Sun was revered 
across the political spectrum as an icon of the revolution of 1911, and the article 
thus invoked his name to construct a sense of shared political ideals of all forces 
opposed to the GMD’s one-party dictatorship.47 Shen Junru similarly distanced 
himself from the GMD and reminded his readers that to hope for creating peace 
with the GMD was just as hopeless as trying to “fish for the moon in the water.”48 
And in an article Shen coauthored with Zhang Bojun, both drew a line in the 
sand between democracy and dictatorship, as well as between the people and 
the people’s enemies. They embraced the call for a new consultative conference 
as the only remaining road to a democratic, peaceful, and united “New China.” 
Everyone not on their side was a reactionary working against the interest of the 
people.49 Without explicitly endorsing Communist ideology, or even praising the 
military or political achievements of the CCP, all of these writings stressed the 
moral decay of the GMD. These intellectuals thus achieved what would have been 
impossible for Communist writers, which is to shift the attention away from the 
potential danger of a new one-party rule under a Communist regime and to decou-
ple the call for a reconvening of a consultative conference from all ideological 
questions that separated the DPGs and the CCP.
The second type of publications that disseminated from Northern China were 
reports on the administrative and political situation in the Communist-ruled areas. 
Sun Qimeng 孫起孟 (1911–2010), a member of the China National Democratic 
Construction Association (Minzhu jianguohui 民主建國會), for example, stressed 
that life was like heaven in comparison to the hell of the GMD-held territories and 
praised the humanistic spirit of the correctional facilities he had visited in Harbin.50 
Fifty-five visitors to the “liberated areas” voiced their support for the political strat-
egy of Mao Zedong in a statement they published in several journals such as the 
Haitao 海濤 in Shanghai and Hong Kong’s journal Gonglun 公論, a mouthpiece of 
the Zhigong Party.51 In the version that appeared in the Haitao, however, an entire 
paragraph praising an “atmosphere of democratic freedom,” the exemplary conduct 
of CCP cadres, and the neat and rapid reconstruction of social and economic order 
was missing.52 Apparently, the subversive force and the discursive power of this 
paragraph were forceful enough to necessitate censorship in Shanghai.
Despite their recurring references to democratic principles and appraisals for 
the rule of law, the publications disseminating from the CCP territories were, at the 
same time, very frank in their portrayal of the CCP’s understanding of democracy. 
In a lengthy article, Sun Qimeng discussed how he came to realize that he and his 
fellow intellectual friends needed to reform their thinking and to better themselves 
for the service of the people (and thereby the CCP), and he denounced all opposing 
forces as reactionary.53 Furthermore, these publications spelled out in no uncer-
tain terms what the CCP expected from intellectuals in general and the DPGs in 
particular. Like the DPG’s public vows of support following the Labor Day Call, 
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these publications thereby contributed to a narrative of a conscious and unhesitant 
submission of China’s minor political forces to CCP leadership in the months pre-
ceding the founding of the People’s Republic. Additionally, in these writings, the 
DPG leaders themselves undermined any future challenges to CCP’s legitimacy 
by labeling all forces questioning the Communist leadership as revisionist.
Newspaper coverage from the GMD-ruled areas countered the CCP’s United 
Front Work Department’s tale of harmonious and unanimous consultations. It 
scolded the intellectuals and their DPGs, who had followed the invitation to 
the “liberated areas,” as victims of false promises. Luo Jianbai 羅堅白 (dates 
unknown) of the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party (Zhongguo minzhu she-
huidang 中國民主社會黨) ridiculed those leaving for the “liberated” areas as 
opportunists trying to hunt down a government post “like ants drawn to rotten 
meat, like flies in pursuit of a foul smell.”54 The New Statesman (Xin zhengzhijia 
新政治家) similarly denounced the theatrical “beating of gongs and drums for the 
new consultative conference,” declaring that all those who still hoped the confer-
ence would be a continuation of the peace talks of 1946 were misguided. The 
article quotes extensively from CCP documents to prove that the CCP had, in fact, 
no interest in engaging with all parties and certainly not on an equal footing.55 
Similarly, the journal Life and Time (Shenghuo yu shidai 生活與時代) questioned 
the CCP’s attempt to convene a consultative conference consisting of small par-
ties that were in no way representative of the general Chinese population. If they 
wanted a more inclusive government, why not merely hold a popular election? 
Yet, the coverage of the preparations for the consultative conference not only 
questioned the “democratic” motives of the CCP, but it also painted a picture of 
an exasperated GMD that resorted to both promises and intimidations to keep 
prominent political figures from joining the conference.56
Overall, the Chinese public was left to speculate for many months as to where 
the conference would assemble, who was to participate, and whether it would 
negotiate peace between the GMD and CCP or herald a new political regime. 
The Communist leadership, due to the rapidly changing national and international 
political situation and out of security concerns, set no definite date or place. Thus, 
making a virtue of necessity, Mao Zedong still claimed in the telegram to the DPG 
representatives that the opportune timing of convening the assembly, its location, 
and the decision who to invite was not yet set because it should rest in the hands 
of the democratic leaders to reach a joint decision on these issues.57
In late 1948, before a formal Preparatory Committee for the New Consultative 
Conference assembled, there were effectively three hubs of activity: the first was 
the CCP’s United Front headquarter in Lijiazhuang, where Zhou Enlai hosted 
some of Beijing’s prominent intellectuals like Fu Dingyi 符定一 (1877–1958), 
Wu Han 吳晗 (1909–1969), and Liu Qingyang 劉清揚 (1894–1977); the sec-
ond was the Northeastern Bureau of the CCP in Harbin, where the CCP cadres 
Gao Gang 高崗 (1905–1954) and Li Fuchun 李富春 (1900–1975) conferred with 
DPG leaders Shen Junru, Tan Pingshan 譚平山 (1886–1956), Zhang Bojun, and 
others who had arrived from Hong Kong in September 1948; the third was the 
network of political allies remaining in Hong Kong.58 In the following months, 
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drafts, comments, and revisions were sent back and forth between these three 
locations.59 Unfortunately, the paper trail that these deliberations must have left 
behind has to this day not been made public. Nonetheless, the available sources 
allow us to reconstruct the haggling over the size and composition of the CPPCC. 
Here again, the symbolic dimension is not only reflective of reality, but it also 
constituted reality: the list of factions invited to the CPPCC became a barometer 
registering who gained or lost favor with the CCP in the following months.
Delegations in the CPPCC
The formal planning process of the first CPPCC began with a draft by Zhou 
Enlai titled “Various Questions Concerning the Convening of a New Political 
Consultative Conference” (Guanyu zhaokai xin de zhengzhi xieshang huiyi zhu 
wenti 關於召開新的政治協商會議諸問題). Unfortunately, all official CCP 
source collections omitted Zhou’s draft. Most other documents drafted and 
revised during the preparations for the consultative conference are also kept under 
lock and key.60 Thus, changes in the available invitation lists can give important 
insights into power struggles between the DPGs and the CCP as well as between 
the DPGs that competed for influence in the new regime.
A list attached to the CCP leadership’s draft from October 1948 mentioned 
39 entities: 9 DPGs, 6 factions representing local interests, 6 factions represent-
ing the military as well as representatives from 17 civic associations.61 Already 
one week later, the number of DPGs had shrunken to seven, excluding the 
Zhigong Party and the Democratic National Construction Association.62 The 
final “Agreement on Questions Concerning the Convening of a New Political 
Consultative Conference,” published on November 25, 1948, listed 23 entities 
that were to dispatch up to 4 delegates (see Table 9.1).
In considering the list’s symbolic importance, let us turn first to its composi-
tion. On closer inspection, an apparent division between the table’s upper and 
lower part reflects two different conceptions of representation (and thereby of 
legitimacy). Even though the participants were never elected by a public vote or 
in a transparent intraparty process, the CPPCC stressed the “representativeness” 
(daibiaoxing 代表性) of this assembly. The upper part catered to Republican-
era conceptions of a representation of competing political forces, such as in the 
Anglo-American system. The lower section, with its delegations of women, eth-
nic minorities, and students, illustrates the CCP’s corporatist approach to repre-
sentation resting on the assumption that women best represent women, members 
of ethnic groups best represent ethnic minorities, and so forth. After 1949, the 
DPGs were subjected to the same corporatist logic of representation when the 
CCP set clear guidelines for noncompetitive membership recruitment that was 
limited to specific constituencies. They assigned DPGs and other political organi-
zations the function of transmission belts communicating with and supervising 
predetermined social groups. Shielded from the public eye, the DPGs included in 
this list had already come under a varying degree of CCP influence by late 1948 
and were after 1949 transformed into corporatist structures.64
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Table 9.1  Groups of Participants of the CPPCC as Listed in the “Agreement on Questions 
Concerning the Convening of a New Political Consultative Conference”63
No. Name Chinese (Pinyin) English
1 中國共產黨 (Zhongguo gongchandang) Communist Party of China
2 中國國民黨革命委員會 (Zhongguo 
guomindang geming weiyuanhui)
Revolutionary Committee of the 
Chinese Guomindang
3 中國民主同盟 (Zhongguo minzhu 
tongmeng)
Chinese Democratic League
4 中國民主促進會 (Zhongguo minzhu 
cujinhui)
Chinese Association for Promoting 
Democracy
5 中國致公黨 (Zhongguo zhigongdang) Chinese Zhigong Party
6 中國農工民主黨 (Zhongguo nonggong 
minzhudang)
Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ 
Democratic Party
7 中國人民救國會 (Zhongguo renmin 
jiuguohui)
Chinese People’s Salvation Association
8 中國國民黨民主促進會 (Zhongguo 
guomindang minzhu cujinhui)
Chinese Guomindang Association for 
the Promotion of Democracy
9 三民主義同志聯合會 (Sanmin zhuyi 
tongzhi lianhehui)
Federation of Comrades of the Three 
Principles of the People
10 民主建國會 (Minzhu jianguohui) Democratic National Construction 
Association
11 無黨派民主人士 (Wu dangpai minzhu 
renshi)
Democrats without party affiliation
12 全國教授 (Quanguo jiaoshou) Professors
13 國內少數民族 (Guonei shaoshu minzu) National minorities
14 海外華僑民主人士 (Haiwai huaqiao 
minzhu renshi)
Chinese democrats living overseas
15 中華全國總工會 (Zhonghua quanguo 
zonggonghui)
All-China Workers’ Union
16 解放區農民團體 (Jiefangqu nongmin 
tuanti)
Peasants’ associations in the liberated 
areas
17 全國婦女聯合會籌備委員會 
(Quanguo funü lianhehui choubei 
weiyuanhui)
Preparatory Committee of the All-
China Women’s Federation
18 全國學生聯合會 (Quanguo xuesheng 
lianhehui)
All-China Federation of Student 
Unions
19 全國青年聯合會籌備委員會 
(Quanguo qingnian lianhehui 
choubei weiyuanhui)
Preparatory Committee of the All-
China Youth Federation 
20 上海人民團體聯合會 (Shanghai 
renmin tuanti lianhehui)
Federation of People’s Organizations in 
Shanghai
21 產業界民主人士 (Chanyejie minzhu 
renshi)
Democrats from industrial circles
22 文化界民主人士 (Wenhuajie minzhu 
renshi)
Democrats from cultural circles
23 中國人民解放軍 (Zhongguo renmin 
jiefangjun)
People’s Liberation Army
294 Henrike Rudolph 
Second, the order of the DPGs in the upper part of the list is of importance. 
Up until today, official documents maintain a particular order in listing the DPGs, 
reflecting a political hierarchy.65 When the preparatory committee officially met 
for the first time on June 19, 1949, the order of the participating parties and 
groups had changed again. For example, the Democratic National Construction 
Association had risen to the 4th position, while the Zhigong Party descended to 
the 11th position.66 In the sources, the underlying rules for setting this hierarchy 
are opaque. Yet, four factors were central: the ideological proximity of the DPGs 
to the Communist Party, the public image of the parties’ most influential mem-
bers, the direct involvement in the consultation process in Lijiazhuang or Harbin, 
as well as the importance of the constituents that each DPG could mobilize for the 
national reconstruction.
Here again, the May First Call was of strategic significance in the construction 
of the consultative conference’s and thereby the CCP’s legitimacy. To deflect 
allegations that the CCP was not interested in a united government but would 
merely pick close allies and weak parties excluding all contesting forces, the CCP 
claimed that hierarchies apparent in the listings merely reflected how quickly the 
DPGs had responded to the call for holding a consultative conference in May 
1948.67 To attentive observers, however, not only the shifting order of DPGs in 
these lists but also the conspicuous absence of certain parties must have called this 
narrative into question.
The Chinese Association for the Promotion of Popular Education (Zhonghua 
pingmin jiaoyu cujinhui 中國平民教育促進會), the Chinese Peasants’ Party 
(Zhongguo nongmindang 中國農民黨), the Guangfu Association (Guangfuhui 
光復會), the Chinese Young Workers’ Party (Zhongguo shaonian laodongdang 
中國少年勞動黨), the Alliance for People’s Freedom and Democracy (Renmin 
minzhu ziyou lianmeng 人民民主自由聯盟), and other political parties and 
associations requested to participate in the CPPCC. Yet, the CCP claimed that 
members of those groups were mostly reactionaries, and thus their request was 
declined. Selected members willing to readjust their political views could none-
theless return to the “people’s camp” and “participate in the construction of a New 
China.”68
The Chinese Democratic Socialist Party (Zhongguo minzhu shehuidang 
中國民主社會黨) was a more complicated case. Under the leadership of Zhang 
Junmai 張君勱 (1987–1969), the Democratic Socialists had joined the “old” 
consultative conference of 1946, and Zhang continued to cooperate with the 
GMD in drafting a new constitution. This caused an intraparty rift because many 
members had become wary of the authoritarian rule of the GMD and, by 1947, 
founded the Reform Faction of the Democratic Socialist Party (Minshedang ge-
xinpai 民社黨革新派).69 Its leaders Sha Yankai 沙彥楷 (1875–1970) and Wang 
Shiming 汪世銘 (1896–1977) had responded to the May First Call on behalf of 
the Reform Faction.70 Therefore, according to a logic one might call “whoever is 
willing to join will be invited,” the Minshedang gexinpai should have participated 
in the CPPCC. In June 1949, the preparatory committee for the CPPCC decided 
that they would not reward seats to the party because their political stance was 
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unclear. Nonetheless, Sha and Wang were offered memberships in the Chinese 
Democratic League, and the Reform Faction of the Democratic Socialist Party 
disbanded.71 In a report to I. V. Stalin, the CCP’s Central Committee member Liu 
Shaoqi commented on the DPG’s structure:
In each democratic party and group there are several leaders who have some 
influence among the popular masses, thanks to their having engaged in 
political activity in China for a long time. Their party organizations are held 
together only in these leaders. There are three categories of people in each 
party and group: rightists, leftists, and centrists.72
Thus, as long as one could integrate the most prominent leftist or centrist leaders 
into the CPPCC, the DPGs as organizational structures were no longer important. 
The Jiusan Study Society (Jiusan xueshe 九三學社), on the other hand, never 
counted more than a hundred members before 1949 and was nonetheless included 
in the CPPCC, representing university teachers and scientists. Its name was only 
added to the list of participating groups in June 1949,73 which exemplifies how 
the CPPCC embraced tiny organizations like the Jiusan or the Taiwan Democratic 
Self-Government League (Taiwan minzhu zizhi tongmeng 台灣民主自治同盟). 
They expanded only after the founding of the PRC into organizational strongholds 
that served to reach certain parts of the Chinese elites.
In short, the publication of the different lists demonstrated the broadness and 
strength of the new united front. They proved that the first CPPCC concluded a 
process that had effectively separated the democratic forces of the Republican 
period into two camps, leading to the successful exclusion, weakening, or even 
disbanding of political associations. It elevated some groups to a level of national 
importance not founded on popular support but rather on corporatist functions that 
these parties had to fulfill within the united front framework.
The preparatory committee of the consultative conference
After the takeover of Beijing in January 1949, the United Front Work Department 
could finally relocate to the new capital. They selected the Beijing Hotel (Beijing 
fandian 北京飯店) and the Liuguo Hotel (Liuguo fandian 六國飯店), two of the 
most luxurious hotels in the city, for a liaison office. The office’s task was to make 
life as pleasant as possible for those political figures who had participated in the 
initial consultations in Lijiazhuang, Harbin, and other parts of the country and 
who now gathered in Beijing. The head of the United Front Work Department, 
Li Weihan 李維漢 (1896–1984), regularly invited the DPG representatives to so-
called tea meetings (chahui 茶會) to the Liuguo Hotel. Additionally, Mao Zedong 
and Zhou Enlai personally met with the DPG leaders to discuss national and inter-
national questions.74 As we do not have detailed accounts of these meetings, it is 
unclear whether the participants were encouraged to express their opinions on the 
convening of the CPPCC or the reorganization of China’s cultural, social, and 
political institutions or if these meetings were merely study sessions intended to 
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teach them Mao’s doctrine of a “People’s Democratic Dictatorship.” Furthermore, 
from April to June, a group of nearly 60 prominent figures from the DPGs, over-
seas Chinese, cultural, and literary circles, as well as from different classes and 
minorities of Chinese society, went on a study tour to the Northeastern cities. Li 
Weihan and his colleagues ensured that the DPG leaders led a comfortable life in 
Beijing and that their children had access to a good education. They should feel 
that the CCP still valued their cooperation and be kept busy until the Preparatory 
Committee for the CPPCC first convened on June 11, 1949, at the residence of 
Mao Zedong in Xiangshan (Beijing).75
By July 1949, Mao Zedong proudly reported to Moscow that the convening of 
a preparatory committee had already been a success. It appeased the democratic 
forces while ensuring CCP control over all proceedings:
The democratic and unaffiliated public figures are quite satisfied with such a 
method of convening the PCC [Political Consultative Conference]. … It [the 
preparatory committee] has 134 members, of which 43 are Communists, 48 are 
progressive figures who will unquestionably support us, 43 centrists, but 12 of 
which are centrists with a rightist inclination. There are 15 among the progres-
sive figures who are clandestine Communists. Leadership in the Preparatory 
Committee is furnished by the Communist Party. A permanent presidium of 
21 people has been created in the Preparatory Committee. Leadership in this 
presidium has also been furnished by the Communist Party.76
Among those who Mao considered “clandestine Communists” might have been, 
for example, Zhang Bojun and Tan Pingshan. Zhang and Tan had joined the 
CCP in the early 1920s but left the party after the Nanchang Uprising in 1927.77 
They were officially known as leaders of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ 
Democratic Party, but rumors of Zhang’s concealed CCP membership or at least 
close cooperation with CCP cadres were rampant in 1947.78 By the late 1940s, the 
fact that the CCP was covertly recruiting leaders of the DPGs or even installing 
CCP members in strategic positions was an open secret.79
Despite the CCP’s growing control over the DPG structures and even though 
they had only invited handpicked individuals to enter the preparatory committee, 
Mao nonetheless feared that the GMD might infiltrate the DPGs or even convene 
a rivaling consultative conference under GMD auspices.80 On the surface, how-
ever, an atmosphere of confidence and friendship was to be maintained. In the 
opening speech of the first meeting of the preparatory committee, Mao Zedong 
reiterated that, apart from the “enemies of the people” (imperialists, feudalists, 
bureaucratic capitalists, and reactionary GMD), “we are all friends, we are all one 
large and strong revolutionary united front.”81 In his speech, Mao even refrained 
from using the rhetoric of CCP leadership over all other parties and groups.
The preparatory committee proceeded to form six workgroups, each being in 
charge of a specific task: group 1 determined the list of associations and groups 
to participate in the CPPCC and their delegates (headed by Li Weihan), group 
2 drafted the statutes for the CPPCC (head: Tan Pingshan), group 3 outlined 
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the “Common Program” as a provisional government program of the PRC 
(head: Zhou Enlai), group 4 prepared the organic law of the Central People’s 
Government (head: Dong Biwu), group 5 wrote the official declaration of the 
first CPPCC (head: Guo Moruo 郭沫若, 1892–1978), and group 6 was to reach 
a decision concerning the national flag, the national emblem, and the national 
anthem (head: Ma Xulun 馬敘倫, 1885–1970). Thus, official (not clandestine) 
CCP party members headed the workgroups and relegated DPG leaders like 
Huang Yanpei 黃炎培 (1878–1965) or Xu Deheng 許德珩 (1890–1990) to vice-
head positions.82 The staged organizing of six groups and public haggling over 
the composition of the CPPCC were part of the CPP’s attempt to at least formally 
meet the criteria observers expected of “democratic” assemblies (as outlined 
above): a large number of delegates, some form of elective procedures with del-
egates dispatched by the parties, a real decision-making power, and a diversity of 
representatives that would reflect China’s social, regional, and ethnic diversity.
The discussion over the name of the new state exemplifies that even though 
the CCP allowed an exchange of views, no final decision could be reached against 
the CCP’s will. While the members of the Preparatory Committee Huang Yanpei 
and Zhang Zhirang 張志讓 (1893–1978) advocated for the name “People’s 
Democracy of China” (Zhonghua renmin minzhuguo 中華人民民主國), Zhang 
Xiruo (張奚若, 1889–1973) favored “People’s Republic of China” (Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo 中華人民共和國). The term “people’s republic” would 
already invoke the notion of democratic rule.83 The CCP’s resistance against the 
inclusion of the word minzhu 民主 in the state name was symptomatic of how 
they understood “New Democracy” to refer to a transitory period, rather than 
a long-term commitment. Gradually the term “democratic” also vanished, for 
example, from the name of the All-China Women’s Federation, which used the 
name All-China Democratic Women’s Federation (Zhonghua quanguo minzhu 
funü lianhehui 中華全國民主婦女聯合會) until 1957.84
In sum, from the perspective of the DPGs, the preparatory committee already 
cemented the pattern of participation without independent decision-making 
power that later characterized their work in the CPPCC. The committee and its 
workgroups concluded their work on September 20, one day before the People’s 
Liberation Army fired a salute outside the Huairen Hall in Beijing and thereby 
ceremoniously heralded the successful convening of the CPPCC. The People’s 
Daily, as the mouthpiece of the new government, reported extensively on the 
proceedings, interviewed the delegates and recorded their speeches, and featured 
pictures showing the members on stage behind microphones or as an attentive 
audience. Other photographs showed Beijing citizens parading the streets with 
banners welcoming the CPPCC.85 The Xinhua broadcasting service of Beijing 
additionally recorded and broadcasted the speeches for a larger audience.86
Conclusion
In the late 1940s, the CCP’s strategy of tying as many political forces as pos-
sible to the regime profited from gravitational forces that drove intellectuals and 
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political activists away from the GMD to the left. Many political activists were 
appalled by the GMD’s lack of respect for the rule of law, and GMD persecu-
tion forced some to seek refuge in the “liberated areas”, while others awaited 
the arrival of a new government in Hong Kong. Dissatisfaction with the GMD 
did not, however, turn directly into support of the Communists. The CCP hence 
went to great lengths to make cooperation attractive. Having by 1948 or 1949 to 
choose between the tutelage of either one of the mass parties (GMD or CCP), 
many political activists chose the latter, because the CCP at least seemed to make 
an effort to consider different voices. The CCP rhetoric of “New Democracy” and 
the temporary deemphasizing of class struggle helped to meet those who were 
skeptical of Communist ideology halfway.
Once political figures had arrived in the CCP-ruled territories, the CCP suc-
cessfully shielded them from GMD influence. It drove a wedge between the 
democratic movement and made DPG leaders and their families financially and 
politically dependent on the new regime. Simultaneously, just as it severed ties 
to “reactionary forces,” the preparatory committee forged new relationships 
between members of different DPGs and nonaligned political figures by bringing 
them together in regular meetings bridging previous party boundaries. Behind the 
scenes, the months of preparation and “rehearsal” of the first CPPCC thus bore 
fruit in eliminating or isolating any influential voices in the public discourse that 
could have challenged the narrative of a peaceful assumption of power of the 
CCP. On the public stage, by convening the CCPCC as a revival of a Republican-
era institution, the CCP upheld the promises for a legal multi-party rule that the 
GMD had broken. To believe, however, that the DPGs were blindly following a 
trace of honey only to fall into the CCP’s totalitarian trap is unfounded. The media 
coverage of the time gave voice to both ardent supporters of the Communist revo-
lution as well as well-informed calls of warning. For many of the later CPPCC 
delegates, their alliance with the Communists must have been a strategic decision 
to secure a political office.
To reach a conclusive answer as to how exactly the preparations and the CPPCC 
itself provided a foundation for a popular belief in legitimacy (Legitimitätsglaube), 
we should revisit Beetham’s three foundations of legitimacy. The gradual institu-
tionalization of consultative structures from discussion meetings to the prepara-
tory committee, and finally to the drafting of laws governing the first CPPCC 
created the “legal validity of the acquisition and exercise of power.” Second, the 
subordination of several DPGs to CCP leadership and the thereby implicit accept-
ance of Mao’s theory of “People’s Democratic Dictatorship” as well as the DPG 
leader’s appraisals of life in the “liberated areas” contributed to “the justifiability 
of the rules governing a power relationship in terms of the beliefs and values cur-
rent in the given society.” And third, the strategy reached its peak when the stag-
ing of the CPPCC itself provided “the evidence of consent.”87
Since 1949, the CCP yearly reconvenes the CPPCC as a televised proof of the 
government’s popular support and its system of rule. Thus, it turned the united 
front policies, once designed to win over the forces of the middle during the civil 
war, into a strategy to stabilize the postwar order and a mythopoeic prehistory 
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of the PRC. The legislative power of the CPPCC was gradually dismantled 
after 1949, and later generations were never again allowed to assume as many 
ministerial posts as the early DPG leaders. Nonetheless, even though the early 
CCP revolutionaries believed that the “New Democracy” phase and its institu-
tions would only be maintained for a decade or two, 70 years later, the CPPCC 
is still meticulously restaged (by now in the symbol-laden Hall of the People 
on Tian’anmen square). In contrast, the preparatory process preceding the first 
CPPCC was in danger of sinking into oblivion. The production of the movie “The 
Founding of a Republic” (Jianguo daye 建國大業), starring a dazzling cast of 
100 of China’s biggest film stars, brought the narrative back to a new generation 
of citizens in 2009. For Sebastian Veg, the film sheds light on some recent trends 
in PRC historiography:
This commercial conceit also carries with it an implied ideological message: 
history, thus invaded by the contemporary star system, is no longer the prov-
ince of the anonymous proletariat; turning away from Marxist methodology, 
the film portrays the founding of the PRC as a succession of intrigues and 
strategic moves by a well-defined set of great men (and a few women) led 
by Mao. The rural masses are to all intents and purposes swept off the stage 
of history.88
Gloria and M. E. Davies share Veg’s assessment that this film is symptomatic 
of a change in official PRC historiography.89 As I would argue, however, the 
movie signifies not only a turning away from the “collective protagonist.”90 The 
more conciliatory stance to non-CCP political figures, the depiction of the DPGs 
leader’s gradual rapprochement to the CCP, as well as the extensive coverage of 
the work of the preparatory committee of the CPPCC that concludes the film is 
re-invoking narratives of peaceful cooperation that the Cultural Revolution had 
erased from public memory. Overall, the public discourse spurred by the movie, 
the recent reemphasis on united front work by President Xi Jinping, and the 
remodeling of the old site of the United Front Work Department in Shijiazhuang 
into a red tourism spot all exemplify that the legitimizing power of the PRC’s 
foundation myth of consensual consultations and decision-making of 1948–1949 
has gained in relevancy in the past decade.91
Notes
1 The scene has been captured in numerous paintings and became a popular motif for 
propaganda posters, such as the famous painting by Dong Xiwen. See Yan Geng, Mao’s 
Images: Artists and China’s 1949 Transition (Wiesbaden: J.B. Metzler, 2018), 127–171.
2 Gerry Groot, Managing Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party, United Front 
Work, Corporatism, and Hegemony (New York: Routledge, 2004), 49–55.
3 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC): Its Role and Its Future,” in The EU-China Relationship – European 
Perspectives, ed. Kerry Brown (London: Imperial College Press, 2015), 51–62.
4 See, for example, Joseph Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1968); Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the 
300 Henrike Rudolph 
Nation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Joshua A. Fogel and Peter 
Zarrow, Imagining the People (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997); Thomas D. Curran, 
Educational Reform in Republican China (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2005); 
Robert Culp, Articulating Citizenship: Civic Education and Student Politics in South-
Eastern China, 1912–1940 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Peter 
Zarrow, After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885–
1924 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
5 Edmund S. K. Fung, “Recent Scholarship on the Minor Parties and Groups in 
Republican China,” Modern China 20, no. 4 (1994): 478–508.
6 Shakhar Rahav, “Predicated on the People: Legitimating Mass Politics and Parties in 
Early Republican China,” Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 6, 
no. 1 (2017): 262–295.
7 Joshua Hill, Voting as a Rite: A History of Elections in Modern China (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2019), 162.
8 Edmund S. K. Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy: Civil Opposition in Nationalist 
China, 1929–1949, Cambridge Modern China Series (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 88–96.
9 Tao Xingzhi 陶行知, “Guonan huiyi yu mingren huiyi” 國難會議與名人會議 [The 
National Emergency Conference and the Celebrity Conference], Shenbao 申報, 
January 28, 1932, 11.
10 Groot, Managing Transitions, 2.
11 Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy, 91.
12 Peng Juyuan 彭菊園, “Ping guomin canzhenghui” 評國民參政會 [Assessing the 
National Political Participatory Assembly], Minzhu 民主 1, no. 1 (1938): 20–21. 
For earlier attempts to establish advisory political bodies in the late Qing and early 
Republican period, see the chapter by Egas Moniz Bandeira in this volume.
13 Also called “Minutes of the GMD-CCP Talks” (Guo Gong huitan jiyao 國共會談紀要).
14 Like Edmund Fung, Gerry Groot translates the minzhu dangpai as “minor parties and 
groups” (MPGs). Groot, Managing Transitions, xiii; Fung, “Recent Scholarship on the 
Minor Parties and Groups in Republican China.” I have chosen the verbatim translation 
of “democratic parties and groups” (DPGs), not because I claim that they were democratic 
but because as symbols of a “new democracy” they are still relevant today. See also James 
D. Seymour, “China’s Satellite Parties Today,” Asian Survey 26, no. 9 (1986): 991.
15 Ruo Yu 若愚, “Cong jiantao Guo Gong huitan jiyao shuodao zhengzhi xieshang huiyi 
de qiantu” 從檢討國共會談紀要說到政治協商會議的前途 [Discussing the Future of 
the Consultative Conference in Light of the Minutes of the GMD-CCP Talks], Minzhu 
民主, no. 5 (1946): 1.
16 Lyman van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist 
History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), 189.
17 Groot, Managing Transitions, 18.
18 Georg Brunner, “Legitimacy Doctrines and Legitimation Procedures in East European 
Systems,” in Political Legitimation in Communist States, eds. Thomas Harold Rigby 
and Ferenc Fehér (Oxford: Macmillan: St. Antony’s College, 1982), 30–32.
19 Mao Zedong 毛澤東, “Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng” 論人民民主專政 [On the 
People’s Democratic Dictatorship], in Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng xuexi cankao 
cailiao 論人民民主專政學習參考材料, ed. Duzhe shudian 讀者書店 (Tianjin: Duzhe 
shudian, 1949), 7.
20 On the construction of legitimacy of leaders within the CCP, see Frederick C. Teiwes, 
Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China: From a Charismatic Mao to the Politics 
of Succession (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1984).
21 H. Gordon Skilling, “People’s Democracy, the Proletarian Dictatorship and the 
Czechoslovak Path to Socialism,” American Slavic and East European Review 10, no. 
2 (1951): 100–116; Benjamin Schwartz, “China and the Soviet Theory of People’s 
Democracy,” Problems of Communism 3, no. 5 (1954): 8–15.
 People’s Political Consultative Conference  301
22 Ruth Amende Rosa, “The Soviet Theory of ‘People’s Democracy,’ ” World Politics 1, 
no. 4 (1949): 495.
23 Liu Shaoqi, “Report from the Head of the Delegation of the CC of the Chinese 
Communist Party, ‘The Current State of the Chinese Revolution’,” trans. Gary 
Goldberg, July 4, 1949, RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 328, ll. 32–50, History and Public 
Policy Program Digital Archive, https :/ /di gital archi ve .wi lsonc enter .org/ docum ent /1 
34156 .
 24 Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1987), 213.
25 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 
12–13.
26 Johannes Gerschewski, “Legitimacy in Autocracies: Oxymoron or Essential Feature?” 
Perspectives on Politics 16, no. 3 (2018): 654.
27 Walter Sullivan, “China’s Communists Set Stage to Form Coalition Regime,” New 
York Times, June 20, 1949.
28 Christopher Flood, Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction (London: Routledge, 
2002), 44.
29 Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, “Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas 
Mikoyan and Mao Zedong,” trans. Sergey Radchenko, January 31, 1949, APRF: F. 39, 
Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 7–16, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, https :/ /di 
gital archi ve .wi lsonc enter .org/ docum ent /1 12436 .
 30 The CCP dropped the term shehui xianda 社會賢達 in 1949, because it was too closely 
associated with those intellectuals who had participated in the National Assembly 
(Guomin dahui 國民大會) under the GMD government. After some of these promi-
nent figures such as Wu Yunwu and Fu Sinian had followed the GMD to Taiwan, the 
CCP instead began to adopt the expression “democrats” (minzhu renshi 民主人士), or 
“patriotic democrats” (aiguo minzhu renshi 愛國民主人士) when referring to those 
anti-GMD intellectuals who did not belong to any political party. Shaanxi zhengjiaoxi 
bianxiezu 陝西師大政教系編寫組, Zhongguo Gongchandang lishi 中國共產黨歷史 
[History of the Chinese Communist Party] (Chang’an: Shaanxi shida zhengjiaoxi, 
1980), 237; Dong Biwu 董必武, Dong Biwu zhengzhi falü wenji 董必武政治法律文集 
[Collected Political and Legal Works of Dong Biwu] (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 1986), 
59.
31 Reprinted in: Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng zhongyang wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui 
中國民主同盟中央文史資料委員會, ed., Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng lishi wenxian 
1941–1949 中國民主同盟歷史文獻1941–1949 [Historical Documents of the Chinese 
Democratic League 1941–1949] (Beijing: Wenshi ziliao chubanshe, 1983), 419–421.
32 Doak Barnett, China on the Eve of the Communist Takeover (New York: Praeger, 
1963), 83.
33 See, for example, Ye Jiefu 葉介甫, “1949 nian xin zhengxie daibiao shi ruhe chan-
sheng de” 1949年新政協代表是如何產生的 [How the New Political Consultative 
Conference’s Delegates Were Nominated in 1949], Yanhuang chunqiu 炎黃春秋, no. 6 
(2019): 41.
34 Groot, Managing Transitions, 58.
35 Groot, 20.
36 Liu Yandong 劉延東, ed., Lishi cong zheli kaishi – Jinian Zhongguo 
Gongchandang lingdao de duodang hezuo wu shi zhou nian 歷史從這裡開始——
紀念中國共產黨領導的多黨合作五十週年 [This Is Where the History Begins – 
Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Parties’ Multi-Party 
Cooperation] (Beijing: Huawen chubanshe, 1999), 9.
37 Barnett, China on the Eve of the Communist Takeover, 83.
38 Li Ge 李格, “Yi jie zhengxie choubei wenti de ruogan kaocha” 
一屆政協籌備問題的若干考察 [Investigation into the Preparations for the Political 
302 Henrike Rudolph 
Consultative Conference], Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu 當代中國史研究 13, no. 4 
(2006): 71–76. Some Chinese sources explain the delay with a disruption of communica-
tion channels so that the DPG’s response only reached Mao Zedong three months later. 
However, that the CCP headquarters were during the summer of 1948 completely cut off 
from all communications seems less likely than a conscious decision to postpone. See, for 
example, Shu Yun 舒雲, “Zhengxie huiyi shang de quwen yishi” 政協會議上的趣聞軼事 
[Interesting Anecdotes from the Consultative Conference], in Jianguo milu 建國秘錄, 
eds. Cao Ying 曹英 and Yu Minhui 余敏輝 (Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, 1993), 154. 
39 Even though this political group still carried the name of the Guomindang, it had split 
from the Nationalists during the civil war and by the 1940s sided with the CCP.
40 Li Jishen 李濟深, “Yonghu Zhonggong baxiang tiaojian: Renmin minzhu geming bixu 
jinxing daodi” 擁護中共八項條件：人民民主革命必須進行到底 [In Support of the 
Eight Demands of the Communist Party – The People’s Democratic Revolution Has to 
Be Carried Through to the End], Gonglun 公論, no. 5 (1949): 21–22.
41 Mao Zedong, “Cable, Mao Zedong to Stalin,” trans. Sergey Radchenko, December 30, 
1948, APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 49–52, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
Archive, https :/ /di gital archi ve .wi lsonc enter .org/ docum ent /1 13789 .
 42 Li Peijin 李沛金, Wo de fuqin Li Jishen 我的父親李濟深 [My Father Li Jishen] 
(Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, 2007), 154.
43 Li Peijin, 162–64.
44 Dong Biwu, Dong Biwu zhengzhi falü wenji, 60.
45 Mao coined the slogan “carry the revolution through to the end” (jiang geming jinxing 
daodi 將革命進行到底) in December 1948 proclaiming that the CCP and its allies 
(including the DPGs) could not stop until they had smashed all traces of imperial 
exploitation, feudalism, or counterrevolutionary activities. Xinhuashe 新華社, Jiang 
geming jinxing daodi 將革命進行到底 (Beijing: Xinhua shuju, 1949), 5.
46 Sha Jiansun 沙建孫, ed., Zhongguo gongchandang tongshi 中國共產黨通史 
[Comprehensive History of the Chinese Communist Party], vol. 5 (Changsha: Hunan 
jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 690–692.
47 Li Jishen 李濟深, “Zhongguo guomindang geming weiyuanhui – Duiyu xin zhengxie 
de yijian” 中國國民黨革命委員會——對於新政協的意見 [The Revolutionary 
Committee of the Chinese Guomindang – Views on the New Consultative Conference], 
Ziyou 自由, no. 8 (1948): 20–21.
48 Shen Junru 沈鈞儒, “Wo duiyu shiju kanfa” 我對於時局看法 [My Views on the 
Current Political Situation], Shidai piping 時代批評 5, no. 104 (1948): 7.
49 Shen Junru 沈鈞儒 and Zhang Bojun 章伯鈞, “Shiju shengming” 時局聲明 [Statement 
on the Current Political Situation], Guangmingbao 光明報 2, no. 8 (1948): 2.
50 Sun Qimeng 孫起孟, “Ha’erbinshi jianyu canguanji” 哈爾濱市監獄參觀記 [Notes 
from a Visit to the Harbin Municipal Prison], Jinbu qingnian 進步青年, no. 1 (1949): 
26–27, 31.
51 Li Jishen, “Yonghu Zhonggong baxiang tiaojian: Renmin minzhu geming bixu 
jinxing daodi”; “Li Jishen Shen Junru Zhang Bojun deng fabiao shiju yijian” 
李濟深沈鈞儒章伯鈞等發表時局意見 [Li Jishen, Shen Junru, and Zhang Bojun 
Express Their Views on the Current Political Situation], Haitao 海濤, no. 5 (1949): 14.
52 “Li Jishen Shen Junru Zhang Bojun deng fabiao shiju yijian.”
53 Sun Qimeng 孫起孟, “Wo duiyu zhishi fenzi gaizao de jidian renshi” 
我對於知識分子改造的幾點認識 [Some Remarks on My Understanding of 
Reforming the Intellectuals], Jinbu qingnian 進步青年, no. 2 (1949): 5–7.
54 Luo Jianbai 羅堅白, “Guoshedang ruci ‘zai fenlie’ ” 國社黨如此「再分裂」 [So 
the National Socialist Party Is Divided Again], in Zhongguo minzhu shehuidang 
中國民主社會黨, ed. Fang Qingqiu 方慶秋 (Beijing: Dang’an chubanshe, 1988), 506.
55 Yu Yuan 于遠, “Miluo jingu de xin zhengxie” 密鑼緊鼓地新政協 [The Beating of 
Gongs and Drums for the New Political Consultative Conference], Xin zhengzhijia 
新政治家 1, no. 4 (1948): 3–6.
 People’s Political Consultative Conference  303
56 One article mentions a rumor that the CCP first planned to hold the consultative 
conference in Hong Kong. It stated that it was only the British government’s deci-
sion to expel the Communist activists from Hong Kong as a retaliation against the 
Soviet Union’s Berlin Blockade that undermined this plan, yet this claim could 
not be substantiated from other sources. Wei Liang 維梁, “Rushi wo wen de xin 
zhengxie ji daji xin zhengxie de fangce” 如是我聞的新政協及打擊新政協的方策 
[What I Heard of the New Consultative Conference and the Measures Taken against 
the New Consultative Conference], Shenghuo yu shidai 生活與時代 1, no. 6 
(1948): 9.
57 Mao Zedong 毛澤東, “Mao Zedong guanyu zhaokai xin zhengxie fu ge minzhu dang-
pai dian” 毛澤東關於召開新政協復各民主黨派電 [Telegram by Mao Zedong to the 
Minor Political Parties and Groups on Convening a New Consultative Conference], 
in Zhonggong zhongyangwenjian xuanji 中共中央文件選集, ed. Zhongyang 
dang’anguan 中央檔案館, 17 (1948) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chu-
banshe, 1992), 273–74.
58 Ye Jiefu, “1949 nian xin zhengxie daibiao shi ruhe chansheng de.”
59 Tong Xiaopeng 童小鵬, Yu Gang 于剛, and Yin Hua 尹華, “Guanyu 
choubei he zhaokai Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi de huiyi” 
關於籌備和召開中國人民政治協商會議的回憶 [Recollection of the Preparations 
and Convening of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference], in Yinglai 
shuguang de shenghui - Xin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi qin liji 迎來曙光的盛會——
新政治協商會議親歷記, ed. Shi Guangshu 石光樹 (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chu-
banshe, 1987), 6.
60 This draft is mentioned, for example, in Sun Xiaohua 孫曉華 and Sun Shizhong 
宋士忠, eds., Fengyu tongzhou gandanqing 風雨同舟肝膽情 [A Heroic Spirit through 
Thick and Thin] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1995), 34.
61 According to Qin Lihai it included ten DPGs. Qin Lihai 秦立海, “1949 nian xin 
zhengxie choubei jishi” 1949年新政協籌備紀事 [Record of the Preparatory Work 
for the New Consultative Conference of 1949], Wenshi jinghua 文史精華, no. 183 
(2000): 4.
62 Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Guomindang (12 representatives), Chinese 
Democratic League (15), Chinese Association for Promoting Democracy (3), Chinese 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Democratic Party (6), National Salvation Association (7), 
Chinese Guomindang Association for the Promotion of Democracy (1), and the 
Federation of Comrades of the Three Principles of the People (8). “Ba ge minzhu dang-
pai de paixu shi ruhe queding de” 八個民主黨派的排序是如何確定的 [How the 
Sorting Order of the Eight Democratic Parties and Groups Was Determined], Renmin 
zhengxie wang 人民政協網, February 2, 2016, http: / /www .rmzx b .com .cn /c /2016 -02 -1 
5 /697 897 .s html; Qin Lihai, “1949 nian xin zhengxie choubei jishi,” 4.
63 Yang Jianxin 楊建新 and Shi Guangshu 石光樹, eds., “Guanyu zhaokai xin de zhengzhi 
xieshang huiyi wenti de xieyi” 關於召開新的政治協商會議問題的協議 [Agreement 
on Questions Concerning the Convening of a New Consultative Conference], in 
Wuxing hongqi cong zheli shengqi – Zhongguo remin zhengzhi xieshanghui dansheng 
五星紅旗從這裡升起——中國人民政治協商會議誕生 (Beijing: Wenshi ziliao chu-
banshe, 1984), 212–214; Fung, “Recent Scholarship on the Minor Parties and Groups 
in Republican China,” 482–483.
64 Groot, Managing Transitions, 20–27.
65 Zhang Xin 張昕, “Ba ge minzhu dangpai paixu de youlai” 八個民主黨派排序的由來 
[The Origins of the Sorting Order of the Eight Democratic Parties and Groups], Shidai 
youkan 時代郵刊, no. 7 (2019): 24–25.
66 Yang Jianxin 楊建新 and Shi Guangshu 石光樹, eds., “Guanyu can-
jia xin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi de danwei ji qi daibiao ming’e de guiding” 
關於參加新政治協商會議的單位及其代表名額的規定 [On the Regulations 
Concerning the Groups and Their Quota of Representatives to the Preparatory 
304 Henrike Rudolph 
Committee of the New Consultative Conference], in Wuxing hongqi cong zheli 
shengqi – Zhongguo remin zhengzhi xieshanghui dansheng 五星紅旗從這裡升起—
—中國人民政治協商會議誕生 (Beijing: Wenshi ziliao chubanshe, 1984), 282–284.
67 Qin Lihai, “1949 nian xin zhengxie choubei jishi,” 6.
68 Ye Jiefu, “1949 nian xin zhengxie daibiao shi ruhe chansheng de,” 45.
69 Roger B. Jeans, Democracy and Socialism in Republican China: The Politics of Zhang 
Junmai (Carsun Chang), 1906–1941 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 305–
306.
70 Fang Qingqiu 方慶秋, Zhongguo minzhu shehuidang 中國民主社會黨 [Chinese 
Democratic Socialist Party] (Beijing: Dang’an chubanshe, 1988), 491–493.
71 Ye Jiefu, “1949 nian xin zhengxie daibiao shi ruhe chansheng de,” 44; Peter Ivanov, 
“The Miscellany of China’s Political Spectrum, 1945–1950,” in Roads Not Taken: 
The Struggle of Opposition Parties in Twentieth Century China, ed. Roger B. Jeans 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 171–188.
72 Liu Shaoqi, “Report from the Head of the Delegation of the CC of the Chinese 
Communist Party.”
73 Ye Jiefu, “1949 nian xin zhengxie daibiao shi ruhe chansheng de,” 44.
74 Duan Haiyan 段海燕, ed., Xianzhe buxiu: Lian Guan tongzhi jinian wenji 
賢者不朽：連貫同志紀念文集 [Virtuous Men Are Immortal: Commemorative 
Source Collection of Comrade Lian Guan] (Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 
1995), 226–228.
75 Duan Haiyan, 213–229; Qin Lihai, “1949 nian xin zhengxie choubei jishi,” 6.
76 Liu Shaoqi, “Report from the Head of the Delegation of the CC of the Chinese 
Communist Party.”
77 Qin Lihai 秦立海, “Jianguo qian de ‘zuopai’ Zhang Bojun” 建國前的「左派」章伯鈞 
[The “Leftist” Zhang Bojun before the Founding of the People’s Republic], Zhongshan 
fengyu 鍾山風雨, no. 3 (2010): 34–36.
78 Hua Sheng 華生, “Zhang Bojun mimi jiaru Zhonggong shuo” 章伯鈞秘密加入中共說 
[Talks of Zhang Bojun Secretly Joining the Chinese Communist Party], Gongpingbao 
公平報 1, no. 2 (1947): 13.
79 See, for example, “Zhonggong mimi fabu dixia douzheng gangling” 
中共秘密發布地下鬥爭綱領 [The Chinese Communist Party Is Secretly Issuing a 
Fighting Plan], Waijiaobu zhoukan 外交部週刊, no. 21 (1947): 1.
80 Liu Shaoqi, “Report from the Head of the Delegation of the CC of the Chinese 
Communist Party..
81 Mao Zedong 毛澤東, “Mao Zedong zai xin zhengxie huiyi choubeihui di yi ci quanti 
huiyi shang de jianghua” 毛澤東在新協商會第一次全體會議上的講話 [Mao 
Zedong’s Speech at the First Plenary Session of the Preparatory Committee for the New 
Consultative Conference], in Wuxing hongqi cong zheli qi – Zhongguo remin zheng-
zhi xieshanghui dansheng 五星紅旗從這裡起——中國人民政治協商會議誕生, eds. 
Yang Jianxin 楊建新 and Shi Guangshu 石光樹 (Beijing: Wenshi ziliao chubanshe, 
1984), 246–247.
82 Zhou Yiqing 周一青, Zhengxie zhishi yu shijian 政協知識與實踐 [Knowledge 
and Practice of the Consultative Conference] (Yuanjiang: Zhengxie Hunansheng 
Yuanjiangshi weiyuanhui, 1994), 123.
83 Shu Yun, “Zhengxie huiyi shang de quwen yishi,” 169.
84 Guo Guilan 郭桂蘭, Zhongguo funü gemingshi 中國婦女革命史 [History of the 
Women’s Revolution in China] (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1988), 440.
85 See especially the issues from September 23 to 29 of the People’s Daily (Renmin ribao 
人民日報).
86 “Beiping Xinhua guangbo diantai jinwan guangbo renmin zhengxie si wu liangtian 
zhuyao fayan luyin” 北平新華廣播電台今晚廣播人民政協四五兩天主要發言錄音 
[Beiping Broadcasting Station Broadcasts the Recordings of the Speeches Given on the 
 People’s Political Consultative Conference  305
Fourth and Fifth Day of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference], Renmin ribao 
人民日報, September 26, 1949.
87 Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 12–13.
88 Sebastian Veg, “Propaganda and Pastiche: Visions of Mao in Founding of a Republic, 
Beginning of the Great Revival, and Let the Bullets Fly,” China Perspectives, no. 2 
(2012): 45.
89 Gloria Davies and M. E. Davies, “Filmed Founding Myths: 建國大業,” China Heritage 
Quarterly, no. 20 (2009): 1–5.
90 Davies and Davies.
91 Ray Wang and Gerry Groot, “Who Represents? Xi Jinping’s Grand United Front Work, 
Legitimation, Participation and Consultative Democracy,” Journal of Contemporary 
China 27, no. 112 (2018): 569–583; “Shijiazhuang fabu 5 tiao hongse lüyou jingpin 
xianlu” 石家莊發布5條紅色旅遊精品線路 [Shijiazhuang Announces Five Premium 
Roads for Red Tourism], Xinhuawang 新華網, October 19, 2019, http: / /www .xinh 
uanet .com/ local /2019 -10 /1 7 /c _1 12511 8144. htm.
Bibliography
Barnett, Doak. China on the Eve of the Communist Takeover. New York: Praeger, 1963.
Beetham, David. The Legitimation of Power. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
“Beiping Xinhua guangbo diantai jinwan guangbo renmin zhengxie si wu liangtian 
zhuyao fayan luyin.” 北平新華廣播電台今晚廣播人民政協四五兩天主要發言錄音 
[Beiping Broadcasting Station Broadcasts the Recordings of the Speeches Given on the 
Fourth and Fifth Day of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference]. Renmin ribao 
人民日報, September 26, 1949.
Brunner, Georg. “Legitimacy Doctrines and Legitimation Procedures in East European 
Systems.” In Political Legitimation in Communist States, edited by Thomas Harold 
Rigby, and Ferenc Fehér, 27–44. Oxford: Macmillan: St. Antony’s College, 1982.
Cabestan, Jean-Pierre. “The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC): 
Its Role and Its Future.” In The EU-China Relationship - European Perspectives, edited 
by Kerry Brown, 51–62. London: Imperial College Press, 2015. https :/ /do i .org /10 .1 142 
/9 78178 32645 51 _00 05.
Culp, Robert. Articulating Citizenship: Civic Education and Student Politics in South-
Eastern China, 1912–1940. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.
Curran, Thomas D. Educational Reform in Republican China. Lewiston, NY: Edwin 
Mellen Press, 2005.
Davies, Gloria, and M. E. Davies. “Filmed Founding Myths: 建國大業.” China Heritage 
Quarterly 20 (2009): 1–5.
Dong, Biwu 董必武. Dong Biwu zhengzhi falü wenji 董必武政治法律文集 [Collected 
Political and Legal Works of Dong Biwu]. Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 1986.
Duan, Haiyan 段海燕, ed. Xianzhe buxiu: Lian Guan tongzhi jinian wenji 
賢者不朽：連貫同志紀念文集 [Virtuous Men Are Immortal: Commemorative 
Source Collection of Comrade Lian Guan]. Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 
1995.
Duara, Prasenjit. Rescuing History from the Nation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995.
Fang, Qingqiu 方慶秋. Zhongguo minzhu shehuidang 中國民主社會黨 [Chinese 
Democratic Socialist Party]. Beijing: Dang’an chubanshe, 1988.
Flood, Christopher. Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction. London: Routledge, 2002.
306 Henrike Rudolph 
Fogel, Joshua A., and Peter Zarrow. Imagining the People. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 
1997.
Fung, Edmund S. K. “Recent Scholarship on the Minor Parties and Groups in Republican 
China.” Modern China 20, no. 4 (1994): 478–508.
———. In Search of Chinese Democracy: Civil Opposition in Nationalist China, 1929–
1949. Cambridge Modern China Series. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Geng, Yan. Mao’s Images: Artists and China’s 1949 Transition. Wiesbaden: J. B. Metzler, 
2018.
Gerschewski, Johannes. “Legitimacy in Autocracies: Oxymoron or Essential Feature?” 
Perspectives on Politics 16, no. 3 (2018): 652–665.
Groot, Gerry. Managing Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party, United Front Work, 
Corporatism, and Hegemony. New York: Routledge, 2004.
Guo, Guilan 郭桂蘭. Zhongguo funü gemingshi 中國婦女革命史 [History of the Women’s 
Revolution in China]. Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1988.
Hill, Joshua. Voting as a Rite: A History of Elections in Modern China. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2019.
Hua, Sheng 華生. “Zhang Bojun mimi jiaru Zhonggong shuo” 章伯鈞秘密加入中共說 
[Talks of Zhang Bojun Secretly Joining the Chinese Communist Party]. Gongpingbao 
公平報 1, 2 (1947): 13.
Ivanov, Peter. “The Miscellany of China’s Political Spectrum, 1945–1950.” In Roads 
Not Taken: The Struggle of Opposition Parties in Twentieth Century China, edited by 
Roger B. Jeans, 171–188. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.
Jeans, Roger B. Democracy and Socialism in Republican China: The Politics of Zhang 
Junmai (Carsun Chang), 1906–1941. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.
Levenson, Joseph. Confucian China and Its Modern Fate. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1968.
Li, Ge 李格. “Yi jie zhengxie choubei wenti de ruogan kaocha” 一屆政協籌備問題的若 
干考察 [Investigation into the Preparations for the Political Consultative Conference]. 
Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu 當代中國史研究 13, no. 4 (2006): 71–76.
Li, Jishen 李濟深. “Zhongguo guomindang geming weiyuanhui - Duiyu xin zhengxie 
de yijian” 中國國民黨革命委員會——對於新政協的意見 [The Revolutionary 
Committee of the Chinese Guomindang - Views on the New Consultative Conference]. 
Ziyou 自由, no. 8 (1948): 20–21.
———. 李濟深. “Yonghu Zhonggong baxiang tiaojian: Renmin minzhu geming bixu 
jinxing daodi” 擁護中共八項條件：人民民主革命必須進行到底 [In Support of the 
Eight Demands of the Communist Party – The People’s Democratic Revolution Has to 
Be Carried Through to the End]. Gonglun 公論 5 (1949): 21–22.
“Li Jishen Shen Junru Zhang Bojun deng fabiao shiju yijian” 
李濟深沈鈞儒章伯鈞等發表時局意見 [Li Jishen, Shen Junru, and Zhang Bojun 
Express Their Views on the Current Political Situation]. Haitao 海濤 5 (1949): 14.
Li, Peijin 李沛金. Wo de fuqin Li Jishen 我的父親李濟深 [My Father Li Jishen]. Beijing: 
Tuanjie chubanshe, 2007.
Liu, Shaoqi. “Report from the Head of the Delegation of the CC of the Chinese 
Communist Party, ‘The Current State of the Chinese Revolution.’” Translated by 
Gary Goldberg. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 328, ll. 32–50. History and Public Policy 
Program Digital Archive, July 4, 1949. https :/ /di gital archi ve .wi lsonc enter .org/ docum 
ent /1 34156 
Liu, Yandong 劉延東, ed. Lishi cong zheli kaishi - Jinian Zhongguo Gongchandang 
lingdao de duodang hezuo wu shi zhou nian 歷史從這裡開始——紀念中國共產黨 
 People’s Political Consultative Conference  307
領導的多黨合作五十週年 [This Is Where the History Begins – Commemorating 
the 50th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Parties’ Multi-Party Cooperation]. 
Beijing: Huawen chubanshe, 1999.
Luo, Jianbai 羅堅白. “Guoshedang ruci ‘zai fenlie’ ” 國社黨如此「再分裂」 [So 
the National Socialist Party Is Divided Again]. In Zhongguo minzhu shehuidang 
中國民主社會黨 [Chinese Democratic Socialist Party], edited by Fang Qingqiu 
方慶秋, 499–508. Beijing: Dang’an chubanshe, 1988.
Mao, Zedong. “Cable, Mao Zedong to Stalin.” Translated by Sergey Radchenko. APRF: 
F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 49–52. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 
December 30, 1948. https :/ /di gital archi ve .wi lsonc enter .org/ docum ent /1 13789 
———. 毛澤東. “Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng” 論人民民主專政 [On the People’s 
Democratic Dictatorship]. In Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng xuexi cankao cailiao 
論人民民主專政學習參考材料 [Study Materials on the People's Democratic 
Dictatorship], edited by Duzhe shudian 讀者書店, 1–12. Tianjin: Duzhe shudian, 
1949.
———. “Mao Zedong zai xin zhengxie huiyi choubeihui di yi ci quanti huiyi shang de 
jianghua” 毛澤東在新協商會第一次全體會議上的講話 [Mao Zedong’s Speech 
at the First Plenary Session of the Preparatory Committee for the New Consultative 
Conference]. In Wuxing hongqi cong zheli qi – Zhongguo remin zhengzhi xieshanghui 
dansheng 五星紅旗從這裡起——中國人民政治協商會議誕生 [From Here the Red 
Five-Star Flag Rose – The Birth of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference], 
edited by Yang Jianxin 楊建新 and Shi Guangshu 石光樹, 246–247. Beijing: Wenshi 
ziliao chubanshe, 1984.
———. “Mao Zedong guanyu zhaokai xin zhengxie fu ge minzhu dangpai dian” 
毛澤東關於召開新政協復各民主黨派電 [Telegram by Mao Zedong to the Minor 
Political Parties and Groups on Convening a New Consultative Conference]. In 
Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji 中共中央文件選集 [Selected Documents 
of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party], edited by Zhongyang 
dang’anguan 中央檔案館, 273–274. 17 (1948). Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang 
dangxiao chubanshe, 1992.
Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich. “Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan 
and Mao Zedong.” Translated by Sergey Radchenko. APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 
7–16. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, January 31, 1949. https :/ /di 
gital archi ve .wi lsonc enter .org/ docum ent /1 12436 .
Peng, Juyuan 彭菊園. “Ping guomin canzhenghui” 評國民參政會 [Assessing the National 
Political Participatory Assembly]. Minzhu 民主 1, no. 1 (1938): 20–21.
Qin, Lihai 秦立海. “1949 nian xin zhengxie choubei jishi” 1949年新政協籌備紀事 
[Record of the Preparatory Work for the New Consultative Conference of 1949]. 
Wenshi jinghua 文史精華 183 (2000): 4–11.
———. “Jianguo qian de ‘zuopai’ Zhang Bojun” 建國前的「左派」章伯鈞 [The 
“Leftist” Zhang Bojun Before the Founding of the People’s Republic]. Zhongshan 
fengyu 鍾山風雨 3 (2010): 34–36.
Rahav, Shakhar. “Predicated on the People: Legitimating Mass Politics and Parties in Early 
Republican China.” Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 6, no. 1 
(2017): 262–295.
Renmin zhengxie wang 人民政協網. “Ba ge minzhu dangpai de paixu shi ruhe queding de” 
八個民主黨派的排序是如何確定的 [How the Sorting Order of the Eight Democratic 
Parties and Groups Was Determined], February 2, 2016. http: / /www .rmzx b .com .cn /c 
/2016 -02 -1 5 /69 7 897 .s html
308 Henrike Rudolph 
Rosa, Ruth Amende. “The Soviet Theory of ‘People’s Democracy’.” World Politics 1, no. 
4 (1949): 489–510.
Ruo, Yu 若愚. “Cong jiantao Guo Gong huitan jiyao shuodao zhengzhi xieshang huiyi 
de qiantu” 從檢討國共會談紀要說到政治協商會議的前途 [Discussing the Future of 
the Consultative Conference in Light of the Minutes of the GMD-CCP Talks]. Minzhu 
民主5 (1946): 1.
Schwartz, Benjamin. “China and the Soviet Theory of People’s Democracy.” Problems of 
Communism 3, no. 5 (1954): 8–15.
Seymour, James D. “China’s Satellite Parties Today.” Asian Survey 26, no. 9 (1986): 
991–1004.
Sha, Jiansun 沙建孫, ed. Zhongguo gongchandang tongshi 中國共產黨通史 
[Comprehensive History of the Chinese Communist Party]. Vol. 5. Changsha: Hunan 
jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000.
Shaanxi zhengjiaoxi bianxiezu 陝西師大政教系編寫組, ed. Zhongguo Gongchandang 
lishi 中國共產黨歷史 [History of the Chinese Communist Party]. Chang’an: Shaanxi 
shida zhengjiaoxi, 1980.
Shen, Junru 沈鈞儒. “Wo duiyu shiju kanfa” 我對於時局看法 [My Views on the Current 
Political Situation]. Shidai piping 時代批評 5, no. 104 (1948): 7.
Shen, Junru 沈鈞儒 and Zhang Bojun 章伯鈞. “Shiju shengming” 時局聲明 [Statement 
on the Current Political Situation]. Guangmingbao 光明報 2, no. 8 (1948): 2.
Shu, Yun 舒雲. “Zhengxie huiyi shang de quwen yishi” 政協會議上的趣聞軼事 
[Interesting Anecdotes from the Consultative Conference]. In Jianguo milu 建國秘錄, 
edited by Cao Ying 曹英 and Yu Minhui 余敏輝, 153–174. Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, 
1993.
Skilling, H. Gordon. “People’s Democracy, the Proletarian Dictatorship and the 
Czechoslovak Path to Socialism.” American Slavic and East European Review 10, no. 
2 (1951): 100–116.
Slyke, Lyman van. Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967.
Sullivan, Walter. “China’s Communists Set Stage to Form Coalition Regime.” New York 
Times, June 20, 1949.
Sun, Qimeng 孫起孟. “Ha’erbinshi jianyu canguanji” 哈爾濱市監獄參觀記 [Notes from 
a Visit to the Harbin Municipal Prison]. Jinbu qingnian 進步青年 1 (1949): 26–27, 31.
———. “Wo duiyu zhishi fenzi gaizao de jidian renshi” 我對於知識分子改造的幾點認識 
[Some Remarks on My Understanding of Reforming the Intellectuals]. Jinbu qingnian 
進步青年 2 (1949): 5–7.
Sun, Xiaohua 孫曉華 and Sun Shizhong 宋士忠, eds. Fengyu tongzhou gandanqing 
風雨同舟肝膽情 [A Heroic Spirit Through Thick and Thin]. Beijing: Zhonggong 
zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1995.
Tao, Xingzhi 陶行知. “Guonan huiyi yu mingren huiyi” 國難會議與名人會議 [The 
National Emergency Conference and the Celebrity Conference]. Shenbao 申報, 
January 28, 1932, 11.
Teiwes, Frederick C. Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China: From a Charismatic 
Mao to the Politics of Succession. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1984.
Tong, Xiaopeng 童小鵬, Yu Gang 于剛, and Yin Hua 尹華. “Guanyu 
choubei he zhaokai Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi de huiyi” 
關於籌備和召開中國人民政治協商會議的回憶 [Recollection of the Preparations 
and Convening of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference]. In Yinglai 
 People’s Political Consultative Conference  309
shuguang de shenghui - Xin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi qin liji 迎來曙光的盛會——
新政治協商會議親歷記 [Greeting a Dawning Great Gathering - Personal Memories 
of the New Consultative Conference], edited by Shi Guangshu 石光樹, 1–25. Beijing: 
Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1987.
Veg, Sebastian. “Propaganda and Pastiche: Visions of Mao in Founding of a Republic, 
Beginning of the Great Revival, and Let the Bullets Fly.” China Perspectives 2 (2012): 
41–53.
Wang, Ray, and Gerry Groot. “Who Represents? Xi Jinping’s Grand United Front Work, 
Legitimation, Participation and Consultative Democracy.” Journal of Contemporary 
China 27, no. 112 (2018): 569–583. https :/ /do i .org /10 .1 080 /1 06705 64 .20 18 .14 33573 . 
Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
Wei, Liang 維梁. “Rushi wo wen de xin zhengxie ji daji xin zhengxie de fangce” 
如是我聞的新政協及打擊新政協的方策 [What I Heard of the New Consultative 
Conference and the Measures Taken Against the New Consultative Conference]. 
Shenghuo yu shidai 生活與時代 1, no. 6 (1948): 9.
Xinhuashe 新華社. Jiang geming jinxing daodi 將革命進行到底 [Carry the Revolution 
through to the End]. Beijing: Xinhua shuju, 1949.
Xinhuawang 新華網. “Shijiazhuang fabu 5 tiao hongse lüyou jingpin xianlu” 
石家莊發布5條紅色旅遊精品線路 [Shijiazhuang Announces Five Premium Roads 
for Red Tourism], October 19, 2019. http: / /www .xinh uanet .com/ local /2019 -10 /1 7 /c _1 
12511 8144. htm.
Yang, Jianxin 楊建新 and Shi Guangshu 石光樹, eds. “Guanyu canjia xin 
zhengzhi xieshang huiyi de danwei ji qi daibiao ming’e de guiding” 
關於參加新政治協商會議的單位及其代表名額的規定 [On the Regulations 
Concerning the Groups and Their Quota of Representatives to the Preparatory 
Committee of the New Consultative Conference]. In Wuxing hongqi cong zheli 
shengqi – Zhongguo remin zhengzhi xieshanghui dansheng 五星紅旗從這裡升起—
—中國人民政治協商會議誕生 [From Here the Red Five-Star Flag Rose – The Birth 
of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference], 282–284. Beijing: Wenshi ziliao 
chubanshe, 1984.
———, eds. “Guanyu zhaokai xin de zhengzhi xieshang huiyi wenti de xieyi” 
關於召開新的政治協商會議問題的協議 [Agreement on Questions Concerning 
the Convening of a New Consultative Conference]. In Wuxing hongqi cong zheli 
shengqi – Zhongguo remin zhengzhi xieshanghui dansheng 五星紅旗從這裡升起—
—中國人民政治協商會議誕生 [From Here the Red Five-Star Flag Rose – The Birth 
of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference], 212–14. Beijing: Wenshi ziliao 
chubanshe, 1984.
Ye, Jiefu 葉介甫. “1949 nian xin zhengxie daibiao shi ruhe chansheng de” 
1949年新政協代表是如何產生的 [How the New Political Consultative Conference’s 
Delegates Were Nominated in 1949]. Yanhuang chunqiu 炎黃春秋 6 (2019): 41–45.
Yu, Yuan 于遠. “Miluo jingu de xin zhengxie” 密鑼緊鼓地新政協 [The Beating of Gongs 
and Drums for the New Political Consultative Conference]. Xin zhengzhijia 新政治家 
1, no. 4 (1948): 3–6.
Zarrow, Peter. After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885–
1924. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012.
Zhang Xin 張昕. “Ba ge minzhu dangpai paixu de youlai” 八個民主黨派排序的由來 
[The Origins of the Sorting Order of the Eight Democratic Parties and Groups]. Shidai 
youkan 時代郵刊 7 (2019): 24–25.
310 Henrike Rudolph 
“Zhonggong mimi fabu dixia douzheng gangling” 中共秘密發布地下鬥爭綱領 [The 
Chinese Communist Party Is Secretly Issuing a Fighting Plan]. Waijiaobu zhoukan 
外交部週刊 21 (1947): 1.
Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng zhongyang wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui 
中國民主同盟中央文史資料委員會, ed. Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng lishi wenxian 
1941–1949 中國民主同盟歷史文獻1941–1949 [Historical Documents of the Chinese 
Democratic League 1941–1949]. Beijing: Wenshi ziliao chubanshe, 1983.
Zhou, Yiqing 周一青. Zhengxie zhishi yu shijian 政協知識與實踐 [Knowledge 




Abdülhamit 221, 223, 225, 227–230, 239
Academy of Worthies 159, 161–162
Administrative Court (China) 178
Advisory Council (China) 164–165




Ahmet Vefik Efendi 226
Ahmet Vefik Paşa see Ahmet Vefik  
Efendi
Aksakov, Ivan Sergeevich 113, 125
Aksakov, Konstantin Sergeevich 106, 
111–113
Akulov, Ivan Alekseevich 263
Albanians 229
Alexander I 17, 120
Alexander II 18, 111–113, 121–123, 125
Alexander III 23, 113, 208
Ali Şükrü 234
All-China Students’ Federation 293
All China Women’s Federation 293, 297
All-China Workers’ Union 293
All-China Youth Federation 293
Alliance for People’s Freedom and 
Democracy (China) 294
Ambassadorial Chamber 16, 120
American Revolutionary War 
(1775–1783) 17
anarchists 25, 126–127, 188





Ankara 233–234, 237–238, 240
Anufriev, Nikolai Petrovich 128
Arabs 229, 232, 234, 242n23
Archangel Michael Russian People’s 
Union 117
Ardahan 228
Ariga Nagao 29, 42n102, 167
Armenians 207, 223, 228–230, 232–233, 
241n9, 242n18, 242n23, 245n81
Assembly Code 105
Assembly of Deputies 221, 223–227








Bagehot Model 56, 63–68
bakumatsu 5, 20, 63
Bakunin, Mikhail Aleksandrovich 
122–123
Balkans 123, 227, 235; First Balkan 
War 229
Bardizh, Kondrat 192, 194–195
Barnett, Doak 288
Basic Law (Turkey) 236, 238
Batum 228
Bavaria 153, 155
Beetham, David 286, 298
Begriffsgeschichte 14





Belgium 153, 221, 225, 246n101, 259
Beliaev, Il’ia Vasil’evich 112
Beliaev, Ivan Dmitrievich 106, 112
Index
312  Index
Belinskii, Vissarion Grigor’evich 121
Belokonskii, Ivan Petrovich 126
Berlin 155, 167, 228, 303n56
Bestuzhev-Riumin, Konstantin 
Nikolaevich 121
Bideyuan see Privy Council (Qing Empire)
Black Sea 17, 189, 204; see also Black Sea 
Cossacks
Block, Maurice 63
Bobrinskii, Aleksei Aleksandrovich 115
Bogd Khan 34–35
Bogdanovich, Iurii Nikolaevich 125





Brazil 150–151, 153–155, 172n5, 174n21
Bridgman, Elijah Coleman 19
British Empire see Great Britain
Brown, Peter B. 108
Buddhism 5, 17, 77–78, 85–90, 95, 98
Bulgaria 222, 228
Bulygin, Aleksandr Grigor’evich 23, 115
Buryats 17–18, 34
bushi 57–59; see also warrior class
Büyük Millet Meclisi see Great National 
Assembly
Cabinet (Japan) 66–67, 69n8, 77, 79, 
81–82, 84, 94–96, 154, 156–159
Cabinet (Qing Empire) 160–164, 177n80
Cabinet (Republic of China) 28, 166, 171
Cabinet (United Kingdom) 152
Cambridge School of intellectual 
history 14
Canzhengyuan see Political Participatory 
Council
Cao Rulin 164
Catherine II 17, 109, 114, 190, 
199, 211n40
Caucasus 26, 188–191, 201, 204, 207
CCP see Communist Party (China)
Central Executive Committee 
262–264, 269
Chamber of Deputies (France) 19–20
Chamber of Deputies (Ottoman Empire; 





Cheliapov, Nikolai Ivanovich 107
Chen Shantong 163
Cherepnin, Lev Vladimirovich 
107–108, 131n11
Chernomoria see Cossacks
Chiang Kai-shek 285, 287
Chicherin, Boris Nikolaevich 18,  
106, 124
Chile 165, 166
China 6–8, 20–22, 28–30, 32–34, 58–59, 
150–152, 160, 162–164, 167, 170–172, 
283–291, 293, 294–299
Chinese Association for Promoting 
Democracy 293, 303n62
Chinese Association for the Promotion of 
Popular Education 294
Chinese Democratic League 287–288, 
293, 295, 303n62
Chinese Democratic Socialist Party 
291, 294
Chinese Guomindang Association for the 
Promotion of Democracy 293,  
303n62
Chinese Peasants’ Party 294
Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference 7, 33, 282–299
Chinese Workers’ and Peasant’s 
Democratic Party 293, 296, 303n62
Chinese Young Workers’ Party 294
Chōshū 77, 95
Christianity 56, 76, 88, 105, 109–110, 113, 
115–116, 118, 128, 189, 201, 221–224, 





Clermont-Tonnerre, Stanislas de 153
Committee of Progress and Union see 
Committee of Union and Progress
Committee of Union and Progress 
228–230, 232–233, 235, 240, 245n80
Commodore Perry 82
communism 126, 267, 273, 285; War 
Communism 257, 261, 266
Communist Party (China) 33, 282–292, 
293, 294–299, 303n56
Communist Party (Japan) 54
Communist Party (Russia; Soviet Union) 
7, 8; see also Bolsheviks
Confucianism 5, 21, 57–59, 70n16, 77–78, 
83–90, 92–93, 95, 97, 99n9
Confucius 70n21, 71n32
Congress (USA) 19
Congress of Soviets 258–259, 261, 263, 
271, 273n9
Index 313
Conseil d’État 152–154, 157–160, 165, 
171, 173n14, 175–176n46; see also 
Council of State
Conseil de la Couronne see Crown 
Council
Consejo de Estado (Chile) 164, 165, 166
Conservative Impartial Party 82, 93
Conservative Senate 153
Constant, Benjamin 150, 153–154, 156, 
158, 162
Constantin the Great 105
constituent assembly 18, 33, 104, 107, 
115, 123–126, 128, 130; All-Russian 
Constituent Assembly 31–32, 34, 119, 
128; Constituent Assembly (China) 
29, 31, 167–168; National Constituent 
Assembly (France) 104
Constitution of the 1848 Republic 
(France) 153
Constitution of 1876 (Ottoman Empire) 
221–234, 239–240
Constitution of 1936 (Soviet Union) 7, 32, 
256–257, 259–270, 272
Constitution of 22 Frimaire, Year VIII 
153, 166
Constitutional Compact (China) 29, 
167–168
Constitutional Democratic Party 
24–25, 192
Constitutional Document (Japan) 62
Constitutional Reform Party 67
Consultation Council of State 165
Cortes 16
Cossacks 6, 17, 25, 34, 106, 188–190, 
192–206, 208–209; Black Sea Cossacks 
190, 196–201, 203, 206, 208–209, 
210n9; Cossack Hetmanate 17, 105; 
Don Cossacks 189, 193, 201, 208; 
Kuban Cossacks 6, 14, 34, 189–192, 
194–206, 208–209; Line Cossacks 190, 
196, 200, 206, 208–209; Zaporozhian 
Cossacks 6, 17, 34, 189, 191, 193, 
196–199, 201–202, 205, 208–209
Council of Elders (Japan) 59
Council of State (Ottoman Empire) see 
State Council (Ottoman Empire)
Council of State 6, 151, 153–154, 156, 
160, 167; Brazil 150–151, 153–154, 
172n5, 173n9, 174n21; England 
152; France 166, 175–176n55; Japan 
155–158; Portugal 154; Prussia 157; 
Republic of China 164, 165, 166, 170; 
Siam 173n14; Spain 151; see also 
Conseil d‘État; Consejo de Estado; 
Political Participatory Council; Privy 
Council; State Council (Ottoman 
Empire); State Council (Russia)
Court Gentlemen of Consultations 22
Court of the Imperial Clan 163







CUP see Committee of Union and 
Progress









Declaration of the Rights of the Man and 
of the Citizen 259
Democratic National Construction 
Association (China) 290, 292, 293, 294
Democratic parties and groups (China) 
284–292, 294–299, 300n14
Democratic Party (Japan) 54
Dicey, A.V. 68n3
Diet (Finland) 17–18, 40n69
Diet (Japan) 5, 20, 53, 66, 68n3, 69n8
Diterikhs, Mikhail Konstantinovich 
118, 129
Ditiatin, Ivan Ivanovich 106
Dolgorukov, Petr Vladimirovich 122
domain (Japan) 5, 57–59, 61–65, 67, 82
Dong Biwu 289, 297
Dong Xiwen 299n1
Double Tenth Agreement 284
DPGs see Democratic parties and 
groups (China)
Drahomanov, Mykhailo Petrovych 
123, 125
Duanfang 161
duma 13–18, 23, 31, 35, 106, 111, 
116, 119–120, 122–123, 130; Boyar 
Duma 15, 17–18, 105–106, 108, 111; 
municipal duma 17–18; Siberian 
Regional Duma 14; State Duma 1–2, 
4, 13–14, 17, 23–27, 26, 30, 114–117, 
119–120, 126–130, 188, 190, 192–194, 
314  Index
202, 204–207, 211n20, 264; Steppe 
Duma 18; zemskaia duma 15, 18, 106, 




Edict of Gülhane 221–222
Edirne 229
Edo 58, 60, 63, 154; see also Tokyo
Egypt 224
Eisendecher, Karl 157
Ekaterinodar 190–192, 196, 199, 
204–205, 208
Emancipation Reform of 1861 (Russia) 
121–122, 124, 209n4, 210n11
Emmanuel, Count of las Cases 176n55
Emperor (Brazil) 150, 154
Emperor (Japan) 57–59, 64, 75–79, 81–85, 
88, 90, 92–95, 97, 151–152, 154–156, 
158–160, 170–171
Emperor (Qing) 20, 28, 161–164, 166–167
Emperor (Russia) see Tsar
Empress (Russia) see Tsarina
England 66, 68n3, 150–152, 157, 259
English Civil War 16, 125
Enukidze, Avel‘ Safronovich 260
Ermolov, Aleksei Sergeevich 114
Estates General (France) 17, 107, 113, 124
Ezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich 263
Fadeev, Rostislav Andreevich 125, 127
False Dmitrii 109, 132n18
Fan Zhijie 163
The Federalist 63, 65
Federation of Comrades of the Three 
Principles of the People 293, 303n62
Federation of People’s Organizations in 
Shanghai 293
Fedor I 108, 110–111, 120
feudalism 5, 69n13, 75–76, 90, 93, 96–98, 
107, 285–287, 296, 302n45; see also 
hōken
Finland 18, 34, 40n69, 128
First Opium War 19
First World War 31, 232–233, 258; 
Armistice of Moudros 233
Flood, Christopher 286
France 17, 19–21, 41n93, 61, 68n3, 104, 
107, 113, 150, 153, 156–158, 160, 165–
167, 173n14, 175n46, 175n50, 175n55, 
180n126, 225, 233, 259, 274n24
Freedom and People’s Rights Movement 
64–65, 67, 71n36
French Revolution 17, 19, 113
Fu Dingyi 291
Fukuoka Takachika 62
Fukuzawa Yukichi 63, 65–67, 71n32, 92










Genrō-in 75–76, 79–82, 84–85
Georgia 207
Germany 7, 14, 35, 84, 111, 113, 151–153, 
155–158, 166, 175n50, 176n59, 221, 
223, 227, 243n26, 246n101, 259, 
263, 274n24
Gertsen, Aleksandr Ivanovich 122–123
Gessen, Vladimir Matveevich 23–24, 
31–32
Glinskii, Boris Borisovich 127
Gneist, Rudolf von 155, 157, 162




Golokhvastov, Pavel Dmitrievich 113, 125
Gonghe guwenyuan see Republican 
Advisory Council
Goodnow, Frank Johnson 30, 42n102,  
167, 170
Gosudarstvennaia duma see duma
Grand Council (Qing) 161
Grand Secretariat (Qing) 161
Grand Vizier 224, 227–228, 230
Great Britain 19, 63, 68n3, 150, 152, 155, 
175n46, 225–226, 263, 272, 274n24, 
303n56; see also United Kingdom
Great National Assembly 221, 233–240
Greeks 223, 229, 232–233




gunken 5, 57–58, 60, 63–67, 69n13
Guo Moruo 297
guohui 20, 28; see also National 
Assembly (China)
Guojia Guwenyuan see Advisory Council 
of State
Index 315
Guolaoyuan see State Council of Elders 
(China)
Guomin canzhenghui see National 
People’s Participatory Assembly
Guomin huiyi see People’s 
Convention (China)
Guomindang 29–30, 33, 36, 164, 165, 171, 
178n100, 283, 287–290, 293, 302n39, 
303n62
Guonanhui see National Emergency 
Conference (China)
Guoxunyuan see Consultation Council of 
State
Gurko, Vladimir Iosifovich 115
Gützlaff, Karl 20
Guwenyuan see Advisory Council (China)
Habsburg Empire 34; see also 
Austria-Hungary
Hamit see Abdülhamid II




Harbin 288, 290–291, 294–295
Hasan Fehmi (journalist) 229
Hasan Fehmi Paşa 226
Hawai’i 151, 153
Hayashi Senjūrō 83, 96
Hayrullah Efendi 225
Heisei Democracy 53–56
hetman 17, 105, 196, 201
Heyet-i Ayan see Senate (Ottoman  
Empire)
Heyet-i Mebusan see Assembly of 
Deputies (Ottoman Empire)
Hiranuma Kiichirō 176n68
HM see Assembly of Deputies (Ottoman 
Empire)
hōken 5, 57–58, 60–67, 69n13, 71n36
Hong Kong 288–291, 298, 303n56
House of Commons 19–20
House of Lords (Japan) 75; see also 
Genrō-in
House of Lords (United Kingdom) 28
House of Representatives (Japan) 53–54, 
59n8, 95
House of Representatives (USA) 19






huiyi 20; see also Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference; 
Constituent Assembly (China); People’s 
Convention (China); Political Assembly 
(China)
Hungary 16; see also Austria-Hungary
Iagoda, Genrikh Grigor’evich 260
Iakushev, Ivan Aleksandrovich 129
Iakushkin, Ivan Dmitrievich 120
Ignat’ev, Nikolai Pavlovich 113, 125
Imperial Household (Japan) 81, 90
Imperial Household Department (China) 163
Indian subcontinent 57
Inoue Kowashi 84, 155, 157–158
Iran 23, 228
Iraq 232
Islam 25, 207, 221–225, 228–230, 
233–234, 238, 242n14, 242n23, 244n58, 
245n87, 245n88, 248n132
İsmet Eker 239
Istanbul 224, 226–230, 232–234, 
238, 247n120
Itagaki Taisuke 75–76
Italy 7, 225, 229, 233, 260, 274n24
Itō Hirobumi 84, 150–151, 155–159, 
162, 166
Itō Miyoji 155
Iushkov, Serafim Vladimirovich 107
Ivan IV 15–16, 105–108, 110–112
Ivanenkov, Nikolai 199
Iwakura mission 63
Japan 3–6, 13, 20–23, 27–29, 53–59, 
62–64, 67, 68n1, 69n8, 69n9, 69n10, 
75–85, 88, 90–93, 95–98, 100n61,  
114–115, 129, 150–157, 159–167,  
170–171, 173n14, 175n46, 175n55, 
177n73, 177n80, 221, 259–260, 
263, 284




Jews 26, 223–224, 229, 241n7, 242n18
Jinbudang see Progressive Party (China)
jiu zhengxie see “Old” Consultative 
Conference (China)
Jiusan Study Society 295
Jixianyuan see Academy of Worthies
Jiyū minken undō see Freedom and 
People’s Rights Movement
July Monarchy (France) 153, 156
Junjichu see Grand Council (Qing)
316  Index
Kaieda Nobuyoshi 156, 175n46






Karamzin, Nikolai Mikhailovich 18, 106, 
111, 119–120
Kars 228
Katkov, Mikhail Nikiforovich 125
Katō Hiroyuki 63, 82, 85
Kavelin, Konstantin Dmitrievich 113
Kazan 121
KD see Constitutional Democratic Party
Kharkov 201
Khmel’nyts’kyi, Bohdan 17
Khomiakov, Aleksei Stepanovich 106, 
111, 132n18
Khomiakov, Nikolai Alekseevich 115
khural 17, 20, 34–35, 38n47
Kido Takayoshi 63, 99n13
Kiev see Kyiv
King in Parliament 16
Kinri 57–60
Kireev, Aleksandr Alekseevich 113, 115
Kliuchevskii, Vasilii Osipovich 18, 
23, 106
Klochkov, Mikhail Vasil’evich 127
Kochevskii, Nikifor 192, 194–195
Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasil’evich 128–129




Korea 20, 41n92, 59, 176n70
Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich 128
Korolenko, Petr 198–199
Koselleck, Reinhart 14
Koshelev, Aleksandr Ivanovich 112
Kostomarov, Nikolai Ivanovich 106
Kotliarevskii, Sergei Andreevich 24
Kramarž, Karel 128
Kropotkin, Petr Alekseevich 25, 127
krug 208
Kryzhanovskii, Sergei Efimovich 23
Kubōsama 61
Kuei Hung-chen 20, 38n46
Kuga Katsunan 87–88
Kulaks 260, 262–264, 267–269, 271
Kulomzin, Anatolii Ivanovich 114
Kuomintang see Guomindang




Kyiv 34, 105, 189–190, 193, 208
Kyoto 58, 154
Labor Day Call 287–289
Land and Freedom 122–123
Latkin, Valerii Nikolaevich 106
Latvia 128
Lavrov, Petr Lavrovich 125
Legislative Commission 109, 114
Legislative Corps 153
Legislative Yuan 13–14, 20, 29, 33
Leipzig 112
Lenin, Vladimir Il’ich 7, 29, 126, 257–260, 
265, 272
Leningrad 271–272; see also Petrograd; 
Saint Petersburg
Li Chao 165, 166
Li Fuchun 291
Li Jiaju 23, 27–28, 162
Li Jishen 282, 288–289
Li Weihan 295–296
Li Yuanhong 170
Liang Qichao 165, 166, 168, 170
Liberal Democratic Party (Japan) 53–55
Liberal Party (Japan) 54, 75
Liberal Party (Ottoman Empire) 233
Liberal Union 229
Lifayuan see Legislative Yuan
Lijiazhuang 291, 294–295
Lithuania 33















Mahmut Şevket Paşa 229
Malinovskii, Ioannikii Alekseevich 127
Manchuria 96, 117, 170
Mao Dun 288
Mao Zedong 8, 282, 285–291, 295–296, 
298–299
Index 317
Mart’ianov, Petr Alekseevich 122–123
Marx, Karl 258, 265, 272
Marxism 8, 107, 260, 267, 285–286, 299; 
Marxism–Leninism 273n7
Matveev, Artamon Sergeevich 110
Mazurenko, Nikolai Nikolaevich 114
Mecklenburg 16
Meclis-i Mebusan see Chamber of 
Deputies (Ottoman Empire, Turkey)
Mehmet Reşat V 230, 232
Mehmet V see Mehmet Reşat V
Meiji 23, 60–63, 65, 67, 75–77, 82–83, 
86, 89, 91–92, 96–97, 99n9, 152, 155, 
171; Meiji Constitution 28, 78, 80, 83, 
95–96, 151, 155, 159, 173n14; Meiji 
Restoration 20, 154
Meiroku-sha 82, 86, 89, 91–92
Mencius 5, 70n16, 80, 82
Meng Sen 162
Mikhailov, Aleksandr Dmitrievich 125
Mikhailov, Nikolai 195–196, 198, 200, 
202, 204, 206
minpon-shugi 97
MM see Chamber of Deputies (Ottoman 
Empire; Turkey)
moderating power 150–151, 154–156, 
171, 174n24; see also neutral power; 
royal power
Molotov, Viacheslav Mikhailovich 
259–260
Mongol Empire 16–17, 37n16
Mongolia 27, 29, 34–35
Mongols 18, 29
Montenegro 23, 225
Montesquieu 5, 55, 60–63, 65, 68
Mori Arinori 64
Moscow 105, 116–117, 121, 126,  
269, 296
Moscow State Conference 117, 128




Murav’ev, Nikita Mikhailovich 120, 130
Muscovy, Grand Duchy of 15–16, 
108–109, 118
Muslims see Islam
Mustafa Kemal 234–235, 237–239
Nabuco, Joaquim 150–151, 173n9
Namık Kemal 223, 225, 242n14
Nanjing 287, 289
Napoléon Bonaparte 152–153, 155–157, 
166, 171, 174n21, 175–176n55
narodnoe predstavitel’stvo 18–19, 24, 
107, 132n25
National Assembly (Qing Empire) 27, 162
National Assembly (Republic of 
China) 20, 28–30, 166–168, 
170–171, 301n30
National Emergency Conference 
(China) 284
National Essence Movement 75–77, 79, 
83, 85, 96, 98n1
National Political Participatory 
Assembly 284
National Salvation Association (China) 
287, 293, 303n62
Neige see Cabinet (Qing); Grand 
Secretariat (Qing)
Neiwufu see Imperial Household 
Department (China)
Neo-Confucianism 86, 88
neutral power 152, 156, 158; see also 
moderating power; royal power
“New” Consultative Conference see 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference
“New Democracy” 8, 282, 283, 285, 287, 
297–299, 300n14
New Zealand 34
Nishi Amane 60–63, 86
Nishimura Shigeki 63, 65
nizamname 220, 225–227, 232, 235–237, 
239, 244n66, 246n109
Nogai Horde 16
Nol’de, Boris Emmanuilovich 23–24
North America 2, 78, 150
Norway 259
Novosil’tsev, Nikolai Nikolaevich  
17, 120
October Manifesto 23–24, 188, 192
Odessa 126
Ogarev, Nikolai Platonovich 122–123
Ogasawara archipelago 56
Ōkuma Shigenobu 67




Organic Law of the National Government 
(China) 33
Orlov-Davydov, Vladimir Petrovich 123
Ottoman Empire 1, 3–4, 6, 14, 17, 22, 123, 
190, 220–240







Parliament (England) 16–17, 19–20, 53, 
103, 119, 124






People’s Convention (China) 33
People’s Liberation Army 282, 293
People’s Party 235
People’s Will 124–125
Pepeliaev, Viktor Nikolaevich 129
Persia see Iran
Pestel’, Pavel Ivanovich 120, 130
Peter I 17, 114, 121–122, 127, 198, 266
Peterhof Conference 23
Petrograd 31, 34, 128; see also Leningrad; 
Saint Petersburg
Petrograd see Saint Petersburg
Petrograd Soviet 31
Petrunkevich, Ivan Il’ich 124
Pingzhengyuan see Administrative Court 
(China)
Piven’, Oleksandr (Aleksandr) 196–197, 
211n45
Platonov, Sergei Fedorovich 106
Pleve, Viacheslav Konstantinovich fon 126
Pokrovskii, Mikhail Nikolaevich 107
Poland 17, 33, 120, 122, 259, 274n24
Poland–Lithuania 16–17, 103, 105, 109, 
119–120
Poles 25, 120
Political Assembly (China) 29, 30, 167
Political Consultative Council 2, 4, 13–14, 
20, 27–28, 160, 162, 170
Political Participatory Council 152, 165, 
168, 169, 170–171, 180n128; see 




Porokhovshchikov, Petr Sergeevich 114
Portugal 16, 151, 154, 173n11
President (Republic of China) 28–29, 
32–33, 166–168, 170–171
President (United States) 56, 61
President of the Republic (Turkey) 239
Prishvin, Mikhail Mikhailovich  
261–262
Privy Council 6, 150–152, 154, 160, 
171–172; Bavaria 153; Hannover 153; 
Hawai’i 151; Japan 29, 77, 93–94, 
150–160, 163, 166, 171, 174n33, 
175n46, 176n68, 177n73; Manchuria 
170; Prussia 155; Qing Empire 152, 
159–164, 171, 177n73; Republic of 
China 29, 170–172, 180n33; Tonga 151; 
United Kingdom 152, 155, 157, 175n46; 
see also Council of State; Political 
Participatory Council
Progressive Party (China) 165
Provisional Constitution (China) 28, 
164, 178n99
Provisional Constitution of the Political 
Tutelage Period (China) 33
Prussia 24, 83–84, 94, 153, 155, 157, 
173n19, 224, 227, 246n101
Pykhtin, Sergei Petrovich 130
Qinding xianfa dagang see Outline of a 
Constitution by Imperial Decree
Qing Empire 1–6, 13–15, 19–23, 27–29, 
32–35, 151–152, 159–162, 164–167, 
170–171
Qingfu 162
rada 6, 16–17, 34–35, 189–191, 195–198, 
203–205, 208; Holovna Rus’ka Rada 
34; Kuban Cossack Rada 6, 14, 34, 
190–191, 195–209; Pereyaslav Rada 
17; Ukraїns’ka Natsіonal’na Rada 34; 
Ukraїns’ka Tsentral’na Rada 34–35, 
189–190
Ramiz Efendi 225
Reform Edict (1856) 221
Reform Faction of the Democratic 
Socialist Party (China) 294–295
Reichstag 243n26
Republican Advisory Council 167
Revolution of 1848–1849 (Habsburg 
Empire) 34
Revolution of 1905–1906/1907 (Russia) 
6, 23, 24, 31, 103, 117, 126, 188–191, 
193–195, 197, 207–209, 228, 256
Revolution of 1908 (Ottoman Empire) 
228–229
Revolution of 1917 (Russia) 31–32, 34, 
103, 107, 117, 127–128, 189, 200, 208, 
256–258, 268
Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese 
Guomindang 287–290, 293, 303n62
Rodzianko, Mikhail Vladimirovich 127
Roesler, Hermann 155, 157–158
Index 319
Rōjū see Council of Elders (Japan)
Romanov dynasty 104, 107, 109–110, 112, 
117–118, 127–128
Romanov, Aleksei Mikhailovich 111
Romanov, Fedor Nikitich 108, 110
Romanov, Konstantin Nikolaevich 113
Romanov, Mikhail Fedorovich 105, 
107–110, 118, 128
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 32, 87–88
royal power 153–154; see also moderating 
power; neutral power
Rozanov, Vasilii Vasil’evich 24–26
Rurik dynasty 110
Rus’ 15, 26, 115, 193
Russia 1–6, 13–18, 22–35, 103–130, 
188–194, 198, 207–208, 225, 227–228, 
256, 258, 264–268, 273
Russian Civil War 6, 103, 110, 117, 119, 
127–128, 130, 200, 265, 268
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party 
25–26, 126, 188; see also Bolsheviks
Russian Social-Ecological Union 130
Russo–Japanese War 22, 27, 114; Battle of 
Tsushima 115
Russo–Ottoman War (1877–1878) 
123, 225
Russo–Ottoman War (1877–1878) 
123, 225




Saint Petersburg 6, 114, 122, 126, 128, 
192, 194, 198, 206; see also Leningrad; 
Petrograd
Salonica 229
Samarin, Dmitrii Fedorovich 115
Samarin, Fedor Dmitrievich 115
Sangiin 54
Satsuma-Chōshū clique see Chōshū
Sava Paşa 225
SD see Russian Social Democratic 
Labor Party
Second World War 33, 159, 284, 286
Seitaisho see Constitutional Document 
(Japan)
sejm 16–17, 33, 119–120; Sejm (Poland–
Lithuania; Poland; Lithuania) 16–17, 33, 
103, 119
Senate (Japan) see Genrō-in; Sangiin
Senate (Ottoman Empire) 223–225, 228, 
230–232, 234, 240, 246n103
Senate (Poland–Lithuania) 16
Senate (Russia) 17, 127, 130
Senate (United States) 19, 61
Serbia 222
Serengüliyan, Vartkes 247n120





Shanghai 21, 170, 290; see also Federation 
of Shanghai People’s Organizations
Sharapov, Sergei Fedorovich 116, 
126–127
Sharia 221, 230, 246n102
Shchapov, Afansii Prokof’evich 106, 
121–123, 127, 130
Shcherbatov, Aleksandr Grigor’evich 
116–117
Shcherbina, Fedor 195–196, 198, 202–203, 
206, 208
Shen Dehong see Mao Dun
Shen Junru 282, 288–291





Shipov, Dmitrii Nikolaevich 126, 130
Shōgun 59, 61
shogunate 82
Shreider, Grigorii Il’ich 128
Shūgiin see House of Representatives 
(Japan)
Shuiskii, Vasilii Ivanovich 109–110, 120
Shumiyuan see Privy Council (Japan); 
Privy Council (Qing Empire)
Siam 173n14
Siberia 14, 122, 128–129
Sino-French War 21
Sino-Japanese War 22
Sivkov, Konstantin Vasil’evich 107
Skinner, Quentin 14, 104
Skrynnikov, Ruslan Grigor’evich 107–108




sobor 15–16, 103–111, 119–123, 130; 
zemskii sobor 6, 18, 23, 103–119, 
121–130, 131n11, 132n18
sobranie 16, 18, 124–125
Socialist Party (Japan) 54
Society of the Great Way 76, 83, 88, 96
Solov’ev, Sergei Mikhailovich 106
320  Index




sovet 15, 18, 32, 103, 106, 109–113, 
116–117, 119, 121–122, 195; see also 
soviet
soviet 3–32, 117, 256–259, 263–266, 
270–272, 273n9, 277n90; congress of 
soviets 258–259, 261, 263, 270–271, 
273n9, 277n90
Soviet Union 1–2, 7–8, 32–33, 35, 105, 
107–108, 256–273, 273n7, 276n60, 
284–286, 289, 303n56
Spain 151, 174n21, 263
Speranskii, Mikhail Mikhailovich 17–18, 
23, 119–120
Staatsrat 153, 155
Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovich 7, 256–271, 
273, 273n7, 273n9, 275n32, 295
Stalinism see Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovich
State Council (Ottoman Empire) 224–225, 
231, 234–235, 240
State Council (Russia) 24, 31, 115, 123, 
127, 130, 205
State Council of Elders (China) 170
State Khural 34–35
States General (the Netherlands) 16
Stein, Lorenz von 151, 155–157, 
167, 175n46
Stolypin, Petr Arkad’evich 117
Stuarts 150
Sultan 7, 221–226, 228–234, 236, 
238–240, 246n104
Sūmitsuin see Privy Council (Japan)
Sun Qimeng 290
Sun Yat-sen 14, 29, 32, 170, 290
Sun Zhongshan see Sun Yat-sen
Sunagawa case 68n1
Supreme Court (Japan) 53, 68n1
Supreme Privy Council 119
Supreme Soviet 7, 32, 256–257, 260–261, 
266, 271–272, 277n84
Şura-yi Devlet see State Council (Ottoman 
Empire)
Suvorin, Aleksei Sergeevich 114




Taiwan 13, 33, 99n13, 301n30
Taiwan Democratic Self-Government 
League 295
Takhtarev, Konstantin Mikhailovich 107
Takii Kazuhiro 155
Tan Pingshan 291, 296
Tang Empire 159, 161
Tani Tateki 79, 84–85, 99n9
Tanzimat 221–222, 228, 241n10
Tao Xingzhi 284
Tatars 16, 37n16, 108, 118, 193, 207, 269
Tatishchev, Vasilii Nikitich 119
temple salary 161





Tikhomirov, Lev Aleksandrovich 113, 116
Time of Troubles 104, 109–110, 117–118, 
120, 128, 130, 132n18
Tocqueville, Alexis de 65, 68n3
Tokugawa 5, 20, 57, 61–63, 70n16, 70n18, 
86, 89, 154




Tooke, Charles Wesley 166
Torio Koyata 5, 75–98
Transkubania see Kuban Cossacks
Treaty of Berlin 228
Treaty of San Stefano 227
Tribunal (France) 153
Tripolitania 229, 242n23
Tsar 14–18, 23, 103–125, 118, 127–130, 
188–190, 193–195, 198–199, 202–204, 
206, 208
Tsarina 190, 203
TsIK see Central Executive Committee
Tsuda Mamichi 61–63, 82, 85–86
Tsushima 56
Tsvetaev, Dmitrii Vladimirovich 117
Tunisia 222
Turkey 6–7, 10n19, 220–221, 235, 
238–240
Ueki Emori 67
Ukraine 34–35, 122, 189, 193, 196, 198, 
201, 205, 209
Ukrainians 26, 34–35, 123, 189–190, 193, 
196, 198, 208, 211n45, 213n88
Union of the Russian People 116
United Front 282, 285, 291, 295, 296, 
298–299
United Kingdom 19, 54, 152, 157; see also 
Great Britain
Index 321
United States 3, 19, 53, 55–56, 61–63, 66, 
69n10, 129, 166, 289
USA see United States
USSR see Soviet Union
Uvarov, Fedor 205
Valuev, Petr Aleksandrovich 123
veche 15, 18, 111–113, 121
Veg, Sebastian 299
Viazemskii, Pavel Petrovich 121–122
Viazigin, Andrei Sergeevich 114
Vienna 155–156, 167
Villiers, George 16
Vishniak, Mark Veniaminovich 32





Vladivostok 103, 110, 117, 127, 129
Vorontsov-Dashkov, Illarion 204, 207
Vyshinskii, Andrei Ianuar’evich 260, 
268–269
Wang Dengyi 165, 166
Wang Hongnian 160
Wang Kaiyun 180
Wang Renqiu see Wang Kaiyun
Wang Rongbao 160, 163–164
Wang Shiming 294–295
War of Independence (Turkey) 238
Warring States 21
warrior class 70n16, 80, 90; see also bushi
Weber, Max 1, 264, 286
Wei Yuan 19





















yuan 13–14, 20, 35; see also Legislative 
Yuan; Political Consultative Council; 
Political Participatory Council; yiyuan
Yuan Shikai 29–30, 152, 167, 170–172, 
178n100, 180n128, 180n133
yuefa huiyi see Constituent Assembly 
(China)
Yunus Nadi 239
Yusuf Ziyaeddin Al-Khalidi 226
Zagoskin, Nikolai Pavlovich 106
Zavoiko, Vasilii Stepanovich 128–129
zemskii sobor see sobor




Zhang Bojun 289–291, 296
Zhang Bolie 177n73
Zhang Junmai 294




Zheliabov, Andrei Ivanovich 125
Zheng Guanying 21–22
zhengzhi huiyi see Political Assembly 
(China)
Zhigong Party 287, 290, 293, 294
Zhivilo, Kirill 195
Zhou Enlai 289, 291–292, 295, 297
Zhu Xi 86
Zhu Yunshan 289
Zimin, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich 107
Ziya Bey 225
Ziya Gökalp 238
Zizhengyuan see Political Consultative 
Council
Zohrab, Krikor 247n120
Zongrenfu see Court of the Imperial  
Clan
Zongtongfu zizheng 171

